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Preface to the Series
The present volume is a component of a series that is intended 
to present a comprehensive survey of the history of East Central 
Europe.
The books in this series deal with peoples whose homelands 
lie between the Germans to the west, the Russians, Ukrainians 
and Belorussians to the east, the Baltic Sea to the north and the 
Mediterranean and Adriatic Seas to the south. They constitute a 
particular civilization, one that is at once an integral part of Europe, 
yet substantially different from the West. The area is characterized 
by a rich diversity of languages, religions and governments. The 
study of this complex area demands a multidisciplinary approach, 
and, accordingly, our contributors to the series represent several 
academic disciplines. They have been drawn from universities and 
other scholarly institutions in the United States and Western Europe, 
as well as East and East Central Europe.
The editor-in-chief is responsible for ensuring the 
comprehensiveness, cohesion, internal balance and scholarly 
quality of the series that he has launched. He cheerfully accepts 
these responsibilities and intends this work to be neither 
justification nor condemnation of the policies, attitudes and 
activities of any person involved. At the same time, because 
the contributors represent so many different disciplines, 
interpretations, and schools of thought, our policy in this, as 
in the past and future volumes, is to present their contributions 
without major modifications.
xi
The authors of this volume are distinguished scholars in the 
field to which the theme of this book belongs to.
Special thanks are due to the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 
the MOL Hungarian Oil and Gas Company, and the Közéletre 
Nevelésért Alapítvány [Training for Public Life Foundation] whose 
contribution to the production costs made this publication possible.
Budapest, March 15, 2011         Ignác Romsics
Editor-in-Chief
xii                                 Preface to the Series
IntroductIon
The Versailles peace process redrew the map of Europe after World 
War I, as new states emerged on the territories of the dismembered 
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. Hungary, one of the successor states 
to finally gain full independence, was in a difficult position. Its 
historical borders within the Monarchy had embraced large non-
Hungarian communities that obtained state-constituting rights 
under US President Wilson’s idea of national self-determination, 
which became the organizing principle for post-war state 
construction. The peace conference, however, presented the new 
Hungarian state with borders beyond which lay wide areas with 
ethnically nearly homogeneous or majority Hungarian populations 
that became annexed to neighboring states. Consequently, the new 
states of Austria, Czechoslovakia, a much-expanded Romania and 
the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (later Yugoslavia) 
began their existence with sizable Hungarian minorities. This book 
traces the history of these minority communities from 1918 until 
the 2000s – including native Hungarian-speakers whose ethnic 
self-identification might have classified them as Jewish, Roma 
(previously known as “Gypsy”) or Moldavian Catholic. Additionally, 
the volume includes accounts of Hungarian diasporas in Western 
Europe and overseas. The book is an edited and annotated translation 
of a work published in Hungarian in 2008 in conjunction with the 
Institute for Ethnic and National Minority Studies of the Hungarian 
Academy of Sciences.1 The most significant changes for the English 
edition include the addition of more extensive annotations and the 
omission, for reasons of space, of the photographs, source documents, 
dictionary of terms, bibliography and statistical materials found in 
the original. Structurally, individual accounts of each country for 
each period in the Hungarian edition have been grouped together 
into chapters covering particular countries in the English edition. 
The volume is written for all those with an interest in the history of 
Central Europe and some basic knowledge of it.
1
2 Minority Hungarian Communities in the 20th Century
In our effort to bring together the histories of Hungarian minorities 
outside Hungary in a comprehensive volume, we were mindful of 
the fact that these histories belong to multiple and contested national 
historiographies. Without questioning the relevance of country-
specific research on Hungarian minorities, we believe that a regional 
comparative perspective can offer invaluable insights into the 
situation of these minority communities. The evolution of Hungarian 
communities in seven states in the region (Austria, Slovakia, Ukraine, 
Romania, Slovenia, Croatia and Serbia, in total numbering almost 
2.5 million today) can be better understood if these separate histories 
are situated in the region’s varying political and socio-historical 
conditions. Hungarian minorities have been for the most part citizens 
of their current country of residence, but they have still considered 
themselves linguistically and culturally as part of a shared Hungarian 
ethnic and cultural community. The territories in which they live form 
buffer zones in neighboring state- and nation-building processes.
The scope of the volume is to explore the histories of these 
minorities through a comparative lens, incorporating perspectives 
from a broad range of Hungarian historians. Half the contributors 
to this volume were born outside Hungary, and a majority of those 
still live in neighboring countries.
The emphasis in the book is on tracing the influence of historical 
events on minority communities in the various regions, examining 
them in a comparative framework. The chapters covering six main 
periods are intended to explore the impact of international changes, 
sketching the situation in each country and developing each theme 
in a comparative manner. Socio-economic history features in these 
chapters as a background to political events. Several chapters discuss 
the impact of successive waves of land reform and collectivization on 
the opportunities available to members of the minority community – 
including minority elites, peasants, and also workers and employees 
living in majority regions (sometimes far from their place of 
origin). These studies demonstrate how the history of Hungarian 
minority communities has been intertwined, from the beginning 
until today, with international changes, domestic and foreign policy 
3Introduction
developments in neighboring countries and the relative status of 
these minorities themselves in the countries in which they live.
These minorities share three important characteristics: (1) Hun-
garian minority communities were created forcibly by post-war 
political and territorial changes as late as the early twentieth century, 
rather than by earlier and more gradual processes of demographic 
change or migration – as is the case with other ethnic minorities in 
Europe or around the world. Hungarians in neighboring countries 
became minorities in their native lands against their will, within 
states formed after 1918. They formed themselves into national 
minority communities over the course of the last nine decades under 
significantly different conditions, striving to maintain their regional 
positions and purposefully organizing themselves as minority 
communities. (2) The Hungarian minority communities that exist 
in the Carpathian Basin today live in ethnically diverse regions 
(representing differing degrees of ethnic concentration) and in varying 
institutional structures of opportunity. Consequently, each regional 
Hungarian minority community can also be seen as a distinct “society” 
organized into social groups of differing composition, structured 
according to specific historical, economic and cultural attributes.
(3) The history of relations between each Hungarian community 
and its neighboring nations is one of parallel nation-building. The 
minority groups severed in 1918 from the Hungarian nation-building 
process have continually been confronted with the nation-state 
efforts of majority nations in their “host states” – and have done so 
in a context of sometimes drastically shifting international power 
relations. Against this backdrop, ever since then, minority elites 
have framed their conceptions about the appropriate structures of 
minority social and communal life in terms of national cultural 
reproduction, striving to minimize the disadvantages of minority 
status and to increase the space available for community self-
organization.
In mainstream Hungarian interpretations of Hungarian minority 
history, three distinct narratives have emerged as dominant. One 
is the narrative of grievances, which focuses on experiences of 
loss – including lost property and rights, continuous demographic 
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decline and individual suffering. A complementary narrative, with 
various degrees of influence in different periods, concentrates 
on the absurdities of the means by which Hungarians ended up 
in minority status. This interpretation offers conspiracy theories 
about the illegitimate dismemberment of the state imposed on the 
Hungarian people by the 1920 Treaty of Trianon, which could be 
rectified only by a restoration of the pre-1918 status quo. During 
the interwar period and in the period of communist consolidation, 
a moderate segment of the Hungarian minority intelligentsia 
tried to sideline the narratives of grievances and injustice, and to 
introduce instead a more pragmatic approach, which addressed 
majority–minority inequalities, emphasized the notion of minority 
self-improvement, and called for political and public participation. 
In other words, this narrative advocated the need for minorities to 
make efforts to influence the course of their history. Dominant from 
the outset were the goals of self-organization, legal protection and 
mediation between national communities. This meant that hard-
won, specific results in daily life gained more importance than the 
grand narratives about national grievances and symbolic victories. 
The editors of this volume consider this pragmatic approach to 
be the most realistic one, enabling people to move beyond the 
interpretations focusing on past grievances. This narrative treats the 
minority condition as an ongoing process of permanent adaptation. 
From this perspective, demographic decline, emigration, scattering, 
loss of language and loss of rights become issues that can mobilize 
the minority to organize itself and keep itself on the alert, while 
bilingualism and multilingualism, together with the various ties and 
identities, become lines of defense against majority domination, as 
well as a routine for adaptation to circumstances.
Underlying all of these interpretations is the view that, under 
the constraints of being in a non-dominant political and economic 
situation, Hungarian minority communities have become focused 
on a shared set of goals: to preserve and strengthen their linguistic 
and cultural heritage, to maintain control over their churches and 
their educational and cultural institutions, and to seek continual 
unhindered cooperation with other parts of a larger Hungarian 
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national society. This self-assessment, along with the awareness 
that it is difficult to distinguish the minority from the majority 
when linguistic or cultural matters are not the issue, has driven the 
Hungarian minority intelligentsia to look beyond the problems of 
specific minority communities and to focus on the idea of a broader 
national community.
In the remainder of this introduction, we focus on three areas 
of issues that we think are important to explore if we want to gain a 
comparative understanding of the history of Hungarian minorities. 
First, we discuss the meanings of the names of regions inhabited 
by Hungarian minorities. Secondly, we place Hungarian minority 
communities into a typology of European minorities. Finally, we 
reflect upon the limitations of past research on this subject, which 
led us to the compilation of this volume.
A Framework of Key Spatial concepts
related to Hungarian Minorities
The names of the regions that are today inhabited by Hungarian 
minorities have undergone significant changes over the last ninety 
years. 
Beyond the southern border of Hungary, the Kingdom of the 
Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was formed in 1918 and took the name 
Yugoslavia in 1929. The Yugoslav federation began to show signs 
of breaking up in 1991, when referendums in Slovenia, Croatia 
and Macedonia indicated a high level of popular support for 
independence, leading to declaration of such and recognition of 
the same, and this culminated in 1992, when Bosnia-Herzegovina 
also gained recognition as an independent state. In the same year, 
Serbia and Montenegro (Crna Gora) formed the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia: this lasted until 2003, when it became the State Union 
of Serbia and Montenegro. The two parts of this confederation 
became separate states in 2006. Regarding the region inhabited 
by Hungarian minorities, the term Southern Region (Délvidék in 
Hungarian) in Hungarian usage denotes the territories of the former 
Hungarian kingdom (Croatia not included) that were annexed to the 
6 Minority Hungarian Communities in the 20th Century
Yugoslav state after 1918: Prekmurje, Bačka, the Baranja triangle 
and the Banat. The term Vojvodina (Vajdaság in Hungarian) was 
originally associated with partially successful efforts to obtain 
Serb autonomy for this region within the Hungarian kingdom. 
This (earlier) territorial entity, Serb Vojvodina, existed as an 
administrative unit in Hungary from 1849 to 1860. After 1945, the 
region known as Srem (Srijem, Szerémség) was added to Bačka, the 
Baranja triangle and the Banat, to form the ostensibly Autonomous 
Province of Vojvodina.
The term Transylvania (Erdély – originally meaning “beyond 
the forest” just as the Latin name does – in Hungarian, Ardeal 
or later Transilvania – meaning the same – in Romanian, and 
Siebenbürgen – “seven castles” as there are seven cities, which were 
once fortified, in the region – in German) is applied today to all 
the territories of “historical Hungary” annexed to Romania after 
World War I, but the names originated in the Middle Ages. The 
pre-1920 and post-1920 territories of Transylvania differ, however, 
and are distinguished in contemporary scholarly discourse (both in 
Hungary and elsewhere) as “historical Transylvania” and “present-
day Transylvania.” The former took shape in the early centuries 
of the Hungarian state as an administrative unit under royal rule, 
stretching from the mountains on the eastern side of the Great 
Hungarian Plain to the west on one side to the northern, eastern and 
southern lines of the Carpathian Mountains on the other, covering 
an area of some 52,000 square kilometers. It became customary in 
the twelfth century for the king to appoint a chief (vajda) to govern 
Transylvania, with strong military and administrative powers, 
expressed also in a separate system of public law. The county 
system applied elsewhere in the Hungarian kingdom did not cover 
the whole of Transylvania, which also contained autonomous areas 
for the Székely (occasionally known in English as Szekler) and 
Saxon peoples (or nations in the medieval sense). Hungary split 
into three parts in the aftermath of the Battle of Mohács in 1526: 
the central part, with Buda as its administrative center, came under 
Ottoman rule, the west and north of the kingdom came under the 
rule of the Habsburgs, as titular kings of Hungary, and “historical 
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Transylvania” gained limited independence as the Principality of 
Transylvania, which was a vassal state of the Ottoman Empire. 
The three feudal estates of Transylvania (Hungarians, Saxons and 
Székelys) sent representatives to diets convened by the prince as 
head of state, who also commanded the army, minted currency and 
maintained wide diplomatic connections.
The prince also ruled over a varying number of adjacent Hun-
garian territories, depending on the relative strengths of Transylva-
nia and the Habsburg dominions. These territories together were 
known as the Partium. The Principality of Transylvania annexed 
Máramaros, Bihar, Zaránd, Közép-Szolnok and Kraszna, Kővár-
vidék Counties under the 1571 Treaty of Speyer. The east of Arad 
County and Szörény County also joined the Partium later. In 1691, 
after the expulsion of the Turks, the Habsburg Emperor Leopold I 
assumed the title of prince of Transylvania. In 1768, the Empress 
Maria Theresa raised Transylvania to the rank of a grand principal-
ity within the Habsburg Empire, which was ruled in the monarch’s 
name by a governor (gubernator). Transylvania remained a formally 
independent state, with its own diet, government and legal system, 
although in practice it became an increasingly backward eastern 
province. During the 1848–1849 Hungarian War of Independence 
from the Habsburgs, Transylvania’s union with Hungary was de-
clared by the Transylvanian Parliament amidst widespread unrest on 
May 29, 1848, but this union could not be fully implemented until 
the Austro-Hungarian Compromise (Ausgleich) of 1867 – due to the 
crushing of the War of Independence when Habsburg military rule 
was imposed on Hungary. A major defeat suffered by the Habsburgs 
in the Austro-Prussian War accelerated  the Compromise. (Mean-
while, the Transylvanian Diet that was reconvened in Nagyszeben 
(today Sibiu) in 1863–1864 became the only one ever to declare the 
equality of Romanians, Hungarians and Saxons in Transylvania.)
The Austrian emperor, in his capacities as king of Hungary and 
grand prince of Transylvania, recognized in 1867 the act of union 
that had been adopted in 1848. This act reincorporated Transylvania 
into the Hungarian kingdom and reduced the term Transylvania to 
a regional geographical designation, as it had been in the Middle 
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Ages. The county system of governance was extended to Transylva-
nia in 1876, when the separate “seats” of the Székelys and the Saxons 
were abolished. The once independent principality was superseded 
by fifteen counties of Királyhágóntúl (the region beyond the Király-
hágó) (as these appeared in Hungarian public discourse). Less than 
half a century later, the 1920 Treaty of Trianon ceded 102,000 square 
kilometers of Hungary’s territory to Romania, the majority of which 
consisted of “historical Transylvania” and the Partium (62,000 
square kilometers). These territories (“historical Transylvania” and 
the Partium) were incorporated into “present-day Transylvania.” The 
remainder of “present-day Transylvania” (40,000 square kilometers) 
consists of areas of Hungary adjacent to “historical Transylvania” 
made up of larger or smaller parts of what had been the counties of 
Máramaros, Szatmár, Ugocsa, Bihar, Arad, Csanád, Krassó-Szörény, 
Temes and Torontál. The enlarged Romanian state that incorporated 
“present-day Transylvania” thus expanded its frontiers from the ridge 
of the Carpathian Mountains to embrace a set of “trans-Carpathian” 
territories that soon became known in Romanian simply as Ardeal or 
Transilvania. This territory was later split by the Second Vienna Award 
in August 1940 into Northern Transylvania (which was reannexed to 
Hungary), and Southern Transylvania (which remained in Romania). 
The previous status quo was restored after World War II.
The region known as Transcarpathia (Kárpátalja in Hungarian) 
took shape as a political entity only in the twentieth century, 
under names that varied over time and between languages. The 
geographical extent of the territory also changed several times. 
Before 1918, most of it belonged to the Hungarian counties of Ung, 
Bereg, Ugocsa and Máramaros. With the addition of Zemplén (in 
the nineteenth century), the territory became known as Északkeleti 
Felvidék (North-East Upper Hungary). From December 25, 1918, to 
September 10, 1919, it was known as the Ruszka-Krajna Autonomous 
Area, but the continuing warfare prevented the establishment of 
exact boundaries for this territory.
After the fall of the Hungarian Soviet Republic (March 21 to 
August 6, 1919), this area of 12,617 square kilometers took the name 
of Podkarpatská Rus and became part of Czechoslovakia under 
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the terms of the Treaty of Saint-Germain. The province became 
known unofficially among Hungarians as Ruszinszkó (by analogy 
with Szlovenszkó, which denoted the then-emerging Slovakia), but 
during the 1930s it became increasingly referred to as Subcarpathia, 
a term reflecting its geographical position as seen from Hungary. 
Although the geographical name of Subcarpathia had existed since 
the later part of the nineteenth century, it came to be employed 
in an administrative sense during the period of the Czechoslovak 
Republic. During the brief period of a federated Czecho-
Slovakia (October 1938–March 1939), the region was designated 
on November 22, 1938, as an autonomous territory of 11,094 
square kilometers, with the official name of Carpathian Ukraine 
(Karpats’ka Ukrai’na in Ukrainian, Kárpáti Ukrajna in Hungarian). 
This territory then became independent for a few hours on March 
15, 1939. Occupied by Hungary, and thereafter remaining under 
Hungarian control, the region became a Hungarian administrative 
entity as the Subcarpathian Governorship (Regents’kyj komisariat 
Pidkarpats’koi’ terytorii’ in Ukrainian, Kárpátaljai Kormányzóság 
in Hungarian), with an area that varied between 11,500 and 12,171 
square kilometers, due to territorial changes under the Second 
Vienna Award of 1940 and local-level administrative changes. 
The territory then came under Soviet control in October 1944 as 
Transcarpathian Ukraine, and became formally incorporated into 
the Soviet Union on January 22, 1946. On August 24, 1991, the 
region became the Transcarpathian oblast (county) of independent 
Ukraine, covering 12,800 square kilometers. The term Subcarpathia, 
banned in the Soviet period as reminiscent of Hungarian military 
rule and of Hungary’s aspirations towards territorial revision, 
became unofficially acceptable again in Hungarian public discourse 
towards the end of the 1980s. Today the region is commonly known 
among Hungarians as Kárpátalja (Subcarpathia), but the official 
name is Transcarpathia (Zakarpattia) in Ukrainian.2
The term Slovakia first appeared in political discourse after 
1918. After the trisection of medieval Hungary in 1526, mentioned 
earlier, the regions of the Habsburg-ruled kingdom further from 
Vienna (such as Szepes and Abaúj Counties) became known as 
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Upper Hungary and those closer to Vienna as Lower Hungary (such 
as Selmecbánya and Körmöcbánya Counties). The term Felvidék 
(Upper Hungary or Upland) began to be used in both a geographical 
and a historical sense, gradually replacing the sixteenth-century term 
Felföld (which was the mountainous counterpart of Alföld – the Plain, 
also known as the Great Hungarian Plain). In the nineteenth century, 
the term Felvidék covered not only the Tátra and Fátra Mountains, 
but also the hills of Zemplén, Bükk, Mátra, Cserhát and Börzsöny, 
which still belong to Hungary. The flat country of Csallóköz (Žitný 
ostrov), which is today commonly included in the Hungarian term 
Felvidék, was not included at the time. Under the Dual Monarchy of 
Austria-Hungary, Felvidék gained political meaning as the territory 
of the northern counties of Hungary either with a Slovak majority 
(Trencsén, Árva, Turóc, Liptó, Zólyom, Szepes and Sáros) or a sizable 
Slovak population (Pozsony, Nyitra, Hont, Bars, Nógrád, Gömör, 
Abaúj-Torna, Zemplén and Ung). The term projected the image of a 
region of Hungarian dominance and identity, as opposed to the term 
Slovensko (Szlovenszkó or Szlovákia in Hungarian), which Slovaks 
preferred as it suggested their own right to the area. A further change 
in the meaning of Felvidék ensued in Hungarian public discourse 
after 1920, as it became a politically slanted synonym for Slovakia 
as an administrative unit within Czechoslovakia. This interpretation 
of the term – according to which the name Felvidék covers the whole 
of Slovakia, with current state borders as its boundaries, rather than 
the geographical area of the original concept – survives to this day 
in Hungarian discourse, and is often employed in ways that Slovaks 
regard as manifestations of revanchist or Hungarianizing ambitions. 
Due to the ambiguities associated with the term Felvidék, the term 
southern Slovakia (Dél-Szlovákia) has become more commonly used 
in both Hungarian and Slovak references to the strip of Hungarian-
inhabited territory along the country’s border with Hungary.3
The parts of three western Hungarian counties (Moson, 
Sopron and Vas) that were annexed in 1918 to (almost 4,000 square 
kilometers) gained the name Burgenland, from the German word 
“Burg” found in the German name of those three county names 
(Wieselburg, Ödenburg and Eisenburg).
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the Hungarians among Europe’s Minorities
In an article published in 2003, Alesina et al. summarize the cultural 
(ethnic, linguistic and/or religious) divisions of the early 1990s in 
the countries of the world in the following table:4












no. of countries    190   28   27 19   34  38   44
Percentage of all 
countries    100   15   14 10   18  20   23
number of groups 1,054 132 175 83 146 183 335
Percentage of all 
groups -   13   16   8   14  17   32
Average percent-
age of majority      68   82   72 69   71  76   44
Average 
percentage of next 
largest group
     16     9   15 19   18  14   19
countries with an 
absolute majority 
nation
   144   25   25 16   27  34   14
countries with a 
majority nation of 
over 90%
     44   17     2   4     7  13     1
According to censuses taken around the turn of the millennium, 
the 39 countries of geographical Europe, including European Russia 
but discounting the mini-states, contain 329 national or ethnic 
groups with an aggregate population of 86,674,000, or 11.45 percent 
of the total population.5 The countries of Europe can be placed in 
four main groups in terms of national divisions, according to ethno-
demographic composition.6 A country can be classified as a nation 
state stricto sensu, which is to say a homogeneous nation state,  if 
its indigenous ethnic minorities account for less than 10 percent of 
the population and there are no sub-state areas where a minority is 
in a regional majority. Of the 15 European countries that meet these 
criteria today – Albania, Austria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, 
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Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Malta, Norway, 
Poland, Portugal, Slovenia and Sweden – only Ireland and Malta lack 
any sizable indigenous ethnic minority, but substantial bilingualism 
exists in both states, as well as a linguistic minority of Gaelic-
speakers and of English-speakers respectively. All other European 
countries that qualify as nation states stricto sensu according to the 
criteria listed above include indigenous minorities, such as the Sorbs 
in Germany, the Samis in Sweden and Finland, and so on. In some 
of the countries on the list, the size of indigenous minorities fell in 
the twentieth century as a result of forced resettlement (in the Czech 
Republic, Greece, Poland and Hungary). In the second half of the 
twentieth century, sizable immigrant minorities appeared in many 
of these countries: their proportions of the total population in 2008 
were 16.7 percent in Ireland, 15.3 percent in Austria, 13.9 percent 
in Sweden, 7.3 percent in Denmark, and 6.1 percent in Portugal.7
Finland, France, the Netherlands and Italy can be described 
as relatively or historically homogeneous nation states, as their 
indigenous minorities amount to less than 10 percent of the 
population. These states, however, cannot be classified together 
with the 15 countries listed above, as their minorities form a sub-
state majority in some districts or provinces. This applies to the 
following: the Swedes of Finland along the west and south coasts 
and in the Åland Islands, the Germans of Alsace and Lorraine in 
France, the Bretons, Catalans, Corsicans and Flemings of France, 
and the West Frisians of the Netherlands. Furthermore, the last two 
countries have sizable immigrant groups, amounting to 10.9 percent 
of the Netherlands’ population and 8.4 percent of France’s.
States whose minorities amount to 10–25 percent of the 
population can be grouped as what may be termed “nationalities 
states” – that is, countries with prominent minorities. The United 
Kingdom, Luxembourg, Romania, Slovakia, Lithuania, Bulgaria 
and Croatia fall under this category. The Scots, Welsh and Northern 
Irish of the United Kingdom have undergone a revival of their 
cultural and political traditions (and have a high degree of autonomy, 
as well as being in majority status within their own regions, which 
are formally recognized as constituent nations, although the official 
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nomenclature for them ranges from principality to province), while 
Luxembourg incorporates both a German and a French cultural 
heritage. Additionally, both of these countries include a high 
proportion of non-indigenous minorities (10.8 and 37.3 percent 
respectively). The other states listed in this group all contain one 
sizable minority – Hungarians in both Romania and Slovakia, 
Russians in Lithuania, Turks in Bulgaria and Serbs in Croatia – 
as well as several smaller ethnic groups. Among the countries in 
geographical Europe that are not likely to join the European Union 
in the near future, Russia, Belarus and Ukraine are distinct cases, 
with proportions of minority populations as high as 20 percent, 18.8 
percent and 17.3 percent respectively. A similar situation may be 
seen in Moldova, where the Russian minority enjoys a better-than-
average social position (in terms of urbanization, school achievement 
and employment structure), similar to the position of the Germans 
and Jews in the pre-war nation states of Central Europe.
The last group consists of countries in which the national majority 
represents less than 75 percent of the population, which may thus be 
termed “multinational states”: Switzerland, Belgium, Spain, Cyprus, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Estonia and 
Latvia. These are states that either operate on a federal principle, or 
have a dominant nation whose proportion of the population is less than 
75 percent. Switzerland is a federation of three-plus-one language 
communities. Belgium includes differentiated Walloon and Flemish 
communities and a smaller community of German-speakers. Spain 
has granted autonomy to 17 communities since 1978, so that the 
Catalans, Basques, Galicians and others enjoy rights in addition 
to their overarching Spanish national affiliation. Cyprus contains 
two separate and ethnically homogeneous national communities, 
each of which has claimed rights as a separate political entity. Some 
of the ex-communist countries mentioned here have political and 
cultural traditions dating back several decades or even centuries, 
for instance the countries that resulted from the fragmentation of 
Yugoslavia (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro and 
Serbia). Others were products of the break-up of the Soviet Union 
(Estonia and Latvia) and consequently have large Russian minorities, 
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the descendants of twentieth-century immigration. (Moldova too 
could be counted in this latter group.)
According to the censuses of the 1920s, Europe after World 
War I (discounting the European part of the Soviet Union) had 352 
million inhabitants, of whom 308 lived in majority status. (The latter 
figure includes also groups that formed multinational federations 
together with other nations, such as Belgium’s Flemings and 
Walloons, Czechoslovakia’s Slovaks, Yugoslav Serbs, Croats and 
Slovenes, and German, French and Italian Swiss; a total population 
of 9.6 million.) Alongside the 38.4 million persons classified in the 
censuses as belonging to a national minority, there were 5.4 million 
in the miscellaneous category, so that 43.9 million Europeans, or 
12.4 percent of the total, can be classified as belonging to a minority. 
The largest of these groups, according to the official census data, 
was that of the 9.6 percent of Germans who at the same time formed 
a majority nation in five countries (Germany, Austria, Switzerland, 
Luxembourg and Liechtenstein). Those living in minority status 
accounted for 11.6 percent of all Germans. Ukrainians represented the 
second-largest minority population, with 8 million people, of whom 
26.8 percent lived in minority status outside the Soviet Union. (That 
is not to imply that Soviet Ukraine constituted a nation state within 
the Soviet Union.) The 2.7 million minority Hungarians amounted 
to 27.4 percent of the whole population of Hungarians. Next were 
the 1.4 million minority Bulgarians (comprising 24.4 percent of all 
Bulgarians). In terms of the proportion of a national group living 
as a minority, the Hungarians were second only to the Albanians, 
50.7 percent of whom (651,000 persons) lived in minority status.8 
Thus, Hungarians currently feature as prominent minority groups 
in two states (Romania and Slovakia) and as smaller minorities in 
other states. The comparative place of Hungarian minorities on the 
broader European scale of majority–minority ethnic demography 
was even more prominent during the interwar period.
As stated earlier, 86,674,000 million Europeans lived as 
minorities in the early 2000s. The countries of greatest ethnic/
national diversity are Russia, Ukraine and Romania (with 43, 23 and 
19 recognized groups respectively). Roma, Germans and Hungarians 
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constitute the overall largest European minorities (living in minority 
status in 28, 22 and 8 countries respectively). Russians in Ukraine 
represent the overall largest minority (11 million), followed by 
Catalans in Spain (6.4 million), and Scots in the United Kingdom 
(4.8 million). The largest national/ethnic minorities in Central and 
Eastern Europe (CEE) are Romania’s Hungarians and Roma. The 
CEE region’s largest minority groups are Russians (12.8 percent), 
followed by Roma (8.5–10 million), Turks (6 million), Poles and 
Hungarians (each with 2.6–2.7 million).
The minority communities of Hungary and of Central Europe9 
can be classified according to five criteria: historical emergence, 
geographical location, characteristics of language use, legal status 
and group identity. The authors of this volume have taken those 
criteria into consideration, as below:10
1. Historically speaking, in order of their emergence, European 
minorities can be placed into four groups. Indigenous minorities 
are groups that have dwelt continuously in their present locations 
since the period preceding the creation of nation states. Historical 
minorities emerged in the Middle Ages through processes of special 
feudal rights, colonizations or migrations. Involuntary minorities 
were separated from their ethno-cultural kin living in another 
country by border changes based on externally imposed political 
decisions. Recent minorities, which is to say immigrant minorities, 
appeared mainly in the second half of the twentieth century through 
emigration for economic reasons to richer Western European 
countries. The majority of minorities in present-day Hungary are 
historical minorities, while the Hungarian minorities of neighboring 
countries are involuntary minorities.
Central European minorities emerged in four main periods: 
(1.1) Medieval colonization and migration processes resulted in 
the incorporation of the region’s formerly sovereign kingdoms that 
could have formed into nation states during the nineteenth century 
into the multinational Habsburg, Tsarist and Ottoman Empires. 
Consequently, the historical roots of today’s minority communities 
of Central Europe are found in the period between the thirteenth 
and the seventeenth century. (1.2) After the period of Ottoman 
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occupation, waves of repopulation resettlement and migration 
significantly rearranged the region’s ethnic demography. The multiple 
partitions of Poland also contributed to demographic developments 
that together produced an ethnic mosaic in the region. This was 
epitomized in such ethnically mixed areas as Bačka (with its mixed 
communities of Germans, South Slavs and Hungarians), the Banat 
(Germans, Hungarians, South Slavs and Romanians) and Dobrudja 
(Bulgarians, Romanians, Turks and Tatars). (1.3) Urbanization 
and industrialization in the nineteenth century triggered large-
scale regional, international and inter-continental migrations and 
assimilation processes. Long-established inter-ethnic relations were 
dramatically altered by the homogenization projects of nation states. 
(1.4) A series of dramatic changes in state boundaries and political 
systems during the early decades of the twentieth century replaced 
multi-ethnic empires with smaller nation states that reduced many 
previously dominant ethnicities (German, Hungarian, Greek and 
Turkish groups) to minority position.
Another major factor in the formation of ethnic minorities was 
the stage that the nation-building process in question had reached 
by the time that the given minority splintered from a larger national 
community. Most Hungarian minority communities outside Hungary 
were already part of a robust nation-building project when they 
became annexed to neighboring countries after 1918. By contrast, 
ethnic minority groups that found themselves in places that were 
geographically remote from the larger part of their ethno-cultural 
kin at the beginnings of modern nation-building were in a different 
position: they were able to participate in the nation-building process 
only through a small intelligentsia. Examples are the Moldavian 
Catholics known as Csángós, and the various ethno-/linguistic 
minorities of present-day Hungary. So it is hard to compare the 
loyalty of the Slovaks, Germans or Rusyns of Hungary towards their 
wider nation to that of the Central European Hungarian minorities, 
which were integral parts of Hungarian statehood at their time of 
severance.
The twentieth-century history of the minorities of Central 
and Eastern Europe is marked by demographic decline, forced 
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assimilation, ethnic annihilation and genocide, ethnic cleansing 
and the negative effects of forcible resettlement. The ethnic map 
of Central Europe has altered considerably since the beginning of 
the twentieth century: communities of Germans and Jews have 
vanished, while the proportion of minorities within present-day 
Hungary has shrunk, and the proportion of minority Hungarians 
in the neighboring countries has halved. Most of the minorities in 
Central Europe after World War I were forced minorities. Today they 
tend to be residual minority communities, while the Roma groups 
belong largely to the underclass. Historical minorities that still exist 
only in fragments include the Jews, the Germans, the Slovaks and 
the Rusyns.
2. A minority community’s development and cohesion 
depends, apart from historical factors, also on its geographical 
position and settlement structure. The legacies of the original 
patterns of minority settlement and of the population movements 
of the twentieth century (migration, urbanization and involuntary 
resettlement) mean that most minorities today are scattered or were 
turned from a majority into a minority (10–50 percent of the local 
population) at the beginning of the last century. Being scattered 
means that communities can only maintain institutions for cultural 
reproduction with outside help, and the native language is confined 
to private life. In this process, linguistic islands have developed in 
villages (or parts of villages) and in urban minority communities. 
Ethnic blocs of Hungarians – such as Žitný ostrov in Slovakia, 
the Berehove district in Ukraine, the Székely Land and the Bihor 
County border zone in Romania, northern Bačka and the area along 
the Danube in Serbia – are exceptions. Thanks to the existence of 
these blocs, 75 percent of Hungarians in Slovakia, 61 percent of 
those in Transcarpathia, 56 percent of those in Transylvania, and 49 
percent of those in Vojvodina live in settlements where Hungarians 
form a majority. All of these regions, except for the Székely Land, 
are border areas, which eases contacts with Hungary, but at the 
same time turns the minority question into a matter of state security 
(due to its being, for example, a possible source of irredentism) in 
the eyes of majorities in the neighboring states.
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3. Concerning majority–minority relations, the most significant 
change in language use during the twentieth century is that most 
members of minority groups have become bilingual, while members 
of majority nations have remained monolingual. A distinction 
can be drawn according to whether the minority language or the 
majority language has become dominant among minorities in their 
daily life. The native language has primacy among the Hungarians 
of Slovakia, Ukraine, Romania and Serbia, the Slovaks of Romania 
and Serbia, the Rusyns of Ukraine and Serbia, the Poles of the Czech 
Republic, the Lithuanians, Ukrainians and Belorussians of Poland, 
the Serbs of Croatia and Romania, the Albanians (and to a certain 
extent the Roma and Turks) of Macedonia, the Turks of Bulgaria, 
and the Russians of Transcarpathia. Among minorities in Hungary 
(including Slovenes, Germans, Slovaks and Czechs) and Hungarians 
in Slovenia and Croatia, the majority language dominates in daily 
contacts and increasingly also in the family.
The linguistically assimilated minorities can be divided into 
two sub-groups. One sub-group comprises people who maintain 
their native language through inter-generational communication 
and the teaching of the literary language in schools – as is the 
case of Hungarians in the Burgenland region of Austria, minority 
groups in Hungary that identify themselves as such in the national 
census and claim language instruction in their schools, and some 
Roma communities in the region. Another sub-group of assimilated 
minorities is made up of people who have lost the language but 
retain a cultural memory of it – such as minorities that once spoke 
Armenian, Yiddish or German.
4. In some instances, minorities can also be given a partial 
categorization on the basis of legal and political status, which 
varies according to the regime under which they live. Some political 
systems grant group rights, cultural and/or language rights, others 
grant individual rights, and some political systems are designed to 
erode such rights through systematic discrimination. In terms of 
political recognition, the status of European minorities ranges from 
constitutional recognition and regional or local self-government 
through minorities who form their own political parties to minorities 
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with other organizations to represent their interests. The Hungarian 
minorities are communities having cultural and/or language group 
rights, and according to political recognition, all three categories 
include Hungarian minority groups.
5.  Three types of minorities can be distinguished according 
to the strength of ethnic identification. Sociological studies 
conducted among the four largest Hungarian minority communities 
in neighboring countries have shown that they hold a Hungarian 
national identity, identifying themselves as members of the universal 
Hungarian nation as commonly understood. Similar adherence 
to a universal national identity (that is, involving such things as 
attachment to the broader national cultural community and to the 
kin-state) is exhibited by South Slav national minorities living in 
neighboring countries, and also by Poles in the Czech Republic and 
by Russian minorities living outside Russia. Minorities that formed 
several hundred years ago and show fluctuating signs of ethnic 
identity represent a second type. Ethnic identification (or at least 
awareness of ethnicity) is manifested in these cases as respect for 
one’s native language, the fostering of local ethnic traditions, and a 
strong sense of ethnic identity based on awareness of one’s origins. 
This type of ethnic awareness, however, differs from national identity 
in that group identity here is largely confined to the local minority 
community, and broader ethno-cultural ties are seen merely as 
extensions of local ties. This type of identification is found among 
most minorities in Hungary, and also among Bulgarian, Slovak, 
Czech and Slovene minorities in the region. An important auxiliary 
element, a complement to the identities of both ethnic and national 
groups, is regional or local identity: the awareness that they belong 
to the minorities of Central Europe. Another significant attribute 
of group identification among Hungarians in Slovakia, Ukraine, 
Romania and Serbia is their identification with specific regions (such 
as Žitný ostrov, the region along the River Bodrog, Transcarpathia, 
Satu Mare, Ţara Călatei, the Székely Land, the Banat, Bačka or 
Baranja). Similarly strong regional identifications can be found 
among the Slovenes, Slovaks and Baranja Germans of Hungary. 
From the point of view of group identity, particularly important 
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here is a third type of identification: dual identity. Dual identifica-
tion is typical among historical minorities living in locations where 
the majority language has become dominant, and where there are 
efforts to integrate particularistic ethnic or national group awareness 
into a broader affiliation with the community of citizens living in the 
same country. Dual identities are built on a fragile balance that can be 
easily tipped by negative impulses. In this region, this type of identity 
leads most often to inter-generational assimilation, largely through 
mixed marriages. In the case of the Hungarian minorities, there is not 
the kind of “hybridization” that led to mass adoption of “Yugoslav” 
or “Soviet” identity, but of concurrent affiliation to the Hungarian 
community and the wider community of the home country.
Based on the typology outlined above, it is possible to place 
the minorities of Central Europe into three overlapping categories: 
(1) national minorities, with a strong awareness of a broader national 
identity, who exhibit an awareness of their belonging to a national 
community and consider it to be a decisive element of their national 
identity; (2) ethnic minorities, whose group identity has for a long 
time developed separately from their original larger ethno-cultural 
or national communities, with which their connection is now based 
mainly on origins and the language that they speak; (3) regional 
minorities, who have lost their language and ethnic identity, but 
preserve a sense of origin and local attributes that distinguish them 
from the majority nation.
A Short overview of Previous research
Research into the history of Hungarian minorities began with the 
materials prepared in 1919–1920 for the Versailles peace process.11 
These materials described the ethnic, communal and social relations 
in the territories likely to be claimed by Hungary’s neighboring 
states. During the decades that followed the signing of the Trianon 
peace treaty, numerous accounts of Hungarian minority grievances 
appeared in Hungary. Educational and cultural grievances concern-
ing Hungarians in several states were first aired in accounts by Gyula 
Kornis and Ferenc Olay.12 The main outlet for related documents 
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and analyses, however, was the journal Magyar Kisebbség (1922–
1942), which was published in Romania (and had Romanian, 
French and German versions). On a European level, a report on 
the continent’s national minorities prepared according to uniform 
criteria by Ewald Ammende appeared in 1931 at the suggestion 
of the Hungarian delegation to the League of Nations’ minority 
congresses.13 By the end of the 1930s, the history of Hungarian 
minority communities became documented in monographs that 
focused largely on grievances. This framework became gradually 
surpassed and replaced by a comparative approach in the post-World 
War II minority research conducted in Hungary during the period 
of peacemaking. This research agenda resulted in works such as 
András Rónai’s Közép-Európa atlasza (Atlas of Central Europe) 
and a three-volume collection of studies and data edited by Elemér 
Radisics and entitled Dunatáj (The Danube Region).
Given the tight political control of the period, it became possible 
only in 1972–1973 for the Hungarian Academy of Sciences’ Institute 
of Literature to initiate research into cultural contacts with neigh-
boring countries, with Lajos Für, Csaba Kiss, Béla Pomogáts, Rudolf 
Joó and others taking part in this endeavor. However, neither the 
several thousand pages of material that emerged from this research on 
the situation of Hungarians beyond the country’s borders nor a short 
summary of this material could be made public at that time. Only a 
decade and a half later did the journal Medvetánc produce a special 
issue of reports on the situation of the Hungarians in four neighboring 
countries. Early in the 1990s, monographs appeared about the 
folklore of Hungarians outside Hungary,14 their ethnic geography15 
and their “living language.”16 Attempts were made to compensate 
for the absence of a comprehensive study of minority history with a 
textbook of Hungarian national studies, followed by the publication 
of a handbook.17 Since the early 1990s, several journals of minority 
affairs have appeared: Fórum Társadalomtudományi Szemle in 
Slovakia, Korunk, Magyar Kisebbség and Székelyföld in Romania, 
and the journals Pro Minoritate, Regio and Kisebbségkutatás in 
Hungary.
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Concerning institutional antecedents, the most important 
interwar institution was the Institute of Governance and Public 
Policy, founded in 1926, which gathered data and analyses in 
support of Hungary’s ambitions for territorial revision. University 
seminars were also offered on minority law, most notably at the 
Minority Institute of the University of Pécs (1936–1949). After 
1940, the Institute of Governance and Public Policy was divided 
into the Hungarian History Institute, the Transylvanian Scientific 
Institute (in Cluj) and the Pál Teleki Institute. The latter provided 
background expertise for the post-war peace preparations. These 
institutions were abolished in 1948, and for several decades the 
issue of minorities was shrouded in silence.
As an aspect of the “softening” of communism in Hungary 
towards the end of the 1980s, research on Hungarian minorities 
abroad became once again acceptable, and an Institute for Hun-
garian Studies was founded in Budapest (1985–1992) to carry out 
primary research that would document the situation of Hungarians 
beyond the country’s borders. The successor of this institute was the 
László Teleki Foundation’s Institute of Central European Studies 
(1992–2006), which published monographs, edited volumes of 
studies and documents, and began a systematic processing of source 
materials and the compilation of chronologies and bibliographies. 
Earlier work had relied largely on press reports, memoirs and 
historical studies, all treated within the framework of cultural 
history. A major goal of the research conducted at the Teleki 
Foundation was to complement that body of work with archival 
research and in-depth studies of political and economic institutions 
– in other words, to move beyond description and documentation to a 
scholarly examination of how minority communities “work”. By the 
turn of the millennium, research on Hungarian minorities (mainly 
ethnographic, sociological and anthropological studies) intensified 
in institutions outside Hungary leading to new avenues of contact 
between researchers and institutions inside and outside Hungary. 
The most visible outcome of this process was the creation of internet 
databanks in Transylvania, Slovakia, Vojvodina and Hungary, 
which provided access to research tools, sources and publications.18 
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New research projects and workshops contributed to an increase 
in volume of publications on minority history (including numerous 
monographs and thematic volumes) and created higher scholarly 
expectations in the field. Building on the work accumulated in the 
study of Hungarian minority history, the studies launched since 
1998 under the auspices of the Institute for Ethnic and National 
Minority Studies of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences have aimed 
at synthesizing the results of this body of research.
In parallel with the publication of the Hungarian-language 
original of our present volume, some methodologically outstanding 
works have appeared on the history and operation of the Hungarian 
minority communities. A monographic analysis of the everyday 
operation of Central European nationalism is given in the monograph 
of Rogers Brubaker and his colleagues at Cluj, and the research of 
everyday ethnicity is represented by the volume of essays edited by 
Margit Feischmidt.19 The demographic conditions of Hungarians in 
Romania and the discourses reflecting on them are presented in a 
new way by Tamás Kiss.20 On the history and institutional world 
of the American Hungarians, different aspects of a summary were 
prepared by Béla Várdy, Agnes Huszár Várdy, Károly Nagy and 
Attila Papp Z.21 The research dealing with the Hungarian minority 
communities within the regional relationships of the Carpathian 
Basin has brought about a breakthrough in two respects. First, the 
15-volume program on the region’s social and economic geographical 
conditions, expounded according to uniform diagnostic criteria, 
edited by Gyula Horváth is nearing completion.22 Furthermore, the 
first comprehensive book on the twentieth-century history of the 
region, edited by Csilla Fedinec and Mykola Vegesh, was published 
– and what is more, as the joint work of the historians of the two 
neighboring nations of Hungary and Ukraine – in both countries 
and in both languages.23
The historiography of the Hungarian minorities has been 
shaped to a great extent by an urge to record and document the 
numerous serious political, economic and social grievances that 
these communities have indubitably suffered, and the dominant 
historical narratives that have emerged in the course of the past nine 
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decades reflect the centrality of those grievances and react to them. 
This volume shifts the focus from a discourse based on grievances, 
and focuses instead on strategies of survival and interest-promotion, 
as it was largely these that were largely responsible for shaping the 
evolution of minority communities during the twentieth century. 
The work concentrates on the history of relations among four 
interconnected fields: minority, majority, a Hungarian kin-state and 
international actors. Our intention is to contribute to the comparative 
history of societies and nationalisms in Central Europe. We hope 
that readers will find this book useful in understanding the place of 
Hungarian minority communities in that history.
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I. cHAnGES oF SoVErEIGntY
And tHE nEW nAtIon StAtES
In tHE dAnuBE rEGIon
1918–1921

1. tHE BrEAK-uP oF HIStorIcAL HunGArY
László Szarka
By the fifth year of the Great War, the opposing Entente or Allied 
Powers (notably France, the United Kingdom, and from 1915–1916 
Italy and Romania) and Central Powers (Germany, Austria-Hungary, 
Turkey and Bulgaria) were nearing the limits of their endurance. 
Austria-Hungary under its new monarch Charles1 had been making 
diplomatic moves in the last year-and-a-half of the war to reach 
a separate peace with the Entente, but public revelations of this 
by France in April 1918 obliged Austria-Hungary to commit itself 
to the Central Powers more closely than ever for fear of German 
military occupation. Since the monarch lacked the power to break 
with Germany openly, the Allied Powers, especially France and 
the United Kingdom, began in the spring of 1918 to treat Austria-
Hungary in the same hostile way as they did Germany, and the 
idea of breaking up the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy after the war 
was soon being mooted.
The only force inside pre-1918 Hungary to press for looser 
constitutional ties with Austria and rapprochement with the 
Entente was the opposition Independence and ’48 Party headed by 
Mihály Károlyi. But this had no influence on foreign policy in the 
Monarchy before the end of the war. So the Western allies did not 
treat Hungary as a separate international factor in any sense. This 
was unfortunate, as the Hungarian government might have gained 
much from a separate national and state presence during the war 
years.
The Entente Powers had managed to win neutral Italy and 
Romania over to their side in 1915 and 1916 with the secret treaties 
of London and Bucharest. The latter, concluded on August 17, 1916, 
offered Romania the whole of Transylvania, and the ethnically mixed 
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regions of the Banat (Bánság) and the Partium, all other Hungarian 
territory east of the River Tisza, and Austrian-ruled Bukovina, in 
exchange for joining the Allies in the war and not making a separate 
peace. By early 1917, successful political and propaganda work and 
military organization had also turned the Czechoslovak and South 
Slav émigré communities in London and Paris into a significant 
international force able to influence the Western Allies’ policy on 
the aims of the war.
Regular, fairly accurate intelligence on the existence of the 
secret treaties and the aims of the émigré Czechoslovak, Romanian 
and South Slav committees reached leading Monarchy politicians, 
including István Tisza, the Hungarian prime minister, but no clear 
steps to realign the Monarchy’s international relations were taken. 
Tisza, for instance, had regularly rejected the idea of Transylvanian 
autonomy, for which the German High Command pressed as a way 
of forestalling Romania’s entry into the war.
In the event, Romania’s invasion of Transylvania in August 1916 
was driven back with German assistance. Defeat was acknowledged 
by Romania in another Treaty of Bucharest concluded with the 
Central Powers on May 7, 1918, but it managed to retain much of its 
army. This allowed Romania in the final stage of the war to reenter 
on the Entente side and occupy the territories that it claimed. France 
and Britain also supported the ambitions of the Czechoslovak 
and Yugoslav political émigrés to form states, and recognized 
the Czechoslovak and South Slav committees abroad as de facto 
governments in the early autumn of 1918. The territorial claims that 
they made were treated as fact in the final stage of the war, which 
made possible the Czechoslovak, Romanian and Yugoslav military 
actions that took place after the armistice agreement, including 
those in the Slovak- and Rusyn-inhabited regions of Northern 
Hungary, the northern border areas of Croatia and Slovenia, and the 
Vojvodina (Vajdaság) region of Southern Hungary.2
In January 1918, the American President Woodrow Wilson was 
still only calling for autonomy for the nations of the Monarchy in his 
draft 14 points for a post-war settlement, but in June the American 
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administration, in consultation with the French and the British, 
decided to support the efforts to found independent states being 
made by the émigré Czechoslovaks led by T. G. Masaryk and the 
Poles inspired by Ignacy Paderewski, along with the movement for 
South Slav unity headed by the Croat Ante Trumbić and Frano Supilo 
and the Serb Nikola Pašić, and the Greater Romanian movement led 
by Ion I. C. Brătianu. Washington accordingly issued a statement 
on June 28 supporting the independence efforts of all the ostensibly 
oppressed nations of the Monarchy.3
On October 17, 1918, István Tisza, who had been Hungarian 
prime minister in 1913–1917, told the Hungarian Parliament that the 
Central Powers had lost the war. The Hungarian National Council was 
set up a week later on October 23, and the break-up of the Monarchy 
became visible in a succession of national revolutions: the Czechs 
in Prague on October 28, the Austrians in Vienna and Slovaks in 
Turócszentmárton4 on the 30th, and the Hungarians in Budapest on 
the 31st all broke with the Monarchy or the Hungarian Kingdom. In 
Budapest, Archduke Joseph appointed a new government headed by 
Mihály Károlyi on October 31; on the same afternoon, István Tisza 
was murdered by soldiers in his villa on Hermina út.
But the victorious powers wanted at all costs to conclude 
an armistice with the united Habsburg Monarchy, so that their 
demands could be imposed on the successor states. Such an 
armistice was signed by the Monarchy in Padua on November 3, 
1918, and in Germany on November 11, after the serious defeats 
on the Balkan, Italian and Western fronts. Since that left Hungary 
without a separate armistice agreement, Prime Minister Mihály 
Károlyi headed a delegation to Belgrade on November 11, 1918, to 
find a substitute, and managed to agree with the French General 
Louis Franchet d’Espèrey on military conditions for ending the war. 
But only Hungary recognized the Belgrade Convention signed two 
days later as valid. This agreement, which would have given de 
facto recognition to the independent Hungarian People’s Republic 
(proclaimed on November 16, 1918) was rejected by the Allied 
and Associated Powers and by Hungary’s neighbors, leaving the 
country’s international legal status still in question.5
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There was no foreign military presence on the soil of historical 
Hungary at the end of World War I, but the collapse of the Balkan 
Front left an imminent danger of attack by Romanian, South Slav 
and Czechoslovak forces. The well-equipped Serbian army duly 
crossed the border at the beginning of November, the first units of 
Czechoslovakia6 on November 8, and Romanian forces on November 
13. The Austro-Hungarian army broke up and the Hungarian 
army that was being formed was unable to put up any resistance 
for some time. The Károlyi government was trying to disarm as 
quickly as possible the old multinational military units, which were 
coming under Anarchist and Bolshevik influence, and then build 
up the new army. This basically rational decision had catastrophic 
consequences, as it prevented the defensive capabilities of the 
country from developing in the Hungarian-inhabited areas.
Active propaganda and diplomatic activity took place during 
World War I. The central issue in East-Central Europe from the 
outset was concerned with the efforts at self-determination and 
establishment of independent states made by non-German, non-
Hungarian nations in the Monarchy. The principle of national self-
determination was also emphasized in November 1917 by Vladimir 
Ilyich Lenin, leader of the Russian Bolshevik Revolution. That and 
defeat in the war were what prompted him to recognize the rights 
of Finland and the Baltic states to self-determination and secession. 
US President Wilson also stressed national self-determination early 
in 1918 as the underlying principle for the post-war reorganization 
of Eastern and Central Europe. But implementation of the principle 
of national self-determination related closely to post-war power 
relations and to realization of the diplomatic and economic aims of 
the peace for the victorious powers and their allies.
The big problem with the principle of national self-determination 
was that the new states advanced exaggerated territorial claims 
incompatible with the historical legal and ethnic positions of the 
Hungarians and the Germans of pre-1918 Hungary. Czechoslovakia, 
for instance, successfully claimed Sudetenland, where three million 
Germans lived, and aspired not just to territories of the historical 
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Hungarian state where a majority of the population was Slovak, 
but to a zone running through Pest, Nógrád, Heves, Borsod and 
Zemplén Counties, with an estimated 1.2–1.6 million Hungarian 
inhabitants. Ultimately it obtained at the Paris peace talks only 
the part of the claimed zone lying north of the Danube–Ipoly line 
and the Rusyn Region of Transcarpathia, together with 800,000–
850,000 Hungarian inhabitants.7
Romania also put a curious interpretation on the principle of 
national self-determination. The Romanians formed a bare majority 
over the Hungarians and the German-speaking Saxons and Swabians 
in the claimed territories of Transylvania and Eastern Hungary, but 
the claim for the whole was formulated in the name of that fragile 
majority, so that it could unite with the Romanian Kingdom. The 
opposing Hungarian plans for federation and cantonization, on 
the other hand, were designed to defend the country’s historical 
integrity.8
Between November 1918 and May 1919, the Czechoslovak, 
Romanian and Yugoslav armies occupied all the territory that 
their countries were to be awarded a year later under the Treaty 
of Trianon. The dwindling Hungarian state found itself in a very 
difficult diplomatic and military situation, under conditions of 
military isolation while facing the superior forces of its enemies 
and the detrimental territorial decisions of the peace conference. 
Indeed the Károlyi government had misjudged the potentials in 
the situation, the strength of post-war international pacifism, the 
peacetime objectives of the victorious powers, and the actual chances 
of saving the country’s territorial integrity. Having demobilized the 
soldiers returning from the world war fronts, its attempts at rapid 
organization of a separate Hungarian army were unsuccessful. Nor 
could it push back or contain the organizing efforts of the Communist 
Party of Hungary or the extreme right-wing nationalists.9
The continual losses of territory prevented the promised 
parliamentary elections based on universal suffrage for men and 
women. A combination of the Entente notes, the ceaseless advances 
by neighboring countries, and the internal divisions meant that the 
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government could not place on war alert forces great enough to 
represent serious resistance to annexation in areas with a majority 
Hungarian population.
The government of Mihály Károlyi and from January 19, 1919, 
of Dénes Berinkey entrusted a “ministry for national minorities” 
under Oszkár Jászi, minister without portfolio, with the task of 
drawing up agreements with the movements of other national 
communities. These were to protect the rights of Hungarian self-
determination in regions dominated by such communities and to 
be shown to the peace conference as domestic pacts, as counters 
to the idea of founding new states, which the Great Powers 
supported. The apparatus behind Jászi, “charged with preparing for 
self-determination of non-Hungarian nations living in Hungary,” 
followed Mihály Károlyi’s policy of pacifism and banking on help 
from the Entente. It pressed for a negotiated peace and for order to 
be restored provisionally by the peace conference, with the aim of 
turning Hungary into an Swiss-type federal state, an idea that had 
long since been overtaken by events.10
Jászi and his staff drafted several ideas. One was to prepare for 
plebiscites to decide the future of the areas earmarked for detach-
ment from Hungary. The first such preparations were made in the 
Slovak region of Upper Hungary, where signatures were collected 
for a petition printed in Hungarian, German and Slovak, supporting 
the country’s territorial integrity. The other central element in the 
Jászi proposals was to initiate Swiss-style cantonization (“Helveti-
cization”) throughout the public administration. A surviving draft 
by Jászi’s team envisaged ethnic Hungarian and non-Hungarian 
cantons having ethnographic cantons (such as for the Palóc)11 and 
cantons embracing cities (Budapest, Debrecen, Kassa, and so on) 
and distinct geographical areas (for example Balaton). Related to 
this were plans for demarcating national groups by drawing ethnic 
boundaries around districts in Upper Hungary and Transcarpathia 
with a majority Slovak or Rusyn population.
Early in December 1918, the Hungarian government promised 
broad ethnic autonomy to a Slovak delegation led by Milan Hodža 
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visiting Budapest as an official representative of the Czechoslovak 
government. On December 6, a short-term agreement was reached on 
a demarcation line to follow the linguistic boundary. Meanwhile Act 
X/1918 granted autonomy to Transcarpathia (officially called Rus’ka-
Krajna).12
Jászi also looked to the Swiss model for an acceptable negotiating 
basis when he proposed having Romanian, Hungarian, German 
and mixed cantons in Transylvania, at Hungarian–Romanian talks 
held in Arad on November 13–14. But the idea was rejected by 
the Transylvanian Romanian National Council delegation headed 
by Iuliu Maniu. Furthermore, the Romanians made radical efforts 
to obstruct any movement inclining towards resistance or self-
determination for the Hungarians of the Székely (Szekler) counties 
or Transylvania. Strong constraints were placed on the Hungarian 
National Council of Transylvania led by István Apáthy, which 
was tied closely to Jászi’s ministry. Shortly after the Romanians 
occupied Kolozsvár, Apáthy was arrested and there were attempts 
to make the work of the Transylvanian Hungarian National Council 
and the Eastern Hungarian Chief Commission impossible. The 
Transylvanian Hungarian civilian and military high command was 
summarily abolished in January 1919.
Jászi’s ministry also supported for a time the movements 
intending to found an independent Transylvanian republic: the 
Budapest group headed by Elek Benedek, Gyula Györffy, Benedek 
Jancsó and Vilmos Nagy, and the other Székely National Council 
headed by the Transylvanians Miklós Bánffy, István Bethlen, Lajos 
Lóczy, Pál Teleki and Gábor Ugron. After the failure of the Arad 
talks and the advance by the Romanians, the prime Transylvanian 
objective became to save the territories west and north of the 
Mureş (Maros) line. So the declaration adopted at the November 28 
Grand Székely Assembly at Marosvásárhely aimed primarily at the 
integrity of the Hungarian state.
The organization in Temesvár headed by Ottó Roth that 
intended to proclaim an independent Banat People’s Republic 
was broken up by the opposing Romanian and South Slav armies 
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moving into the territory. The Romanian force did not respect the 
Belgrade Convention or the later Berthelot–Apáthy Transylvanian 
demarcation line (see below). It was held up at Csucsa for a couple of 
weeks only by resistance from Hungary’s Transylvanian Division.
The first small Romanian units crossed the Hungarian state 
border at Gyergyótölgyes on November 12. The government initially 
took incisive action against the Romanians, sending three armored 
trains into Transylvania. Károlyi appealed to President Wilson 
against the advance. But on December 2, 1918, one day before 
the Romanian Assembly at Gyulafehérvár declared Romanian 
unification, Franchet d’Espèrey consented, with Prime Minister 
Clemenceau’s approval, to the Romanians’ crossing the Mureş 
demarcation line drawn in the Belgrade Convention, which they 
did on December 18. The Hungarian military command hastened 
to reinforce its Transylvanian positions, notably Kolozsvár, but 
could not muster appreciable forces against the Romanians, who 
had orders to occupy the whole province.
When the Károlyi government saw that the Belgrade Convention 
had been ignored, it requested through Lieutenant Colonel Fernand 
Vix that the nine main Transylvanian cities be placed under French 
military occupation, in an effort to secure the ceasefire terms.
The Kolozsvár Assembly of the Transylvanian Hungarians took 
place on December 22, 1918, calling for “full equality, liberty and 
self-government for all nations here living… within a united and 
undismembered Hungary.” But Kolozsvár was occupied on December 
24, 1918, by the advancing Romanian army under General 
Constantin Neculcea, which had met no resistance. Three days later 
Neculcea declared a state of siege in the city, introduced internment, 
and placed a ban on public assembly. Six days after that, Apáthy 
and the French General Henri Mathias Berthelot, seconded to 
command the military forces of Allied Romania, reached agreement 
on a new demarcation line past Nagybánya, Kolozsvár, and Déva. 
After Berthelot’s departure, the Romanian military administration 
disbanded the Eastern Hungarian Chief Commission – the 
Hungarian government’s highest body of state in Transylvania – 
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and arrested Apáthy. Emil Grandpierre, who succeeded him as chief 
commissioner, was removed from office on January 28. The city’s 
Romanian officials were appointed on the same day.13
By December 1918, several ministers in the Károlyi and the 
Berinkey governments, including Jászi and Minister of Agriculture 
Barna Buza, were calling for abandonment of the pacifist stance. 
The strategy of waiting out the decisions of the peace conference 
had failed, as the majority of the country’s territory was occupied by 
neighboring armies by the end of 1918. Károlyi ultimately changed 
his position, having seen that the Czechoslovak, Romanian and South 
Slav armies were not waiting for the peace conference decisions 
before taking military action, that many conflicts were breaking out 
on Transylvanian and Upper Hungarian soil, and that an attitude 
inimical to Hungary would dominate the Paris peace conference 
when it opened on January 29. By that time there was no hope of 
Hungary regaining the occupied territories or of non-Hungarians in 
them exercising self-determination within a Hungarian framework.
The Hungarian regiments in the Székely counties and in the other 
regions of Transylvania refused to lay down their arms. They and 
other volunteers in the Romanian-occupied Székely counties then 
formed a 2,000-strong Székely Division, which along with the other 
Transylvanian Hungarian military units was under the command of 
Austro-Hungarian army Brigadier Károly Kratochwill, as military 
commander of Transylvania. The previous local and national guard 
units and the Székely Division may have together numbered 10,000–
12,000 men by the end of 1918, and in January 1919, Kratochwill’s 
Székely Division managed to hold up the Romanians at the Király-
hágó, the pass on the main road between Kolozsvár and Nagyvárad, 
on the traditional border between Transylvania and Hungary. Fatally 
late in the day, Mihály Károlyi outlined an alternative policy in an 
address to the Székely Division at Szatmárnémeti on March 2.14
There were only local attempts at resistance by the Hungarians 
of Upper Hungary, such as those at Érsekújvár, Balassagyarmat, 
Kassa and Abara. Lacking a history of regional self-determination, 
they looked on passively at the rapid advance of the small but 
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organized Czechoslovak military forces. In February 1919, a 
people’s assembly at Jóka adopted a memorandum in the name of 
the people of the Csallóköz protesting against annexation of the 
district by Czechoslovakia. There was also resistance to annexation 
from the Germans of the region of Zips (Spiš, Szepesség), who 
planned an independent Zipser Republic (Szepesi Köztársaság). 
Such local pockets of resistance in areas of Hungary awarded to 
Czechoslovakia were easily dealt with by the Czechoslovak forces, 
drawn from the Czech and Slovak legions in Italy. On February 
3, 1919, the minister plenipotentiary for Slovakia, Vavro Šrobár, 
moved from Zsolna to Pozsony), to set up there Slovakia’s new seat 
of government, Bratislava.
Among the Hungarian peace notes can be found a protest by 
the Hungarians of the Banat (Bánság) and Bačka (Bácska) districts, 
claimed by the South Slavs, and one by the Hungarians of the Western 
Hungarian areas being claimed by Austria (Burgenland), dismissing 
such claims and demanding a plebiscite.15
The proclamation of the Hungarian Soviet Republic16 on March 
21, 1919, was followed by a coordinated attack by the Romanian and 
Czechoslovak armies. The Romanians entered Debrecen on April 
23, and then met up with the Czechoslovaks at Csap. The forces 
mobilized by the Hungarian Soviet Republic were placed under new 
command and took up defensive positions against the Romanians 
along the River Tisza. Kratochwill, still in command of the Székely 
Division, issued orders on April 25, 1919, effectively disbanding 
the Division, citing antagonism from the Hungarian Red Army, but 
some units fought on as the Székely Brigade.
On May 20, a counter-attack to the north beat back the 
Czechoslovak units. Léva, Kassa, Selmecbánya, and Bártfa were 
recaptured between June 1 and 6. The Hungarian Soviet Republic 
lasted 133 days, during which Béla Kun in his capacity as commissar 
for foreign affairs proved willing, unlike Károlyi’s government, to 
abandon territorial integrity when faced with the peace conference 
decisions.17 It was conceded in notes to the Czechoslovak, Romanian 
and South Slav governments on April 30 that the three countries 
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had admissible national and territorial claims, but Kun demanded 
in exchange an immediate end to hostilities and any interference in 
the internal affairs of the Hungarian Soviet Republic, freedom of 
transit, and protection for the remaining minority communities in 
the neighboring countries.18
The constitution of the officially named Socialist Federal Soviet 
Republic of Hungary was adopted on June 23, 1919, by the National 
Assembly of Federal Soviets, which met only once. It designated 
the Soviet Republic as a federal state of the nations dwelling within 
it. But none of this could take effect in practice. On June 13, the 
Hungarian Soviet government was informed in the Clemenceau 
Note of the decision of the Paris Peace Conference on Hungary’s 
borders and ordered the Hungarian army to withdraw inside them. 
On July 1, a Czechoslovak–Hungarian ceasefire was signed in 
Bratislava.19 After the northern retreat, the Tisza front collapsed and 
the Hungarian Soviet Republic fell. The Romanian army marched 
into Budapest on August 4.
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2. HunGArY At tHE PEAcE tALKS In PArIS
László Szarka
There were preliminary discussions among the victorious Great 
Powers – the United States, France, the United Kingdom, Italy and 
Japan – before the Paris Peace Conference opened ceremoniously 
on January 18, 1919. The Conference was unparalleled in size – with 
delegates from over 30 countries, including Romania, Czechoslovakia, 
Poland and the South Slavs – and level of organization, but the 
defeated countries were excluded from it, although its prime aim 
was to devise peace treaties with them, above all with Germany. 
Delegates of defeated countries were only invited to Paris to be 
handed the completed draft of each treaty.
The basic principles of the settlement were decided by a Supreme 
War Council of the prime ministers and ministers of foreign 
affairs of the five Great Powers. They set the main political issues, 
reviewed commitments made in the war, and weighed proposals 
by the Conference’s committees. Then they heard the demands of 
the affected neighboring countries. Finally they decided, on the 
recommendations of territorial and specialist committees (for ports, 
waterways and railways, for territorial questions, and so on), what 
the German, Austrian, Hungarian, Bulgarian and Turkish peace 
treaties would contain.
After each draft treaty had been handed over, the Supreme War 
Council listened to the delegation head of each defeated country, but 
the latter had no right to ask questions or negotiate with Supreme 
War Council members.
Hungary’s status at the peace conference was especially complex, 
as the Great Powers had still not recognized Hungary officially since 
the break-up of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. Thus the Allied 
and Associated Powers did not accept, for instance, the Belgrade 
Military Convention of November 13, 1918, as an armistice or see 
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it as a commitment. Moreover, the Peace Conference was intent on 
ending the Hungarian Soviet Republic, which had succeeded the 
Hungarian People’s Republic on March 21, 1919. So Hungary was 
not invited to the Peace Conference until December 1919.1
The most important decisions for Hungary derived from the 
border demarcation work of the Czechoslovak and the Romanian–
Yugoslav territorial committees, meeting between February 10 and 
mid-April 1919. Representatives of the Great Powers took part, but 
in cases of dispute, the delegation heads of the Allied and Associated 
powers concerned – Czechoslovakia, Romania and the South Slav 
state – were heard. The criteria in drawing the state borders of the 
new Hungary were these:
- Commitments made in the Great War or the months leading 
up to the Peace Conference (such as the 1916 Bucharest Treaty, the 
armistice agreements, and the territorial decisions of the various 
demarcation agreements reached between November 1918 and 
June 1919).
- The ethnic principle, although from the outset the Great 
Powers differed greatly in their interpretations of it. The principle 
for settling ethnic disputes was to decide in favor of Allied states.
- The territorial claims of Allied countries, in which the 
utmost attention was paid to historical, geographical, economic 
and other criteria designed to support the demands expressed in 
the Czechoslovak, Romanian and South Slav peace notes. So in 
demarcating and justifying the territories of the Czechoslovak, 
Polish, South Slav and Romanian states, the arguments for the 
legitimacy of the territorial demands made in the beneficiary 
states’ peace memoranda rested sometimes on historical grounds 
and sometimes on those of ethnicity or ethnography.
- The main aim of the Great Powers’ efforts at peace-making 
was to avoid further military action and strive to withdraw and 
demobilize their forces as fast as possible. This meant working to 
boost local Allied countries, which could monitor Eastern Central 
Europe militarily, economically and politically, as an adequate 
counterweight to Germany and Russia.
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- Strategic military criteria came to the fore in connection with 
military plans of Soviet Russia and the Hungarian Soviet Republic. 
The regional strategic and military purposes of the Great Powers 
were thought to be best served by so-called railway borders: along 
the River Ipoly, in Transcarpathia, and between Szatmárnémeti, 
Nagyvárad, Arad and Temesvár in Eastern Hungary. In each case 
these lines fell within the borders of Allied states, to reinforce 
their economic and military predominance.
- An attempt was also made to apply to the defeated countries 
the principle of economic viability, although this occurred in 
Hungary’s case only with the coalmines of Salgótarján, Miskolc 
and the Mecsek Hills.
Demarcation of the new Hungarian state borders was completed 
by the territorial committees at the end of March and beginning of 
April 1919. The aim had been to prepare and conclude the peace 
treaties with Austria and with Hungary at the same time, but the 
declaration of the Hungarian Soviet Republic and the activity of 
the Hungarian Red Army intervened.2 On June 13, 1919, a note 
from French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau on behalf of 
the Supreme War Council informed Béla Kun, in his capacity as 
commissar for foreign affairs of the Hungarian Soviet Republic, 
of the Conference decisions on the new borders of Hungary. No 
substantive change in them ensued before the Treaty of Trianon was 
signed.
These borders meant that Hungary lost substantial amounts 
of territory with a majority of Hungarian inhabitants, to Czecho-
slovakia, Romania and the Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom: the 
Csallóköz and Mátyusföld, the land along the Garam, Gömör, Upper 
Bodrogköz, the Ung district, Bereg, Szatmár and Bihar, as well as 
Arad County, the Székely Land (Szeklerland) and Kalotaszeg, and 
the Banat (Bánság) and Bácska. This meant that larger or smaller 
Hungarian-speaking areas and village communities became 
minority regions or parts of them. Among the ceded cities with 
a majority Hungarian population were Érsekújvár, Komárom, 
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Rozsnyó, Kassa, Munkács, Ungvár, Szatmárnémeti, Nagyvárad, 
Kolozsvár, Arad, Marosvásárhely, Csíkszereda, Szabadka, Zenta, 
and several others.3
The advent of the Hungarian Soviet Republic and the success 
and reception of its Red Army’s northern campaign were a warning 
to the Great Powers at the Peace Conference that neglect of the 
principle of ethnic justice and equity was causing appreciable new 
tensions in the Danube basin. So the Supreme War Council tried to 
rein in the territorial ambitions of the Romanians, Czechoslovaks 
and South Slavs, and order their armies to withdraw behind their 
agreed state borders.
But the other main Allied objective in Hungary was to avert 
and eliminate the danger of Bolshevism. This led them to condone 
the occupation of Budapest by the Romanian army in August 1919. 
They sought through diplomats sent out by the Peace Conference to 
consolidate the situation in Hungary as fast as possible. But there 
was no chance of progress while the complexity of the domestic 
political and military situation in Hungary prevented either the Peidl 
or the Friedrich government from taking substantive decisions, 
and the Romanians followed up their occupation of Budapest by 
overrunning most of Transdanubia as well.
The British diplomat Sir George Clerk arrived in Budapest on 
October 23, 1919, as a special envoy of the Supreme War Council, 
with a mandate to consolidate the political situation and create stable 
conditions for the end to the Romanian occupation. He agreed on 
November 5 with local party leaders and the commander-in-chief 
of the National Army, Miklós Horthy, on the composition of a new 
government to include members of all parliamentary parties. He then 
won from the Romanian army’s Budapest command a commitment 
to withdraw from the city before November 14.
Horthy entered Budapest on November 16 at the head of his army 
units and gave a well-remembered speech on Gellért tér in which he 
called Budapest a “guilty city” for the way in which it had helped 
the Commune to power. The “concentration” (coalition) government4 
formed by Károly Huszár on November 24 was recognized by the 
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Peace Conference on the following day, and, based on Clerk’s report 
in Paris, was invited on December 1, 1919, to receive the draft treaty.
The government appointed Count Albert Apponyi to head 
the peace delegation. While neighboring countries did all that they 
could to prevent the protests of Hungarians in the territories under 
their control from reaching the Peace Conference, the Hungarian 
peace delegation appended several such documents to its peace 
memorandum. The tensions prompted the Czechoslovak government 
to declare a lengthy state of emergency, which lasted a year and a half 
in Transcarpathia, and it did not wait for the Treaty of Trianon before 
holding general elections in April 1920. Meanwhile Hungarian civil 
servants and professionals were under pressure from Romania and 
the Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom to resign their jobs or even leave 
the country, requiring public employees, for instance, to take an oath 
of allegiance to the new state. In the event, several hundred thousand 
Hungarians who had been transferred to neighboring countries fled 
into the Trianon territory of Hungary during 1919 and 1920.5
The Apponyi delegation arrived in Paris on January 6, 1920, and 
was handed the peace conditions, which is to say the draft Hungarian 
peace treaty. Apponyi told the Supreme War Council on January 16 
that Hungary was willing to submit to plebiscite all disputed territory. 
Citing Wilson’s self-determination principle, he said “We demand a 
plebiscite for the parts of our country that you now wish to detach 
from us. I declare that we will submit to the results of this plebiscite 
whatever they may be.”6 Those running the Peace Conference paid no 
more heed to this demand than to other Hungarian observations on the 
draft, for instance on ecclesiastical, cultural and regional autonomy 
for minority Hungarian communities or assurance of broad rights to 
use their language.
After secret Hungarian–French negotiations in April–May 1920 
had failed, the Hungarian peace treaty was initialed on June 4, 1920, at 
the Grand Trianon in the grounds of Versailles, by Ágoston Bernárd, 
minister of labor and public welfare, and Alfréd Drasche-Lázár, 
envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary. The structure 
of the Treaty of Trianon followed that of the Austrian peace treaty 
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signed in the Palace of Saint-Germain-en-Laye on September 
10, 1919. It covered not only political and territorial matters, but 
rules, implementing measures and miscellaneous measures to do 
with war reparations, military commitments and restrictions, and 
international economic, commercial and transport links, as well as 
international minority protection measures, which were covered in 
relation to the victorious countries in the region in the form of a 
separate agreement.7
Hungary had no option but to sign the treaty, due to its succession 
of domestic crises in 1919, continuing political isolation, and 
consequent military and economic defenselessness. Yet for several 
reasons the treaty remained anathema to the Hungarian public 
between the wars, on whichever side of the Trianon frontier they 
lived. It was seen as a grave injustice to detach compact Hungarian-
inhabited areas along the borders and cities with a majority 
Hungarian population, putting more than three million Hungarians 
in a minority situation. The historical Hungarian state was seen as a 
thing of great value, to which the foundation of the new, still multi-
ethnic, states compared badly, as for a long time the Hungarian 
public would not even acknowledge the right of neighboring nations 
to self-determination. None of the rapidly changing state systems 
in Hungary in 1919 – people’s republic, soviet republic, republic, 
kingdom – or any of the governments had managed to spur 
Hungarian society to defend itself or its country, even in areas with 
a Hungarian majority in an ethnic sense. That absence of national 
resistance, the desertion of hitherto loyal minorities (notably the 
Saxons), and defenselessness against merciless assimilation policies 
in neighboring states would lead to grave dilemmas and traumas in 
Hungarian society.
US President Woodrow Wilson took the initiative to establish on 
May 1, 1919, the Committee on New States and Minorities, which 
drafted the minority protection treaties with certain European Allied 
and Associated Powers – Czechoslovakia, Greece, Poland, Romania 
and the Serb–Croat–Slovene State – and the minority protection 
passages in the treaties with the two defeated successors to the 
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Habsburg Monarchy – Austria and Hungary – and with Bulgaria and 
Turkey. These laid the foundations for a minority protection system 
based on a guarantee system that allowed individual minorities to 
take complaints before the League of Nations. The minorities were 
granted, in the identical texts of the minority protection treaties 
and the minority protection chapters of the peace treaties, not only 
civil but linguistic, educational, cultural and religious rights. These 
general legal principles were accompanied by other provisions 
specific to each treaty. Article 10 of the Romanian Minority 
Protection Treaty, for instance, follows the others in stipulating that 
“Roumania will provide in the public education system in towns 
and districts in which a considerable proportion of Roumanian 
nationals of other than Roumanian speech are resident adequate 
facilities for ensuring that in the primary schools the instruction 
shall be given to the children of such Roumanian nationals through 
the medium of their own language,” but adds a special provision in 
Article 11: “Roumania agrees to accord to the communities of the 
Saxons and Szeklers [Székely] in Transylvania local autonomy in 
regard to scholastic and religious matters, subject to the control of 
the Roumanian State.”8
The Hungarian government’s attitude was criticized on several 
occasions by representatives of the Hungarians now in a minority 
position. The Hungarians of Transylvania, Upper Hungary and the 
Southern Region saw it as a great error, indeed treachery, to have 
signed the treaty without reference to the minority communities 
concerned or consistent, unconditional representation of their 
position. The most harrowing document to reflect this view is a 
memorandum called “Cry for the Hungarian-ness of Transylvania, 
Bánság, Körösvidék and Máramaros” issued by Károly Kós, Árpád 
Paál and István Zágoni in Cluj in 1921. A similar warning came on 
June 2, 1920, in Parliament in Prague from the Czechoslovakian 
Hungarian members who had gained seats in the 1920 general 
elections, on whose behalf a joint statement of Hungarian parties 
was read by Lajos Körmendy-Ékes.9 This insisted on the right of 
the Czechoslovakian Hungarians to self-determination, pointing 
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out that nobody in the Hungarian peace delegation had received 
a mandate to sign on behalf of the Hungarians transferred to 
Czechoslovakia a peace treaty that denied the right of self-
determination to the Hungarian communities of Slovensko and 
Rusinsko10 (Slovakia and Ruthenia).
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3. tHE crEAtIon oF
HunGArIAn MInorItY GrouPS
romania (Nándor Bárdi)
The period under discussion here can be divided into two parts. 
One ran from the Aster Revolution to the signing of the Treaty of 
Trianon (October 31, 1918, to June 4, 1920). The other covered the 
subsequent period in the former areas of Eastern Hungary, when 
the Romanian state administration was acknowledged also by 
the Hungarian community, up until the formation of the National 
Hungarian Party1 in Romania in December 1922.
On the minority question the Károlyi government (October 31, 
1918, to January 8, 1919) supported Wilson’s principle of self-
determination, hoping to defend Hungary’s territorial integrity by 
granting rights to self-determination to its national minorities. In 
the first half of November, events in Budapest and the influence 
of returning soldiers revolutionized the mining districts of Eastern 
Hungary and the urban working class and the peasantry, who 
were under local military government. But only sporadically did 
the military and social revolts that broke out assume a national 
character. The government turned for help in curbing these to the 
local authorities: the Hungarian and Romanian national councils that 
had begun to form at the end of October. Many rural administrative 
staff had fled and the influence of urban authorities was reduced. 
The Transylvanian Hungarian military force of some 4,000 was too 
small to keep order, which meant relying on national guard units 
that the national councils had organized. This new power system 
was riven by two conflicting sets of objectives. The radicalized 
Hungarian and Székely national councils thought in terms of the 
republican movement; the question of the country’s integrity came 
to the fore only gradually. Not so with the parallel Romanian 
organizations, where national interests were foremost.2
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On November 9, the Romanian National Council issued from 
Arad an ultimatum to the government calling for the transfer of 
26 Romanian-inhabited counties in Eastern Hungary, based on 
Wilson’s principle of self-determination and the need to preserve 
public order. Then negotiators in Arad headed by Minister of 
Nationalities Oszkár Jászi (November 13–14) offered, until the 
peace negotiations were over, rights to self-determination to areas 
with a Romanian majority on a kind of cantonal system. This the 
Romanian National Council representatives rejected as being too 
complex. A second proposal from Jászi was for the areas with a 
Romanian majority to be subject to the Romanian National Council, 
which would be represented in Parliament, while the local minorities 
(Saxons, Romanians and Hungarians in this case) would be under 
the protection of the 1868 Nationalities Act. This the Romanian side 
also rejected, demanding complete secession.3
On December 1 came the Romanian Assembly at Gyulafehérvár 
(Alba Iulia). During the preparations, some representatives of 
Transylvania’s Romanian National Party (the initiators of the 
Romanian National Council) and the Social Democrats regarded 
the democratization of Romania as a precondition for the union, 
and were planning partial autonomy for Transylvania. However, 
only the democratic principles (universal franchise, freedom of 
the press and assembly, agrarian reform, extension of working-
class rights, and broad minority rights) made it into the final draft. 
Later the Romanian King Ferdinand I assented only to Point I 
of the resolution, the act of union.4 The 1,228 delegates of the 
Romanians of Hungary at Gyulafehérvár passed the resolution and 
proclaimed it to a crowd of a hundred thousand. They then elected 
a 200-member Grand National Council that appointed a 15-member 
Governing Council, headed by Iuliu Maniu, which was set up on 
December 7 in Nagyszeben (Sibiu) as a provisional government for 
the province.5 The Hungarian government on December 8 named as 
high governing commissioner of Eastern Hungary István Apáthy, 
a Kolozsvár professor and head of the Transylvanian Hungarian 
National Council. His aspiring government office sought to control 
the civil unrest in the province.6
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The rivalry of the two ethnically based regional centers of 
administration and power was decided by military events. The 
November 3 Padua ceasefire agreement had simply ordered the 
evacuation of areas occupied in the war without affecting Hungary’s 
borders, except for the secession of Croatia. The armistice was made 
concrete in the Belgrade Military Convention of November 13. One 
of its terms required the Hungarian government to withdraw behind 
a demarcation line along the Upper Nagy-Szamos river as far as 
Marosvásárhely (Oşorhei/Tărgu Mureş), then along the River Maros 
to Szeged, but it allowed Hungarian administration to remain in the 
ceded territories. On the day that the treaty was signed, Romanian 
forces arrived at the passes over the Eastern Carpathians and went 
on to occupy Marosvásárhely on December 2, Beszterce (Bistriţa) 
on the 4th, Székelyudvarhely (Odorhei/Odorheiu Secuiesc) on the 
6th, and Brassó (Braşov) on the 7th, and reached the demarcation 
line. The local Hungarian administration treated the Romanian 
units as Entente forces in control of the territory up until the peace 
negotiations, and there was no appreciable resistance. During 
the days after the Gyulafehérvár Assembly, the Romanian forces 
overstepped the demarcation line in some places. On December 
12, General Henri Berthelot, in command of the Entente’s Danube 
Army, arbitrarily allowed the Romanian forces to advance to a line 
running from Szatmárnémeti (Satu Mare) through Nagykároly 
(Carei) and Nagyvárad (Oradea) to Arad.7
The Károlyi government in Budapest put up no military 
resistance, partly out of faith in the Belgrade Convention and its 
acceptance as a partner by the Entente, but also because the soldiers 
returning from the war were causing huge social tensions and the 
government aimed to disarm these masses as quickly as possible. 
Nor did it have enough funds for setting up the new army. Of 
the new Hungarian republican defense force, only 3,000–4,000 
Transylvanian local guards were available to face an advancing 
Romanian force of 20,000–40,000 men. So on December 24 
Kolozsvár (Cluj) was ceded without a fight to the Romanian troops, 
who reached the Máramarossziget (Sighetu Marmaţiei)–Nagybánya 
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(Baia Mare)–Zilah (Zalău)–Csucsa (Ciucea) line before mid-January. 
The only opposing force consisted of the Székely Division recruited 
among refugees from occupied territories. By the end of January, 
experience had persuaded Károlyi in favor of armed defense of 
the country, but he still had no adequate military force available. 
But he could not accept the peace conference decision allowing 
the Romanians to advance to a line from Szatmárnémeti to Arad, 
fronted to the west by a neutral zone that was to embrace Debrecen, 
Békéscsaba and Szeged. Seeing that his policy of cooperating 
with the Entente had failed, Károlyi resigned. The only remaining 
chance of preserving the country’s integrity lay in a foreign policy 
of alignment with Soviet Russia.8
In mid-November, the Hungarian and Székely national councils 
in Transylvania responded to the Romanian self-determination 
effort by coming out in support of government from Budapest or 
alternatively of Transylvanian self-rule. A plan for an independent 
Székely state was also mooted. A rally of 40,000 held in Kolozsvár 
on December 22 called for national equality before the law in a 
“united, unmutilated Hungary.” There were attempts during the 
change of sovereignty to fill the power vacuum with autonomous 
local centers of authority: the Banat Republic, centered in Temesvár 
(Timişoara), the Székely Republic (Székelyudvarhely) and the 
Republic of Kalotaszeg (Bánffyhunyad/Huedin).9
The Romanian forces, having taken Nagyvárad on April 
20, 1919, introduced press censorship, a curfew and corporal 
punishment, banned the operation of political and social 
organizations, and suspended freedom of assembly and movement 
everywhere. On January 15, 1919, a delegation headed by Judge 
Emil Grandpierre met in Nagyszeben with Iuliu Maniu, head of 
the Governing Council. The Hungarian position – until the final 
legal settlement emerged from the peace talks – was for public 
administration in Hungarian-inhabited areas of Transylvania to be 
Hungarian, in Romanian-inhabited areas Romanian, and in mixed 
areas mixed. Officials should not be required to take an oath, just 
give an undertaking, for which the delegation had brought the 
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wording. The proposal was rejected by the Governing Council. 
Two days later, István Apáthy was arrested and his High Governing 
Commission for Eastern Hungary10 wound up forthwith. Meanwhile, 
control of the railway and postal services was assumed by Romanian 
army units. In March, the courts in Kolozsvár were taken over, as 
were the University of Sciences and the National Theater in May. 
Public officials, lawyers and railway employees were made to swear 
allegiance to the Romanian king, but refused on the grounds that the 
peace talks had not been completed. This meant loss of the franchise, 
employment and pensions, and most of them fled to Hungary. In all, 
about 145,000 persons left Transylvania for Hungary in 1918–1920, 
mostly from the urban middle class and officialdom. Conditions 
worsened further as dwellings were requisitioned by the military 
authorities. In September 1919, Romanian became the language of 
instruction in state secondary schools.11
After the High Governing Commission was closed and its head 
was arrested, there continued to be an illegal Transylvanian Center12 
headed by Judge Emil Grandpierre, the lord lieutenant of Kolozsvár 
appointed by the Károlyi government. The Center kept in touch with 
politicians in Budapest and Szeged, organized passive resistance 
among officials, gave what financial support it could to institutions 
and officials, and, last but not least, gathered information for those 
in Budapest who were preparing for the peace talks and for local 
Hungarian leaders in Transylvania.13
Once the Treaty of Trianon had been signed on June 4, 1920, 
were made to seek ways of settling in within the Romanian state. 
The Hungarian postal and administrative officials and lawyers who 
were still in their posts swore their oaths of allegiance in the same 
month. The land reform began to be implemented in September. 
The undertakings necessary for alleviating its effects (appeals, 
matters to do with expropriations of estates) made it essential to 
institutionalize some kind of political interest protection. A group 
consisting of Grandpierre and the former heads of the Hungarian 
state administration, on the grounds of the minority protection 
treaty signed by Romania in December 1919, sought foreign help 
for remedying Hungarian grievances. By November 1920 they 
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were thinking in terms of a legal body to represent the Hungarian 
community before the League of Nations, using the terms of the 
treaty, and the Hungarian Association emerged on January 9, 1921.14 
Meanwhile, another group appeared in Transylvanian public life in 
1918–1919, a group of younger, socially sensitive radical bourgeois, 
advocating integration into the Romanian state and the democratic 
organization of the Hungarian community within it. They promised 
loyalty to Romania in return for democratization that would have 
granted national autonomy to the annexed Hungarian community. 
The decisive influences were architect Károly Kós and journalist 
Árpád Paál (a former deputy lieutenant of Székelyudvarhely who had 
sworn loyalty along with county officials to the Székely Republic and 
then spent a year and a half in prison).15 Essentially these were the 
two groups that competed to represent the Hungarians of Romania in 
1921–1922: the traditional Transylvanian Hungarian elite (including 
church leaders), trying to defend their positions, and the bourgeoisie 
and the intellectuals, who were setting the agenda of the press and 
were urging democratic self-organization and political, economic 
and social modernization.
It was essential to create a united body to represent Hungarian 
interests against the discriminatory policies that Romania was pur-
suing. In the spring of 1921, the Hungarian Church leaders (Roman 
Catholic, Reformed and Unitarian) swore allegiance, for they were 
the one remaining institutional umbrella over the Hungarian com-
munity, able to offer some political representation, mainly for griev-
ances over the school system and land reform, but representation in 
Parliament became essential. This meant running in the elections as 
a political party. The Hungarian People’s Party (Magyar Néppárt) 
was formed in the summer of 1921 by the “activists” among the Hun-
garian minority elite,16 and in July, integration went further when the 
“passivists” united with the People’s Party and joined the Hungarian 
Association, which was now headed by Baron Sámuel Jósika, the 
last speaker of the Hungarian Upper House (the House of Lords), and 
as such, formerly the highest-ranking public figure in Transylvania. 
The Association (as their self-governing organization) saw itself as 
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the legal embodiment of the Hungarians of Romania. This claim 
prompted the government to fabricate reasons to suspend its opera-
tion in October 1921. For the general elections due in 1922, first the 
People’s Party in January and then Grandpierre’s Hungarian National 
Party (Magyar Nemzeti Párt) in February reorganized and agreed on 
common candidates. They were not helped by the fact that much of 
the Hungarian community had been left off the electoral rolls and 
most of the Hungarian candidates were not allowed to stand for vari-
ous reasons. These and other electoral abuses – designed to ensure a 
majority for the Liberal Party in the constituent assembly – resulted 
in a House of Representatives and a Senate with only three Hun-
garian members each, whereas their proportion of the population 
would have warranted 25–30. When the operation of the Hungarian 
Association remained banned in the autumn of 1922, the leaders of 
the two parties agreed at the end of December to merge as the Na-
tional Hungarian Party (Országos Magyar Párt), which essentially 
continued with the program of the Hungarian Association, this way 
preventing the Romanian political parties from forming organiza-
tions to represent the Hungarians.17
czechoslovakia: Slovakia (Attila Simon)
The Czechoslovak state was proclaimed on October 28, 1918, but 
its borders were not settled for several months. Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Edvard Beneš intended to present the Paris Peace Conference 
with a fait accompli, and so Czech forces (without any warrant to do 
so) tried unsuccessfully in November 1918 to occupy the northern 
counties of Hungary, where the administration was falling apart. 
Only at the end of the month did the Entente draw a provisional 
demarcation line between the two countries, running along the 
Danube and Ipoly rivers, then from Rimaszombat (Rimavská 
Sobota) as far as the River Ung. The Hungarian government only 
learnt of this in the so-called Vix Note of December 23.
Czech legions ordered back from Italy began on December 31, 
1918, to occupy the southern, Hungarian-inhabited areas of 
Upper Hungary (the future Slovakia) and gained control before 
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mid-January. Local inhabitants saw the Czechoslovak rule as 
temporary and received the Czech soldiers peacefully, except in a 
few places near Érsekújvár (Nové Zámky) and in the Mátyusföld 
(Matúšov) villages of Deáki (Deakovce) and Pered, where local 
guard units opposed them. There was resistance in the form of a rail 
strike in the occupied areas called in the early days of February by 
the Pozsony (Bratislava) Social Democrats, who also held a mass 
rally of Hungarian and German inhabitants of Pozsony on February 
12, 1919, protesting against social grievances and the Czechoslovak 
occupation. The intervention by the authorities led to Czechoslovak 
soldiers firing on the peaceful demonstrators, causing eight fatalities 
and 14 injuries.
The Czechoslovak army went on to attack the Hungarian Soviet 
Republic, seeking to push Slovakia’s borders still further south to a 
line along the ridge of the Mátra and Bükk hills, but without success. 
The Paris Peace Conference in June 1919 drew the final border 
along the December demarcation line, but with some alterations, to 
Hungary’s detriment. Ethnic principles were ignored, meaning that 
890,000 of the 2.9 million inhabitants of the new Slovakia appear to 
have been Hungarians if the 1910 census data are projected onto the 
new state borders. Most of the Hungarians lived in a homogeneous 
Hungarian-speaking zone along Slovakia’s southern borders.18
In terms of its nature, Czechoslovakia’s history from the foundation 
of the state up to the first parliamentary elections in the spring of 
1920 can be called a period of Czechoslovak national dictatorship.19 
Legislative power was held by a provisional National Assembly in 
which the German and Hungarian inhabitants were unrepresented. 
This body adopted the basic laws that would remain in force until the 
autumn of 1938: the Constitution, the language act, land reform act, 
public administration act, and so on. The National Assembly granted 
full powers to govern Slovakia to a minister plenipotentiary, Vavro 
Šrobárt. There commenced a de-Hungarianization of Slovakian 
public life using a series of new laws and regulations and the means 
available to the military dictatorship that had been declared due 
to the presence of the Hungarian Soviet Republic. It meant that 
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large numbers of Hungarian officials, teachers and other state 
employees were dismissed. Many others left rather than take an 
oath of allegiance to the new state. As a result, several thousand 
families (about 120,000 persons) who had lost their livelihood fled 
to Hungary. A process of rapid ethnic transformation began in the 
cities along the ethnic border. Suddenly several important centers 
such as Eperjes (Prešov), Nagyszombat (Trnava) and Nyitra (Nitra) 
became predominantly Slovak-speaking. Over the next couple of 
years, Hungarian monuments and statues disappeared as well. The 
statue of Maria Theresa in Pozsony was broken to pieces by Czech 
legionaries, as were the Millenary moments in Dévény (Devín) and 
Nyitra, the statue of an 1848 Hungarian soldier in Kassa (Košice) and 
statues of Lajos Kossuth in Rozsnyó (Rožňava), Losonc (Lučenec) 
and Érsekújvár.
The constitutional changes soon affected Slovakia’s ethnic 
structure. The census of 1921 recorded 637,000 Hungarians, a fall 
of over 250,000 in the number in Slovakia since 1910, due to the 
many who had left the country and tens of thousands of bilingual 
city dwellers now more inclined to record themselves as Slovaks 
than as Hungarians.20
The Constitution adopted by the provisional Czechoslovak 
National Assembly on February 29, 1920, ended national dictatorship 
and created a basis for parliamentary democracy. The First 
Republic was a centralist state run from Prague, with an ideology 
of “Czechoslovakism,” whereby the Czech and Slovak nations were 
one. So the official language of state was Czechoslovak, which did 
not exist in reality. Relations between the Czechs and the Slovaks 
remained unresolved throughout the period, as Czechoslovakism was 
widely rejected by Slovaks pressing for autonomy for Slovakia.
Czechoslovak legislation was relatively generous with 
minority rights, allowing minorities to found political and cultural 
organizations, and to use their language in official contacts if they 
accounted for over 20 percent of the population. But there were 
obstacles to applying this in practice, as the Czech officials who had 
replaced the Hungarians were unable to speak the local language.
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Development of Hungarian political and cultural institutions 
in Slovakia was assisted by the new Constitution and the first 
parliamentary elections, but went slowly due to uncertainty over the 
borders and a want of distinct political traditions in Upper Hungary. 
Most Hungarians voted in the elections in April 1920 for parties 
that advocated self-determination for minorities. Two Hungarians 
entered the Prague Parliament on the list of the left-wing German–
Hungarian Social Democratic Party and another six on those of 
the right-wing National Christian Socialist Party and the National 
Hungarian Smallholders’, Agriculturalists’ and Artisans’ Party. The 
popularity of left-wing ideas also appears in the fact that a further 
two Hungarians won seats for the biggest Czechoslovak party, the 
Czechoslovak Social Democratic Movement.21
Opposition Hungarian members set out to exploit the scope 
of Czechoslovak parliamentarianism, speaking up in their native 
language for the right of the Hungarian minority to self-determination 
and the minority rights assured to them by international agreement 
and under the Czechoslovak Constitution. Lajos Körmendy-Ékes, 
presenting a joint declaration by the right-wing Hungarian parties in 
the Prague legislature on June 2, 1920, picked out well the cardinal 
policies to be pursued by the Hungarians of Czechoslovakia in 
the coming years: “It is our parliamentary duty to the Hungarian 
community over a million strong, forced into alien frames and 
under strong pressure there, and to our German brethren suffering a 
similar fate, to afford them at all times, by legal means but without 
compromise, devoted protection, until such time as all people realize 
and it be the truth in everyone’s eyes that the Hungarians may well 
have been the sole combatants in the world war who sought to win 
without taking aught from others, striving simply for their existence 
and national honor on the grounds that a word given is sacred. 
Although we have now through others’ crimes lost all, yet has our 
honor remained; precisely this is what obligates us to state clearly 
and decisively that we shall never in any wise abandon our right of 
self-determination, for that we reserve, that we demand.”22
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czechoslovakia: transcarpathia (Csilla Fedinec)
The government of Mihály Károlyi, in Act X/1918,23 granted autonomy 
to the Rusyn (Ruthenian) people of the variously named northeast 
Felvidék (Upper Hungary), one of the most backward parts of the 
country. The name given to the territory in the act was Ruszka Krajna 
(Rus’ka Krajna, in English: Ruthenian Border Territory). In December 
1918, a Ministry for Rus’ka Krajna was set up under Oreszt Szabó (Orest 
Sabov), and a Munkács-based governor, Avgusztin Stefán (Avgusthyn 
Shtefan), was appointed, but foreign armies advanced into the territory 
in January 1919 and the borders of Rus’ka Krajna receded before 
them.24 The Upper Tisza district came under Romanian control, while 
Czechoslovak forces occupied the western part up to the River Ung, 
including the city of Ungvár (Ukrainian: Uzhhorod, Slovak: Užhorod). 
The foreign forces continued to advance under the Hungarian Soviet 
Republic (March 21–August 6), whose constitution25 recognized a 
Rusyn autonomous area, but it existed for only 40 days in March and 
April before being overrun by Czechoslovak and Romanian military 
forces.26 But the major influences on the destiny of Transcarpathia were 
not confined to the Hungarian government, which sought to retain 
possession of the Rusyn-inhabited areas and to prevent secessions 
or detachments from them.27
One such influence was the so-called Ukrainian line, which 
had the strongest influence in the Máramaros County. Its main aim 
was to annex Transcarpathia to Ukraine. From November 1918 to 
May 1919, a body called the Hutsul People’s Council was based 
at Kőrösmező (Ukrainian: Jasyna, Slovak: Jasiňa) and declared a 
Hutsul Republic, but this was ended by the Romanian invasion.
The other main initiative came from the Rusyn-Ukrainian 
émigré community in North America. Several organizations were 
founded but the decisive influence on events was the American 
National Council of Ruthenians founded at Homestead, Florida, and 
chaired by Nicholas Chopey. The aims of the Council were formu-
lated by Gregory Zhatkovych, a lawyer. It joined the Mid-European 
Democratic Union chaired by T. G. Masaryk, signed the Declara-
tion of Common Aims of the Independent Mid-European Nations, 
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and voted at Scranton, Pennsylvania, on November 12, 1918, for an-
nexing the Rusyn-inhabited counties of historical Hungary (Szepes, 
Sáros, Zemplén, Abaúj, Gömör, Borsod, Ung, Bereg and Márama-
ros) to the new Republic of Czechoslovakia, provided that the latter 
gave autonomy to the majority population, the Rusyns. US President 
Woodrow Wilson was informed of the Scranton resolution as well.
Thereafter, the Rusyns who were invited to the Paris peace 
conference that opened on January 18, 1919, by Edvard Beneš and 
Karel Kramař, representing the Czechoslovak government, were 
not local figures sympathetic to Hungary or the Ukrainian line, 
but representatives of the émigré American National Council of 
Ruthenians, including Gregory Zhatkovych and Anton Beszkid 
(Anton Beskyd), president of the Rusyn Council of Eperjes 
(Slovak: Prešov), who was resident in Czechoslovakia by then. 
The Czechoslovak claims in Transcarpathia were endorsed by the 
Paris peace conference on March 12, 1919. On May 8, 1919, the 
Rusyn councils of Eperjes, Ungvár and Huszt (Ukrainian: Khust, 
Slovak: Chust) held a joint meeting in Ungvár (by then occupied by 
Czechoslovakia) to found the Central Russian (i.e. Rusyn) National 
Council, which declared “voluntary” annexation to Czechoslovakia. 
The Czechoslovak government took steps in August to introduce 
civil government alongside the military administration in force 
there since the beginning of the occupation.
That was the situation when the Treaty of Saint-Germain-en-
Laye was signed by the Allied and Associated Powers and the new 
Republic of Austria on September 10, 1919.28 To the Czechoslovak 
Republic was ceded Transcarpathia – the most of the counties 
of Ung, Bereg, Ugocsa and Máramaros, under the designation 
“Podkarpatská Rus” (Subcarpathian Russia) – with more than 
600,000 inhabitants, of whom 370,000 described themselves in 
1921 as Rusyn (or Russian or Ukrainian), 102,000 as Hungarian, 
80,000 as Jewish, and smaller numbers as Romanian, Czech, Slovak, 
German and Gypsy.29 Czechoslovakia committed itself under the 
treaty to running the territory as an autonomous self-governing 
unit. Until this commitment should be met, a provisional Rusyn 
Autonomous Directory was appointed under the chairmanship of 
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Gregory Zhatkovych, who moved to Užhorod with his family in the 
summer.
The constitution of the Czechoslovak Republic adopted on 
February 29, 1920, confirmed that Transcarpathia was to receive 
wide autonomy.30 On May 5, Zhatkovych was appointed as governor, 
again provisionally, until autonomy should be granted. One reason 
given for the provisional status was the fact that the Romanian army 
had yet to withdraw. That was also why the region was omitted 
from the first Czechoslovak elections to the National Assembly and 
the Senate, held in the spring of 1920. The Romanian withdrawal 
was completed at the end of August that year, but still no change 
was made in its status. Zhatkovych could make no progress in his 
talks with the government and resigned in disillusionment. After an 
official farewell to Užhorod on May 17, 1921, he moved back to the 
United States over the summer.31
Simultaneously with these Transcarpathian events, of 
importance primarily to the Rusyns, the Hungarian community was 
following its own route. It took a long time for it to sink in with the 
Hungarians that these new borders were permanent, not temporary. 
The first steps were to try to save Hungarian as a language of 
instruction in secondary schools – petitions were drawn up or 
efforts made to start private gymnasia in Munkács (Ukrainian: 
Mukacheve, Slovak: Mukačevo), Beregszász (Ukrainian: Berehove, 
Slovak: Berehovo) and above all Ungvár – and to establish political 
organizations. That early period marked the beginning of several 
Hungarian parties in Transcarpathia: the Hungarian Party of Law, 
the Autonomous Party of the Indigenous, the Christian Socialist 
Party and the Smallholders, Artisans and Agriculturalists’ Party. 
The Hungarian branch of the Czechoslovak Communist Party also 
had a strong influence on the public initially.32
The Hungarian population of Transcarpathia experienced 
the change of state sovereignty and its results in a way specific 
to itself. It took a while before people realized what life under a 
new state entailed. People interpreted the events around them 
quite unrealistically until the peace treaties had been concluded. 
Officials and government employees in the early days refused to 
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swear allegiance to the new Czechoslovak state. The Hungarian 
intelligentsia viewed uncomprehendingly the sudden political self-
confidence of the Rusyns, who now had no desire to fall back on 
Hungarian politics and wanted to further their own interests. Only 
after the international treaties that decided the fate of the whole of 
Transcarpathia had been concluded did the Hungarians grasp their 
real situation, treating what had happened to them and their mother 
country as a drama, a tragedy. As a way of suffering the tragedy 
more easily, they sought a scapegoat for what had happened, and their 
choice fell on the Jews. Once it was realized that the borders could not 
be changed, their attention shifted: if there was to be a border between 
them and their mother country, let it be permeable, not sealed. The 
Hungarian community experienced for the first time what it was like 
to live as a minority. The Austro-Hungarian Monarchy had contained 
a great many national groups, and the peace agreements that ended the 
First World War typically acknowledged them by detaching them as 
new states, and by creating a new national minority, the Hungarians 
themselves.33
the Serb-croat-Slovene Kingdom (Enikő A. Sajti)
The Zagreb National Council of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes 
declared its secession from Austria-Hungary on October 29, 1918, 
and proclaimed the State of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. On 
November 24, it announced the unification of the South Slav lands, 
including Vajdaság (Vojvodina). Due to a dispute with Zagreb about 
unification procedure, the Novi Sad Grand National Assembly, on 
the advice of the Serbian National Council in Újvidék (Novi Sad), 
announced separately on November 25 that the Bánát (Banat), Bácska 
(Bačka) and Baranya (Baranja) were detached from Hungary and 
annexed to the Kingdom of Serbia. This assembly did not reflect the 
ethnic composition of Vajdaság: 750 of the 757 delegates were Slavs 
– 578 Serbs, 84 Bunjevci (Bunyevác), 62 Slovaks, 21 Rusyns, 3 Šokci 
and 2 Croats – with only 6 Germans and 1 Hungarian, but it passed 
a resolution proposed by Jaša Tomić, head of the Újvidék Council of 
Nationalities ensuring minority rights for non-Slav peoples.34
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Formation of the Royal State of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes 
was announced formally in Belgrade on December 1, 1918. This 
became the Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom with the adoption of 
the St. Vitus’ Day Constitution of June 28, 1921 (Vidovdanski 
ustav).
On November 13, 1918, the Károlyi government signed the 
Belgrade Military Convention (in effect an armistice), which confirmed 
the Serb military occupation of the Southern Region, and obliged the 
Hungarian government to evacuate the areas of Transylvania and the 
Banat east of the Upper Szamos river and south of the River Maros, 
and also the lands south of the Szeged–Baja–Pécs–Varasd (Varaždin) 
railway. In addition, the city of Pécs, with part of Baranya (Baranja), 
and Baja with its environs came under Serbian military occupation. 
These were not evacuated as required under the Treaty of Trianon 
until August 24, 1920. The Convention did not apply to the Muravidék 
(Pomurje), but the Serbian army occupied it for a time. A Croatian 
unit took over the Muraköz (Međimurje) in December 1918. Only on 
February 20, 1919, could the Serbian military command take over 
the Banat from the Bánát National Council, which had envisaged a 
measure of autonomy under French supervision.35
The Belgrade Military Convention left the administration of 
Serbian-occupied areas to “local organizations”: Hungary should 
have run them up to the signing of the peace treaty. However, the 
Grand National Council elected by the Grand National Assembly in 
Újvidék set up for administrative purposes a new regional Serbian 
body (people’s government) called the People’s Administration for 
the Banat, Bačka and Baranja,36 headed by Joca Lalošević. This was 
abolished by a royal decree of March 11, 1919, that centralized and 
regulated the provisional administration of the new state. Thereafter 
the Southern Region territories annexed to the Kingdom of Serbs, 
Croats, and Slovenes were administered directly from Belgrade 
through the separate Bačka, Banat and Baranja Department of the 
Ministry of the Interior.
Up to the end of September 1919, successive Hungarian 
governments urged the Southern Region officials (and those of other 
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detached territories) to resist openly. They were to take orders only 
from Budapest and refuse to take the oath of allegiance to the new 
state. The Friedrich and the Huszár governments changed this stance 
before the peace treaty was signed and began to accept “seeming 
integration,” but there were serious conflicts between the Southern 
Region Hungarians and the new South Slav authorities.
The National Directorate, ignoring the terms of the Belgrade 
Convention, immediately started to dismiss Hungarian lord 
lieutenants, deputy-lieutenants, mayors and notaries in favor of 
mainly Serbian officials, often current, as being more reliable in 
their allegiance. Non-compliance by the old Hungarian judges and 
prosecutors led to some civil cases being brought before Serbian 
military courts. Censorship was imposed, and Hungarian-language 
theater performances and film shows were banned, as were 
assemblies of “unreliable elements,” including family gatherings. 
A curfew was introduced, and officers of the Austro-Hungarian 
army were placed under police surveillance, while officials and 
teachers who refused to swear an oath of allegiance were dismissed 
from their posts and had their property confiscated. Nor were armed 
clashes between the Serb military and locals rare.
In March 1920, the Belgrade government ordered the 
conscription of young men in the Southern Region. There was a 
mass refusal to join on the part of the Germans and Hungarians 
of Bačka and the Banat, which sparked shooting incidents between 
the military and the local population. One such left 15 dead and 20 
wounded in Torzsa (Torž) and another 10 dead and 20 wounded in 
Zombor (Sombor). The authorities took hostages in several places 
as a way to keep order. The Szabadka (Subotica) Rail Directorate 
sacked two thirds of the Hungarian railway staff in an attempt to 
crush a strike, during which the Szabadka police department was 
attacked and two men were killed.37
The borders of the South Slav state emerged from the peace 
treaties and frontier agreements of 1919–1920. Under Trianon, 
Hungary (excluding Croatia–Slavonia) lost 20,551 square kilometers 
with 1,509,295 inhabitants to the South Slav state (in Muravidék/
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Prekmurje, the Baranya Triangle, part of the Banat, and Bácska/
Bačka), where 30.3 percent of the population had been Hungarian 
at the time of the 1910 census. According to the Yugoslav census of 
1921, the area ceded by Hungary to the South Slav kingdom held 
467,658 Hungarians, of which 378,107 dwelt in Vojvodina (the Banat, 
Bačka and Baranja). The “Southern Region” in Hungarian parlance 
and historical terminology means the areas (except Croatia) annexed 
to the Yugoslav state after 1918 (the Banat, Bačka, Baranya and 
Muravidék/Međimurje), while the term Vajdaság (Vojvodina) was 
linked with nineteenth-century autonomy efforts, partly successful, 
by Hungary’s Serbian national minority. The Serbian Vojvodina 
existed from 1849 to 1860. After 1945, the Autonomous Province of 
Vojvodina included the Banat, Bačka and Baranya, and also Srem 
(Szerémség/Srijem).
A total of 44,903 Hungarians left the Serb-Croat-Slovene 
Kingdom between 1918 and 1924, as deportees, refugees, or optants.
Inroads into the Hungarian school system began right after 
the Serbian troops arrived, as teachers were dismissed in large 
numbers for refusing to take the oath. By 1920, the Serbian system 
of elementary and secondary state schools had spread over the 
Southern Region and the teacher training college in Subotica had 
been closed. The old system of communal, denominational and 
private schools, including Serbian ones, was almost completely 
eliminated by the nationalization.
Article 16 of the St. Vitus’s Day Constitution provided for 
mother-tongue education in elementary schools for “citizens 
belonging to another race and speaking another language.” Children 
were to be raised in a spirit of “state self-awareness and national 
unity,” and so even a minimum of Hungarian national subjects 
was left out of the curriculum. In June 1920, Minister of Education 
Svetozar Pribičević issued a notorious “name-analysis” order that 
limited the right to mother-tongue education for Hungarians. The 
order, which remained in force under the new constitution, right up 
to 1938, gave access to mother-tongue instruction only to Hungarian 
children whose parents and grandparents bore surnames deemed by 
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a committee to be Hungarian. This also meant that all those classed 
as ethnic Germans or as Jews were barred from enrolling their 
children in Hungarian-taught classes.
Nationalization of the economy began in the autumn of 1918 with 
the freezing of ostensibly foreign assets. Local Hungarian owners 
were obligated under an order, which has never been found, to elect 
“reliable Serbs” onto the boards of directors of their companies.
After some hesitation, Yugoslavia stated on December 5, 1919, 
in connection with the Austrian peace treaty, that it would endorse 
the international minority protection treaty. This committed the 
country to providing mother-tongue elementary education for the 
minorities in its territory (except for the Albanians and Macedonians) 
and requisite funding for that from the state budget. The treaty also 
contained option rights for Hungarians. Yugoslavia’s Hungarians 
were not able to exercise their rights as citizens until the option 
right expired on July 26, 1922. They could not take part in the 1921 
elections to the constituent assembly or found any business, political 
or cultural organizations.38
Austria (Gerhard Baumgartner)
The Allied Powers, after the proclamation of republics in Austria 
and Hungary, proposed at talks with them that western areas of 
the counties of Moson, Sopron and Vas be annexed to Austria. Yet 
these areas had not been included in the new Republic of Austria’s 
territorial claims.39
These areas (the future Burgenland) were inhabited chiefly 
by Germans (75.1 percent), Croats (15.2 percent) and Hungarians 
(8.4 percent). Those whose native language was Hungarian were 
unevenly distributed over the annexed territory. Most lived in 
mixed communities or were scattered. There was mainly Hungarian 
habitation only in the Oberwart (Felsőőr) and western Neusiedl 
(Nezsider) districts. The 1920 census recorded 22,867 native-
speaking Hungarian inhabitants in Burgenland. Only in the villages 
ceded from Vas County did the Hungarians exceed 10,000, but 
there they made up only 8 percent of the population. The highest 
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proportion of Hungarians was in the ceded areas of Moson County: 
14.3 percent. The ceded community with the highest proportion of 
Hungarians was Eisenstadt (Kismarton, 35.0 percent), the future 
provincial capital. The most important Hungarian communities 
were in Oberwart (Felsőőr) with 3,138 Hungarians, Unterwart 
(Alsóőr) with 1,230, and Eisenstadt with 1,020. There were altogether 
53 communities with over 100 Hungarian inhabitants. A more 
significant picture emerges if the number of Hungarian-speakers, 
rather than native speakers, is taken. These were in an absolute 
majority in the Neusiedl and Oberpullendorf (Felsőpulya) districts 
and the towns of Eisenstadt and Rust (Ruszt), and their proportion 
in the whole of Burgenland was 35.1 percent (78,686 persons).
Most people (67.7 percent) were engaged in farming, the rest in 
industry (16.2 percent), commerce and credit (1.9 percent), mining 
and smelting (1.9 percent), public service (1.2 percent), armed forces 
(1.6 percent) and transport (1 percent), and 1.8 percent were self-
employed. Only Neufeld an der Leitha (Lajtaújfalu) had a sizeable 
mine, employing 549, and a yarn factory, employing 603.40
The German-speaking inhabitants of Burgenland began to 
organize themselves in November 1918 with the foundation of the 
German People’s Council for Western Hungary41 in Mattersdorf 
(Nagymarton, after 1924 Mattersburg), to which 200 communities 
later became affiliated. A month later, Mattersdorf was again the 
center for a “Republic of Heanzenland,” instigated on the initiative 
of the Austrian Social Democratic Party as a way of easing accession 
to Austria.42 Participants in a German People’s Day in Sopron in 
January 1919 called for territorial autonomy, which the Hungarian 
government legislated for ten days later. This brought into being 
a Deutsches Gouvernement for the German-inhabited parts of the 
country, allowing the Germans cultural autonomy.43
The 1919 peace treaty of Saint-Germain annexed Burgenland to 
Austria. Hungary was forced to acknowledge this in the 1920 Treaty 
of Trianon. In 1921, the Austrian government passed legislation 
making Burgenland a separate province, although it was not yet 
able to occupy the whole of it. The Hungarian Soviet Republic 
was replaced by one appointed by Miklós Horthy as regent, but 
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there were legitimists who sought to place Charles IV back on the 
throne. One legitimist center was the Erdődy mansion at Rotenturm 
(Vörösvár). The legitimist units played a key part in resisting the 
Austrian forces that began to take over in 1921. The first clash took 
place between the Austrian police and Hungarian irregulars at the 
border village of Pinkafeld (Pinkafő). The irregulars managed to 
expel the Austrian forces from the whole of Burgenland during 
September. On October 4, the “Lajtabánság” (the Banat of Leitha) 
was proclaimed as an independent state at Oberwart.44 Thereafter 
negotiations between the Austrian and Hungarian states began, 
leading to the Venice Memorandum of October 13, in which 
Hungary undertook to cease supporting the irregulars and Austria 
agreed to a plebiscite to decide the fate of Sopron and eight 
neighboring villages.
Austrian troops occupied Burgenland on November 26, 1921, 
and took over the public administration, but they withdrew from 
Sopron and district before the plebiscite, held on December 14–15, 
in which 72.8 percent of the votes were in Hungary’s favor. The 
town and eight villages remained Hungarian.45 Contributing to the 
result was the fact that the majority of the inhabitants of Sopron 
were Evangelical (Lutheran), whereas Austria was almost entirely 
Catholic. Thus the Hungarian-speaking citizens were joined in 
voting for Hungary by German-speakers known as the Ponzichter 
– mainly market gardeners and vineyard owners.46 The Hungarian 
government awarded Sopron the honorary title of Civitas fidelissima 
(most faithful city).
No self-governing organizations ever emerged among the 
minority Hungarians in the territories ceded to Austria, only 
cultural associations in Hungarian communities, which had been 
functioning since the late nineteenth century – the Alsóőr Reading 
Circle since 1890 and the Reformed Youth Reading Circle since 1899, 
for instance. Apart from those, Hungarian cultural associations were 
found in Austria after 1918 only in Vienna and Graz. The oldest was 
the Hungarian Reading Circle of Vienna, founded in 1864, and the 
Graz Hungarian Cultural Association, founded in 1888.47
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II. BEtWEEn tHE tWo WorLd WArS
1921–1938

1. nAtIon StAtES And MInorItIES
In cEntrAL EuroPE
László Szarka
The radical post-war changes of sovereignty and state borders in 
Europe still left sizeable minorities. The majority of the continent’s 
62 million minority citizens dwelt in the 17 newly constituted states 
of non-Russian East-Central Europe and in Turkey, but there were 12 
million in Western Europe and 11.5 million in the interwar territory 
of Russia as well.1
Only in six European locations was an attempt made to 
settle territorial disputes by plebiscite – four involving Germany 
(Schleswig-Holstein, southeastern Prussia, Upper Silesia and the 
Polish Corridor2) and two involving Austria (southern Carinthia, 
and the Sopron/Ödenburg district). Plebiscite plans in three other 
areas (Teschen/Cieszyn/Těšín, and parts of former Árva/Orava and 
Szepes/Spiš/Zips, disputed between Czechoslovakia and Poland, 
and the territories of Eupen–Malmedy, disputed between Belgium 
and Germany) were abandoned.
A plebiscite in the Austrian provinces of Tyrol and Salzburg 
in April and May 1921 showed 99 percent voter support for union 
with Germany, in contravention of the terms of the Treaty of Saint-
Germain-en-Laye, which specifically forbade Austria’s accession to 
Germany. The Austrian regime bowed to international pressure and 
quashed these initiatives. When the new borders of Hungary were 
being drawn, neighboring countries combined to protest against 
the solution by plebiscite urged by the Hungarian peace delegation 
under Albert Apponyi. Except in the Sopron/Ödenburg district, 
Hungary’s Trianon borders were settled administratively even in 
places where local demands for a vote were insistent (Salgótarján 
and Prekmurje).3
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In Western and Northern Europe, the borders agreed in the 
treaties ending World War I created four sizeable new ethnic 
minorities in the following cases: the annexation of the Germans 
of South Tyrol to Italy, the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine to France 
(a longstanding conflict involving dual identity), the cession of 
largely German-speaking Eupen and Sankt Vith to Belgium, and 
the incorporation of the Swedish-speaking Åland islanders into 
Finland. These recipient countries opposed the demands of the 
minority communities with their own, concerning defense or the 
territorial aspirations of neighboring parent countries. The Swedish 
and German minority regions now have settled legal status, but all 
except Åland were the source of numerous conflicts in the interwar 
period. In the final third of the twentieth century, exemplary and 
well-functioning forms of minority autonomy were devised for self-
government in South Tyrol and German-speaking Belgium, but on 
the back of very unsteady interwar backgrounds. However, the cases 
of much larger historical ethnic groups in Western Europe – Basques 
and Catalans in Spain, Bretons and Corsicans in France, Frisians 
in the Netherlands, or speakers of Celtic languages in the United 
Kingdom – were left unmentioned in the treaties and uncovered by 
the international system for minority protection.4
Most countries in Western and Southern Europe – Britain, 
France, Spain and Italy – became nation states by seeing the 
commonwealth of citizens as the basic concept and framework of 
the “nation”. Historical and regional minority communities would 
steadily lose their language, and with it their potential for forming 
a separate nation. A “political nation” in Western Europe, in raising 
its language to the status of a state language, would strive to impede 
the development of parallel national movements. Certain countries 
in Northern and Western countries afforded language-use rights to 
a chosen minority. Finland made both Finnish and Swedish official 
languages under the 1922 Constitution. Belgium in the 1930s 
counteracted the political and cultural supremacy of French by 
granting broad language-use rights to the Flemings. In Spain, on 
the other hand, the Catalans’ rights of language use were curtailed 
in 1918.5
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Far bigger conflicts took place after World War I in East-
Central Europe and the Balkans, in both the victorious and the 
defeated successor states to the Habsburg Monarchy. To the east of 
Germany, which Versailles had deprived of several border regions 
and provinces with a German majority, there arose a plethora of 
separatist movements and local plebiscites. Just after the foundation of 
Czechoslovakia, representatives of the Sudeten Germans tried to set up 
provinces of German Bohemia (Deutschböhmen), German Moravia 
(Deutschsüdmähren) and Bohemian Forest Region (Böhmerwald) 
as units of German Austria, rejecting the idea that Sudetenland 
should belong to Czechoslovakia, although these initiatives were 
easily defeated by military force. Similar efforts were made in 
Silesia and several other Polish/German border areas.6
The populations of the buffer-zone states created by the 
Versailles peace system – Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland and Yugoslavia, with the radically altered 
Germany, Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania – included 
about 80 million people (50 percent) whose citizenship changed. It 
was mainly in the ostensible nation states of Central and Eastern 
Europe that the minority issue assumed great importance through 
the enhanced political weight of old and new minority ethnic 
groups and the minority protection agreements attached to the 
peace treaties and the League of Nations guarantee system.7
The Versailles peace system rested on what proved an 
erroneous French geostrategic notion, the idea that France could 
only manage in conjunction with Eastern allies to contain the 
revisionist efforts of Germany, and the Soviet Russian efforts to 
expand into the Baltic, Poland’s Ukrainian areas, Bessarabia and 
Bukovina. Germany managed with the 1925 Treaty of Locarno 
to break out of its diplomatic isolation, having accepted and 
guaranteed the Rhine border laid down in the Treaty of Versailles, 
in other words relinquishing its claims to Alsace-Lorraine and the 
German-speaking parts of Belgium. In return for the five-nation 
Rhine guarantee pact, France and Belgium ceased to occupy the 
Ruhr and Germany could rejoin the international community as a 
member of the League of Nations.8
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The Versailles process left only three self-declared nations 
in East-Central and Southeastern Europe without separate 
constitutional status: the Rusyns, Bosnians and Macedonians. 
All other nations (along with the Austrians, Hungarians, Serbs, 
Romanians, Bulgarians, Finns, Albanians and Greeks, who had 
attained statehood in some form before 1918) were equipped with a 
nation state in some sense. The borders for the nations with historical 
statehood – the Czechs, Poles, Lithuanians and Croats – and those of 
the nominal “Soviet republics” and “autonomous areas” of the Soviet 
Union were drawn on the basis of ethnic regions. The Estonians and 
Letts gained independent statehood for the first time. Others, who 
had never had a “national” state – the Slovaks, Slovenes and Croats, 
and the Belorussians within the Soviet Union – were accommodated 
with nations that spoke a related language.
The most ethnically diverse of the new states in East-Central 
Europe and the Balkans were Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, 
although their constitutions spoke of composite “Czechoslovak” 
and “Serbo-Croat” nations that hardly featured in the declared 
affiliations of their inhabitants. Their pseudo-federal systems 
caused serious problems not only for the national minorities within 
their territories but for minority nations within them as well – the 
Slovaks and Rusyns, and the Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians and 
Bosnians.9
Both East-Central and Southeastern Europe contained large 
numbers of sizeable national minority groups old and new. The two 
most numerous were 4.4 million minority Ukrainians living mainly 
in Poland but to some extent in the Baltic states, and 8.9 million 
ethnic Germans living in 13 states. The two biggest minorities 
in a single state were Poland’s Ukrainians and Czechoslovakia’s 
Sudeten Germans, each numbering about 3 million.10
Even post-war Hungary still had sizeable minority communities, 
a fact that Czechoslovakia in particular cited in its minority-related 
diplomatic activity, both bilateral and through the Little Entente. 
For 10.4 percent of the population of post-Trianon Hungary had a 
native language other than Hungarian, the most numerous being the 
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Germans (551,000), followed by the Slovaks (132,000), the Croats 
(37,000), the Serbs (36,000) and the Romanians (24,000). The native 
language of the vast majority of the Jews in Hungary was Hungarian. 
They numbered over 470,000 in 1920. No official cognizance was 
taken of two non-Hungarian Gypsy languages.11
The number of ethnic Hungarians on the post-war territories 
of the new neighboring countries of Austria, Czechoslovakia, 
Romania and the Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom, now minority 
communities, had fallen significantly since the census of 1910. 
The assimilation processes of the pre-war period had given way to 
dissimilation. This was especially the case in the cities of Slovakia 
and Transcarpathia (Ruthenia). The proportion of Hungarians 
among the inhabitants of Bratislava and Košice, for instance, had 
sunk below 20 percent by 1930, with the result that that Hungarian 
language-use rights there had lapsed. Resettlement, flight and the 
opting process for citizenship had led to a sizeable loss of 426,000 
between 1918 and 1924, or 13 percent of altogether 3.3 million 
minority Hungarians in Czechoslovakia, Romania, Yugoslavia 
and Austria. Another factor, however, was the fact that many in 
the previously assimilated Jewish communities of the northern 
and southern regions of pre-1918 Hungary and Transylvania 
dissimilated themselves by designating themselves as Jewish in 
an ethnic sense, not just a religious one.12
The nation states concerned sought to settle the status of these 
minorities by legal means. It might have sufficed in principle to 
strengthen the League of Nations’ minority protection terms if 
these had been enshrined in domestic law, but the constitutions 
promulgated in 1920 in Czechoslovakia, Poland and Austria, in 
1921 in Yugoslavia, and in 1923 in Romania defined each country 
as a unitary nation state. The Czechoslovak constitution endorsed 
and incorporated the minority protection treaties, exceeding them 
in terms of language rights, and the country concluded bilateral 
minority protection treaties with neighboring Austria and Poland. 
The Yugoslav St. Vitus’ Day constitution of June 28, 1921, put a 
limiting interpretation on the minority protection treaties. The 1923 
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Romanian constitution (a version of the constitution of 1866) failed 
to consider the minorities, even though the population of expanded 
Romania was only 71.9 percent Romanian.
Inadequate regulation of minority rights in Romania left ample 
room for discriminatory and assimilatory practices in minority 
policy. The Hungarian, Ukrainian, Jewish, Bulgarian and Russian 
minorities made almost 50 submissions to the League of Nations 
minority protection panel in just ten years.13 The Yugoslav and 
Austrian constitutions named the minorities and stated what their 
language and educational rights were, but Yugoslavia opposed 
from the outset the founding of minority parties and sought to curb 
native-language educational and cultural activity. National cultural 
and educational associations could not be formed. Yet Yugoslavist 
ideology proved even less successful than the Czechoslovakist one. 
The idea of South Slav national unity was rejected outright by the 
Croats, which left the Serb nation in the fatally weakened position 
of a minority.14
The nationalism of nineteenth-century Western Europe had 
led to serious ethnic conflicts, but also to strong, linguistically 
almost homogeneous, nation states. The patterns chosen by Eastern 
European nations were primarily those of Britain and France, not 
Switzerland or Belgium, although the latter were cited by Hungary 
and its neighbors even in the most critical situations in the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries. The states that formed in 1918–1920 could 
only aspire to resemble either of these Western ideals. They declared 
themselves unitary nation states in their constitutions, yet remained 
multinational throughout the interwar period, with severe problems of 
regional development and differentials and of historical and national 
identity. Only on the rarest occasions did members of the minorities 
concerned – Hungarians, Germans or Slavs – accept the proffered 
option of assimilation into the majority.
It is usual to interpret the nation states and ethnic features 
of interwar Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe in terms 
of a classic triad of relations between parent states (“kin states”), 
citizenship-awarding states, and minorities.15 All nations had a state 
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of their own, or at least formed part of the political nation of a nation 
state, and all without exception had national minorities within 
the borders of “their” states. So all peoples in East-Central and 
Southeastern Europe had ambitions relating to their parent state and 
their citizenship state: that is, national tasks and aims of a cultural and 
political nature. The majority nations of Western European nation 
states retained almost exclusive state power over their territories, 
despite language and assimilation battles in the nineteenth century. 
Most nations east of the Oder, Elbe and Leitha gained state means 
of nation-building and assimilation (state nationalism) only after 
Versailles.
This specifically Eastern European lag – discernible in the 
development of nationalism as well – gave rise to serious conflicts. 
Most of the national minorities within the new nation-state structure 
of the region, simultaneously subject to the triad system of relations 
and participants in it, faced a duality of state, cultural and political 
identities and loyalties. In striving to create the economic, political 
and cultural foundations of their own minority, to campaign 
for individual and communal rights, and to found and operate 
their institutions, they were the subject of scarcely compatible 
expectations from their wider national community and the state in 
which they dwelt.
What those running the nation states expected was a pattern of 
assimilation and integration, rapid acquisition of majority language 
and culture, acceptance of proffered cultural and political patterns, 
and unquestioning cooperation and loyalty, in most cases without 
gaining in exchange any state support for their own aspirations. 
Meanwhile, the parent country expected its interwar minorities 
to retain their national language and cultural identity, insulate 
themselves from the majority offer, and behave in a way that 
pointed back to an earlier status. So it was rare in most minorities 
to find cooperation with majority parties, as such “activism” would 
displease the parent country. The commonest minority stance was 
one of grievance, shown in documentary activity important for 
minority legal protection and community building, and providing 
some kind of momentum for mobilization.16
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Of all the nation states of East-Central and Southern Europe, the 
one that went furthest in minority rights was Czechoslovakia, but 
not even Masaryk’s First Republic could bring itself to implement 
Slovak and Rusyn autonomy or grant communal rights to 3.3 million 
Germans, almost 800,000 Hungarians, or the Polish minority in 
Czech Silesia. Czechoslovak democracy and “nationalism with 
a human face” did not produce in the twenty years available any 
substantive integration processes with the first two, or still less the 
second three, which contributed to the secession of the minorities 
during the months of grave international crisis in 1938–1939.17
The outcome of minority policy in Yugoslavia and Romania was 
more negative still. Despite efforts by some of the Transylvanian 
Romanian elite to alter the direction of Bucharest government policy 
towards the minorities, the successive short-lived governments, 
fearing demands for territorial revision from parent countries, thought 
it too risky to support minority community building and proceeded 
with a policy of assimilation instead. This is even truer of the South 
Slav state (the Serbo-Croatian-Slovene Kingdom), suffering from 
constant structural crisis and sheltering for a time behind a mask of 
royal dictatorship. The neighboring states that “inherited” the three 
populous Hungarian minorities tried to curb Hungary’s revisionist 
aspirations with the consultative mechanisms of the Little Entente, 
while laming the minority political elite, reliant throughout the period 
on its close political and financial relations with Budapest.
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2. IntErnAtIonAL MInorItY dEFEnSE SYStEM: 
tHE LEAGuE oF nAtIonS
Ferenc Eiler
The League of Nations, which set to work soon after the Great War, 
on January 10, 1920, was intended mainly to monitor observance of 
the peace treaties, mediate in conflicts between states, and provide 
an international forum for cooperation among them. The victorious 
Great Powers saw it as essential to peace in Europe to ensure some 
form of international protection for the minorities of smaller states 
affected by the border changes. The almost identical minority 
protection treaties concluded with victorious countries and minority 
protection clauses in the peace treaties concluded with defeated 
countries were placed under League of Nations guarantee.1
The international stipulations for minority protection had taken 
more or less their final form at the Paris Peace Conference. Not so 
the League of Nations guarantee procedures, which were built up 
step by step in the 1920s.2 The minority treaties already implied that 
the victors would not place the future procedures in the hands of the 
General Assembly of delegates of member countries, but with the 
Council, a narrower body operating under Great Power influence 
and composed largely of their political representatives. For it was 
stipulated that every Council member had a right to bring to the 
attention of the Council any infraction or any danger of infraction of 
any such obligations, and that any such member was to take action 
against the state concerned. Any difference that arose between a 
member of the Council and a state signatory to the minority treaty 
obligations counted as an international dispute, and at the member’s 
request, it could be referred to the Permanent Court of International 
Justice in the Hague, whose decisions were final.
Under the established procedural system, minority organizations 
and even minority members had rights like those of Churches, 
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governments and individual citizens to place complaints before 
the League of Nations. But such petitions counted as informal, and 
petitioners were not equal in rank at the proceedings to the state 
against which they complained. Indeed, before 1929 they were not 
even informed officially whether the League was dealing with their 
complaints or not.
The petitions arrived at the Secretariat of the League of Nations, 
where they were examined by its Minority Section to see if they met 
the formal and substantive criteria for submission. Complainants 
could only request protection from infractions for which international 
protection was stipulated in the treaty; they could not demand 
political secession of the minority from the state concerned. Nor 
could the reports emanate from anonymous or unauthenticated 
sources, and they had to abstain from violent language. Finally, they 
could not concern matters already investigated.
If the Section found the petition acceptable, the results of the 
investigation were conveyed to the state accused, which had two 
months in which to submit its observations in official form. After 
the response arrived, the Section put the case before the Council, 
which appointed a Committee of Three (later of Five in some cases) 
to examine the case, usually in continual consultation with the state 
accused. The committee could reach a decision in three different 
ways: it could place the matter on file, formulate a proposal for 
remedying the complaint, or initiate official proceedings. The last 
was relatively rare, as the Council and the states concerned tried 
to avoid investigations that would attract big publicity. Even if an 
investigation reached that stage, there was no guarantee that the 
complaints would be fully remedied. The Council might issue a 
final decision calling on the state to cease its breach of the law, but 
it might recommend a compromise solution, or it might dismiss the 
case.3
So at the center of the complaints procedure was the Council 
of the League of Nations and its Committee of Three, but the 
Secretariat’s Minority Section, confined to administrative tasks 
and with no decision-making powers, yet managed to develop into 
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the decisive factor in the process.4 For the Secretariat was the only 
body within the League of Nations with staff at work in Geneva 
all the year round. Those in the Minority Section were well able 
to orient themselves in the diplomatic jungle of Geneva, and they 
gained great expertise, as they had to collect the arriving petitions 
and government responses, and all the information, legislation, 
proposed legislation and press accounts to do with the situation of the 
minorities. In addition, the Section was regularly visited by delegates 
of the reported governments and even by minority politicians. 
Furthermore, the Section head – strictly with the permission of 
and at the invitation of the government concerned – could visit the 
location and talk there with government representatives and on 
some occasions those of minorities as well.
The Section would present at the first meeting of the Committee 
of Three a summary of the petition and the reported government’s 
response to it. This was often augmented with specific proposals 
on the matter. If the Committee of Three saw fit, it could hold with 
the government concerned confidential talks, which the chief of 
the Section would usually be charged with heading. Typical of the 
work of the Committee of Three and of the Section was mediation 
and secret discussions behind closed doors. In fact the aim was to 
reach compromises acceptable to the state concerned and to the 
Council of the League of Nations. They never set out to harass a 
state publicly and were well aware that implementing a League of 
Nations resolution depended in practice on states being willing to 
cooperate.
The guarantee clause in the minority treaties named as an 
important factor in the guarantee process the Permanent Court 
of International Justice in the Hague, as the highest resort of 
international law. The Council might refer a minority protection 
case to the Court for two purposes. It could call for a professional 
opinion – in which case the Court’s decision counted only as a 
legal opinion and had no compulsory force – or it could request a 
final, enforceable judgment. In the event, the Court played only a 
marginal role in interwar minority protection, principally because 
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the Council, essentially a political forum, also exercised a kind of 
judicial function in such cases, and as such, favored compromise 
solutions wherever possible, to avoid the publicity and serious 
political risk entailed in official proceedings.
Almost 500 petitions – about one half of those submitted between 
1921 and 1938 – were judged after preliminary examination to be 
acceptable and fit for forwarding to the Council.5
Table 1. Distribution of acceptable petitions by states accused6
Poland 203 Bulgaria   2 Hungary   9
Germany   29 Greece 41 Estonia   1
Lithuania     3 Albania 12 Yugoslavia 35
Romania   78 Iraq   2 Austria   9
Turkey   12 Czechoslovakia 36 Latvia   1
Most petitions submitted to the Secretariat concerned the 
minority policy of smaller states that gained territory out of the 
Great War (Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, Yugoslavia, and so 
on), the complainants naturally being minorities of those countries.
Table 2. Distribution of acceptable petitions by complainants7
Germans in Poland 163 Ukrainians in Poland 25
Greeks in Albania   21 Hungarians in Yugoslavia 12
Hungarians in Romania   43 Poles in Germany 25
Germans
in Czechoslovakia   15
Macedonians
in Yugoslavia 11
The legal grounds for the complaints were very varied. Besides 
the petitions against general discrimination, the commonest claimed 
infringements were to do with education, land reform, labor law, 
freedom of worship, cultural and association activity, freedom of 
the press, confiscation of private property, citizenship, and use of 
the mother tongue.
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The interwar system of international minority protection was 
often criticized from several sides. These criticisms were aimed 
alike at countries that had gained by the war and those that had 
lost by it, and at various international bodies and minority political, 
cultural and economic organizations.
The smaller countries on the winning side saw the imposed 
minority protection treaties as an infringement of sovereignty. 
Their objections were strengthened because the League of Nations 
proclaimed the equality of its member states, and yet only a few 
European countries were bound by the minority protection system. 
They demanded that it should be extended to all members. That did 
not succeed because the Great Powers (the United Kingdom, France 
and Italy) were not prepared to be bound in that way.
The defeated countries now with high numbers of compatriots 
abroad (Germany, Hungary and Bulgaria) and the minorities 
themselves were dissatisfied with the efficacy of the guarantee 
procedure. They saw the Secretariat and its Minority Section 
as biased and considered it to be unacceptable that these bodies 
should decide legal issues on political grounds. In terms of the 
minority protection treaties, they saw it as the biggest shortcoming 
of the system that it aimed at minimal average protection with a 
view to the sensibilities of the states, instead of moving towards 
providing the conditions for minority self-administration. They 
were undoubtedly right in concluding that the degree of protection 
accorded to different minorities was not uniform. While the prospect 
of territorial autonomy was mooted for Transcarpathia, with its 
population of 430,000, the far more numerous Székely and Saxon 
communities in Transylvania were only given a general promise of 
limited local autonomy in religious and educational affairs, and the 
4.75 million Ukrainians of Poland were given no hope of any kind 
of self-administration.
A great number of problems arose when resolutions were not 
phrased precisely enough, leaving room for various interpretations. 
Statements, for instance, that the minority would receive adequate 
relief, or statements about districts where they lived in a significant 
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proportion, or receiving a substantial and appropriate part of public 
wealth, in practice left the minorities at the mercy of the legislature 
and administration of the state concerned. There were similar 
consequences if the definitions of obligations were not categorical 
enough or no time limit was placed in the treaties for meeting them. 
Governments duly took advantage of this by indefinitely prolonging 
the process of putting the regulations into practice, or in most cases, 
simply sabotaging them.
Naturally there were several proposals for improving the 
guarantee procedure. One of the major demands was to create a 
status under international law for minorities submitting petitions, 
as a way of recognizing them as legal entities, which would have 
radically changed the legal complexion of the procedure. In that case 
the complainant could have featured in the proceedings as a party of 
equal rank with the reported state. But there was never any chance of 
acceptance for this, as it would have been at variance with the treaties 
and governments were not prepared even to consider it. Another 
idea for reform was to establish a permanent minority committee 
alongside the Council, with the task of reviewing the complaints 
with a professional competence that the ad hoc Committees of Three 
lacked.8 The legal side of the guarantee procedure would also have 
been strengthened by the ideas for reinforcing the influence of the 
Permanent Court of International Justice.9 But these proposals came 
to nothing, achieving only a little in the publicity field in 1929, after 
which the secretary-general gave statistics on the fate of petitions 
from the minorities in his general report, and member states might, 
with the consent of the state concerned, publish Committee of 
Three reports. Moreover, the Committees of Three (thenceforward 
sometimes Five) might meet more frequently.10
The minority protection treaties had many shortcomings, but 
neither the Great Power delegations nor the states concerned desired 
to offer the minorities more than the accepted terms stipulated. 
International minority protection between the world wars cannot 
be assessed in terms of a non-existent normative level of minority 
protection, desirable though it might be in principle. League of 
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Nations protection of minorities left open the possibility of positive 
domestic legislation, and despite its shortcomings, set a minimum 
for minority rights in some states of Central Europe. Well or badly, it 
policed through its guarantee procedure the respect for such rights, 
which was a leap forward compared with the minority protection 
of earlier times. The main obstacle to the League’s regionally 
delimited international system of minority protection was its place 
within the international security system, unable to insulate itself 
from the prevalent divisions in broader politics. Any notion of 
minority protection remaining a purely legal matter was precluded 
by the antagonisms of interest groups pursuing disparate aims. 
From behind the debate there soon emerged the real endeavors of 
states: revision of the peace treaties in the case of those that had 
lost territory through the war, and the fastest possible assimilation 
of minorities into a nation state in those created or enlarged by the 
treaties. The fate of international minority protection was ultimately 
sealed when Hitler’s Germany withdrew from the League of Nations 
in 1933, and Poland in September 1934 repudiated its obligations 
under the minority protection treaty and refused to cooperate with 
the international forum until minority protection should be made 
general. Although petitions continued to arrive at the Secretariat up 
to 1939, the system of minority protection had been dead for years 
when the Second World War broke out.
The foundation of the League of Nations and development of its 
system of minority protection was the political background to the 
establishment of another international organization that focused on 
the national minority question and the struggle for minority rights. 
The European Congress of Nationalities was founded near Geneva in 
1925 with the tacit support of the Hungarian prime minister, István 
Bethlen, but with initial disapproval from the German Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs; its exclusive concern was to tackle minority 
problems that arose.11 Having grown out of Baltic German initiative, 
it held an annual forum of consultation for the legitimate member 
organizations’ official delegates, who represented the political and 
social elite of the minorities. In most years they conferred for two 
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or three days in Geneva. During the rest of the year, the members 
of the Board (representing Ukrainian, Jewish, Hungarian, German, 
Catalan and some smaller Slav groups) normally met three times a 
year to prepare for the next conference and discuss legal and political 
matters that had arisen. The secretary-general and driving force, the 
Estonian German Ewald Ammende, headed until his death in 1936 
a small Congress office in Vienna and kept in touch with minority 
leaders through correspondence and personal meetings.
Ammende had wanted to found a body that presented mainly 
theoretical work to the outside world. Building on the solidarity 
among minorities and international publicity, it was to position 
itself as an autonomous component in international politics and 
lobby effectively on behalf of member organizations, on the one 
hand presenting to states the need for cultural autonomy, and on the 
other urging the League of Nations to make its international system 
of minority protection more effective.
During the 14 years in which the European Congress of 
Nationalities existed, 49 European national minorities sent at least 
one delegate to one of the annual conferences. The frequency of 
participation was influenced by several factors, apart from interest 
from the minority political elite. The first filter was the degree of 
security felt at home by minority politicians, but the stance of the 
minority’s parent state could also play a part. But the decisive factor 
was how long the groups could continue to accept the basic principles 
of the Congress or follow its political line. So in 1933, 14 minorities 
announced that they would withdraw permanently. The minorities 
in Germany and another four Polish minorities in solidarity with 
them withdrew after the third conference, sensing pan-German 
intentions in the background. The seven Jewish organizations that 
had hitherto taken a regular part left the Congress, as it was not 
prepared to publicly condemn the 1933 anti-Semitic atrocities in 
Germany, pointing out that the valid statutes of the Congress forbade 
direct criticism of states.
Up to 1933, the course and activity of the Congress was decided 
largely by the German, Hungarian and Jewish delegates. The 
100 Minority Hungarian Communities in the 20th Century
withdrawal of the Jewish minorities and increased interest from the 
German Ministry of Foreign Affairs – including financial support – 
meant that the Congress came clearly and definitively under German 
influence. The Hungarian government also surreptitiously provided 
the organization with substantial sums for foreign policy reasons 
(bearing in mind its publicity value), and the minority Hungarians 
were extremely active in the Congress for the same reason.
The Congress never managed to persuade the League of Nations 
or the states concerned to radically alter their approach to minority 
protection. But its resolutions over 15 years covered and brought 
to international notice its position on all the important issues, most 
of which remain cogent today. The way in which it catalogued all 
the expectations of the national minorities, passing them through a 
legal filter, has certainly left a serious, if only theoretical, legacy, 
despite the efforts of the German and Hungarian governments to 
use the organization for their own ends.
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3. THE POLICIES TOWARDS HUNGARIAN 
COMMUNITIES PURSUED BY HUNGARY’S 
NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES
Nándor Bárdi
The situation of a national minority depends basically on three 
factors: the settlement structure and demographic, economic and 
social attributes of the ethnic group concerned, the policy of the 
host state towards its minorities, and the relations and ties of the 
minority group to its kin-state – the state or states in which it was 
in a majority. The section examines the second factor as it applied 
in Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia. The national question 
also became decisive in Austria in the 1930s (especially because of 
the Anschluss in March 1938), but the minorities played no direct 
part in this. The Hungarians of Austria – bilingual, and forming 
a tiny proportion of the population – were not a domestic political 
issue.
The attitude towards the national minorities in the Entente 
countries was determined mainly by the change in international 
power relations and the ambitions of the three new states to build a 
uniform nation.
The minority protection treaties attached to the peace treaties 
that concluded the First World War were rejected initially by the 
Yugoslav and Romanian prime ministers. Then Nikola Pašić of 
Yugoslavia signed after certain concessions had been made, but Ion 
Brătianu of Romania preferred to resign, and the treaty was signed 
for Romania by another peace delegation member, Alexandru Vaida-
Voevod of Transylvania. Hungary accepted the Trianon minority 
stipulations with resignation, as it was ethnically more homogeneous 
than its neighbors. Only about 10 percent of the population belonged 
to a national minority, and these lived scattered across the country. 
Furthermore, the terms allowed for the rights of Hungarian minorities 
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abroad to be raised internationally. Although the minority protection 
treaties were ratified, not one country in the region codified the rights 
of its minorities. Instead they declared the equal rights of all citizens 
in their constitutions, and then enshrined the interests of the state in 
relation to the minorities through sectorial legislation. None of these 
countries, not even Hungary, met its obligations to the minorities to 
the full.1
One aim of the Little Entente that Czechoslovakia, Romania and 
the Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom formed in the 1920s was to make 
a military and political alliance against Hungary’s ambitions for 
territorial revision, but they were also interested in regional economic 
cooperation. However, the latter called also for participation by 
Hungary, which saw the problems of the Hungarian minorities 
as a precondition for consolidating relations with these countries. 
Budapest also needed to assert its interests, but its geopolitical 
weight was too low to do so. For in terms of area and population, 
Hungary was only half the size of any of the three neighbors. All 
that Hungary could rely on were the Italian and German discontent 
with the European status quo and the chance to win over British 
public opinion.
By 1935, it was clear that the Little Entente countries could not 
base their defense against German and Italian threats on support 
from Britain or France. Since defense against any German or Italian 
attack would be precluded by Hungarian action, Yugoslavia and 
Czechoslovakia set out to normalize relations with Budapest. This 
was opposed by Romania, whose domestic political legitimacy 
rested on anti-revisionism and a Hungarian enemy, but as its two 
partners were ready to negotiate with Budapest even without 
Bucharest, the latter agreed to join after all. Hungary, however, 
was only interested in agreement with Yugoslavia and temporary 
settlements with Romania. For Czechoslovakia in 1935–1936 was 
the only place where Hungary, with Hitler’s support, had some 
chance of territorial revision.2
In 1937, the Hungarian government attempted to reach a 
separate agreement with Yugoslavia. The essential aims were 
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to settle the educational situation of the Hungarian minority, to 
ensure ethnically proportional local government representation, 
and to obtain land for landless Hungarian farm laborers out of 
the redistribution scheme. Initially the Yugoslav prime minister, 
Milan Stojadinović, seemed willing to tackle the minority problems 
and reach a separate agreement, but he rejected the advance from 
Budapest after the Italian–Yugoslav pact of March 25, 1937, fearing 
the reactions of the other members of the Little Entente.
Romania and Czechoslovakia, sensing that the alliance system 
was weakening, agreed with Yugoslavia at the Belgrade meeting of 
the Permanent Council of the Little Entente in April 1937 that before 
any of them concluded a bilateral agreement with Hungary, they were 
to consult the other two members and request their consent. They 
also agreed to recognize Hungary’s equal right to arm (easing the 
Trianon military restrictions) if the Hungarian government concluded 
a treaty of non-aggression with them in return. There were talks on 
this in August 1937 at Sinaia in Romania, where László Bárdossy, 
the Hungarian ambassador in Bucharest, tried to tie this to a remedy 
for the minority problems, but the Romanians refused.3
Romania again sat down to negotiate at the request of the 
other two Little Entente members in Geneva in the autumn, but 
Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs Kálmán Kánya found his 
Romanian counterpart, Victor Antonescu, implacable. The upshot 
was that Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia held Romania responsible 
for the breakdown of negotiations and announced that they would 
agree with Hungary nonetheless. On March 11, 1938, one day before 
German troops overran Austria, Bucharest indicated to Budapest a 
desire to resume the negotiations and the imminent appointment of 
a high commissioner for minorities to handle minority grievances. 
The talks with the Little Entente states then continued. But it had 
been clear since Hungarian Prime Minister Kálmán Darányi’s 
visit to Berlin in November 1937 – when it emerged that Hungary 
would not give military support to Austria in the event of a German 
occupation and was in agreement with the idea of revising the 
borders of Czechoslovakia – that Budapest was in no hurry to agree 
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with Prague. At the same time, the Czechoslovak position was the 
most flexible, as a start had been made on drafting new minority 
legislation. Hungary’s armed forces were not strong enough to 
impose such revision, and it was not certain that Yugoslavia and 
Romania would remain neutral in such an eventuality. On August 
21–22, 1938, the Little Entente states agreed in Bled to recognize 
Hungary’s equal right to arm, and agreed to negotiate in the future 
about the situation of the minorities, and Budapest renounced the 
use of force to alter the frontiers. But only a month later, the Munich 
Agreement brought about a new situation in Central Europe.4
It is time to examine how the two key concepts of nation-
building and the nation state operated in the minority policy of the 
neighboring countries, which also affected the loyalty of the local 
Hungarians to the new states.5
Two of the three were constitutional monarchies and the third, 
Czechoslovakia, a bourgeois democracy. But the real difference 
was the fact that the last had kept the Austro-Hungarian model 
of public administration, while the other two followed the pre-
1918 administrative patterns of the small Balkan states. While 
the Monarchy had had regional and local governments and self-
governing commonality of farmland and vineyards, the headsmen 
of the villages of the Romanian Old Kingdom, for instance, had been 
dependent on central government, and individuals were at the mercy 
of appointed local officials. The same applied to urban property, where 
the local authorities and councils in the Monarchy could manage the 
property for themselves. So the concept of decentralization of power 
was interpreted differently in the two political cultures. While the 
guarantee of this was seen in the Monarchy to lie in the decision-
making powers of the elected communal and county organizations, 
the local and regional power in the two Balkan states was in the 
hands of officials appointed by the center. The three differed also 
in the Orthodox Churches’ dominance in the areas that had lain 
outside the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy – pre-1918 Romania and 
Serbia – where they had not performed the social functions that 
the Churches in the Monarchy had (for instance in education). 
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Similarly, Romania and Serbia had no organized minority groups, or 
had assimilated them. They had not had to reckon before 1918 with 
such groups in their nation-building or state organization. At the 
same time the two countries had assumed the role of a kin- state for 
the Romanians of Transylvania and Serbs of the Southern Region, 
and were the potential ally for the Croatian and Slovenian national 
movements. A further difference: the regions acceding to Romania 
and Yugoslavia were much more developed than the core regions. 
In Czechoslovakia’s case, the Sudeten German territories were at 
the same level of industrialization as the core Bohemian/Moravian 
regions, or a slightly higher one, but the territories annexed from 
Hungary were far less developed.
What the three had in common were significant national groups 
other than the country’s dominant nation. The proportion of Czechs 
in Czechoslovakia was 50.5 percent, of Serbs in Yugoslavia 39.2 
percent, and of Romanians in Romania 71.9 percent (in 1930–1931). 
So it was necessary to draw related nations into the nation-building 
process: the Slovaks (15.7 percent) in Czechoslovakia, and the Croats 
(23.4 percent) and Slovenes (8.1 percent) in Yugoslavia through 
the Yugoslavist program. The Slovenes had gained a system of 
institutions through their permanent provincial status under Austria, 
and the Croats of the Kingdom of Hungary, without an army or 
foreign policy of their own, could count on military protection 
against Italy from the Serbs. But 22.5 percent of the Czechoslovak 
population were ethnic Germans and 4.9 percent Hungarians, as 
were 4.1 and 7.9 percent respectively in Romania and 3.6 and 3.4 
percent in Yugoslavia. The German minority posed a revisionist 
threat only to Prague. Those of the other two countries (not bordering 
Germany) followed the traditional German minority (volksdeutsch) 
policy of loyalty to the extant regime. But the Hungarian minorities 
represented a security concern for all three countries.6
Two strategies towards the Hungarians appeared in Romania, 
the land least divided in national terms. Iuliu Maniu, the leader of 
Transylvania’s Romanians, thought in terms of integration through 
socio-economic reinforcement of the Romanians and introducing 
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a modern system of institutions, rather than open discrimination. 
There would be equal civil rights, and as with Hungary’s minority 
policy, the minority issue was to be limited to language usage, and 
minority education left to the Churches.7
The Liberal Party’s aim in Bucharest, on the other hand, was to 
break the socio-economic strengths of the minorities by force. The 
discriminatory approach became dominant. The Transylvanian cities 
were Romanianized, as the only way to gain the economic positions 
rapidly. In party political rivalry, even the smallest concessions to 
the Hungarians were branded as un-national. Essential minority 
problems were not solved by the Minority State Secretariat (1931), 
the Minority High Commission (1938), or the Minority Statutes, 
which served propaganda purposes abroad.8
Yugoslavia adopted a clearly discriminatory policy, steered 
by relations with Hungary, rivalries among the regional parties in 
Vojvodina, and fear of a rapprochement with the Croats. In socio-
economic terms, the Hungarians of Yugoslavia were not even of 
great regional weight.9
In Czechoslovakia the edge was taken off discriminatory 
measures by the region’s most democratic, pluralist political 
system, with correctly held general and local elections, effective 
local government, and freedom of the press. In principle, greater 
stress was placed on winning the loyalty of the Hungarians. A big 
role here was played by President Masaryk, who sought to integrate 
the minorities by affording them equal civil rights and full linguistic 
and educational rights, initially proclaiming Czechoslovakia “the 
Switzerland of the East” for its minority policy. Certainly a third of 
the Hungarians there voted for the social democratic and communist 
parties, which were not organized on national lines, while in the 
1930s, the governing Agrarian Party of Czechoslovakia gained 10–15 
percent of the poll in Hungarian communities.10
None of the three states recognized the national minority 
autonomy urged by Hungarian minority parties in exchange for 
loyalty to the new state. The main minority policy measures of the 
three countries did not even secure the equality of individual rights 
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offered instead of collective rights. Only the Czechoslovak constitution 
made mention of the minorities. This, apart from according equality 
of civil rights, stated that membership in a minority could not be an 
obstacle to official employment and that any language could be used 
in commerce and in public. Some stipulations were taken over from 
the minority protection treaty: the right to use the minority language 
in the courts, the right to found institutions, and the right to gain 
access to mother-tongue education supported by the state.11 The 1923 
Romanian constitution defined Romania as a “unitary and indivisible 
nation state.” No concept of a national minority was recognized, 
only that of a religious minority. The 1921 constitution of the Serb-
Croat-Slovene Kingdom likewise afforded only basic civil rights. 
The 1931 constitution of the royal dictatorship stated that no political 
party or association could have a racial or religious basis.12
The basic condition for equal rights under the new state was 
granting nationality in the sense of citizenship. The article of the 
minority protection treaty covering this would have granted nationality 
to all inhabitants of the new territories, but Czechoslovakia instead 
passed separate legislation (Act 236/1920) whereby citizenship 
went to those who had gained entitlement (domicile, payment of 
communal tax) by 1910. Later arrivals underwent a complicated 
process of application and examination. The problem was settled in 
part by Lex Dérer et Szent-Ivány (Act 152/1926), seen as one of the 
great achievements of the activist Hungarian policy.13
Romania also passed separate legislation on citizenship (Act 
41/1924), requiring evidence of domicile on December 1, 1918, i. e. 
four years of residence and evidence of payment of local taxation, 
as communal registration had not been compulsory before 1918. But 
“racial Romanians” obtained citizenship with no difficulty through 
a different procedure. The seriousness of the problem becomes 
apparent from the fact that the nationality of almost 100,000 heads 
of family (300,000–400,000 people) was still unsettled in 1939.14
Yugoslavia likewise did not implement the citizenship article 
of its minority protection treaty. The option right included in it was 
used until July 26, 1922, to justify a ban on political and cultural 
activity by Hungarians, who did not have voting rights either. 
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Under the option stipulation, those resident in the new territories on 
January 1, 1910, could apply for citizenship or emigrate to Hungary. 
The deadline for this was extended to November 1930. Altogether 
45,000 Hungarians migrated from the Southern Region in 1918–
1924. Even in 1934, there were still over 21,000 option holders in 
Yugoslavia whose citizenship was unsettled. Furthermore, politically 
motivated expulsions were common, the most important wave (of 
2,700 people) being expelled after the Marseille assassination of King 
Alexander I.15
One key aspect of minority rights was use of native language. 
The most generous provision was the Czechoslovak language law 
passed at the same time as the constitution (Act 122/1920). This 
named “Czechoslovak” as the republic’s state and official language. 
So after an initial nation-building process in which the Slovak 
language was classed as a dialect of Czech, there were two state 
languages, as Slovak was used in Slovakia. Article 2 stated that 
in districts where the proportion of “non-Czechoslovaks” exceeded 
20 percent, it was compulsory to allow use of a minority language 
in the courts, public administration and local government. Where 
the proportion of the minority reached two thirds, administration 
could be conducted using just the language of the minority. But the 
law did not prevent Slovakization, as it was enough to redraw the 
administrative districts or change the legal status of cities, or to 
produce situations where it was worthwhile for those with a dual 
allegiance to return themselves as Slovaks in the census. The main 
measure of this kind was the 1922 act on the status of cities, which 
left only four of Slovakia’s 39 cities with full municipal rights – 
Bratislava, Košice, Užhorod and Mukačevo. The 1930 census put 
the proportion of Hungarians at less than 20 per cent in the first 
three, but 82 percent of Hungarians still lived in localities where 
their language rights remained.16
The constitution of Romania designated Romanian the official 
language of state. No separate language legislation was passed, the 
use of Romanian being governed by various regulations from 1921 
onwards. The courts were obliged to use Romanian under Order 
No. 28.819/1921, and minority languages were forbidden in public 
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administration under Order No. 19.654/1922. Internal regulations in 
public offices and in transportation ordering staff to communicate 
only in Romanian appeared continually in the second half of the 
1920s. By the 1930s, adequate knowledge of Romanian was a prime 
condition for employment in the civil service and education, and 
members of the minorities were subjected to several language tests, 
causing over 10,000 Hungarian employees to be dismissed. Language 
use in local councils was governed not by the 1925 and 1929 acts 
on public administration but by local executive authorities, which 
forbade minority representatives to use their native language. A surtax 
was levied on businesses keeping their books or putting up signs in 
a non-Romanian language, and there was an extra charge for such 
telegrams. In the second half of the 1930s, the Romanian language 
was prescribed exclusively for business use. In 1937, Hungarian place 
names and geographical names were banned from the press.17
Of the three official languages of the Serb-Croat-Slovene 
Kingdom, Serbian was preferred in official forums. It was forbidden 
to speak Hungarian in public offices or local administration. There 
was official interference in language use in business and private 
affairs as well. Hungarian was confined to the first four grades 
of elementary school, the cumbersome cultural societies, Church 
activity, the Hungarian press, and private life. This was unchanged 
until the end of the 1930s.
The role of the state in social organization and local communities 
increased across Europe after the Great War. This administrative 
change had marked significance in the minority-inhabited areas of 
the new states of Central Europe. The change of sovereignty in all 
three countries discussed here entailed dissolving county, district 
and local representative bodies and chambers and appointing new 
personnel to run them.
In Czechoslovakia the administrative changes meant that the 
counties lost their regional political powers, while one third of 
the members of district, city, county and provincial assemblies 
were government appointees, which was usually enough, with the 
governing party representatives elected, to control them and the 
appointments that they made.18
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Romanian laws on public administration would change every 
four or five years, which prevented the system from operating 
effectively. Transylvania had a regional Governing Council from the 
union until April 1920, which from a national point of view adapted 
the pre-1918 legal system to the new situation. Standardized public 
administration ensued in 1925, when new legislation significantly 
curtailed the powers of cities, and the names and seats of counties 
were altered to suit Romanian national interests. Altered borders 
meant that four counties (Mureş–Turda, Braşov, Bihor and Satu 
Mare) gained Romanian majorities. The group of those summoned 
to the representative bodies was reduced to state-appointed officials 
and representatives of the Romanian Churches. The most important 
change came in the 1929 act on public administration, whereby 
the communal, county and city councils elected in often rigged 
local government elections (in 1926 and 1930) could be dissolved 
by government decree and their powers vested in provisional 
committees. As a result, the sizeable local government assets 
in Transylvania came under the control of the Romanian state. 
Meanwhile, the judges and public officials were also changed, so 
that the Hungarians were underrepresented everywhere by the 
1930s.19
The 1922 local administration system in Yugoslavia consisted 
of 33 provinces, with the majority of the Hungarians living in those 
of Bačka and Belgrade. There were elections to provincial and 
local assemblies in 1927. The Hungarian Party, under an agreement 
with the ruling Radical Party, gained six seats in both provincial 
assemblies, i. e. 10 percent representation. After the local elections 
in November, the local assemblies of Ada, Čantavir, Horgoš, Mol 
and Senta had Hungarian majorities, although they achieved little 
beyond airing grievances. Even that modicum of local representation 
was lost with the coming of the royal dictatorship in 1929.20
The key institutions for sustaining the Hungarian minority 
community belonged to the education system. Schools were a central 
issue in all regions. In Czechoslovakia and Romania, the Churches 
sought to fill the gap left by the previous state and village schools 
teaching in Hungarian. In Czechoslovakia, the body to decide and 
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authorize the language of instruction was the schools bureau of the 
Slovakian Ministry Plenipotentiary. Church schools came to play 
the decisive role in Hungarian-language schooling in Slovakia. In 
1922, 22.7 percent (29,000) of lower and upper elementary pupils of 
Hungarian ethnicity were not taught in their mother tongue. Nor were 
33.3 percent (1,500) of such secondary students in 1926. For higher 
education, most Czechoslovakian Hungarians applied initially to 
German-language universities in Czechoslovakia or to universities 
in Hungary, but degrees from Hungary ceased to be recognized in 
1928. By that time, the first students of Hungarian ethnicity were 
graduating from the Czechoslovakian gymnasia (academically 
oriented high schools), who were more inclined to enroll in Czech 
or Slovak colleges and universities. The 1922 schools act raised the 
period of compulsory schooling from six years to eight. (This did 
not happen in Hungary until after World War II.)21
The language measures in Romania extended beyond the 
state education system to impede the operation of non-Romanian 
Church schools. Church schools had hardly been a factor in pre-
1918 Romania. Nationalizing Transylvanian schools was seen as a 
measure of national modernization. There the pre-war Romanian 
community had had its own denominational school system, while 
the Hungarians had relied on state schools teaching in Hungarian. 
With the change of sovereignty, the Romanian state closed 
more than two thirds of the lower and upper elementary schools 
teaching in Hungarian, and three quarters of such high schools 
and teacher-training institutions. The Greek Orthodox and Greek 
Catholic institutions teaching in Romanian (2,600 institutions) 
were nationalized. All 645 Hungarian kindergartens and 59 day-
care centers were closed, as were peoples’ schools for repeating the 
upper elementary course (3,500), and trade and industrial apprentice 
schools (almost 200). To compensate, 403 lower elementary schools 
(319 Reformed, 62 Catholic and 23 Unitarian) had been founded by 
1923 by the Churches, as had 33 upper elementary schools, 7 trade 
schools and 5 teacher-training colleges.22 This burst of Church-based 
self-organization prompted the Romanian Liberal Party to frame an 
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assimilatory schooling policy by withdrawing state subsidies from 
Church schools, and through three pieces of legislation. Under the 
1924 act on state elementary education a state permit was needed 
to found a school. State Hungarian-language elementary schools 
were to be formed in minority communities, even if a Church school 
existed. There would be kindergartens for minority communities, 
but teaching would be conducted in Romanian. Families deemed 
officially to be of Romanian origin would be obliged to enroll their 
children in Romanian-language schools. One special measure was 
to designate a “culture zone”: Romanian elementary teachers taking 
posts in 20 counties with predominantly minority inhabitants were 
offered a 50 percent salary supplement, 10 hectares of land and a 
removal allowance. Despite protests from the minorities and the 
Churches on the international level, the private education act of 
1925 demoted Church schools to the status of private schools and 
curtailed their right to issue certificates of entitlement to further 
education, tying it to a permit, which one third of denominational 
schools failed to obtain. The same act set Romanian as the language 
of instruction for five subjects, and as the exclusive language in 
schools run by religious orders; Jewish institutions were to teach only 
in Romanian or Hebrew. The third major measure was the 1925 act 
on the baccalaureate, whereby high school graduation was awarded 
not at the school attended, but before a board of teachers from other 
state schools, who could only be Romanians. Even subjects taught 
in Hungarian were to be examined in the state language. Thus 73 
percent of Hungarian candidates failed their examinations in 1925.23
Yugoslavia imposed on the rest of the country the pre-1918 Serbian 
school system, in which the village schools and denominational 
schools important under the Monarchy for minority education found 
no place. There was no chance of setting up a system of Church 
schools. Apart from the dismantling of the Hungarian school system 
and dismissal of its teachers, the most damaging measure was to 
enroll children in schools based on analysis of their family names. 
Several regulations on schools were followed in December 1929 by 
an act on people’s schools, introducing eight years of compulsory 
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education. The sizeable number of communities with a minority 
population were instructed to set up separate sections for such 
pupils, but with a Serbian director in charge. Here the pupils were 
officially to be taught the lower four elementary grades in their 
native language. In 1929–1930, there were 528 classes taught in 
Hungarian in the Danube Banat, with 364 teachers, a third of whom 
were not ethnic Hungarians. The Hungarian community itself had 
no representatives with a say in how these institutions were run. 
The teaching staff were trained in the Belgrade teacher-training 
college. Two high school sections teaching in Hungarian remained 
at Senta and Subotica in the mid-1920s; only 14.5 percent of the 
Hungarian high school students were taught in Hungarian. About 
500 Hungarians received college or university degrees in Belgrade, 
Zagreb or Subotica between the two world wars; the majority of 
them became clergy, lawyers or pharmacists. An attempt to fill the 
gap was made by the Hungarian Party, various left-wing movements 
and local cultural associations, providing literacy classes, adult 
education and educational lectures, taking advantage of an easier 
political atmosphere in the second half of the 1930s.24
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4. dISPutES, PLAnS And ProPoSALS
For HAndLInG tHE MInorItY QuEStIon
Nándor Bárdi
Strategies that evolved in the twentieth century for handling 
ethno-cultural conflicts can be placed in two categories. One 
aims to eliminate ethno-cultural differences, the other to preserve 
communities exhibiting them. Under the first heading come 
genocide (exemplified by the Holocaust), deportation, population 
exchange (such as that between Slovaks and Hungarians), founding 
new states on grounds of national self-determination (for example, 
the disintegration of Yugoslavia), and integration by assimilation 
(as in the United States or Australia). Methods of handling ethnic 
conflict that belong to the other category include authoritarian 
control (for example, by the Serb minority in Kosovo or the white 
minority in South Africa), international control and adjudication 
(for example, the UN role in the Middle East or Cyprus), also public 
administration within ethnic borders, cantonization (Switzerland), 
federalism (Canada), territorial autonomy (Alto Adige), and 
personal and cultural autonomy (indigenous Swedes in Finland). 
The most advanced model for coexistence of ethnic groups and 
nations within one state is power-sharing, that allows each group 
to retain its collective identity and culture. The requirements 
are a constitutional right of veto, communal self-government, 
proportional representation, labor opportunities, budget share, and a 
grand coalition government in which the minority has a permanent 
place.1
About half the inhabitants of In-Between Europe2 before World 
War I, some 50 million people, lived as a minority without their own 
nation state. After World War I, there were still 32 million living 
as a national minority. The Austro-Hungarian Monarchy was the 
one Great Power in pre-World War I Europe whose ruling nations 
formed only a plurality of the population (44.8 percent in 1910). 
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Under the Versailles system between the two world wars, the Serbs 
in Yugoslavia formed only 47.7 percent of the population (the “Serbo-
Croats” 74.4 percent), and the Czechs in Czechoslovakia 49.8 percent 
(the “Czecho-Slovaks” 65.5 percent). Poland and Romania had 
dominant nations (forming 68.9 and 71.9 percent of the population 
respectively). Meanwhile 37.5 percent of Albanians, 27.6 percent of 
Hungarians, and 11.2 percent of Germans lived outside the borders 
of their nation state (or in the Germans’ case, outside the three states 
of Germany, Austria and Switzerland). Taking the absolute figures 
of the 1930 censuses, the largest minority in In-Between Europe 
was that of the Germans (8.9 million in 12 countries), then the Jews 
(6.5 million in 11 countries), then the Ukrainians (4.4 million). 
There were 2.7 million Hungarians in five neighboring countries. 
Other nations with over a million members spread over several 
countries were the Poles, Byelorussians and Russians. The biggest 
minorities in a single country were the Ukrainians of Poland (4 
million), the Germans of the Czech Lands (3.2 million), the Polish 
Jews (3 million), the Romanian Hungarians (1.4 million) and the 
Polish Germans (1 million).3
The architects of the post-World War I peace system, after the 
break-up of the three Central European empires, started from the 
principle of national self-determination in responding to the nation-
building efforts of less numerous peoples by creating new states. 
The 1919 minority protection treaties and the foundation of the 
League of Nations brought into being the concepts of international 
minority protection and of national minorities, whereas the question 
of national groups had been handled as a domestic matter in the 
1910s. The rules of minority protection devised at that time were 
built into the five minority protection treaties, the four peace treaties 
and the Covenant of the League of Nations. These can be classified 
in three groups: stipulations on citizenship and on equal rights, and 
guarantees of implementation. The several treaties also contained 
stipulations specific to local conditions. These went beyond the 
equality of citizens to cover elements of national autonomy and 
territorial autonomy. Concerning the Hungarian minority, Article 11 
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of Romania’s minority protection treaty referred briefly to granting 
“the communities of the Saxons and Székelys in Transylvania local 
autonomy with regard to scholastic and religious matters,” but these 
rights were not meant by the Romanian government for the community 
recognized as a self-standing legal entity, but for their existing 
religious and educational organizations. Articles 11–13 of the treaty 
with Czechoslovakia raised the prospect of territorial autonomy for 
the Rusyns, extending to linguistic, religious and local government 
affairs. The treaty promised a provincial assembly as a separate 
legislative authority and a governor appointed by the Czechoslovak 
president as a separate executive authority.4 But these expectations 
were not met in political practice.5 The minorities themselves were 
divided on the matter. A common minority view of the future was 
clarified at the meetings of the Congress of European Nationalities 
held between 1925 and 1939, where it seemed possible to treat the 
question as one of autonomy for national minorities. But that seemed 
too little for the minorities living in blocs of continuous territory in 
Poland, and too big a challenge for the minorities of Germany. When 
the Jews, divided over the question of cultural autonomy, quit the 
organization in 1933, the National Socialist leanings of the German 
minorities left the Hungarian minority representatives as the sole 
consistent advocates of autonomy in international minority politics.6
The nation-building elites of the new states were also divided 
both ethnically and regionally. The divisions were something that 
Hungarian diplomacy and the Hungarian minority parties aspired 
to exploit in the 1920s, to gain a base for minority and regional 
interests against central governments.
Attempts were made in Czechoslovakia to defend local interests 
via the Czech–Slovak antagonisms and ideologies (of indigenousness) 
found in Slovensko and Transcarpathia. The strongest political group 
in the former was the Slovak People’s Party, which sought Slovak 
national autonomy and in 1927 joined the governing coalition in 
Prague. Thereby the so-called Slovak Ministry gave way to greater 
provincial autonomy, but constitutional settlement of the Czech–
Slovak relationship and greater decentralization were not gained. 
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Nor was the Rusyn or Transcarpathian autonomy prescribed in 
the minority protection treaty, on the one hand because Prague 
feared that it might set a precedent for Sudeten German or Slovak 
devolution, and on the other because some of the Rusyns, in what was 
the poorest and most divided part of the new country, were oriented 
towards Hungary, which represented a threat to its integrity and 
the whole Little Entente system of military defense. (Transcarpathia 
provided a common Czechoslovak–Romanian border to set against 
possible Polish or Hungarian designs.)7
In Romania, relations between the Bucharest-based National 
Liberal Party and the National Peasant Party, rooted in Transylvania 
and Bessarabia, can be seen in terms of the decisive political and 
administrative position gained after 1918 by the Romanians in 
lands transferred from Hungary to Romania. So the Romanians of 
Transylvania had to struggle on two fronts. They sought on the one 
hand to change by state means the economic and social structure 
that had emerged historically in Transylvania, and on the other 
to defend and strengthen their own positions against colonizing 
efforts from the Regat.8 The idea of recognizing any form of 
autonomy (internal self-determination) or the historical and social 
particularities of Transylvania was quashed by the constitution of 
1923, with its aims of unification. Indeed, the 1925 and 1929 public 
administration acts placed question marks over the introduction of 
viable local government precisely because the cities of Transylvania 
were dominated by non-Romanian elements. If fair and democratic 
local government elections had been held, most Transylvanian cities 
and half of the counties would have come under the political control 
of minorities that opposed the unifying, nation-building endeavors 
of the Romanian state. So no interest was shown even by Romanian 
political forces in Transylvania in retaining local government 
autonomy. The process of institutionalizing the regional politics of 
the Transylvanian Romanians came to an end in 1926, when the 
Romanian National Party of Transylvania merged with the Peasant 
Party of Bessarabia, as Iuliu Maniu and his group needed a national 
program to put up against the National Liberal Party. Thus even the 
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National Peasant Party government of 1928–1932 failed to bring 
decentralization, let alone provincial or institutional autonomy.9
Politics in Yugoslavia were dominated by the antagonism 
between the Croats and the Serbs, mainly because the centralist 
efforts of the new state system founded by the Serbian nation, whose 
embourgeoisement was less developed, conflicted with the interests 
of the Croats and Slovenes, who had more advanced social and 
economic institutions. Lukács Peszkovics, head of the People’s Circle 
in Subotica in the 1920s, tried to represent regional interests and the 
minority interests of the Germans and Hungarians, with a view to 
attaining “Vojvodina autonomy” (as a successor to the Vojvodina 
set up after 1848), but this was rejected even by the Hungarian Party 
in Yugoslavia, which was just forming. The Hungarian leaders in 
the Vojvodina were looking for concessions from Belgrade, and also 
rejected the advances of Iván Nagy’s group, which was advocating 
an alliance with the Croatian national movements.10
Efforts at national autonomy, seen at the time as the best way 
to handle the issue, appeared among Hungarians abroad alongside 
trust in border revisions, as a view of the future that might be held 
openly. The political leaders of the minority Hungarians stated 
everywhere that in return for loyalty to the new state, they sought 
the right to institutions that they ran and controlled themselves.11 
Administrative autonomy for the minority was mooted in three 
contexts. (1) The Hungarian minority parties viewed themselves in 
terms of representing the minority as an (unrecognized) institution 
of self-government. This appeared as an item in the 1922 program 
of the National Hungarian Party in Romania and the United 
Hungarian Party in Czechoslovakia, although not in that of the 
National Hungary Party in Yugoslavia.12 (2) These parties spoke 
out both for equality of rights and for retention of the pre-1918 
local and communal self-government, especially autonomy of the 
Churches and the independence of Church schools in Transylvania. 
But there was central control of local government in all three 
countries. In Czechoslovakia, otherwise the most democratic of the 
three, the elected local government authorities could be dissolved by 
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government-appointed bodies at the župan (county) level, or after 1927 
the provincial level, and new elections held. In Romania, the central 
government manipulated the actual local government elections. 
Later the self-governing bodies in most Transylvanian counties 
and cities were replaced by extraordinary committees, which could 
dispose over city and county property almost without restriction. In 
Yugoslavia, the Hungarians found it hard even to register themselves 
as voters, and there were seldom any local elections. The whole 
public administration operated with officials appointed from above.13 
(3) The Hungarian minority parties devised specific proposals for 
handling the problems. This remained in Yugoslavia on their level of 
demanding equal civil and political rights.14
In Czechoslovakia, the Hungarian political forces in Trans-
carpathia supported the Rusyn efforts to gain political autonomy 
throughout the period.15 The efforts of the Hungarian parliamentary 
parties were directed either at enrolling the pro-Hungarian (or pro-
Hungary) Christian Socialists in Slovakia, or at activism, or at 
setting up social institutions of their own. In the spring of 1938, after 
the two main Hungarian parties had merged, there was an official 
demand for a national quota system in offices and factories and for 
minority powers over schools and adult education institutions.16 The 
background to this was a debate in Czechoslovakia initiated at the 
end of 1937 by Pál Szvatkó, which started from a proposal for three 
“cantons” with a Hungarian majority, which were to have special 
rights of language use and education.17 In Romania, more than 50 
Transylvanian Hungarian proposals were drawn up between the 
world wars to settle the Transylvanian question in some way.18 
These can be grouped in terms of their objectives: ideas for frontier 
changes; plans for independence for Transylvania or autonomy 
within Romania or Hungary; drafts of minority legislation; plans 
for national (Hungarian or Székely) autonomy. Those mooted in 
the period of the change of sovereignty, in 1918–1920, usually 
proposed decentralization and regionalization. Those that 
emerged in 1928–1931 were plans for minority legislation or public 
administrative reform influenced by the prospect of a minority act 
and unsuccessful plans for administrative decentralization. At the 
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end of the 1930s, plans for cultural autonomy and maps of border 
changes were simultaneously drafted for the awaited negotiations 
on territorial revision.
In the debates in Romania in the 1920s, lack of a Romanian 
partner meant that ideas of Hungarian national autonomy 
gained ground over those of Transylvanian autonomy (political 
“Transylvanianism”).19 Again, opinion was divided, as there was 
only the minority protection treaty to cite under international law, 
and that referred only to communal autonomy for the Székelys. So 
potential cultural autonomy for the Székely Land would have split 
the Hungarian community, and the local government school system 
would have come up against the Székely Land’s widespread system 
of Church education.20 Iuliu Maniu as prime minister held out the 
prospect in 1929 of amending the minority act, and two drafts 
for that were prepared by the National Hungarian Party. One by 
Árpád Paál took cultural self-government for the Székely Land’s 
Hungarians as its starting point, thinking in terms of an independent 
school system funded by self-taxation and of defending the area’s 
communal wealth (ensuring a prior right of purchase for locals).21 
The other, by Elemér Jakabffy, envisaged cultural self-government 
organizations covering the whole territory of the country, brought 
about through voluntary enrollment into a special register.22 National 
councils elected in that way were to control a system of minority 
educational and cultural institutions, which the state would support 
out of a proportion of the taxes paid by those featuring on the land 
registry. Romania’s promised minority act did not even get so far as 
to formulate a proposal. When Romania and Yugoslavia reached an 
international agreement in 1933 on schools for the Serbs of the Banat, 
this prompted the National Hungarian Party, at its grand assembly 
in July 1933, to include in its program the question of autonomy 
for the Székelys, but that meant little under the political situation 
prevailing at the time. In the following year the National Hungarian 
Party unsuccessfully requested the Romanian parties to formulate a 
clear common stance of the majority regarding the minorities, such 
a standpoint was never clarified. Neither was the measure calling 
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for an end to the discrimination against the Hungarian community 
implemented, which was part of the government’s minority statute 
of 1938.23
The Little Entente countries were intent on building 
homogeneous nation states. The League of Nations and international 
public opinion started out from requiring individual civil rights and 
condemned only measures of forcible assimilation that infringed 
those. How the Hungarian minorities were treated was related 
directly to the measure of democratization in each country. The 
worst measures of assimilation and discrimination were suffered by 
the Hungarians of Yugoslavia.
The larger Hungarian state that resulted from the Vienna Awards 
of 1938 and 1940 broke with its earlier official ideology of calling 
for national autonomy and collective minority rights. Thereafter the 
national minority question was treated as one of language and public 
administration and the national minority act of 1868 was taken as a 
basis for handling it.24
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5. tErrItorIAL rEVISIon And MInorItY
ProtEctIon In HunGArIAn PoLItIcS
Nándor Bárdi and Ferenc Eiler
Hungarian society and the Hungarian communities that came 
under other sovereignty were alike shocked by Trianon’s economic, 
social and territorial terms. The stipulations were felt to be unfair 
in every detail. The clear rejection of them by the whole of society 
immediately placed territorial revision in the forefront of interwar 
Hungarian foreign policy.1
Such revision was a foreign policy objective and a way for the 
Horthy regime to gain social legitimacy. Apart from the cult of 
territorial revision, the determination to regain the lost territories 
was inherent in the system of expectations and arguments that ran 
through the whole system of power, and this aim was often given 
precedence over the social and economic problems confronting 
the country. So policy in pursuit of territorial revision needs to be 
treated separately from minority protection or nationhood policy, 
known today as policy towards the Hungarian community.
Since creating conditions for territorial revision was a permanent 
feature of Hungarian foreign policy between the world wars, the 
search for allies in this became a crucial diplomatic endeavor. 
Hungary had little room for diplomatic maneuver in the early post-
war years, due to the demands of economic stabilization and the 
constraints placed on its sovereignty. France and Britain, despite 
their sporadic disputes and differences of interest, were committed 
to keeping things as they were. Italy deepened its relations with the 
neighboring countries (Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia) 
that had formed the Little Entente expressly to contain Hungary. 
Germany was busy with economic reconstruction and stabilizing 
its domestic and foreign political position. Hungary unsuccessfully 
attempted to weaken the Little Entente through bilateral negotiations 
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with its members. Seeking a relationship with Germany founded on 
the minority question failed as well. In this way Hungarian foreign 
policy in 1921–1927 took the form of an “achievement policy” 
designed to seek leverage in the new European order.2
Mussolini, on the other hand, sought to base his efforts as a 
Great Power on his policy and alliances in the Danube Basin, with 
the result that the Italian–Hungarian Treaty of Friendship of 1927 
won the Hungarian prime minister István Bethlen an ally ready 
to give support to limited Hungarian revisionist intentions against 
Czechoslovakia. Thereafter the Italian connection played a prominent 
role in Hungarian diplomacy, even though the collaboration was far 
from serene and still less a unilateral commitment. This period saw 
the first, still general, reference made by Bethlen in a public speech to 
territorial demands by Hungary on the successor states. At about the 
same time, the British newspaper owner Lord Rothermere began an 
international press campaign calling for fairer borders for Hungary 
based on ethnic proportions.3
As early as 1927, Bethlen was also trying to extend Italian–
Hungarian cooperation to Germany, thus giving it greater 
importance. This idea was rejected by the German minister of 
foreign affairs, Gustav Stresemann, as a potential danger to the 
steadily improving relations of Germany with the Western powers, 
which were in his country’s fundamental interest. Nor did he want 
to strain relations with the other countries in the region by putting 
friendship with Hungary to the fore.
Even in the 1930s, Germany firmly refused to enshrine its 
cooperation with Hungary in a political treaty. The idea of German–
Italian–Hungarian–Austrian cooperation returned to Hungary’s 
agenda under Gyula Gömbös’s premiership, only to be rejected 
by Germany again. For the two countries’ economic and strategic 
interests in the region were at variance for a long time. Even in 
principle, Nazi Germany would only have been willing to support 
Hungary’s efforts at territorial revision in relation to Czechoslovakia, 
and it bluntly turned down the suggestion that it try to bring the 
German minorities in the successor states to cooperate with the 
Hungarians on revision.4
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While seeking allies, the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
tried several times to drive a wedge between the members of the 
Little Entente, whose efforts were directed mainly against Hungary. 
This was certainly a driving force behind the talks with Yugoslavia 
in 1926–1927, Romania in 1928, and all three Little Entente countries 
in 1937–1938.5
The theoretical possibility of redrawing Hungary’s frontiers 
was raised seriously only once in the twenty years up to the Munich 
Agreement of September 29–30, 1938, during preparatory talks for 
the Four Power Pact of July 15, 1933. The plan drawn up by the 
British prime minister, Ramsay MacDonald, and Mussolini in March 
1933 raised the questions of the Polish corridor and of restoring to 
Hungary the Hungarian-inhabited lands across its borders, but both 
points were omitted from the final pact.6
Hungarian views on territorial revision seemed united to outsiders. 
In practice the closest that they came to consensus was in stating 
that the frontier changes had to be peaceful, as the military forces 
of Hungary’s neighbors were an order of magnitude stronger than 
Hungary’s. But the specific revisionist goals were left vague. Only 
the Gömbös government went so far as to set concrete revisionist 
goals. This secret draft prepared for Mussolini’s benefit weighed 
ethnic, economic and strategic criteria when abandoning the idea of 
territorial integrity in favor of sharing the disputed territories roughly 
half and half with the other states involved. Hungary’s area would 
have grown from 93,073 to 195,000 square kilometers, but only 1.65 
million of the minority Hungarians would have rejoined their parent 
country,7 while the proportion of the non-Hungarian minorities in the 
total population would have risen from 10.4 to 37 percent. The model 
envisaged a peaceful transfer. In fact Gömbös himself did not believe 
that the frontiers could be altered by negotiation.8
The version of revision most stridently advocated (by social 
organizations) was to restore the integrity of pre-1918 “historical” 
Hungary, but to diplomatic minds, the idea of revision on ethnic 
grounds seemed the most attainable, even if this was drowned out in 
domestic politics by the cult of “No, nay, never!” among the general 
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public. Experts were thinking mainly of annexing the Hungarian-
inhabited areas just across the border. What was envisaged for 
Transylvania was a corridor through Cluj and Sălaj districts connecting 
the Hungarian settlements around Satu Mare and Salonta with the 
Székely Land. Plebiscites were proposed for ethnically mixed areas 
and for those where the majority community in the state concerned 
formed a minority.9
No comments on such plans came from representatives of 
Hungarian political parties beyond Hungary’s borders, whose 
programs advocated schemes of national autonomy that cited 
motions passed at the unification rallies of 1918 and the stipulations 
of the minority protection treaties.10
The main arguments advanced in Hungarian revisionist 
propaganda can be grouped under four types. (1) First came the 
arguments resting on the geographical and economic integrity of 
the Carpathian Basin, backed by age-old historical processes (the 
highland/lowland relation and the function of Budapest) and the 
economic anomalies that arose after 1918.11 (2) This covers the 
discourse on the historical virtues of Hungarian statehood and 
the cultural superiority of the Hungarian people.12 (3) The starting 
point here was the geopolitical need to offset the power of Germany 
and Russia, which only strong and stable countries such as Poland 
and a Hungary that ruled the Carpathian Basin could do.13 
(4) It was argued that the new states had been unable since 1918 to 
handle the minority question, with the result that the situation had 
become less stable and the relations of the various national groups 
more inimical than they had been before 1918 under the Austro-
Hungarian Monarchy.14
The propaganda for territorial revision was made by the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs and by various social organizations. Several 
dozen societies pledged to struggle for the territorial integrity of 
Hungary had arisen in 1918. The most active was the Territory 
Protection League (TEVÉL), which sought to appeal to the patriotic 
feelings of Hungarians and win over the former minorities of pre-
1918 Hungary. However, this was dissolved by the government 
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under the stipulations of the Treaty of Trianon. Still, TEVÉL was 
one of the forerunners of the National Federation founded in 1920. 
This organization refused to recognize Trianon, so it was suitable 
only for domestic propaganda. In April 1920, the Hungarian Society 
for Foreign Affairs was founded by a group of foreign policy 
experts, intending to raise the awareness of the Hungarian public 
about foreign policy issues.15 Scholarly research was specifically 
the aim of the Sociographic Institute, founded in 1924 to tackle 
social issues in Hungary, as it was of the Political Science Institute 
(Államtudományi Intézet) founded two years later and headed by 
Pál Teleki. The latter set out to gather social, economic and political 
data on the neighboring countries and their Hungarian minorities 
and to provide data based upon which decisions could be made.16 
The newspaper propaganda that strengthened with the campaign 
by Lord Rothermere gave rise in April 1927 to the Hungarian 
Revisionist League, as an association of more than 500 member 
organizations. It set up offices abroad (in London, Milan, Paris, 
Amsterdam, Berlin, Washington, Warsaw and Geneva) and by 1940 
had published 270 books in various languages (English, Italian, 
French and German). In 1931, the League took over the publication 
of the foreign policy journal Magyar Külpolitika.17
The minority protection efforts of Budapest governments 
appeared openly both in revisionist politics and on international 
forums, in conjunction with support for the self-organization and 
political activities of the minority Hungarian communities. This 
policy towards the Hungarian community was represented at the 
time by Benedek Jancsó’s idea: territorial integrity had been lost, 
but not cultural integrity, which was backed by the minority treaty 
and had to be sustained, along with the demographic, economic 
and cultural positions, so that use could be made of all this as a 
basis at new peace negotiations in the future.18 For this reason, 
great emphasis was placed in Hungary’s interwar support policy on 
denominational education and maintaining the means of minority 
publicity (via the press).
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During the change of sovereignty (1918 to 1920–1922), Budapest 
advised the former elite of officials in Transylvania to take a politically 
passive stance, while in Czechoslovakia it supported restoration 
of the old party frameworks. (Uncertainty over citizenship and 
political rights remained in Serbia until 1922, when the opting period 
expired.) As it emerged that the alteration in international relations 
had to be accepted in the longer term and as emphasis shifted onto 
consolidation in Hungary (in 1923–1926), Budapest came to support 
the idea of integrating minority Hungarians into the politics of the 
successor states, through a framework of distinct Hungarian parties.19 
Beyond the organization of Hungarian political activity, Budapest 
encouraged cooperation with other ethnic groups in Hungarian-
inhabited regions (Slovaks, Rusyns, Croats, Šokac, Bunjevac or 
Germans), as well as with local members of the majority group 
(the Romanians of Transylvania), on asserting regional interests 
against the nation-state center, and tried to support such programs 
(Transylvanianism, or the Slovensko idea and other ideologies of 
“indigenousness” in Slovakia and Transcarpathia). It was clear by 
the end of the 1920s that this was not working. Hungary could not 
supply sufficient political or economic resources to persuade non-
Hungarian regional groups to turn against Prague, Belgrade or 
Bucharest.20 Moreover, some of the non-Hungarian regional parties 
and some of the minority Hungarian parties joined the government, 
to pursue a policy of concluding pacts with the authorities of the 
day.21 So Hungarian parties everywhere were on the defensive by 
the end of the 1920s, pursuing their grievances through appeals to 
the League of Nations that were backed by Budapest, while seeking 
at home to extricate the minority question from party politics by 
persuading the majority parties to introduce some kind of legal 
and political regulation. In the 1930s, a period of national drawing 
together, government policy in Budapest shifted towards internal 
organization and unification of Hungarian minority societies. The 
main goal became to maximize the institutional organization of 
each such society.22 By the second half of the 1930s, preparations 
for territorial revision had become the focus, despite negotiations on 
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the minority question with the Little Entente and with neighboring 
countries individually (Yugoslavia and Romania).
Budapest governments between the world wars saw the 
Hungarian political elites of neighboring countries as part of the 
Hungarian political class and their parties as pursuing Hungarian 
national goals. Although many Hungarian politicians in neighboring 
countries stayed loyal to the policy of Budapest, they were also 
seeking scope for political integration at home by the end of the 
1920s. Later they trusted simultaneously in the prospect of revision 
and in gaining acceptance for their minority as a political entity (in 
Transylvania, the Southern Region, Transcarpathia or Slovakia) by 
building up their own social institutions.
The dominant strand in the overlapping, cross-supporting 
arguments of the Hungarian minority elites and of Budapest in its 
policy towards those communities was reference back to the minority 
protection treaties of 1919, with utilization in the second half of the 
1930s of the League of Nations’ minority complaints procedure. 
Emphasis went on the language-use problems in Vojvodina, the 
absence of the Székely cultural autonomy promised in Romania’s 
minority protection treaty, and the failure of Prague to provide the 
oft-promised administrative autonomy for Transcarpathia.23
The second line of argument (especially in the 1920s) involved 
the post-unification conflicts between central government 
and the regions in the new nation states. Hungarian leaders of 
Romania sought to ally with advocates of “Transylvania for the 
Transylvanians” against the liberal economic and political elite of 
Bucharest. With Slovensko and Transcarpathia, they argued against 
intrusions of the Czech economy and administrative apparatus and 
in favor of the rights of “indigenousness” championed by the Slovak 
national movement. In Yugoslavia, Hungarian leaders sought to 
magnify regional conflicts between Vojvodina and Belgrade or 
between Zagreb and Belgrade to assert the interests of Hungary or 
the Hungarian minority.
The third group of arguments consisted of appeals to decisions 
made before 1918, at the time of the change of sovereignty, or made 
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earlier to promote it. It included (1) calls to new national political 
elites over national demands made by movements gaining a majority 
after 1918, (2) comparisons of the current situation with stated 
political aims at the time of secession from the Monarchy, and 
(3) comparisons of the liberal minority policy of pre-1918 Hungary 
with current policy towards Hungarians in the successor states.24
The work of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs through the lega-
tions in Prague, Bucharest and Belgrade tied in with that of the Na-
tionalities and Minority Department of the Prime Minister’s Office, 
headed by Tibor Pataky from its foundation until 1944.25 The latter 
did not deal with the Austrian or Western Hungarian communities, 
only those of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Romania, and non-
Hungarian communities in Hungary. It performed the day-to-day 
operative tasks of maintaining relations and mediating in certain 
cases, and had advisory powers, preparing summaries on certain 
subjects or mediating between persons or social organizations and 
the prime minister or Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The latter had 
the task of bringing minority problems to the attention of Great 
Power governments and to contributing international propaganda. 
Hungarian missions in Central Europe began in the later 1920s to 
establish close ties with Hungarian minority leaders and to make 
regular reports on minority questions. Their mediating role covered 
policy and information, and under Bethlen’s premiership they re-
ported only to him. Later the Second Department of the Prime Min-
ister’s Office became the decisive factor. Apart from preparing the 
international ground for revision, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
pursued Hungary’s interests through bilateral contacts with neigh-
boring countries and international campaigns for minority rights, 
by preparing minority petitions to the League of Nations and man-
aging them in Geneva, secret funding for the European Congress of 
Nationalities, and propaganda for minority rights.26
In the spring of 1920, István Bethlen and some confidants of 
his of Transylvanian origin – some of whom had taken part in the 
peace preparations before joining the Second Department – set up 
the Bocskay Association to give support to the “detached Eastern 
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Hungarian territories.” This later changed its name to the Populist 
Literary Society. Since the relations between the government and 
such social organizations were unclear, a government meeting on 
August 12, 1921, endorsed Bethlen’s proposal for a Center for the 
Association of Social Societies27 (TESZK), headed by Pál Teleki, 
with Antal Papp as executive deputy. The government decision 
stated that only the prime minister could take action on questions 
concerning the Hungarians beyond the borders, having listened to 
the requisite minister on each specific question. The task of TESZK 
was to coordinate social activity in Hungary to protect and support 
the interests of Hungarians abroad. This meant in practice that 
during Bethlen’s premiership TESZK dispensed the funding for 
Hungarian social institutions, through the Rákóczi Association in 
Czechoslovakia, the Society of St. Gellért in the Southern Region 
(including the parts of the Banat south of the River Mureş ceded 
to Romania), and the Populist Literary Society in other parts of 
Romania.28
The allocation for operating the system and forwarding the 
subsidies amounted to 0.178–0.443 percent of the annual central 
budget in 1921–1931, or 10–35 percent of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs’ allocation. The associations were not funded equally. This 
depended not only on the number of Hungarians that they covered, 
but also on the projects to fund and the relative lobbying powers of 
their officers. The Rákóczi Association (the Association of Upland 
Societies29 after 1924) mainly channeled subsidies for political 
purposes: operation of the Hungarian parties and infrastructural 
support for them. Only 10–12 percent of the total went on cultural 
and educational purposes, whereas the Populist Literary Society30 
and the Society of St. Gellért spent the bulk of their funds on Church 
(educational) and cultural matters.31
But the task of the associations went beyond channeling 
subsidies. They gathered information, published books, and up to 
the end of the 1920s, ran hostels for Hungarian students in higher 
education from abroad.
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The operation of TESZK falls into three stages. The first (1921–
1925) was one of coordinating the work of the associations abroad 
financially and through propaganda for revision. In the next (1925–
1932) it simply organized assistance from Hungary through the 
associations, and with the end of the Bethlen era in 1931, its task of 
channeling subsidies ceased. The government replaced it in the 1930s 
with a new framework that operated through the diplomatic missions 
and consulates. Of the three social associations, only the Populist 
Literary Society retained a more important role, as it continued to run 
the university hostel and scholarship schemes.30
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6. outcoMES And InconSIStEncIES In
HunGArIAn PoLIcY on tErrItorIAL rEVISIon
László Szarka
The Treaty of Trianon imposed on Hungary on June 4, 1920, 
remained a factor in Hungarian public thinking through the 
twentieth century – as an act of injustice by the Great Powers, 
evidence of unbridled nationalist expansionism in Hungary’s 
neighbors, an obstacle to sober consideration of the question, or 
populist demands for full return of the lost territory. All appreciable 
political and public forces in interwar Hungary saw some revision 
of the borders laid down in the treaty as inevitable and essential.
It was commonly held across the political spectrum (for instance 
by Albert Apponyi, Miklós Horthy, Gyula Gömbös and even 
Ferenc Szálasi) that the ultimate aim was “integral revision” – full 
territorial restitution. The commonest arguments for this cited 
the geographical unity of historical Hungary or reformulated and 
updated versions of traditions of a multi-ethnic historical state 
ascribed to its founder, St. Stephen of Hungary.1 Some, mainly in 
the opposition and on the left wing, accepted in part the nation-state 
realities of the new Central Europe and sought only the return of 
areas with an ethnic Hungarian majority. Yet others (among them 
two prominent prime ministers, Pál Teleki and István Bethlen) cited 
diplomatic realities, the need for international support for Hungary’s 
claims, and maintenance of independence as reasons for asserting 
the territorial claims in stages.2
One influential writer of the period, Dezső Szabó, took a position 
that altered from time to time. Another, László Németh, saw a lasting 
solution in idealized cooperation among the Danubian peoples, 
with gradual extension of minority rights and “spiritualization” of 
national borders. A similar view was taken by the émigré Oszkár 
Jászi, who echoed the sentiments of more sober figures in Hungarian 
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government, having discovered at first hand, as a member of the 
short-lived Hungarian National Council of 1918–1919, the risks of 
armed conflict inherent in a policy of territorial revision.3
Ultimately, the chances depended not on domestic political debate 
in Hungary, but on power relations in interwar Europe.4 After Hitler 
came to power in 1933, there was increased antagonism between the 
Great Powers, divided between those for and those against preserving 
the Versailles status quo. The situation prompted Hungary to press 
for Great-Power support for its territorial objectives, where possible 
seeking peaceful, diplomatic means of attaining them, although this 
was only successful for the predominantly Hungarian-inhabited 
parts of Czechoslovakia, recovered in the autumn of 1938.5
Britain and France stood back from the problem, which meant 
that Hungary’s plans to revise its borders could be furthered 
only by Germany and Italy. There was no thought in Berlin of 
accommodating Hungary’s claims during the Anschluss of March 
13, 1938, either in Burgenland or in Devín and Petržalka, two 
former Hungarian villages in Slovakia annexed at the same time. 
At the Kiel talks in August 1938, Hitler offered Hungary the whole 
of Slovakia if it would act as an initiator of the dismemberment 
of Czechoslovakia. This was rejected by Governor Miklós Horthy 
on the advice of Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs Kálmán 
Kánya and the Hungarian chief of staff. Hitler then went ahead with 
stepping up pressure on Czechoslovakia. Britain and France, anxious 
to resolve the crisis and avert world war, came to see detachment of 
minority-dominated areas of Czechoslovakia as the means to do it, 
which prepared the way for the Munich Agreement on September 29, 
1938, after four-power negotiations to which Czechoslovakia was not 
invited.6
So Hungary’s insistence on “integral revision” had to be aban-
doned (for Slovakia and then Transcarpathia) in favor of the ethnic 
principle and a bilateral deal presaged by an addendum to the Munich 
Agreement. Czechoslovakia lost the Sudeten German territories, and 
after an ultimatum from Warsaw, the mainly Polish settlements in 
Silesia and Orava County. On October 6, 1938, Slovakia’s autonomy 
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was proclaimed at Žilina.7 A few days later, an autonomous Trans-
carpathian government formed under András Bródy (Andrej Brody) 
at Khust, and was recognized by Prague two days later.8
Referring to the Munich Agreement, Hungary sought a bilateral 
agreement with Czechoslovakia as fast as possible, basing its ethnic 
claims on the 1910 census returns. At talks held in Komárno on 
October 9–13, 1938, the Hungarian government delegation was 
headed by Teleki and Kánya and the Czechoslovak one by Jozef Tiso, 
but these foundered on rival interpretations of the Hungarian and 
Czechoslovak census returns, especially as they concerned the four 
largest cities in the territory affected: Bratislava, Nitra, Košice and 
Užhorod. At that point, Italian diplomacy, orchestrated by Mussolini 
and Ciano, tended to favor Hungarian arguments, and the Third 
Reich’s diplomacy, under Hitler and Ribbentrop, Czechoslovakia’s. 
A decision was reached on November 2, 1938, by means of German–
Italian arbitration, as the First Vienna Award. This took the 1910 
census returns as its starting point and awarded Hungary two of the 
cities: Košice and Užhorod.9
The Hungarian politicians of Slovakia and Transcarpathia worked 
to ensure a calm atmosphere for the bilateral and international 
negotiations. They prepared a memorandum and also gave an oral 
report to the British negotiator, Lord Runciman, as well as making 
contact with Warsaw and Rome, but this won them no invitations to 
the Komárno talks or the Vienna tribunal. On October 3 they formed 
a Slovensko Hungarian National Council, and shortly afterwards a 
Transcarpathian National Council as well. These two bodies broke 
with the earlier autonomy policy and demanded that the borders 
be changed. However, the views of the Hungarian minority played 
practically no part in either negotiating process.10
The territory granted to Hungary by the First Vienna Award 
was occupied in the first half of November 1938. After twenty 
years of Czechoslovak rule, the “return” was greeted by most of 
the population of former Upper Hungary with euphoria, as an act 
of historical justice. The rulings of the German–Italian tribunal 
were given specific form in several bilateral agreements, finalizing 
Outcomes and Inconsistencies 145
the new frontier, exchanging certain settlements, dealing with the 
Czechoslovak settlers in the reannexed areas and their property, 
addressing the minority question, and settling matters such as trade, 
and postal and rail services. Britain and France endorsed the First 
Vienna Award, with some reservations, although they had played no 
part in arbitrating it.
Western assessments of the Czechoslovak question and of 
Hungarian border revision changed radically when Hitler invaded 
Czechoslovakia on March 14, 1939, thrust qualified independence on 
Slovakia, and de facto annexed the remainder of the country to the 
Reich as the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. At the same time, 
Berlin concurred with a Hungarian invasion of the Transcarpathia of 
Avgusthyn Voloshyn, then known officially as “Podkarpatská Rus.” 
The Hungarian forces defeated the Sich Guards of the Voloshyn 
government and advanced to the Polish frontier, also annexing 65 
settlements along the eastern border of Slovakia.11
Administrative efforts ensued to integrate the reoccupied areas 
economically and culturally into the Hungarian state. Despite some 
success, this soon precipitated regional differences of interest. The 
Hungarians of the returned Upper Hungary had met in the minority 
period with the democracy prevalent in Czechoslovakia and did 
not feel that they were receiving clear support from Hungarian 
officialdom, notably in the case of the Hungarian reversal of the 
Czechoslovak land reform and in the parent country’s stance in 
administrative political decision-making.12
The autonomous and then semi-independent Slovakia was 
dismayed by the First Vienna Award, as it had lost the city of Košice 
and three islands of largely Slovak settlement in Slovenský Meder/
Šurany, Nógrád and Gemer. The Slovak legislature began to apply 
the principle of reciprocity, placing obstacles to the operation of János 
Esterházy’s Hungarian party and infringing Hungarian cultural and 
economic interests.13
Hungary’s territorial demands on Romania in Transylvania 
were affected by three main factors: the international position of 
Romania, especially after the Molotov–Ribbentrop pact of August 
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23, 1939; the ethnic topology of the territories ceded to Romania 
after Trianon; and the places of both countries in Hitler’s plans for 
a second world war. Furthermore, the Teleki government was keen 
to ensure at least tacit agreement from the Western powers for its 
moves to revise its frontiers, which it could not expect from either 
Britain or France in the case of Transylvania.14
The German–Soviet pact proved advantageous to Hungary over 
Transylvania in several respects. The German/Soviet occupation 
of Poland had made the Soviet Union an immediate neighbor, 
and both powers were prepared to support Hungary’s demands in 
Transylvania. During the short pre-war period of Soviet–Hungarian 
rapprochement, the Soviet Union stated several times that it had 
no objections to Hungary’s revisionist efforts there. Britain and the 
United States were prepared to accept limited border changes based 
on bilateral agreement. Germany, as it prepared for war on the Soviet 
Union, sought the soonest possible end to the Hungarian–Romanian 
dispute, by mutual agreement.
The next development was a four-day Soviet military campaign 
against Romania, launched on June 28, 1940. The Soviet Union 
occupied northern Bukovina and Bessarabia, thereby becoming the 
first power to overturn Romania’s territorial settlement under the 
Versailles system. Budapest made strong use of the Bessarabian 
precedent, but sought to avoid any appearance of cooperating 
with the Soviet Union. As Hungary weighed up the risks of armed 
intervention in Romania, it was interrupted a second time by joint 
German–Italian arbitration. Pressure from Berlin induced the two 
countries to hold talks at Turnu Severin in mid-August. The formula 
of a German–Italian tribunal was revived after the Romanian 
government found Hungary’s alternative territorial proposals 
unacceptable.
The Second Vienna Award of August 30, 1940, came out in favor 
of a Northern Transylvanian “ethnic corridor” to link Hungarian-
majority areas and other areas with a relatively strong Hungarian 
ethnic presence in the Partium, Northern Transylvania and the 
Székely Land. The division of historical Transylvania caused grave 
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concern and antagonism among the Hungarian and the Romanian 
public alike, especially the Hungarian Székelys (Szeklers). For 
a time public delight in Hungary at the return of Transylvanian 
cities with a mainly Hungarian population and of the Székely Land 
overrode the anxieties about new conflicts after the border change. 
But the Romanian public was deeply offended by this second almost 
immediate infringement of the country’s sovereignty, involving 
territory seen as vital to Romanian national development and a 
transfer to Hungary of some 1.1 million ethnic Romanians. The 
subsequent riots led to the king’s abdication and rapid installation 
of the totalitarian Antonescu regime.15
Based on agreements at Borşa and Debrecen between military 
delegations of the two governments, the Hungarian army occupied 
the land granted under the Second Vienna Award on September 
5–15, 1940. There was a huge welcome for the arriving army from 
Hungarian society in Transylvania, after decades of indignities, 
persecution and grievances as a minority. Celebrations of the 
“return of Transylvania” were remembered by many for the rest 
of their lives, and the annexation greatly reinforced the Hungarian 
identity of the Hungarians in the reoccupied region. But the ensuing 
months of Hungarian military administration brought about many 
local conflicts. The bloodiest reprisals for attacks on the army took 
place in Sălaj County, at Treznea on September 9 and at Ip and 
Marca on September 13–14. Altogether 243 people lost their lives in 
these brutal reprisals.16
During September and October 1940, the two sides held so-
called liquidation talks to find mutually acceptable solutions for the 
Hungarian and Romanian inhabitants of divided Transylvania, but 
the initiative was swamped by the waves of refugees and deportees 
in both directions and by the related confiscations of property. 
From the outset the Antonescu regime with its totalitarian methods 
opposed any rapprochement with Hungary, thereby expressing its 
refusal to recognize the validity of the Second Vienna Award. This 
was underlined by a statement issued by the Romanian government 
on March 15, 1941.17
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The Hungarian government sought to consolidate the conditions 
in Northern Transylvania and the Székely Land as rapidly as 
possible. Once civilian government had been introduced on 
November 26, 1940, attempts were made to address the grievances 
of the Hungarians. Major investments were made in education and 
culture, transport and infrastructure.18
The two Vienna Awards left the Hungarian government 
strongly indebted and committed to Hitler’s Germany. It had already 
subscribed to the Anti-Comintern Pact in February 1939, and it joined 
the Tripartite Pact on November 20, 1940. Despite some promising 
diplomatic moves, neither Horthy nor the Teleki government was 
willing to cooperate with the Soviets, as such action would probably 
have led to rapid German occupation.19
After the German occupation of Poland, the one weak alternative 
to alliance with the Axis that remained was Hungarian–Yugoslav 
cooperation. Teleki had pressed deliberately for the so-called treaty 
of eternal friendship between the two countries, seeking thereby 
to preserve Hungary’s neutrality and to encourage confidential 
relations with the Western Allies. The treaty signed in Belgrade 
on December 12, 1940, simply alluded to the unsettled political 
questions between the two countries (concerning territory and the 
minorities) and sought to postpone mutual agreement on them.
As the Germans and Italians spread ever more aggressively 
through East-Central and Southeastern Europe, the Balkans became 
a strategically important region, especially Western-oriented 
Yugoslavia. Two days after the latter’s sudden accession to the 
Tripartite Agreement on March 25, 1941, there was a coup d’état in 
which the now pro-German Regent Paul was replaced by his young 
nephew King Peter II and a government headed by Dušan Simović. 
Hitler immediately began to prepare an invasion.
Hungary, indebted to Germany for the Vienna Awards, faced 
a grave dilemma. Joining in Germany’s military aggression 
irrevocably lost it the goodwill of the Western Allies, and 
subsequently any chance of retaining the territorial gains that it 
had made. Yet to have rejected Germany’s overture would have 
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gone against the revisionist aims pursued through the period, 
by precluding the recovery even of territories with a majority of 
Hungarian inhabitants, still living in the ignominious state of a 
minority. The dilemma appeared in its most extreme form in the 
case of Yugoslavia, less than four months after the treaty of eternal 
friendship had been signed. Horthy, with an eye to the territorial 
claims that Hungary was still making against Yugoslavia, had 
assured Hitler on March 28 that there could be Hungarian–German 
military cooperation, in view of the “common lot” of the two 
countries.
Prime Minister Teleki tried to make Hungary’s military 
participation in the invasion conditional on circumstances that 
might excuse his country breaching the treaty of eternal friendship. 
But participation meant abandoning two basic ideas behind 
Hungary’s policy for territorial revision. None of the Western 
Allies was prepared to condone Hungary’s attack on Yugoslavia, 
and they stated their opposition to Hungary’s pursuing its territorial 
objectives by military means. As the German forces began to pass 
through Hungary on April 2 to launch the attack, it became clear 
that Hungary was now in a dependent position. It can be assumed 
from a suicide note, addressed to Horthy, that this moral problem, 
or some aspects of it, prompted Pál Teleki to take his own life on the 
night of April 3, 1941.20
Military action by Hungary, commencing on April 11, 1941, 
after the formation of the so-called Independent Croatian State, 
resulted within three days in the capture of Bačka, south Baranja 
and Međimurje. Southern Region Hungarians greeted the invaders 
as a liberating army freeing them from oppression as a minority, 
although there was disappointment that the Banat came under 
German military control and part of Međimurje went to Croatia 
under a bilateral agreement. In the event only 55 percent of the lands 
lost to the South Slav state under Trianon was regained – 11,475 
square kilometers, with some 1,300,000 inhabitants, of whom 39 
percent were Hungarians.21
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The Hungarian army met with no appreciable resistance from the 
Serbs before Yugoslavia capitulated on April 17, but the number of 
Serb civilian victims rose steadily, due to a spate of charges brought 
in the occupied territories. Serious local incidents proliferated, due to 
false intelligence and poor knowledge of local conditions. The worst 
of these occurred at Sirig, a village of Serb settlers that belonged 
to Temerin, where locals were driven out to greet the Hungarian 
forces, who suddenly surrounded them and killed over 100 of them 
(470 according to one Serb report).
Cleansing operations began all over Bačka on April 18. 
During these, several tens of thousands of post-war Serb settlers 
(dobrovoljac), Jews, and others labeled unreliable were interned, 
and a still larger number of Serbs were deported to German-
occupied Serbia, the Banat and Croatia.22 To replace them the 
Hungarian government imported 3,279 northern Bukovina Székely 
families (about 13,200 people) into 14 settler villages in Bačka in 
May and June 1941, under an agreement with Romania signed on 
May 11, 1941, whereby the land-starved Székelys (descendants 
of eighteenth-century settlers in Bukovina) would evacuate the 
villages of Józseffalva, Istensegíts, Hadikfalva, Andrásfalva and 
Fogadjisten (now Vornicenii Mici, Ţibeni, Dorneşti, Măneuţi and 
Iacobeşti respectively).23
Alongside the cleansings and internments that continued 
throughout the year, costing many civilian lives, there appeared 
signs of Serb and communist partisan resistance. Acts of sabotage 
proliferated in October 1941. Martial law and summary trials 
were introduced by Lieutenant General Ferenc Szombathelyi, 
successor to Henrik Werth as chief of staff, but were approved only 
subsequently, on October 28, by the Hungarian government, and 
were aimed mainly at diversionary and partisan actions by the Serb 
communists.
The incidents in Čurug and Žabalj, which had slid into armed 
conflict, were followed on January 4, 1942, by a full-scale raid 
from the direction of the Šajkaš district of south Bačka, ordered by 
Szombathelyi and led by Lieutenant General Ferenc Feketehalmy-
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Czeydner. The increasingly savage operations aimed at suspected 
Chetniks,24 partisans and communists, as well as Serbs and Jews 
accused of assisting them, spread on January 15 to Stari Bečej and 
Srbobran and the city of Novi Sad. The three-day raid across Novi 
Sad became a pogrom in which innocent Jews of all ages were 
massacred by Hungarian forces. Those days in Bačka are estimated 
to have cost several thousand civilian lives. There was a temporary 
lull in the communist and partisan actions against the Hungarian 
regime, but they did more damage to Hungary’s international 
reputation than any military act before them.25
The four border changes brought Hungary’s area to 172,200 
square kilometers at the end of 1941, and brought its population 
to 14.7 million. The Romanians, Rusyns, Serbs and Slovaks in 
the acquired territories made the country more multi-ethnic: the 
proportion of native Hungarian speakers in the population fell to 
77.5 percent. So the result was equivocal in terms of an ethnically 
based policy of territorial revision.26
notes
  1 See, for example, Jenő Szűcs, Nemzet és történelem. Tanulmányok 
[Nation and History. Studies] (Budapest, 1984), p. 35.
  2 Summarizing the revisionist ideology and strategy: Miklós Zeidler, 
Ideas on Territorial Revision in Hungary 1920–1945 (Boulder, 
CO/Wayne, NJ/New York, 2007); Anikó Kovács-Bertrand, 
Der ungarische Revisionismus nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg. Der 
publizistische Kampf gegen den Friedensvertrag von Trianon 1918–
1931 (Munich, 1997). Trianon: Béla K. Király, Peter Pastor and Ivan 
Sanders, eds., Essays on World War I: Total War and Peacemaking, 
a Case Study on Trianon (New York, 1982); Miklós Zeidler, ed., 
Trianon (Budapest, 2008); Miroslav Michela, Pod heslom integrity. 
Slovenská otázka v politike Maďarska 1918–1921 [Under the Slogan 
of Integrity. The Slovak Issue in Hungarian Policy 1918–1921] 
(Bratislava, 2009). For revisionist views of Hungarian politicians and 
public figures, see Ignác Romsics, ed., Trianon és a magyar politikai 
gondolkodás, 1920–1953 [Trianon and Hungarian Political Thinking, 
1920–1953] (Budapest, 1998); the following contributions are worth 
152 Minority Hungarian Communities in the 20th Century
listing: sections on Pál Teleki (by Balázs Ablonczy), pp. 12–30; 
István Bethlen (by Lóránt Péteri), pp. 31–50; Gyula Gömbös (by 
Miklós Zeidler), pp. 70–97; Ferenc Szálasi (by Krisztián Ungváry), 
pp. 117–133; Jászi Oszkár (by Gábor Richly and Balázs Ablonczy), 
pp. 134–155; László Németh (by Nándor Bárdi), pp. 175–192.
  3 Jászi covers the most important issues, dilemmas of the revision in 
his English-language works. See for example Oscar Jászi, Revolution 
and Counter-Revolution in Hungary (London, 1924); Idem, The 
Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy (Chicago, 1929); Idem, 
“Neglected Aspects of the Danubian Drama,” The Slavonic and East 
European Review 14 (July 1935) 40: 53–67.
  4 The limited scope in Hungarian foreign policy: Pál Pritz, “Magyar-
ország külpolitikája a formálódó Berlin–Róma tengely árnyékában,” 
Századok (1981) 5: 921–954; Idem, “Entscheidungsprozesse in der 
ungarischen Aussenpolitik (1919–1944),” in Gábor Máthé, ed., 
Theorie und Institutionsystem der Gewaltentrennung in Europa 
(Budapest, 1993), pp. 173–191; Idem, “Hungarian Foreign Policy in 
the Interwar Period,” Hungarian Studies 17 (2003) 1: 13–32; Magda 
Ádám, The Little Entente and Europe (1920–1929) (Budapest, 
1993).
  5 Hungary’s claims against Czechoslovakia and actions in 1938: K. Jörg 
Hoensch, Der ungarische Revisionismus und die Zerschlagung der 
Tschechoslowakei (Tübingen, 1967), p. 323; Henry Delfiner, Vienna 
Broadcasts to Slovakia, 1938–1939: a Case Study in Subversion 
(Boulder, CO/New York, 1974); Edward Chaszar, Decision in Vienna: 
the Czechoslovak–Hungarian Border Dispute of 1938 (Astor, FL, 
1978); Nandor F. Dreisziger, Hungary’s Way to World War II (Astor 
Park, FL, 1968); Eric Roman, “Munich and Hungary: an Overview 
of Hungarian Diplomacy during the Sudeten Crisis,” East European 
Quarterly 8 (March 1974) 1: 71–97; Thomas L. Sakmyster, Hungary, 
the Great Powers and the Danubian Crisis, 1936–1939 (Athens, 
1980).
  6 Magda Ádám, “The Munich Crisis and Hungary: the Fall of the 
Versailles Settlement in Central Europe,” in Igor Lukes and Erik 
Goldstein, eds., The Munich Crisis 1938, Prelude to World War II 
(London, 1999), pp. 82–121; Gergely Sallai, “A határ megindul…” 
A csehszlovákiai magyar kisebbség és Magyarország kapcsolatai 
az 1938–1939. évi államhatár-változások tükrében [“The Frontier 
Moves Off…” Relations between the Czechoslovakian Hungarian 
Outcomes and Inconsistencies 153
Minority and Hungary in the Light of the 1938–1939 Border Changes] 
(Bratislava, 2009), pp. 81–112.
  7 The question of Slovak autonomy: K. Jörg Hoensch, Die Slowakei 
und Hitlers Ostpolitik. Hlinkas Slowakische Volkspartei zwischen 
Autonomie und Separation 1938/1939 (Cologne/Graz, 1965); James 
Ramon Felak, At the Price of the Republic: Hlinka’s Slovak People’s 
Party, 1929–1938 (Pittsburgh, PA, 1995).
  8 Paul R. Magocsi and Ivan Pop, Encyclopedia of Rusyn History and 
Culture (Toronto, 2005); Christian Ganzer, Die Karpato-Ukraine 
1938/39: Spielball im internationalen Interessenkonflikt am Vorabend 
des Zweiten Weltkrieges (Hamburg, 2001); Albert S. Kotowski, 
“Ukrainisches Piemont? Die Karpartenukraine am Vorabend des 
Zweiten Weltkrieges,” Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas 49 
(2001) 1: 67–95; Mykola Vegesh, “Ukrajna belpolitikai helyzete, 
1938–1939” [Ukraine’s Domestic Situation, 1938–1939], in Csilla 
Fedinec, ed., Kárpátalja 1938–1941. Magyar és ukrán történeti 
közelítés [Transcarpathia 1938–1941. Hungarian and Ukrainian 
Historical Rapprochement] (Budapest, 2004), pp. 21–36; Vasyl 
Hudanych, “Mi volt a Kárpáti Szics?” [What Was the Carpathian 
Sich?], in ibid., pp. 37–52. The Sich was a separatist defense force.
  9 László Szarka, “The Principle and Practice of Ethnic Revision in 
Hungary’s Foreign Policy in Connection with the First Vienna 
Award,” in Ferenc Eiler and Dagmar Hájková, eds., Czech and 
Hungarian Minority Policy in Central Europe 1918–1938 (Prague/
Budapest, 2009), pp. 135–153.
10 Comprehensive Slovakian Sourcebook on the Vienna Award, see 
Ladislav Deák Viedenská arbitráž. 2 november 1938. [The Vienna 
Award. November 2, 1938] Vol. I–III (Bratislava, 2002–2006); Gergely 
Sallai, “Az első bécsi döntés diplomáciai és politikai előtörténete” 
[Diplomatic and Political Antecedents to the First Vienna Award], 
Századok (2000) 3: 597–631; Gyula Popély, “A müncheni döntéstől 
a komáromi tárgyalások megszakadásáig” [From the Munich 
Agreement to the Break-Up of the Komárno Talks], Magyar Szemle 
7 (1993) 11: 1133–1151.
11 Ladislav Deák, Malá vojna [The Little War] (Bratislava, 1993); Paul 
R. Magocsi, The Rusyn-Ukrainians of Czechoslovakia: an Historical 
Survey (Vienna, 1983); Iryna Haponenko-Tóth, “Kárpáti Ukrajna 
magyar megszállása (1938. november–1939. március)” [Hungarian 
Occupation of Carpathian Ukraine, November 1938–March 1939], 
in Fedinec, ed., Kárpátalja 1938–1941, pp. 71–86.
154 Minority Hungarian Communities in the 20th Century
12 On the first Slovakian state: Mark W. A. Axworthy, Axis Slovakia – 
Hitler’s Slavic Wedge, 1938–1945 (Bayside, NY, 2002). Hungary’s 
image of Czechoslovakia’s Hungarian elite: Tamás Gusztáv Filep, 
“Két előadás a visszatért magyarokról. Felföldi társadalomkutatók az 
1938 utáni magyarországi viszonyokról” [Two Lectures on Returned 
Hungarians. Upland Social Researchers on Conditions in Hungary 
after 1938], in Idem, A humanista voksa. Írások a csehszlovákiai 
magyar kisebbség történetének köréből 1918–1945 [Humanist Voice. 
Writings on the History of the Czechoslovakian Hungarian Minority 
1918–1945] (Pozsony, 2007), pp. 187–221. The “return” problem 
is treated in detail in László Bukovszky, “A visszacsatolt Felvidék 
(Dél-Felvidék) közigazgatási szervezete” [The Administrative 
Structure of the Reannexed Upland (The South Upland)], Limes 20 
(2007) 4: 53–64, Gábor Demeter and Zsolt Radics, “A Dél-Felvidék 
reintegrációjának gazdaság- és társadalomföldrajzi vonatkozásai” 
[Economic and Socio-Geographical Aspects of Reintegration in the 
South Upland], ibid., pp. 65–82, István Gaucsík, “Bankstratégia 
a dél-felvidéki területeken (1938–1941)” [Bank Strategy in South 
Upland Territories (1938–1941)], ibid., pp. 83–97, and Gyula Popély, 
“Az iskolai nemzetnevelés problémái az 1938 novemberében 
felszabadult felvidéki területeken” [Problems of School National 
Education in Upland Territories Liberated in November 1938], ibid., 
pp. 133–140. 
13 On Esterházy: Gabor Szent-Ivany, Count Janos Esterhazy. The Life 
and Works of the Great Son of the Hungarian Highland (Astor, FL, 
1989), at http://www.hungarian-history.hu/lib/esterh/esterh00.htm. 
A detailed picture: A szlovákiai magyarság élete 1938–1942 [Life of 
the Slovakian Hungarians 1938–1942] (Budapest, 1948). The lessons 
and community strategies of the second minority period: János 
Esterházy, “A szlovákiai magyar család élete a második sorsforduló 
óta” [Life of the Slovakian Hungarian Family after the Second Turn 
of Events], in ibid., pp. 7–20; Rezső Peéry, “Perem-magyarok” 
[Marginal Hungarians], in ibid., pp. 21–34.
14 Pál Pritz, “La crise de guerre internationalle et la Hongrie (1938–
1941),” Guerres mondiales et conflits contemporains: revue d’historie 
(September 2001): 67–82; Zeidler, Ideas on Territorial Revision, pp. 
255–279; András D. Bán, Hungarian–British Diplomacy, 1938–1941. 
The Attempt to Maintain Relations (London/Portland, OR, 2004).
Outcomes and Inconsistencies 155
15 Preparations: András Rónai, Térképezett történelem [Mapped 
History] (Budapest, 1989). Diplomatic and political ties: Béni L. 
Balogh, A magyar–román kapcsolatok 1939–1940-ben és a második 
bécsi döntés [Hungarian–Romanian Relations in 1939–1940 and the 
Second Vienna Award] (Csíkszereda, 2002).
16 Péter Illésfalvi, “‘Édes Erdély itt vagyunk.’ Az 1940-es erdélyi 
bevonulás során történt atrocitásokról” [“Dear Transylvania, Here 
We Are.” The Atrocities during the 1940 Entry into Transylvania], 
Pro Minoritate 9 (2004) 1: 58–77.
17 Béni L. Balogh, “A magyar–román viszony és az erdélyi kérdés 
1940–1944 között” [Hungarian–Romanian Relations and the 
Transylvania Question 1940–1944], in Gyöngy Kovács Kiss, ed., 
Történelmünk a Kárpát–medencében 1926–1956–2006 [Our History 
in the Carpathian Basin 1926–1956–2006] (Kolozsvár, 2006), pp. 
19–27.
18 For works on conditions in Northern Transylvania in 1940–1944, 
see the following: digital text base www.adatbank.ro; Zeidler, 
Ideas on Territorial Revision, pp. 279–286; Holly Case, Between 
States: The Transylvanian Question and the European Idea during 
World War II (Stanford, CA, 2009), pp. 67–198; the whole of Limes 
19 (2006) 2 (a themed issue), especially the following: Csaba Gidó 
and László Márton, “Észak-Erdély és Magyarország 1940. évi 
gazdasági fejlettségének összehasonlítása” [Economic Development 
Comparison between Northern Transylvania and Hungary, 1940], 
Limes 19 (2006) 2: 19–42; Edit Csilléry, “Közalkalmazottak és 
köztisztviselők Észak-Erdélyben a második bécsi döntést követően” 
[Public Employees and Officials in Northern Transylvania after 
the Second Vienna Award], ibid., pp. 73–92; András Tóth-
Bartos, “Háromszék vármegye gazdaságának fejlesztésére tett 
próbálkozások 1940–1944 között” [Attempts to Develop the 
Economy of Trei Scaune County 1940–1944], ibid., pp. 107–118; 
Nándor Bárdi, “A múlt, mint tapasztalat. A kisebbségből többségbe 
került erdélyi magyar politika szemléletváltása 1940–1944 között” 
[The Past as Experience. Change of Outlook in Transylvanian 
Hungarian Politics after the Minority/Majority Shift], ibid., pp. 43–70.
19 Miklós Zeidler and Béni L. Balogh, “Az ‘Erdély-kérdés’ a magyar–
szovjet külkapcsolatokban” [The “Transylvanian Question” in 
Hungarian–Soviet Relations], 2000 14 (2002) 3: 41–67.
156 Minority Hungarian Communities in the 20th Century
20 The background and farewell note appear in Zeidler, Ideas on 
Territorial Revision, pp. 273–279; also see Balázs Ablonczy, 
Pál Teleki (1874–1941): The Life of a Controversial Hungarian 
Politician (Boulder, CO, 2006) on Teleki. The note, to be delivered 
to Horthy if the suicide attempt succeeded, read as follows: “Your 
Serene Highness! We have become breakers of our word – out 
of cowardice – in defiance of the Treaty of Eternal Friendship. The 
nation feels this, and we have thrown away its honor. We have placed 
ourselves on the side of the scoundrels – for there is not a word of 
truth in the stories of atrocities – against either the Hungarians or 
the Germans! We shall become the despoilers of corpses, the most 
abominable of nations! I did not restrain you. I am guilty.” Quoted in 
translation in Paul Lendvai, The Hungarians: a Thousand Years of 
Victory in Defeat (London, 2003), p. 408.
21 Enikő A. Sajti, Hungarians in the Voivodina 1918–1947 (Boulder, CO/
Highland Lakes, NJ, 200), pp. 191–233; László Göncz, Felszabadulás 
vagy megszállás? A Mura mente 1941–1945 [Liberation or Occupation? 
Along the Mura 1941–1945] (Lendava, 2006).
22 Sajti, Hungarians in the Voivodina, pp. 234–249.
23 Ibid., pp. 250–297; Enikő A. Sajti, Székely telepítés és nemzetiségi 
politika a Bácskában [Székely Settlement and Minority Policy in 
Bačka] (Budapest, 1987).
24 Originally a Serbian nationalist and royalist organization, the 
Chetniks turned after 1941 to supporting the Axis occupation against 
Tito’s partisan forces.
25 Sajti, Hungarians in the Voivodina, pp. 342–402.
26 Detailed socioeconomic statistics appeared in the following: “A vissza-
csatolt északi terület” [Reannexed Northern Territory], Magyar 
Statisztikai Szemle 6 (1938) 1–12: 1011–1158; “Az 1939. március 
közepén birtokba vett kárpátaljai terület” [Transcarpathian Territory 
Obtained in Mid-March 1939], Magyar Statisztikai Szemle 7 (1939) 
8: 196–240; “A visszacsatolt keleti terület” [Reannexed Eastern 
Territory], Magyar Statisztikai Szemle 8 (1940) 8: 657–787; 
“A visszafoglalt délvidéki terület” [Reannexed Southern Region 
Territory], Magyar Statisztikai Szemle 9 (1941) 11: 767–821.
7. MInorItY HunGArIAnS
And cEntrAL EuroPEAn LAnd rEForMS
Attila Simon and Attila Kovács
The objective of the interwar Czechoslovak, Yugoslav and Romanian 
governments, sometimes tacitly, sometimes openly, was to establish 
nation states. One method employed was to weaken the economic 
power of the minorities and nationalize industry, agriculture and 
banking. For economic power brought political power, and a 
Hungarian minority shorn of its property became more vulnerable 
in political, cultural and educational terms as well. The main vehicle 
of the Czechoslovak, Yugoslav and Romanian nationalization 
process was land reform, to transfer land ownership to the nation 
that constituted the state.
Almost every country in Europe took up the question of 
reorganizing land ownership after the First World War. Land 
ownership in most of the still mainly agricultural countries of 
Central Europe was skewed, most of the farmland being owned by 
a few aristocratic landowners, while most villagers owned little or 
no land. The land reforms of the 1920s in Romania, Yugoslavia and 
Czechoslovakia showed great similarities: (1) Aside from their social 
and economic objectives, they were intended to weaken the politico-
economic positions of the Hungarian minority. (2) They were 
accompanied by resettlement campaigns that brought Romanian, 
South Slav or Czechoslovak colonists into Hungarian-speaking 
areas.
Slovakia and transcarpathia
Land reform was announced in Czechoslovakia in November 1918, 
just after the republic had been declared. Apart from its social and 
economic intentions, it had the open objective of transferring land 
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from German and Hungarian to Czech and Slovak ownership. The 
Sequestration Act of April 1919 set upper limits on permissible land 
ownership of 150 ha for farmland and 250 ha for other land (forest, 
pasture, and so on). Land that exceeded those limits was seized by 
the State Land Office against compensation. The area of land seized 
in Slovakia and Transcarpathia was 740,000 ha, of which 113,000 
ha could be claimed back by its original owners, while the rest was 
put up for sale to legitimate claimants under the Allocation Act of 
January 30, 1920. Although one objective of the land reform was 
to reinforce peasant farming, most of the best sequestered land 
was parceled into so-called residual estates of 100 ha for sale to 
those close to the government. This created a new, loyal stratum 
of middling landowners who were not German or Hungarian, but 
Czech or Slovak.
The land reform had a particularly strong effect in the 
southern Slovakian region inhabited by Hungarians. On the one 
hand that was where most of the large sequestered estates lay, but 
on the other more than 60 percent of the inhabitants were earning 
their living from agriculture. There were plenty of potential 
Hungarian claimants, and the number of landless agricultural 
workers and day laborers in agriculture was much greater among 
the Hungarians (42 percent) than the national average. Yet the 
partiality of the State Land Office meant that only 20 percent of the 
land redistributed in the Hungarian-majority districts of southern 
Slovakia and Transcarpathia went to local Hungarian people. The 
rest went to residual estate owners, settlers and other claimants, or 
passed into state ownership. That left large numbers of Hungarian 
estate workers and poor peasants without a livelihood and highly 
susceptible to communist agitation.1
The national objectives of the Czechoslovak land reform 
became clearer during the ensuing colonization campaign, for 
claimants under the Allocation Act could also apply for land outside 
their place of residence. Using this loophole, the State Land Office 
set out to attract tens of thousands of Czech and Slovak claimants 
to the southern, Hungarian-inhabited districts of Slovakia and 
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Transcarpathia, where they were granted holdings averaging 12 ha 
of farmland and received substantial subsidies to buy the holding 
and start farming it. The colonies were usually sited so as to break 
up the uniform Hungarian character of the district, place a buffer 
between the Hungarian-language area and a nearby city (such as 
Bratislava or Galanta), or extend the Slovak-language area southward 
to the border.
One type of colony consisted of villages founded to defend 
the border and populated with legionnaires from the Czechoslovak 
foreign legions that had fought in World War I. These legionnaires 
living right by the Hungarian border were still army reservists who 
could be mobilized at any time. They were also used to guard railway 
junctions. Major legionnaire settlements were sited at Buzitka 
(formerly Nógrád County), Gerňov (formerly Gömör–Kishont 
County) and Solomonovo by the River Tysa in Transcarpathia.
The Czechoslovak colonization program brought over 3,300 
Czech, Moravian and Slovak families to 143 communities in southern 
Slovakia, and some 300 families to 16 colonies in Transcarpathia.2 
The colonists, mainly from the northern mountains, found it hard 
to adjust to strange natural and farming conditions, and many had 
financial troubles. Furthermore, it was hard to gain acceptance from 
local inhabitants, who had been overlooked in the reform, and as a 
result there were constant ethnic tensions.
When the Hungarian-inhabited areas of Slovakia and 
Transcarpathia were reannexed to Hungary under the First Vienna 
Award in the autumn of 1938, over 70 percent of the settlers came 
under Hungarian rule. Some 400 families left their colonies before 
the Hungarian army arrived, and double that number were deported 
by the Hungarian authorities. The remaining 1,200 or so colonists 
stayed put throughout the war.3
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romania
The unusual feature of the land reform in Romania was that separate 
arrangements were made for each part of the country (the Regat, 
Transylvania, Bessarabia and the Banat). The main reason was 
not simply the topographical differences, but the aims of nation-
building policy as well.
The Land Ownership Act of July 30, 1921, that applied to the 
annexed territories of Eastern Hungary and Transylvania differed 
from the legislation in the Regat in not setting an upper limit to the 
total area of land to be sequestered, and it gave greater scope for 
expropriating the land of public institutions (schools and churches) 
than the legislation in other parts of the country. It also stipulated 
that land could be seized without compensation from those who had 
resided abroad other than on public business between December 
1, 1918, and publication of the act. This affected thousands of 
Hungarians who had fled from Transylvania to Hungary for a longer 
or shorter period (even a few days) at the time of annexation.
As in Czechoslovakia, the act discriminated against the 
Hungarians of Romania in the way in which sequestered land was 
reallocated. According to official statistics issued on June 1, 1927, 
the land reform in Transylvania benefited 212,803 Romanians, 
45,628 Hungarians, 15,934 Saxons and Swabians, and 6,314 
members of other minority groups. The losses were especially great 
for the largely Hungarian Churches (the Catholics and Reformed), 
weakening their ability to contribute to Hungarian education and 
culture in Romania.
The land reform in Romania was also accompanied by 
colonization campaigns. These brought into being 111 settlements, 
mainly in Hungarian-inhabited areas of Transylvania, in which 
almost 5,000 Romanian families were settled on altogether 40,000 
ha of land.
Application of the Land Ownership Act for Transylvania caused 
tensions between Romania and Hungary, as the Romanian state 
also seized the estates of those who had moved to Hungary and 
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taken Hungarian citizenship, thereby contravening the terms of the 
Treaty of Trianon. It affected, for example, former Transylvanian 
aristocrats who were prominent in Hungarian politics, including 
Prime Minister Bethlen. The diplomatic debate finally ended with 
international agreements in the early 1930s.
Yugoslavia
The land reform in the Yugoslav state that came into being after 
World War I took place under very intricate conditions, mainly 
because of the great differences between the territories that were 
uniting.
The purpose of the Yugoslav agrarian reform was to apply 
the Serbian system of peasant smallholdings to other parts of the 
country. So there was support for land reform and for regulations 
and acts on colonization that would produce smallholdings. Land 
was granted only to the landless and to those with less than 10 
cadastral hold (5.7 ha), the latter receiving one 1 hold per family 
member, for which they had to pay. Colonists, however, received up 
to 8.7 cadastral hold (5 ha), again having to pay, with the exception 
of the dobrovoljac, “men of goodwill” or volunteers who had fought 
for Yugoslav unity, who had the sum paid for them by the state. The 
upper limit before great estates had to be parceled out varied by 
region. In Slovenia, estates over 200 ha were confiscated, while in 
Vojvodina it was as much as 500 ha. The minorities were entirely 
excluded from the redistribution, which was especially unfortunate 
for the Hungarians in the northern areas, where the proportion of 
Hungarians with no land or less than 10 cadastral hold was highest. 
Yugoslavia alone of the successor states first rented out to the 
claimants the lands expropriated from the great estates. Only after 
the act concluding the land reform had been passed in June 1931 did 
the redistributed land pass into the ownership of the claimants.4
The colonization took place in parallel with the Yugoslav land 
reform, with settlers of Serb national origin in the main settling in 
areas inhabited by the minorities. The authorities used the settlers 
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to spread Slav influence over the newly acquired territories, to assist 
in assimilating the non-Slav population, and in Macedonia’s case, to 
forestall the spread of a Macedonian national identity and Serbianize 
the inhabitants. The settlements carried out in Yugoslavia between 
the world wars were aimed mainly at two regions: Kosovo and the 
northern territories. In both cases most colonists were sent to border 
communities, where they were supposed to constitute a Slav stratum 
unconditionally loyal to the Yugoslav state. These people were used 
by the authorities, especially in the 1920s, to keep the minorities 
under surveillance and intimidate them.5
The colonization campaign in Vojvodina was concentrated in the 
north, where the greatest number of great estates (mainly Hungarian- 
and German-owned) were found and there lived populous minority 
communities (Hungarians, Germans, Romanians, Rusyns, Slovaks, 
and so on). The colonists brought into the plains were mainly 
from mountainous areas of the country and were interested in 
stockbreeding. Their farming knowledge was woefully inadequate 
and they were also short of the tools for farming. At least 20,000 
South Slav families with about 100,000 dependants were brought 
into the northern areas of Slovenia, Croatia and Vojvodina between 
the world wars, setting in motion changes in the ethnic complexion 
of those regions, compounded by strong emigration from the 
minorities excluded from the land reform.6
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8. MInorItY HunGArIAn SocIEtIES
Nándor Bárdi
The positions held by the minority communities in society were 
decided in general by their historical and cultural heritage, the 
legal and political framework in which they lived, the institutional 
scope available to them, and the structural attributes of society. This 
section examines how social and economic conditions changed for 
the Hungarian communities that became minorities after 1918. 
Then there is the separate question of whether these ethno-cultural 
communities can be called “minority societies,” although they 
certainly saw and proclaimed themselves as such.1
Around 1930, the number of Hungarians outside Hungary 
but within the Carpathian Basin was 2.6 million. There had been 
3.3 million in 1910, and 3.24 million declared themselves so in 
1941, after the reannexations. In all the countries of the region, 
the proportion of the community constituting the state nationality 
increased at the expense of the minorities. The proportion of self-
described Hungarians in Hungary rose from 88.4 to 92.1 percent. In 
Czechoslovakia, the proportion of Slovaks and Czechs in the territory 
of today’s Slovakia rose from 58 to 72 percent, while the proportion 
of Romanians in Transylvania rose from 54 to 58.2 percent. The 
population of Trianon Hungary in 1920 was 7.98 million, which had 
risen by 700,000 by 1930, and to 9.32 million in 1941, making a 
growth of 16.8 percent over the 1920–1941 period.2
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Table 1. The number and proportion of those with Hungarian as a 
native language (1910) or with Hungarian as a national affiliation 
(1930 and 1941) in the areas annexed by successor states3
1910 1930 1941
Slovakia/
czecho slovakia 881,326 30.2% 585,434 17.6% 761,434 21.5%
trans-
carpathia 185,433 30.6% 116,584 15.9% 233,840 27.3%
transylvania 1,658,045 31.7% 1,480,712 25.8% 1,711,851 28.9%
Vojvodina 425,672 28.1% 376,176 23.2% 456,770 28.5%
croatia 119,874 3.5% 66,040 1.7% 64,431 -
Prekmurje 20,737 23.0% 15,050 - 16,510 20.1%
Burgenland 26,225 9.0% 10,442 3.5% 2,076 -
 
The 1910–1930 decrease in the recorded Hungarian population 
was greatest numerically in Czechoslovakia (295,894) and 
proportionally in the new Austrian province of Burgenland (by 
about two thirds). The causes of the declines in the numbers of 
Hungarians fall into two groups: actual processes and manipulative 
census-taking techniques. About 350,000 people moved to Hungary 
from lost territories in 1918–1924 (197,000 from Transylvania, 
107,000 from the former Upper Hungary, 45,000 from the southern 
counties).4 Another reduction in the statistical size of the community 
came from the many Hungarians of unsettled citizenship: some 
30,000 in Czechoslovakia and over 100,000 in Romania counted 
as foreigners.5 A big contribution to the change in the national 
structure of the regions concerned was made by colonization. Some 
of these colonists filled places left by the Hungarian official class. 
The colonization connected with the land reform was designed to 
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break up the blocs of Hungarian settlement along the borders with 
Hungary, for security and social reasons. A total of almost 120,000 
Czech officials, workers and colonists moved into Transcarpathia 
and Slovensko.6 In Romania, 34,000 families were moved into new 
villages in the Partium and the Banat,7 and in 1930 Transylvania 
had 245,000 non-native inhabitants.8 In the Southern Region, over 
50,000 Slav colonists were moved into the 50-kilometer border 
zone during the Yugoslav land reform.9 The post-1918 censuses in 
neighboring countries treated the Hungarian-speaking Jews as a 
separate national group and did not usually group them with the 
Hungarian-speakers. In Czechoslovakia, five sixths – 110,000 – of the 
Jews declaring themselves Hungarian-speakers in 1910 were treated 
separately in later censuses, as were 40 percent – 60,000 – of those 
in Transylvania.)10 Similarly, Hungarian-speaking Greek Catholics 
were counted as Rusyns in Transcarpathia and as Romanians in 
Transylvania. Romania treated the Hungarian-speaking Gypsies and 
the Csángó (Ceangăi) in the same way.11 So the Romanian census of 
1930 under-recorded the number of native Hungarian speakers by 
about 100,000–120,000.12
In terms of ethnic spatial structure, the Hungarian presence 
shrank due to the factors just mentioned and also because many of the 
bourgeois in the smaller cities (Bratislava, Nitra, Levice, Komárno, 
Lučenec, Rimavská Sobota, Košice, Trebišov, Užhorod, Mukačevo 
and Berehovo) had a multiple identity (Hungarian/German/Jewish/
Rusyn/Slovak) and were drawn towards Czechoslovakia, which 
meant the assimilation of about 100,000 people by 1930. (There were 
786 localities in Czechoslovakia with a Hungarian majority in 1921, 
but only 46 in 1930.) A similar process took place in the Partium13 
(Satu Mare, Sighetu Marmaţiei, Baia Mare, Carei and Oradea), 
except that there was substantial immigration of Romanians. In 
Yugoslavia, the land reform was used to replace the native farm 
laborers on the Hungarian-, Jewish-, or German-owned estates 
with immigrants from southern Serbia. The number of Vojvodina 
localities with a Serb majority rose from 203 in 1910 to 258 in 1930, 
while the number with a Hungarian majority fell from 134 to 90. 
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The area inhabited by Serbs increased in the Bačka Topola, Novi 
Sad and Veliki Bečkerek districts.14 There the number of localities 
with a Hungarian majority fell from 139 to 59 in 1931. In Prekmurje 
the number fell from 33 to 15.15
The biggest changes of proportion in the urban population 
occurred among the multi-identity bourgeoisie of the northern cities. 
In 1910, 44 percent of the urban population of the future Slovakia 
were Hungarians, but this had fallen to 11 percent by 1930. The 
shifts over that period were from 40.5 to 16.1 percent in Pozsony/
Bratislava, 75.4 to 17.9 percent in Kassa/Košice, 80.3 to 17.7 percent 
in Ungvár/Užhorod, and 73.4 to 22.5 percent in Munkács/Mukačevo. 
In all except the last, this meant the loss of language rights by the 
Hungarians, who had to make up 20 percent of the inhabitants to 
qualify. The extent of the census manipulations in these cities and 
the expedient shift to the majority ethnic allegiance become clear in 
a post-1941 resurgence of the Hungarians, when the number of votes 
cast for the Hungarian parties exceeded the self-declared Hungarian 
population.16
Transylvania was far more rural than the Upland: 83 percent 
of the population in 1930 lived in villages, and a third of the city-
dwellers were also involved in agriculture. In 1910, 59 percent 
of urban Transylvanians were Hungarian-speakers, 23.1 percent 
Romanian-speakers, and 16.2 percent German-speakers. By 1930 
the proportion of Hungarians was down to 45 percent, partly 
through emigration to Hungary by some 50,000, mainly of the 
official class, and by a similar number to villages for reasons of 
livelihood. The second reason was that only 2 of the 10 localities 
raised to city rank had a Hungarian majority. The third was that 
some 120,000 city-dwellers counted in the 1930 census were not 
native to Transylvania. Although 32 of the 49 Transylvanian cities 
had a Hungarian majority in 1918, the figure was 27 in 1930. The 
number with a Romanian majority rose from 8 to 18 and those with a 
German majority fell from 9 to 4. (The cities to lose their Hungarian 
majorities were Deva, Alba Iulia, Lugoj, Beiuş, Făgăraş, Hunedoara 
and Ibaşfalău. By 1930, Timişoara had gained a Hungarian plurality 
due to a rapidly growing Hungarian working class.)17
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By comparison with Hungary’s 36.3 percent proportion of urban 
inhabitants in 1930 (including Budapest’s 16.6 percentage points), 
the Hungarians of Transylvania and Slovakia were more urbanized 
and those of Transcarpathia and the Southern Region less so.
The employment structure of the interwar Hungarians in 
neighboring countries was less favorable than the average in 
Czechoslovakia and more favorable in Romania. In the Southern 
Region it was worse than that of the majority nations in the region.18 
In Czechoslovakia, 65.4 percent of active Hungarians worked in 
agriculture and forestry (which accounted for 57.4 percent of the 
region’s total employment), but they were underrepresented in 
industry (16.9 percent) and commerce (6.30 percent), where the 
regional totals represented 18.8 and 10.1 percent respectively. The 
proportion of self-employed among the Hungarians and that among 
the Slovaks were almost the same (38.7 and 37.8 percent respectively) 
and the same applied to the working class (25.2 and 26.8 percent). 
Looking at the sectors more closely, it emerges that of the 374,000 
working in agriculture, 53,000 (with 210,000 dependants) owned 
land and 110,000 did not. But most of those with land (about 
38,000) had more than the 10 ha required to make a living. Of the 
100,000 Hungarians working in industry, 10,000 were proprietors 
(in small-scale industry) and 86,000 were workers. There were 
6,000 Hungarians in public employment, and about 10,000 were out 
of work. But unemployment was worse than the recorded figure, 
especially in the Transcarpathian timber industry.
The Hungarians, like the Germans and the Jews, were 
overrepresented in Transylvania’s service sector. While 26.7 
percent of the Transylvanian population were ethnically Hungarian 
in 1930, that applied to 40 percent of those working in industry 
(70–80 percent in small-scale industry), 39.9 percent in credit and 
commerce, 33 percent in mining, and 30 per cent in transport. 
The proportions in 1910 had been 52.5 percent in industry, 58.8 
percent in commerce, 41.2 percent in mining, and 74.2 percent in 
transport.19 So the continued overrepresentation was coupled with 
a sense of retreat in Hungarian society, compounded by the ground 
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lost in the professions. The proportion of Hungarian lawyers fell 
from 73.1 percent in 1913 to 20.4 percent (542 persons) in 1935. The 
case was similar in health care, where only 27 of the 257 physicians 
in Cluj were Hungarian by 1930, while the proportions in 1935 were 
24 out of 157 in Mureş County, 10 out of 34 in Odorhei County, 
and 5 out of 64 in Bihor County. Only 10.9 percent of the district 
doctors in Transylvania in 1936 were Hungarians. The proportion of 
Hungarians in public administration was down to 11.9 percent and 
among local notaries it was 2.4 percent.20
The territories ceded to Yugoslavia after World War I had been 
rural, agricultural areas dominated by large estates. Much of the 
small urban population had also lived by agriculture. Industry 
mainly meant small-scale industry and food processing, and the 
middle class meant the staff of state and county offices. Even in 
1910, the Hungarian agricultural labor force showed the highest rate 
of landlessness (53.2 percent). The Hungarians accounted for 35.5 
percent of the landowners in Vojvodina, 43.2 percent of the landless 
peasantry, and 48.9 percent of the farm servants. The indicators 
for the Germans, Serbs, Slovaks and Rusyns were all better in 
this regard.21 The disadvantage was compounded by the fact that 
two thirds of the teachers moved to Hungary after the change of 
sovereignty.22 In the absence of ethnic breakdowns of employment 
in the 1931 census returns, it is only possible to compare the ten 
Southern Region districts with a Hungarian majority with the 
aggregate figures for Bačka, the Banat and Baranja. (The 231,737 
Hungarians in the ten districts, 53.4 percent of the population, 
accounted for 61 percent of the Hungarian population in Yugoslavia 
in 1931.) It emerges from the regional figures that the Hungarians in 
the districts with a Hungarian majority were underrepresented in all 
sectors except agriculture.23
The Hungarians formed 31.4 percent of Vojvodina’s urban 
population in 1931 (and 29 percent of Hungarians lived in urban 
localities). That figure and contemporary accounts of Hungarians still 
poorer after the land reform seeking work elsewhere in Yugoslavia 
yield an estimated 18–20 percent of Hungarians (80,000–90,000) 
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as working in industry (small-scale industry).24 The closest to the 
1930 position was the employment structure of the Hungarians in 
Transylvania. (Comparative figures for Hungary were 51.8 percent 
in agriculture, 23 percent in mining and industry, 5.4 percent in 
commerce and credit, and 3.9 percent in transport.)
As for educational achievement, illiteracy was a grave 
concern in Romania and Yugoslavia. In Slovakia, 88.6 percent of 
Hungarians over the age of five could read and write, as could 83.17 
percent in Transcarpathia. Czechoslovakia introduced eight years 
of compulsory schooling in the 1920s, and illiteracy among the 
Hungarian community almost entirely disappeared. In Transylvania, 
half of the population could not read or write in 1910, 75 percent 
of the illiterates being Romanians (20 percent being Hungarians 
and 2 percent Germans). In 1930, 42.9 percent of the inhabitants 
of Greater Romania over seven were illiterate, but the proportion 
was only 32.6 percent in Transylvania, and it was lowest in Odorhei 
and Trei Scaune Counties (14.9 and 15.7 percent), and highest in the 
Romanian-dominated Maramureş and Someş Counties (61.2 and 51 
percent).25 The illiteracy rate in Yugoslavia was still 51.5 percent in 
the mid-1920s, but the proportion in Vojvodina was 23.3 percent, 
and as the social structure of the Hungarians there can be gauged as 
average or below average, it must have been 15–20 percent among 
them as well.26 In Hungary before World War I, illiteracy among 
the agricultural population was about one third, but in Trianon 
Hungary it had halved by 1930, just as it had fallen in industry (to 
5 percent).
The parts of the school system in the greatest danger were the 
secondary schools teaching in Hungarian. The number of state-run 
Hungarian-language gymnasia in Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia 
was a source of dissatisfaction. There were only five Hungarian-
language middle schools and a single women’s teacher-training 
college in the whole Upland and Transcarpathia. There were 5,135 
ethnic Hungarian middle school students in 1921–1922, but the 
number fell to 4,006 in 1929–1930, of whom only 2,838 were being 
taught in Hungarian. So the Hungarians accounted for 4.97 percent 
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of the country’s middle school students, which was slightly higher 
than their proportion of the population (4.78 percent).27 Only two 
gymnasia teaching in Hungarian remained in the whole Vojvodina.28 
In Transylvania, teaching in minority languages was done mainly 
in Church schools, and the scope for this was narrowed by the state 
through the medium of the baccalaureate examinations. Most of 
the vocational training in all three countries was conducted in the 
majority language, which presented a serious obstacle to Hungarian 
students seeking upward employment mobility in industry.
In higher education, altogether about 500 Yugoslav Hungarians 
obtained a university degree during a twenty-year period, mainly in 
Zagreb, but also in Belgrade and Subotica, most of them qualifying 
as clergy, lawyers or pharmacists. In Romania, most Hungarian 
undergraduates attended university in Cluj, where their proportion 
rose from 5 percent at the beginning of the 1920s to 15–20 percent. 
Nationally, there were 1,434 Hungarian undergraduates in 1935–
1936, of which 550 were studying law, the same number training 
to be teachers, and 160 doing medicine. The number of Hungarian 
college and university students in Czechoslovakia varied strongly: 
1,200 in 1921–1922 and 779 in 1925–1926, but 1,127 in 1929–1930, 
when they represented 3.62 percent of the country’s university 
students. In other words, the Hungarians were underrepresented in 
higher education.29
In terms of economic positions, the land reforms in all three 
countries meant that Hungarian individual, collective and Church 
estates lost land to claimants of other national groups. In other ways 
the role and development of the three regions differed, as did the 
consequent economic development of the Hungarian community. 
Žitný ostrov was a granary for Czechoslovakia, as was the Banat/
Bačka for Yugoslavia, but they differed strongly in their land 
ownership structures. Žitný ostrov producers were able to modernize 
by changing products (from grain to truck farming to supply the 
capital and smaller cities), mechanizing, and forming cooperatives, 
but not so the Vojvodina Hungarians, as day laborers or owners of 
small or dwarf holdings. Transylvania was Romania’s most developed 
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region, and the Southern Transylvanian industrial centers (Arad, 
Timişoara, Sibiu and Braşov) grew rapidly. The worker supply was 
recruited mainly from the increasingly impoverished Hungarian 
artisans and surplus labor in the Székely Land. According to the 
statistical comparisons made after the reannexations, Žitný ostrov 
developed in parallel with neighboring Transdanubia, but eastern 
Slovakia, Transcarpathia and Transylvania had only reached the 
level of pre-war Hungary. Vojvodina had not even managed that.30
The Hungarian farmers of Yugoslavia were the most indebted 
stratum of all, in a country burdened by high interest rates. Serbian 
nation-building at the time was focused on nationalizing agricultural 
land and eliminating Hungarian financial institutions and credit 
cooperatives. By 1930, Hungary too had stopped subsidizing these, 
with the result that Southern Region Hungarian farmers were left 
without institutional financial back-up. Furthermore, the region had 
the highest taxes.31
Nation-building economic policy in Czechoslovakia was 
governed by the interests of heavy industry and the financial sector. 
Small-scale and local industry in the Upland and Transcarpathia 
failed against competition from large-scale Czech industry, while 
agricultural incomes were siphoned off by rapid rises in the prices 
of industrial and consumer goods.32
Rapid development of the timber, textile and chemical industries 
in Transylvania in the 1920s brought appreciable economic growth. 
The state imposed a unitary economic policy mainly at the expense 
of newly acquired territories and the minorities. The main features 
were the following: land reform (1920–1921); colonization in border 
areas (1921 and 1930); nationalization of natural resources to turn 
the oil and gas reserves into national capital; nationalization of 
corporations by tightening state permits and controls and banning 
the use of foreign bank credit; transport tariffs to discourage raw-
material exports; location of new industry away from cities near 
the Hungarian border; a taxation policy whereby the tax yield in 
counties with a Hungarian majority rose to three times the national 
average.33
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The demographic, social and economic positions of all the lost 
areas of Hungary deteriorated and fell behind Hungary itself. The 
biggest lags developed among the Hungarians in Vojvodina and 
Transcarpathia. In every region, the biggest losers of the political 
transformation, followed by the economic and social ones, were 
the urban middle and artisan classes.
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9. MInorItY HunGArIAn cuLturE,
Art, ScIEncE And ScHoLArSHIP
Tamás Gusztáv Filep
The beginnings of minority life and of minority culture in the strict 
sense did not coincide.1 This is not just because institutions were 
banned, communal forms paralyzed, and a state of emergency 
declared after the military occupations of 1918–1919. Before cultural 
activity could begin, there had to be awareness of the formation of 
political-cum-legal communities, separate by necessity, which had to 
assess for themselves their specific problems and find the responses to 
them. The position as a minority – there would later be an extensive 
theoretical literature on it – decided in practice the character and 
purpose of the arts and scholarship and invested them with social 
tasks. Members of the public who were prepared to speak out called 
on culture to interpret the “minority destiny,” examine its attributes, 
and document its experiences. The most important demand by the 
fragmented society was for art to help them to survive and preserve 
their national identity, language and threatened values. Of course 
the values in question were mainly ones that reflected unmistakable 
features. The aims were attained where the attributes specific to the 
minority could be tied to universal criteria on a theoretical level. That 
was the basis for more or less effective Hungarian minority ideologies 
in the successor states, such Transylvanianism, or the local-color 
theory in the Southern Region.2 Respect for regional values meant 
in principle denying provincialism. That was also the origin of the 
oft-heard theory in Upper Hungary that the urbane tradition of the 
region’s rich ensured close contact with Western Europe.3
One constant attribute of minority intellectual life was its 
truncated, partial nature; its viable elements performed a kind of 
supplementary, gap-filling purpose. An especially large number of 
functions fell to literature (and its background areas).4 It is typical 
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to find permeability between forms of consciousness and expertise: 
journalism, literature and scholarship were often blurred together 
by the higher social functionality expected of them. Later it became 
generally accepted in Hungarian intellectual life that Hungarian 
literature and Hungarian culture were universal, but they were 
organized into separate centers because of the political disunity. 
The aim was for the parts to cooperate and build relations.5 The 
early period brought an extraordinary expansion of the press, which 
became rich and varied, and was increasingly divided by political 
trends, areas of knowledge, occupations and religious denominations. 
The previous readerships of the small, localized papers multiplied, 
and new papers were founded with the aim of influencing public 
opinion. This role was retained by the press until the end of the 
period, although many papers died or dwindled in the meantime. 
On the other hand, a system of minority cultural institutions grew 
up to some extent.
The detached minorities, naturally, saw themselves as part of the 
global Hungarian community and its common spirit. However, when 
the intellectual barriers finally came down, the Czechoslovakian, 
Romanian and Yugoslavian Hungarian communities proved capable 
of supporting cultural life, if not their own culture. But the required 
edifice lacked foundations.
Many provincial cities at the turn of the century had been calling 
for culture to be decentralized,6 for institutions to be shared between 
the capital and provincial centers. Furthermore, the period had 
seen many modern centers of culture begin to emerge – the most 
important being Nagyvárad, which had launched the generation of 
the poet Endre Ady – but the critical weight would not have been 
reached: the necessary figures would have been lacking, had many 
of the participants in the 1918 bourgeois revolution and the 1919 
proletarian dictatorship not withdrawn into territories occupied by 
the successor states.7 One of the period’s most influential Hungarian 
editors in Czechoslovakia, Pál Szvatkó, referred to the first phase in 
Czechoslovakian Hungarian literature as one of struggle between 
the émigrés and the dilettanti,8 a comment that could apply largely 
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to Romania and Yugoslavia too. The difference is more that the 
frontlines were not equally sharp, and the modernizers did not have 
equal chances of integrating into the new environment. It depended 
on the structure and proportions of the minority political forces, on 
the effectiveness with which the advocates of a bourgeois democratic 
“people’s republic” took part in establishing Hungarian party politics 
there. Nor did the generations raised in the minority situation identify 
completely with their modernist or conservative elders, aiming rather 
to build on and synthesize the various effects. In the literature9 and 
borderline areas of all three emerging minority cultures, there was a 
conspicuous advance by avant-garde groups, associated partly with 
bourgeois radicalism10 and partly with the labor movement,11 against 
which more conservative circles could not bring appreciable forces to 
bear, although the latter had greater chances of reaching a mass public. 
The most important members of the groups whose ideas developed 
the népi schools of thought12 tended up to the 1930s to cooperate with 
the bourgeois humanists, with regional groups still connected with the 
world trends, and to establish creative community with them. Then in 
the 1930s, younger members gained steadily more interest in “reality 
literature” based on knowledge of the people and “sociographical” or 
even sociological matters, which became the basis for a new concept of 
the collective.13 The respect for value-based literature that seemingly 
consolidated during the decade was shaken by an increasing number 
of more or less scientifically conducted pieces of social research. The 
demand for culture shifted from literature towards social research.14
The development of literary and scholarly life was impeded by the 
inadequate system of institutions: there was a want of well-capitalized 
publishers, scientific establishments, or institutes of higher education, 
where scientific and scholarly thinking might develop and thrive. 
Higher education in Hungarian for the leading intelligentsia ceased, 
except in theology. Every field of culture and scholarship suffered 
from a shortage of state and municipal (city, village) subsidies. Books 
most often had to be published privately, in editions from periodicals 
and enterprising local printers (who soon failed), under the auspices 
of local literary societies, or with a covert subsidy from the Hungarian 
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state.15 The space that the supplements of the daily papers and the 
periodicals were prepared to give to scholarship and literature 
meant that they preferred methods appealing directly to the public, 
rather than scholarly immersion. But the focus on news also gave 
rewards: the newspapers took literature and literary journalism to a 
relatively wide readership. Some papers that played such a role, in 
some periods and some regions, included Kassai Napló (Košice), 
Prágai Magyar Hírlap (Prague), Ellenzék and Keleti Újság (Cluj), 
Bácsmegyei Napló (Subotica) and Reggeli Újság (Novi Sad). Apart 
from some fleeting periodicals, they were the sites where there began 
to appear regularly, alongside the literature and the journalism with 
a basis in social science, the scientific studies needed for informed 
discussion of minority social problems.16 Many researchers were self-
taught, or dealt with subjects that drew on local knowledge.17 There 
were some experts in minority law, and one respected publication 
commanding attention throughout the language area: Magyar 
Kisebbség (“Hungarian Minority”), edited by Elemér Jakabffy and 
published in Lugoj.18 Only in the second decade did sociological and 
psychological works begin to appear, mainly from researchers now 
socialized into the minority situation. That was when life’s work 
of permanent value appeared: in Transylvania, for instance, from 
archivist Lajos Kelemen, philologist Attila T. Szabó, jurist Artúr 
Balogh and sociologist József Venczel;19 in Czechoslovakia from 
historian Andor Sas20 and educationalist and social psychologist 
Jenő Krammer.21 Only in Transylvania was there a longstanding 
tradition of scholarship. Drawing on a background of Kolozsvár’s 
Francis Joseph University of Sciences, the turn-of-the-century 
school of philosophy surrounding Károly Böhm, espousing the 
neo-Kantian theory of value, had several members who continued 
their careers in Hungary after World War I, but many others 
remained in Transylvania. The most important philosophers to have 
studied at Kolozsvár were the Reformed Bishop Sándor Makkai, 
also a theologian, prose writer and apologist for Endre Ady, and 
the Unitarian Bishop Béla Varga. The most interesting experiment 
was associated with the Kolozsvár/Cluj philosopher and theology 
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professor Sándor Tavaszy, who sought to develop a new philosophy 
out of Kantian ethics, theory drawn from his experience of the 
minority way of life, and new recognitions of the existentialism that 
began with Kierkegaard. Tavaszy was among the first to bring to 
public attention in Hungary the ideas of the existentialist Martin 
Heidegger, one of the most influential thinkers of the twentieth 
century.22 He played a similar pioneering role in introducing into 
the Hungarian-speaking world, through the Transylvanian Church, 
the main strand of new Protestant theology: the dialectic philosophy 
of Karl Barth.23 The neo-scholastic theologian Cecil Bognár was 
among the Hungarian scholars in Czechoslovakia to contribute 
several important works.24
The importance of literature grew immeasurably, but the 
frames for this were only created to a limited extent, at a cost of 
great efforts.
Contemporaries stressed the importance not only of arranging 
book publication, but of setting up regular literary and cultural 
forums, having journals and literary workshops based on criteria 
of quality not ideology, and, where possible, collaboration between 
societies, periodicals and publishers. This had lasting results only 
once, in Transylvania, where in 1926 Baron János Kemény set up 
at his mansion in Brâncoveneşti the Helikon literary society, which 
from 1928 to 1944 published the Erdélyi Helikon, the period’s 
leading literary paper, alongside an earlier publishing company, 
the Transylvanian Arts Guild.25 The bourgeois democratic, liberal, 
conservative liberal and Transylvanian népi writers were still working 
together at that time.26 Discounting some private initiatives, the Guild 
published most of the literary work that still has validity and become 
symbolic of the Transylvanian community in the period: the prose 
of Áron Tamási, Károly Kós, Miklós Bánffy and Benő Karácsony, 
the lyric poetry of Lajos Áprily and Sándor Reményik, exploring 
the symbols of standing one’s ground, and the verse of Jenő Dsida, 
the poet of modern neo-Catholicism. Later the Guild co-published 
several series with Révai in Budapest, sometimes reaching six-figure 
sales in Hungary, although the sales were not always proportionate 
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to literary worth, having more to do with adept promotion. Still, 
many were expecting a renascence of Hungarian literature to come 
out of Transylvania, in the light of major achievements around the 
turn of the 1920s and 1930s.27 This coincided partly with a growing 
demand for literature dealing with communal and social problems. 
The radical left wing congregated around the Marxist periodical 
Korunk.28 Pásztortűz overlapped strongly with Erdélyi Helikon in 
its authors and editors;29 the latter was a more traditional journal of 
the middle class, taking on board the achievements of the influential 
Hungarian journal Nyugat, but without breaking off relations with the 
old conservative authors who had founded the Transylvanian Literary 
Society30 and its paper the Erdélyi Irodalmi Szemle. An institution 
operating more traditionally was the Transylvanian Museum 
Society,31 whose periodical the Erdélyi Múzeum was revived in the 
1930s.32 The generation growing up in the 1930s (some having split 
off from the Helikon) showed a strong will to influence public life 
and share knowledge of the common people in their journal Erdélyi 
Fiatalok, as did a still younger generation in theirs, Hitel.33 The last 
three journals no longer found room for literature.
The landowning politician József Szent-Ivány attempted to form 
a united Hungarian literary front in Czechoslovakia, by inviting to 
Liptovský Ján in 1930, 1931 and 1932 a number of writers without 
reference to their world outlooks, but either the right or the left would 
stay away. The fragmentary program that came out of the gatherings, 
known as the Szentiván Curiae, was not applied, for want of funding 
and for lack of interest. The Kazinczy publishing company, formed 
after earlier efforts at unity, brought out a three-volume publication, 
only to have it confiscated, which took the company to the brink of 
failure, with the result that it only vegetated after that, failing even 
to support a periodical throughout the whole period.
The role of a central literary periodical was taken by Magyar 
Írás and at the end of the period by Tátra, under the auspices of 
the Czechoslovakian Hungarian Literary Association,34 with which 
talented prose writers such as Mihály Tamás, István Darkó and Pál 
Neubauer were more closely or loosely associated, as was the poet 
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Dezső Vozári. The novelist and short story writer Piroska Szenes 
was more directly connected with forums in Hungary. Partly due to 
connections with the lively Czech intellectual scene, many outlooks 
opposed to the cult of minority survival also had advocates among 
Czechoslovakian Hungarians, but the most popular body of poetic 
work proved to be that of Dezső Győry, who managed to proclaim 
in publicist form the emotions of the first generation of Hungarians 
to grow up as a minority.35 Neither the dogmatic Marxists (with 
the poet Imre Forbáth to the fore) nor the new generation’s Sarló 
movement36 managed to launch a periodical comparable to Korunk 
in Transylvania, but the neo-Catholic youth group succeeded in 
carrying their periodical Új Élet over into the new period. One 
feature of the situation was that the government and president 
launched what was intended to be a central organization, the 
Hungarian Scientific, Literary and Art Society (known colloquially 
as the Masaryk Academy), although it operated in practice only for 
a few years.37
Both Ernő Ligeti in Transylvania and Pál Szvatkó in 
Czechoslovakia set up papers that gathered together the value of the 
bourgeois, non-totalitarian world view and included contributions 
from writers, scholars and public figures: Független Újság and Új 
Szellem respectively.38
The work of building up a strong Hungarian cultural presence 
in Czechoslovakia was impeded by a small potential readership 
and absence of the kind of patrons found in Transylvania. In the 
Southern Region, almost everything was lacking, including local 
cultural traditions.39 There it was for the longest time that newspaper 
columns, supplements and anthologies had to make up for the 
absence of literary journals. Not until 1928 was there a meeting of 
writers with a view to founding an overall body, and in the event, 
there was no continuation of the Helikon meeting at Bečej. Several 
short-lived literary reviews appeared (the poet Zoltán Csuka being 
the main organizer), but not until 1932 did the periodical Kalangya40 
appear, focused on the theory of local color. This was edited by 
Kornél Szenteleky and survived until 1944. Szenteleky, an exponent 
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of three genres, was criticized by many for seeing local color not as a 
set of external, random constituents, but as the depiction of minority 
life. As an organizer of literary activity, he hardly got beyond the 
stage of calling together writers of varying talent. After Szenteleky’s 
death in 1933, the task of running Kalangya passed to the prose 
writer Károly Szirmai, under whom it really became a periodical 
that mapped the reality for Hungarians in the Southern Region. 
Kalangya was also involved in some successful book publishing. 
Two other careers to mention are those of the prose writers János 
Herceg and Mihály Majtényi. In addition to Kalangya, there appeared 
a Marxist publication entitled Híd,41 which was mainly devoted to 
disseminating factual knowledge, and so was not associated with 
any appreciable literary initiatives.42
Theater, closely related to literature,43 was hampered by bans 
and systematic state control in Czechoslovakia and Romania, along 
with a lack of state or municipal subsidies, problems of recruitment, 
restriction of the theater season, and arbitrary limits on the number 
of venues. Some theaters were requisitioned by the state (for instance 
in Bratislava, Cluj and Košice). Concessions to run theaters often 
went to those thought to be sufficiently loyal. Here as in other areas 
of the arts, the politically motivated state controls led to a fall in 
standards. (In Transylvania, most theater companies dwindled or 
merged into weaker groups.) Impoverishment of the theater-going 
public encouraged artistically undemanding programs. The theater 
directors who stood out were in Transylvania Jenő Janovics in 
Cluj, and in the Upland Ödön Faragó. Janovics spiked his program 
of classical drama and opera with work by Romanian Hungarian 
playwrights, and even encouraged drama to spread in Transylvania 
by running competitions. By the end of the 1920s his company was 
providing seasons in Oradea and Timişoara as well. (Janovics was 
also a pioneer of Hungarian film production, making movies in 
Transylvania up to the end of the 1920s, in a studio established at 
the beginning of the century.) 44 Ödön Faragó’s programs and artistic 
objectives were outstanding as well. He too strove to incorporate 
local dramatists. Eventually his budget became so overburdened 
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by extra assignments that he was forced to hand matters over to 
Imre Kádár in 1934–1935 and leave for Hungary. Although he 
returned several times, he could never make the company pay. 
Both countries spawned voluntary societies to support drama. The 
Theater Patrons’ Association was founded in Romania in 1922, 
the Slovakian Hungarian Theater Patrons’ Association in 1925, 
and the Transcarpathian Rusyn Theater Patrons’ Association in 
1926.45 Professional theater companies were banned in Yugoslavia 
in 1920. Not one professional performance of a Hungarian play was 
given in the period up to 1941. Nor were companies from Hungary, 
Romania or Czechoslovakia allowed to appear, and even amateur 
theater was banned in the sensitive border city of Subotica. Without 
professionals, the already depleted traditions became confined to 
nineteenth-century popular peasant plays and operettas. In other 
fields, efforts to save the arts were made by denominational, local, 
youth, and many other societies and groups, which sponsored 
performances and evenings that took more traditional forms, or 
followed the new ideological trends, but even so, often did good 
service among an audience deprived of more organized and expert 
cultural manifestations or indifferent to them. In many localities, the 
choral society or the farmers’ union was the one basis for preserving 
cultural values. In Yugoslavia, for instance, the People’s Circle 
in Subotica organized shows and literature courses throughout 
Vojvodina, in the absence of professional bodies to do so, and it was 
not until 1940–1941 that the Southern Region Hungarian Education 
Association was formed.46 The main integrating, and to some extent 
representing, role in Czechoslovakia was played by the Hungarian 
Cultural Associations in Slovensko and Transcarpathia,47 but by the 
end of the period some use was being made of the state-instituted 
district public education boards as well.48
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The policy of interwar Bucharest governments towards the 
Hungarians can be seen mainly in terms of a centrally directed 
homogenization process for the regions at various levels of 
development (Transylvania, Bukovina, Bessarabia) and of 
international relations between Romania and Hungary. The pattern 
for the Romanian model envisaged was a homogeneous nation state 
such as nineteenth-century France. Attainment of this was envisaged 
differently by the Romanian National Party in Transylvania and by 
the Bucharest politicians. The former sought individual integration 
of the minorities, or state reinforcement of the Romanian national 
(ethno-cultural) community, while the then dominant Liberal Party 
wished to continue the assimilatory, discriminatory national policy 
of the pre-war period, which had been successful for the Romanian 
nation in Dobruja and Moldavia.1 The underlying question in the 
period was how the Romanians of Transylvania, having gained 
political power, could make headway against the dominant Germans, 
Jews and Hungarians in the economic, cultural and social fields.
The 1918–1921 period – of the Sibiu Governing Council and 
the first governments led by Alexandru Vaida-Voevod and by 
Alexandru Averescu – saw the transfer of the institutional system, 
removal of Hungarian officials, and implementation of a land 
reform that weakened the Hungarian landowners. The Governing 
Council’s policy on the Hungarians, decisively influenced by the 
Transylvanian Romanian National Party, took as its starting point 
Hungary’s minority policy before 1918: leaving education to the 
religious denominations, and obstructing minority self-organization. 
The succeeding Liberal government led by Ion I. C. Brătianu took 
the view that Hungarians should exercise their political rights 
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individually within the existing Romanian party structure. This 
was rejected by the Saxons, with their long traditions of minority 
politics, and by the rapidly organizing Hungarians, with their strong 
urban bourgeoisie.
During the rule of the Liberal Party in the 1922–1926 period, the 
means employed to erect a homogeneous, unified nation state were 
rooted in a discriminatory model determined by Ion and Vintilă 
Brătianu, which gained precedence over the integration techniques 
advocated by Iuliu Maniu. This discriminatory strategy contained 
two strands: on the one hand, it involved Hungarian industrial cor-
porations and financial institutions being nationalized and smaller 
Hungarian banks and artisan industry suffering systematic econom-
ic discrimination, and on the other an education policy devised by 
Minister Constantin Angelescu that became institutionalized in the 
limitation of language rights and self-determination (the act on pri-
vate education, the baccalaureate system, cultural zones, and so on).
The third period, between 1927 and 1931, brought relative peace 
and prosperity under the government by the National Peasant Party 
and Maniu. Policy on the Hungarians focused on individual rights 
such as the pensions of former public officials who had not taken the 
oath of allegiance to Romania. But antagonism towards minorities 
remained a feature of party political competition, meaning that little 
was achieved.
The 1931–1934 period was marked by economic crisis. The 
Hungarians received no government support of any kind, and lost 
their gains from the period of economic prosperity. New Romanian 
worker and clerical strata produced by the national school policy of 
the 1920s appeared and demanded jobs, further reducing the scope 
for Hungarians on the labor market.
What marked the 1934–1938 period were anti-revisionist 
movements. One reaction to the changed international situation was 
for Romanian governments to regard the Hungarians as hostages 
against Hungary’s territorial ambitions. So the economic and 
language-rights positions of the Hungarian minority continued to 
narrow.
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The likelihood of territorial revision increased in 1938–1940, 
prompting three defensive moves. Bucharest’s Minority Statute was 
meant to show the world that the minority Hungarian question had 
been settled legally. At the same time, measures of labor, language 
and economic discrimination continued. Yet the period of royal 
dictatorship gave rise to a Hungarian branch of the National Front for 
Rebirth – the Hungarian People’s Community2 – which undertook 
effective work of building up society and organizing the community 
among the Hungarians.3
Romanian government policy on the Hungarian community 
took the form of legal and economic measures. There were five 
available sources of legitimacy for minority demands in interwar 
Romania. The only part of the Gyulafehérvár (Alba Iulia) 
Resolutions of December 1918 to be adopted as legislation was the 
union of Transylvania with Romania, and thus this did not count as a 
constitutional source. The Minority Protection Treaty of December 
1919 was ratified, but as an international treaty it ranked lower than 
domestic legislation. The official Romanian policy was to claim 
that the autonomy obligations towards the Székelys and Saxons had 
been met through the system of Church institutions. Both the 1923 
and the 1938 Constitution only recognized the concept of a religious 
minority, but not that of a national minority (on a racial or linguistic 
basis). The Minority Statute of 1938 set up a minority government 
commissionership to show the world that efforts were being made to 
handle the minority question, but gave it no decisive powers, while 
the Council of Ministers minutes that spelled out the minority rights 
did not count as a legal regulation.4
The discrimination that most affected Hungarians in their daily 
lives concerned citizenship. The 1924 Nationality Act prescribed 
domicile (four continuous years of residence and certified payment 
of local dues), not just place of residence, as the criterion for 
Romanian citizenship. So even in 1939 there were tens of thousands 
of Hungarians in Romania whose citizenship was unsettled. On the 
labor market in the 1930s, there were regulations stipulating that 80 
percent of a firm’s employees and 50 percent of its managers were to 
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be of Romanian nationality (ethnicity), while use of the Romanian 
language became compulsory in the judiciary, commercial 
bookkeeping, the postal services, and city and county public offices. 
In the second half of the 1930s it became illegal for the Hungarian-
language press to use Hungarian names for geographical features 
and places in Romania.5
The most important change in the economy was the land reform. 
Four separate land reform acts were introduced for the country’s 
four big regions, of which the legislation for Transylvania was the 
most radical, although it had the least unequal ownership structure. 
The expropriation in Transylvania covered whole estates, whereas 
in the Regat it included only cultivable land. Also expropriated were 
the lands of those who had been abroad between December 1, 1918, 
and the summer of 1921, and the same applied to the lands of those 
who had opted for Hungarian citizenship. Altogether 3,192,508 hold 
(1,819,730 hectares) in Transylvania were redistributed, 24.9 percent 
to applicants for ownership and 65.6 percent for public pasture 
and forest to strengthen the position of local Romanians. The 
beneficiaries up to 1927 were 212,803 people of Romanian, 45,628 
of Hungarian, 15,934 of German, and 6,314 of other ethnicity.
Also discriminatory was the expropriation of the estate of the 
Ciuc Border Guard (62,000 hold mainly of forest and other valuable 
pieces of real estate), while that of the Romanian-recruited Năsăud 
Border Guard of similar origin remained in communal ownership. 
The compensation was paid as an annuity bond after the 1913 price 
had been converted into lei, which meant that the estates were 
valued at next to nothing. The biggest institutional sufferers by the 
land reform were the Hungarian Churches, which were deprived 
of 84.5 percent of the 372,000 hold used for educational and other 
public purposes.6
There was economic discrimination also in the fiscal system. 
The amount of tax levied on Transylvania in the mid-1920s increased 
twice as fast as the national average increase, and the tax collection 
results in the Hungarian counties was far more effective than in the 
Romanian counties (96.8 percent in Ciuc County, 99.9 percent in 
Mureş-Turda, and 100.2 percent in Trei Scaune).7
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Interest assertion specific to the Romanian Hungarians can 
be distinguished in party political and social policy strategy.8 
The former encompassed four kinds of political stance: a pact 
policy, formation of a minority bloc, separate political activity 
by Transylvanian Hungarians, and integration into the royal 
dictatorship. By social policy is meant internal construction of society 
and institutions. Romania’s National Hungarian Party concluded 
three pacts with Romanian parties in 1923–1926, thus integrating 
itself into the Romanian political system and obtaining seats in the 
legislature. But much of the Hungarian community was not even 
on the electoral roll, and it was always the government supervising 
the elections that won them, through substantial ballot rigging, an 
agreement had to be reached with the party expected to govern in 
the future. The Liberal Party, however, denied the need for any 
separate minority party, while the National Party in Transylvania 
feared for its regional urban votes, which left Averescu’s People’s 
Party as the sole possible ally, as it needed Transylvanian votes. The 
secret Ciucea Pact with it in 1923 envisaged revision of the electoral 
rolls and settlement of minority grievances, not just parliamentary 
representation.9
The Liberal Party held negotiations on a pact with the National 
Hungarian Party before the local elections of 1926, to prevent the 
National Party from gaining exclusive positions. This was never 
signed, although local organizations cooperated, and the largely 
Liberal Party lists supported by the National Hungarian Party won 
30 of the 49 cities in the province, while Hungarians were added 
to the electoral rolls and the National Hungarian Party became a 
nationally accepted political force. However, the king appointed 
Averescu to form a government, and parliamentary elections were 
called in May. This put the 1923 pact with the People’s Party back 
on the agenda. István Ugron (having dissolved the pact a few weeks 
earlier in favor of one with the Liberal Party) stepped down as 
National Hungarian Party leader in favor of György Bethlen, who 
renewed the earlier pact almost unchanged and gained his party 
14 seats in the Lower House and 12 in the Upper House. But the 
promised redress of the minority grievances came to nothing, as the 
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Romanian parties vied for two decades to accuse the government of 
the day of betraying the Romanian nation if it proposed changing 
the disadvantageous position of the Hungarians. In 1927, the Liberal 
Party returned to power, but offered the National Hungarian Party 
only seats in the Parliament in that summer’s elections.10
Electoral law stated that a party had to poll 2 percent of the vote 
nationally or an absolute majority in one county to qualify for seats. 
This prompted the leaders of the German and Hungarian parties to 
form a joint minority bloc, for fear of electoral fraud (1927). The 15 
seats obtained were divided 8:7 between them, although there were 
twice as many Hungarians as Germans in Romania. Such political 
arrangements worked well elsewhere in Europe, but not in Romania, 
owing to the size of the Hungarian minority, its regional weight, the 
kin-state’s open aim of territorial revision, and the conflict between 
Hungarian/Jewish and Hungarian/German dual identity as opposed 
by separate Jewish and German parties.11
Another problem was the German minority insistence (ever 
since the Austro-Hungarian Ausgleich of 1867) on concluding a 
pact with the government parties of the day, and cooperation was 
offered also to Iuliu Maniu when he took power in November 1928. 
This would not work for the Hungarians, because the National 
Peasant Party (successor to the Romanian National Party in 
Transylvania) was threatening further land reform at Hungarian 
expense. So thereafter the National Hungarian Party stood alone 
in elections,12 during a decade of separate political activity from 
1928 to 1938. Apart from its parliamentary presence, the National 
Hungarian Party represented the Hungarian cause before local and 
ministerial bodies, transmitted the Hungarian standpoint to the 
Romanian public, and helped to run Hungarian social organizations. 
Furthermore, it worked internationally, for instance in the European 
Congress of Nationalities, where Elemér Jakabffy, Artúr Balogh 
and other National Hungarian Party politicians were active.13 
On 54 occasions it made complaints on behalf of the Romanian 
Hungarians to the League of Nations, with little success.14 The 
minority policy of Maniu’s National Peasant Party in 1928–1931, 
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although representing a community that had itself been a minority 
up to 1918, was a big disappointment. As the international situation 
changed and the anti-Hungarian mood in Romania increased, in 
1934 the National Hungarian Party recommended accepting the 
Romanian Parliament’s inter-party agreement on the minority 
issue, but eventually this was rejected by the other parties. The 
main achievement in this period was to keep the Hungarian political 
community together and obstruct some of the anti-minority measures 
that were mooted.15
All political parties and associations were dissolved by royal 
decree on March 31, 1938. The National Front for Rebirth brought 
into being by the royal dictatorship managed to win over the entire 
organized Hungarian community after talks with the former leaders 
of the National Hungarian party, the Hungarian bishops, Miklós 
Bánffy (former Hungarian minister of foreign affairs (1921–1922) 
who had returned to Transylvania), and Pál Szász (president of 
the Transylvanian Hungarian Agricultural Association).16 Under 
the January 1939 agreement, special departments were set up in 
Hungarian settlements and their trade associations admitted into 
corporatist national trade bodies. Bánffy was the man that the king 
appointed to head the comprehensive economic, social and cultural 
institution known as the Hungarian People’s Community, which 
took over the tasks carried out hitherto by the National Hungarian 
Party and worked intensively in the social field. However, much of 
its work after the First Vienna Award shifted to offsetting or diluting 
the mounting anti-Hungarian campaigns and measures in the parts 
of Transylvania that remained under Romanian control.17
The most extensive system of institutions among the Romanian 
Hungarians consisted of the Churches and their school system. It was 
mentioned in Section 2.3 that teaching in Hungarian became largely 
confined to denominational schools unsupported by the state. These 
numbered, in 1930–1931, 483 maintained by the Reformed Church, 
297 by the Catholics, 36 by the Unitarians, and 6 by the Evangelicals. 
In fact 57.6 percent of the Hungarian children for whom school was 
compulsory (76,255 pupils) attended a denominational school. The 
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number of state schools teaching in Hungarian had fallen to 112 
by 1934–1935. There were 23 Hungarian-language denominational 
middle schools (17 lyceums, 7 teachers’ training colleges, 4 upper 
commercial schools, and 4 winter commercial schools) provided 
native-language teaching for 54 percent of Hungarian secondary 
students. Some 6–7 percent of those receiving university degrees 
were of Hungarian ethnicity. There was no separate Hungarian 
institution: university education was attempted in jointly run Church 
colleges set up in Cluj, providing separate Hungarian-language 
teaching in each major subject. The broadest Church organizations 
in society were the women’s associations.18
The long-established Hungarian cultural associations in Transyl-
vania confined themselves in this period mainly to preserving what 
they had accomplished in the past. The library and collections of 
the Transylvanian Museum Society19 were used by the University of 
Cluj, but no rent was paid for that20 and the Society was not recog-
nized legally until 1926. The funds for the Hungarian Cultural Asso-
ciation of Transylvania21 all but dried up after the transfer of power. 
Its statutes were not recognized until 1935 and its interwar activ-
ity was negligible. The Transylvanian-Hungarian Economic Asso-
ciation (Erdélyi Magyar Gazdasági Egyesület, EMGE), founded in 
1844, had no village branches until Pál Szász took over as president 
in 1936. Thereafter it began widespread work of information and 
organization in support of small provincial farmers and managed 
to attract almost 40,000 members within a few years.22 There was 
intensive organization of choral societies, with 150 of them affiliated 
to the Romanian Hungarian Singers’ Association by 1930.23
Public opinion among the Hungarians of Transylvania was 
shaped by the political newspapers and periodicals and by a variety 
of “internal parliaments” (general assemblies of the National 
Hungarian Party, and meetings of the executives of the Roman 
Catholic Status24 and the Transylvanian Reformed Church District). 
Some 25–30 Hungarian-language newspapers appeared in Romania 
between the world wars, of which the most influential were the 
Keleti Újság, Ellenzék, Erdélyi Lapok and Brassói Lapok. The 
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periodical with the largest circulation was Magyar Nép. Other 
influential periodicals were the internationally recognized journal 
of the minorities Magyar Kisebbség, and the standard-bearer of 
conservative literature in Transylvania, Pásztortűz. Miklós Bánffy 
was instrumental in launching the most prestigious literary journal 
in the province: Erdélyi Helikon, which published the pick of the 
literary output in that period. The periodicals and movements of 
most importance in the field of social policy were Erdélyi Fiatalok, 
Hitel and Korunk.25
The Hungarian minority in interwar Romania strove to establish 
its own national minority institutions, to oppose the efforts to build 
a uniform Romanian nation state. In a situation where the state 
support for building the Hungarian nation had ceased, and against 
the intentions of both the Bucharest and the Budapest government, 
the Hungarians began to protect their positions by building up a 
separate regional and political community.
czechoslovakia: Slovakia (Attila Simon)
It is important to note, when examining the policy, culture and public 
life of Slovakian Hungarians, that they had never had traditions of 
their own (unlike the Transylvanians): Kassa, Pozsony, Komárom, 
and so on had looked to Budapest for examples. It was some time 
after the change of sovereignty before the Slovakian Hungarians 
could build up a system of institutions from scratch and establish 
their own traditions, although the democracy prevalent in interwar 
Czechoslovakia assisted them in doing so in the 1920s.
The scope available to the Slovakian Hungarians was decided 
largely by Prague’s minority policy, which was inconsistent, despite 
the country’s democratic system and the broad rights that it ensured 
for its minorities. For instance, there was insistence throughout 
the period on building up the Czechoslovak nation state. Plans for 
German, Hungarian and even Slovak autonomy were rejected mainly 
due to fear of possible efforts by the Sudeten Germans to secede. On 
the other hand, Prague generally made broader concessions to the 
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Sudeten Germans than to the Hungarians, for reasons that included 
the greater numbers of the former, the greater flexibility of minority 
German policy (the role of the activist school), and the greater 
respect felt for Germany.
There were three main political strands among the Slovakian 
Hungarians. The strongest gave electoral backing to the right-
wing opposition Hungarian parties, which trimmed their policies 
to Budapest’s expectations. They insisted throughout on self-
determination for the Hungarian minority, being prevented by 
Czechoslovak law from stating their real aim of peaceful revision 
of the borders. The deciding figures in the mainly Christian 
Socialist Party26 were Jenő Lelley, then Géza Szüllő, while the 
Hungarian National Party,27 popular mainly among Reformed 
Church members, was led by József Szent-Ivány. Despite several 
initial conflicts, the two parties managed steadily to consolidate 
their cooperation. By the 1930s, they had a joint parliamentary 
club, and they merged in 1936 as the United Hungarian Party,28 
whose national president was Andor Jaross and executive president 
János Esterházy.
Support for the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, affiliated 
to the Third International, was much higher among the Slovakian 
Hungarians (20–25 percent) than it was among the majority Slovaks 
(12–14 percent). This was due partly to its attitude on the minority 
question and the influence of its social rhetoric on the Hungarian 
agricultural workers excluded from the land reform. Hungarians 
played important roles in the communist movement in Slovakia, 
notably Jenő (Eugen) Fried29 in the national leadership and István 
Major in minority public life in Slovakia.
The third strand of Hungarian minority politics, Activism, 
was less successful. It mainly took the form of Hungarian sections 
within the two main Czechoslovak parties, the right-wing Agrarians 
and the Social Democrats. What it lacked was the strong economic 
motivation that made it popular among the Sudeten Germans. 
The groups headed by the Agrarian István Csomor and the Social 
Democrat Ignác Schulcz could hardly point to any autonomy within 
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their parties or political results. Although the example of the Sudeten 
Germans seemed to justify Activist politics, it was vehemently 
opposed by Budapest: Slovakian Hungarian activists were often 
branded as traitors to their nation.
The authorities may have eliminated Hungarian-language 
teaching in the cities beyond the linguistic border, but it was 
profoundly important to the identity of Slovakian Hungarians that 
Hungarian-language elementary schooling largely remained in the 
districts where they predominated. Still, there was no Hungarian 
higher education in Czechoslovakia, while the Germans had their 
own universities in Prague and Brno.
The Hungarian-language press was extensive and varied. The 
total of more than 500 Hungarian papers of various kinds that 
appeared for longer or shorter periods in interwar Slovakia included 
plenty of political and popular dailies, cultural magazines, and even 
sports papers. The foremost daily was the Prágai Magyar Hírlap, 
a mouthpiece of the opposition, but the Kassai Napló in Košice and 
the moderate pro-government Magyar Újság of the 1930s were of a 
high standard as well.
Cultural life was as divided as politics, each institution being 
tied to some party or political trend. The main national body was the 
Hungarian Cultural Association in Slovensko,30 closely associated 
with the opposition. This had broadly active branches in every 
region, maintaining drama and folklore groups, and holding lectures 
and celebrations. The main regional bodies were the Kazinczy 
Society (Kazinczy Társaság) in Košice, the Toldy Circle (Toldy Kör) 
in Bratislava, and the Jókai Cultural and Museum Society (Jókai 
Közművelődési és Múzeum Egyesület) in Komárno, but there were 
many reading circles, boys’ brigades, Church groups, workers’ 
academies and middle-class clubs that played a crucial local role. 
A donation from President Masaryk prompted the formation in 1931 
of the Czechoslovakian Hungarian Scientific, Literary and Artistic 
Society31 (known colloquially as the Masaryk Academy), to act as 
a kind of academy of sciences for the Hungarian community, but 
it foundered on the hostility of opposition Hungarians and fell into 
dilettantism.
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Slovakian Hungarian youth was organized initially into the 
Scout movement and the Association of Czechoslovakian Hungarian 
Academics,32 which encompassed university students, but ideological 
and political polarization had invaded by the end of the 1920s. The 
more left-wing Sarló (Sickle) movement in Slovakia was inspired by 
the rural researchers and folksong collectors, while the Prohászka 
Circles33 were focal points for Catholic young people. But Slovakian 
Hungarians growing up after Trianon shared an acquaintance with 
Czech and Slovak culture, to which they were more open than their 
elders. They saw the solution to the minority question primarily in 
cooperation among the nations of the Carpathian Basin.
Sports in interwar Czechoslovakia were organized on a national 
basis as well, so that the Hungarians and other minorities had 
autonomous sports institutions, in the former case the Czecho-
slovakian Hungarian Physical Education Association.34 This ran 
championships in association football, tennis, athletics, swimming, 
water polo and even ice hockey.
Despite the relative comprehensiveness of minority life, the 
Hungarian minority in Slovakia had numerous grievances, mainly 
to do with the efforts in Prague to build up a Czechoslovak nation 
state. The Hungarian parties criticized not only the 1920 Language 
Act, but also the failure of the authorities to observe its terms. The 
Hungarians lost by the reform of public administration, which 
replaced the traditional system of counties and restricted local self-
government. Particularly detrimental was the conduct of the land 
reform, in which the Slovakian Hungarians were hardly included at 
all, while thousands of them were left jobless by the break-up of the 
great estates. Another recurrent complaint was over the expulsion of 
Slovakian Hungarians from state offices and public administration. 
The authorities treated all Hungarians as unreliable from the 
state’s point of view, with the result that they were almost entirely 
eliminated from central and district state offices, and even from the 
post office and the railways, where they no longer made up even 
one percent of the workforce.35 The lack of Czechoslovak generosity 
towards the minorities appeared also in the legislation that banned 
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public use of Hungarian national symbols or public celebration of 
Hungarian national feasts. The authorities discerned irredentism 
in anyone who wore or hung out a flag in the Hungarian national 
colors, or sang the Hungarian national anthem. Prosecution would 
follow any infringement of these regulations.
Prague’s attitude to the minorities changed in the second half 
of the 1930s, when the actions of Hitler brought radical changes 
in international relations and placed Czechoslovakia in direct 
danger. In the spring of 1938, in the shadow of the German/
Austrian Anschluss, Prime Minister Milan Hodža tried to rescue 
his fragmenting country by abandoning nation-state ideology 
and preparing a so-called Nationality Statute. This promised to 
eliminate national grievances, accord equal rights to the languages 
of the minorities, and grant them cultural and educational autonomy, 
but it was never introduced, due to the heightening antagonism 
between the government and the Sudeten Germans, who wished 
to join the German Reich. The imminent threat of world war was 
lessened by the four-power Munich Agreement between France, 
Britain, Germany and Italy concluded on September 29–30, 1938, 
but the areas of Czechoslovakia with a German-speaking majority 
were incorporated into Germany. The Hungarian minority initially 
hoped that the talks on the Statute would improve the situation 
in Czechoslovakia,36 but the United Hungarian Party reacted to 
the changed conditions by issuing a statement on September 17 
demanding rights of self-determination. The Hungarians in many 
Hungarian-inhabited areas held demonstrations after Munich, 
in the early days of October, calling for annexation to Hungary.37 
On October 7, Hungarian representatives and senators formed a 
Hungarian National Council38 aimed at ensuring that the return to 
Hungary took place peacefully, without disorderliness. Although 
the Hungarian communists in Czechoslovakia had initially given 
support for the integrity of the country, Slovakian Hungarian 
politics became united after Munich, as they and the Activists fell 
in behind the Hungarian National Council and the aim of peaceful 
revision of the borders. Of course the choice made by the Slovakian 
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Hungarians facilitated in residual Slovakia, which had gained 
autonomy from Prague, the arrival of a regime headed by Jozef Tiso 
that was intolerant of all differences (Jews, Gypsies, Hungarians or 
Freemasons) and intent on imposing a Fascist model of state.
czechoslovakia: transcarpathia (Csilla Fedinec)
After the first Transcarpathian governor, Gregory Zhatkovych, 
resigned, his successors – Anton Beszkid (Anton Beskyd) (1923–
1933) and then Konstantin Hrabar (1935–1938) – were still 
appointed by Prague. Fulfillment of the repeated promise that this 
was a temporary arrangement until autonomy continued to be 
postponed. Transcarpathia was needed mainly for strategic reasons 
of access to the other Little Entente countries (Romania and thereby 
Yugoslavia), it being in the Little Entente’s interest to keep Hungary 
surrounded.
The governorship was the only difference in public administration 
between Transcarpathia and the rest of Czechoslovakia, after it had 
been declared a province of the republic in 1928. Elsewhere there 
was a uniform two-tier system of local and district offices, but in 
Transcarpathia there remained a governor’s office, attached to the 
provincial governor (known colloquially as the national governor).39 
The head of the National Office was Antonín Rožypal from 1928 
to 1937, after which the post was left vacant due to the “imminent 
introduction” of autonomy, and the regular tasks were carried out 
by the national vice-president, Jaroslav Meznik. Uzhhorod (Slovak: 
Užhorod; the center of the territory) and Mukacheve (Slovak: 
Mukačevo) retained the rank of incorporated cities, but Berehove 
(Slovak: Berehovo), the one Transcarpathian city to keep its 
Hungarian majority throughout the century, was demoted to a large 
civil parish. According to the 1930 census returns, the population 
of Transcarpathia exceeded 750,000, of whom almost 450,000 were 
Rusyns (Ukrainians or Russians), about 110,000 were Hungarians, 
and 91,000 were Jews. In their religious affiliation, about 50 percent 
were Greek Catholic, 15 percent Orthodox, 15 percent Jewish, 10 
percent Reformed, and 10 percent Roman Catholic.40
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The first practical move towards the promised autonomy came 
in 1937, with an act defining the powers of the governor.41 The 
autonomy act followed on November 22, 1938,42 but its form was 
affected by the war situation, with the public demanding autonomy 
on national lines, in other words demanding that Transcarpathia 
should be declared a Rusyn autonomous area.
The official explanations for postponing autonomy usually cited 
the territory’s backwardness and poverty. An attempt to alleviate 
the poverty had been made at the turn of the century in a so-called 
Highland Economic Campaign headed by Ede Egan. Transcarpathia 
certainly was the most backward corner of pre-1918 Hungary and 
then of the whole East-Central European region. It remained so 
despite success in the Czechoslovak period in reducing illiteracy. 
The land reform, on the other hand, did not have the desired results. 
The stratum of officials consisted almost wholly of immigrant 
Czechs. “Czech settlements” were placed on the old great estates. 
Almost 70 percent of the population worked in agriculture and 
forestry, with hardly any small or large-scale industry (about 10 
percent) or commerce (about 5 percent). There was a long tradition 
of winemaking and beekeeping. Flooding was a constant problem, 
especially in 1933.
The most obvious changes after Transcarpathia’s annexation 
to Czechoslovakia were in infrastructural development and 
construction. Paved roads and bridges were built, and there 
were extensive water regulation works, along with several 
construction projects in cities. The Galagó district was added to 
Uzhhorod/Užhorod in Czech constructivist style. Hospitals went 
up in Mukacheve/Mukačevo, Berehove/Berehovo and Vynohradiv 
(Slovak: Sevľuš), and a gymnasium (high school) was built in Khust 
(Slovak: Chust). Solotvyno (Slovak: Slatinské Doly) underwent 
planned development.43
The Hungarian parties in interwar Transcarpathia got little 
further than defining themselves and establishing relations with 
each other. After 1927, there were no exclusively Transcarpathian 
parties, as they operated only as district organizations of national 
(Czechoslovak) parties up to the turn of events in 1938, when 
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there was a ban, followed by conversion into the “Highlands.” 
The two exclusively Transcarpathian parties in the 1920s were the 
Hungarian Party of Law (1920–1922, chaired by Endre Korláth, 
publishing the Ruszinszkói Magyar Hírlap and later the Ungvári 
Közlöny)44 and the Autonomous Party of the Indigenous (1921–
1927, chaired by Ákos Árky, publishing the Ruszinszkói Magyar 
Hírlap).45 The other parties operated as Transcarpathian branches 
of so-called national parties, which sought to maintain vestiges of 
a separate political complexion, mainly for reasons of financing. 
These were the Christian Socialist Party (1920–1936, chaired by 
István Kerekes, publishing the Kárpáti Napló, later the Határszéli 
Újság), and the Smallholders’, Artisans’ and Agriculturalists’ Party 
(1921–1926, after which it became the Hungarian National Party, 
chaired by Ferenc Egry, publishing the Beregi Hírlap and later the 
Kárpáti Magyar Gazda).46 From 1920 to 1936, the Hungarian parties 
operating in Transcarpathia were grouped in the Hungarian Party 
Association chaired by Endre Korláth (publishing the Ruszinszkói 
Magyar Hírlap, later the Kárpáti Magyar Hírlap). This lost its 
function when the Christian Socialists and the Hungarian National 
Party merged as the United Hungarian Party in 1936. On March 
15, 1940, the United Hungarian Party was declared to be dissolved, 
or rather subsumed into the Hungarian Party of Life (established 
by Pál Teleki in 1939 and in government in Hungary until March 
1944).47
The Hungarian parties in Transcarpathia cooperated closely with 
the eponymous Hungarian parties in Slovakia, but as separate entities, 
not parts of a uniform national organization. The Hungarian parties 
made an electoral alliance with the German parties of Slovakia. The 
main figures in Hungarian politics included Endre Korláth, Ferenc 
Egry and Károly Hokky (Charles J. Hokky). The public role of Egry, 
a respected senator and a famous bell-founder, was enhanced, as 
many church bells had been melted down to make guns in the war, 
and he could use the social occasion of consecrating new ones to 
make speeches encouraging people to take heart. These Hungarian 
parties and the Rusyn ones pressing strongly for autonomy received 
regular financial support from official sources in Hungary.
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An appreciable part was also played by the Communist Party of 
Czechoslovakia, which opposed autonomy but made strong social 
demands. It set up youth organizations and “red” trade unions, 
organized hunger strikes in the early 1930s, and began in the mid-
1930s to campaign strongly against fascism. It came to the republic’s 
defense during the crisis of 1938, as the only party to embrace all 
ethnic groups, and oriented itself towards the Soviet Union. Its 
Hungarian-language paper was the Munkás Újság.
Election results in the 1920s show that some 70 percent of voters 
in Transcarpathia supported the working-class parties (as opposed 
to about half nationally). The centralist parties had more support 
than those demanding autonomy, and this stayed largely unchanged. 
The Communists consistently polled more votes in Hungarian-
inhabited districts than the Hungarian parties did.48 However, 
irredentist movements gained strength during the depression at 
the turn of the 1920s and 1930s. Official Hungarian government 
support for Hungarian politics in Transcarpathia came through the 
Center for Alliance of Social Associations49 or directly through 
the Prime Minister’s Office or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
Separate support went to the autonomist Rusyn parties, notably the 
Autonomous Agriculturalists’ Association50 headed by Iván Kurtyák 
(Ivan Kurtiak) and then András Bródy (Andrej Brody).51 The united 
indigenous demands for autonomy were broken in 1938 by the idea 
of Hungarian national autonomy, whose main exponent was the 
Hungarian National Party, although the same politicians rejected all 
forms of autonomy after Hungary overran Transcarpathia in 1939. 
There were several Hungarian papers appearing in Transcarpathia 
during the Czechoslovak period, including the Ruszinszkói Magyar 
Hírlap (later Kárpáti Magyar Hírlap), Határszéli Újság, Az Őslakó, 
Kárpátalja, Kárpáti Híradó, Kárpáti Magyar Gazda and Munkás 
Újság, almost all with clear political affiliations.
Most Hungarians in Transcarpathia belonged to the Reformed 
Church, with some Roman and Greek Catholics,52 the latter 
being organized into the Greek Catholic Diocese of Mukacheve/
Mukačevo. Under an agreement between the Czechoslovak 
government and the Vatican, that and the Diocese of Prešov were 
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removed from the Province of Esztergom, to which they had belonged 
since September 1918, and temporarily placed directly under the 
Apostolic See, although the former was returned to Esztergom in the 
summer of 1939. In 1921, the twelve parishes of the former Diocese 
of Ung remaining in Transcarpathia expressed a wish to split off 
as a separate Diocese of Transcarpathia. On October 31, 1922, the 
formation of the Transcarpathian Reformed Diocese was declared, 
and it was recognized soon afterwards by the first legislative synod 
of the Combined Reformed Church of Slovakia and Transcarpathia. 
This was followed on December 16, 1925, by the first ordination of 
Reformed clergy to have taken place in Transcarpathia since the 
war. The diocese received official state recognition in 1932.
Authority over Roman Catholic parishes in this part of 
Czechoslovakia was exercised by the bishop of Satu Mare in 
Romania. A movement began in Transcarpathia in 1928 to have 
a separate Roman Catholic bishopric for the territory. In 1929 the 
Holy See concluded a concordat with Romania whereby the ordinary 
authority of Satu Mare over the Transcarpathian parts of the diocese 
ceased, and in 1930 it ended the authority of Satu Mare, passing it to 
a Transcarpathian Roman Catholic Apostolic Governorship.
The Czechoslovak Republic inherited in Transcarpathia 
elementary schools (with various languages of instruction), 
three gymnasia (in Užhorod, Mukačevo and Berehovo, teaching 
in Hungarian), a vocational middle school, and three teachers’ 
training colleges (two in Užhorod and one in Mukačevo, teaching 
in Rusyn and Hungarian). These were under the authority of the 
schools department in Užhorod, although the governor had certain 
powers of appointment and administration. The elementary system 
was left largely unchanged. The civil schools were expanded but 
parallel classes teaching in Hungarian remained only in Užhorod and 
Mukačevo, and the time spent in such schools was reduced from 
four years to three in the 1930s, although an additional fourth year 
was made available in some places. The Hungarian classes were 
steadily run down in the Czechoslovak system’s real gymnasia 
(the more practically oriented type of gymnasium, the other being 
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the human gymnasium) in Užhorod and Mukačevo, until the 
Hungarian language of instruction remained only in one place: the 
parallel classes of the bilingual real gymnasium in Berehovo. In 
addition, a bilingual Rusyn–Czech gymnasium opened in Khust, 
as well as a Jewish gymnasium in Mukačevo and, in the 1930s, a 
Hebrew gymnasium in Užhorod. Many Hungarian teachers lost their 
positions and their citizenship after the change of sovereignty. The so-
called Small Schools Act stated that pupils in educational institutions 
were not obliged to attend religious education. The Library Act, on 
the other hand, had a beneficial effect, ensuring good supplies of 
Hungarian books to village and city public libraries.53 
Transcarpathia had no prominent regional literary traditions. 
This was the region where literary thinking veered furthest away 
from the development path of Hungarian literature as a whole, into 
regional frames. Despite attempts to raise the literary standard, the 
regional awareness behind them remained a literary standard as 
such. It is not possible to draw a sharp line between Transcarpathian 
and Slovakian Hungarian literature in the 1920s and 1930s, apart 
from pointing to the peripheral state of the former. Yet it is not 
possible to omit this from the history of Hungarian literature, as 
it was an indispensable part of Transcarpathian awareness. The 
foremost writers included Árpád Fülöp, Pál Ilku, Margit Prerau, 
Pál Rácz, László Sáfáry, Menyhért Simon and Mihály Tamás. But 
Transcarpathia accounted for only a tiny proportion of over 2,000 
Hungarian-language books published in Czechoslovakia. The main 
source, with about 25 publications, was the Kálvin Press in Berehovo, 
which belonged to the Transcarpathian Reformed Church.54
In the arts, the general opinion today is that the self-organizing 
activities of the local Hungarians under the Czechoslovaks were 
directed from Košice and other Slovakian cities. But the social 
and cultural organizations of Transcarpathia resembled the 
parties in emphasizing their autonomy and objected to attempts 
to incorporate them or influence them from Slovakia. There was 
an independent dramatic society in the 1920s that was merged 
in the 1930s with that of East Slovakia, to constant protests in 
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Transcarpathia. An independent Transcarpathian Hungarian Drama 
Patronage Society55 was formed in Mukačevo in 1926. This ran 
acting courses and published a drama periodical for long or short 
periods (the Színházi Újság, later Ruszinszkói Színházi Élet). The 
members of the Transcarpathian Hungarian theater company often 
appeared in Budapest as unemployed actors looking for parts. The 
amateur societies presented work by local playwrights that later 
appeared in print. Interestingly, the press reports of the time suggest 
that amateur theatricals were important social occasions, arousing 
more momentary interest than the professional performances did. 
The commercial survival of the theater companies depended on the 
fluctuating audiences. The breakthrough often came by appealing to 
the national sentiments of the audience or by suggesting that these 
might be waning. So consumption of Hungarian culture became a 
means of professing one’s ethnicity.56
The most successful of the Transcarpathian Hungarian 
cultural groups was the Mosaic Cultural Society, which became 
the Transcarpathian Hungarian Cultural Society in the 1930s, then 
the Literature and Drama Society in Berehovo.57 There were also 
several larger and smaller local societies organizing innumerable 
events, evenings, commemorations, readings, evening classes and 
other occasions, even ice-cream afternoons. The most prestigious 
event on the Hungarian calendar was the Hungarian National Ball in 
Berehovo. There was mass participation in the gymnastics and sports 
associations, which were prominent cultural events as well. The 
Athletics Club in Užhorod started a flower carnival and election of a 
rose queen in 1926, long before Debrecen did. It was a matter of pride 
for a community to support a singing circle, and there was a “national” 
(Transcarpathian) review of them. These were hosted by Sevľuš, 
Berehovo, Mukačevo and Užhorod in the 1930s, while a children’s 
song contest was held in Vylok (Slovak: Ujlak) and Berehovo. 
Beauty queen contests were already being held in the 1930s. In 1935 
the Three Borders Community organized a march of several thousand 
to the Rákóczi Memorial Column in Tiszabecs, which was revived in 
the 1990s by the Transcarpathian Hungarian Cultural Association, 
214 Minority Hungarian Communities in the 20th Century
although it is now held at the restored Turul Statue in Vylok, which 
was destroyed in the 1920s. Young people were brought together in 
the Scout movement, the Transcarpathian Scout Federation founded in 
1920 having Czech/Slovak, Rusyn/Ukrainian, Jewish and Hungarian 
sections. The latter was set up in 1923 by Ferenc Haba. There was 
another association for Transcarpathian students in higher education. 
There were freemasons’ lodges in Užhorod and later (known as Pro 
Libertate) in Berehovo.58
One important arts event was the establishment in 1921 of the 
Artists’ Club in Mukačevo (or Transcarpathian Painters’ Club) 
under the painter Gyula Virágh. Then in 1931, József Boksay, Béla 
Erdélyi and the Czech painters Bedrich Oždian and Jaroslav Kaigl 
initiated the Podkarpatska Rus Artists’ Association, of which Erdélyi 
remained president for many years. There were regular exhibitions 
in the province from 1921.59 The big celebrations in 1922–1923 
to mark the centenary of the birth of the Hungarian poet Sándor 
Petőfi initiated, according to Ferenc Sziklay, cultural secretary of 
the National Hungarian Party Association, “‘minority’ awareness 
and a sense of community among Slovakian and Transcarpathian 
Hungarians.”60 A reproduction of a full-length painting of Petőfi 
by Gyula Ijjász appeared in the Christmas 1922 supplement of the 
Ruszinszkói Magyar Hírlap. The works of Transcarpathian painters 
were exhibited in Paris in February 1938.
Yugoslavia (Enikő A. Sajti)
After the law on opting for citizenship expired, the Southern Region 
Hungarians became the last community in the successor states to 
enter formal politics. The Yugoslavian Hungarian Party61 was 
founded at a congress in Senta on September 22, 1922, chaired by 
the physician Dr. György Sántha, who was elected president. The 
party never established branches in Baranja or Prekmurje, and the 
Catholic Hungarians of Novi Sad did not join either. In Prekmurje, 
there was a short-lived United Party of Prekmurje to represent local 
interests.62
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The Hungarian Party worked strictly within the framework 
of the Vidovdan (St. Vitus’ Day) Constitution of June 28, 1921, 
although it was subject to official harassment throughout the period. 
Its main policies were to ensure native-language education, free 
operation of cultural associations, lifting of electoral measures 
that discriminated against the Hungarians, freedom of business 
associations, alteration of the detrimental tax system in Vojvodina, 
reinstatement of dismissed Hungarian officials, and recognition of 
pension claims obtained in Hungary. Its activity was subsidized 
through St. Gellért’s Society by the Hungarian government’s Center 
for Alliance of Social Associations.63 The president of St. Gellért’s 
Society was the writer Ferenc Herczeg.
The party first put up its own candidates in the parliamentary 
elections of February 8, 1925, but failed to gain seats. However, in 
the provincial elections of 1927, won by the Radicals, the Hungarian 
Party gained six of the 60 seats in the Bačka oblast and a similar 
number in that of Belgrade, to which the Banat belonged. In the 
1927 general elections, an alliance with the ruling Radicals ensured 
seats for Dr. Dénes Streliczky and Dr. Imre Várady in the Belgrade 
legislature. No aggregate figure for the seats gained in communal 
assemblies is available, but in Subotica, for instance, with the 
Hungarian population in majority, the party won only 14 out of 100 
seats. In Senta it was 55 out of 80, but some communities (Mol, 
Čantavir, Horgoš and Ada) elected purely Hungarian assemblies.64
The scope for Hungarian political and cultural representation 
was severely curtailed by the royal dictatorship that ensued on 
January 6, 1929, when King Alexander dissolved the legislature, 
banned political parties and national and other cultural associations, 
introduced censorship, and dissolved the provincial and communal 
assemblies. Under the “imposed” constitution of September 3, 1931, 
an organization loyal to the regime was formed within the monopoly 
of the Yugoslav National Party in December, but this was boycotted 
by leaders and members of the dissolved Hungarian Party. In the 
second half of the decade, Hungarians studying in Zagreb started 
an anti-Belgrade radical movement within the Croatian Peasant 
216 Minority Hungarian Communities in the 20th Century
Party, proposing autonomy for Vojvodina (previously opposed by 
the leaders of the Hungarian Party) and a right-wing radical solution 
to the land question.
Yugoslavia’s international position was being eroded by 
Germany’s advances. On August 20, 1938, a pact between the rival 
Croatian and Serbian power centers was made, to shore up domestic 
political stability. Belgrade also began to take a more tolerant 
attitude to the Hungarians.
The Yugoslav government addressed several longstanding 
grievances among Yugoslavia’s Hungarians in the months preceding 
the Hungarian–Yugoslavian Treaty of Eternal Friendship of 
December 12, 1940. After long hesitation, permission was given 
on January 30, 1940, to form the Yugoslavian Hungarian Public 
Education Association, of which Gyula Kramer became president. 
The first officially licensed Hungarian-language theater in Yugoslavia 
opened in the same year.65
Southern Region Hungarians belonged to three denominations: 
Roman Catholic, Evangelical and Reformed. There are no exact figures 
for their relative sizes, and diocesan boundaries in any case underwent 
big changes after 1918. Agreement on disputed issues was reached 
in 1922 between the Vatican and the Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom, 
covering the interim government of Southern Region Catholic 
dioceses and two new bishoprics in Subotica and Veliki Bečkerek. 
The Catholic priesthood was trained in seminaries in Croatia, which 
meant an acute shortage of Hungarian-speaking priests. The 1935 
concordat between the Vatican and the Kingdom of Yugoslavia 
was not ratified after Orthodox protests. The Reformed Church at 
an inaugural synod in Sombor decided in favor of an independent 
Yugoslav province. Its clergy would be trained at Hungarian 
theological colleges in Cluj, and in Bratislava and Lučenec. The 
Evangelical Church retained its links with Hungary to the greatest 
extent. It received permission to hold a founding synod in 1926, 
but the Slovak parishes did not attend. Yugoslavia’s Churches failed 
to play the kind of role in preserving language, culture and self-
awareness that they did, for example, in Transylvania.
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One factor destructive to the general economic situation in the 
Southern Region was the fact that the border broke contacts that 
had existed for centuries. The Yugoslav land reform promised a fair 
solution to the land question and abolition of the great estates, to 
make small-scale peasant farming general in Serbia and eliminate the 
remnants of serfdom. However, it served openly nationalist purposes. 
The Hungarians were excluded from the reform on the grounds that 
their citizenship was unclear (due to the opting law), and colonies 
of settlers (dobrovoljac) loyal to the Yugoslav state were established 
near the Hungarian border. Of the private land redistributed in 
the reform, 4.4 percent (110,684 hectares) had been in Hungarian 
hands. Hungarian optant landowners (61 persons) lost 71.2 percent 
(90,062 hectares) of their holdings and Hungarian landowners who 
had taken Yugoslav citizenship 38.6 percent (20,622 hectares). The 
364 redistributed estates owned by the state, communities, the 
Churches and charitable foundations covered 247,565 hectares (36 
percent of the land was in this type of ownership), while 61.5 percent 
of the estates belonging to Hungarians was redistributed. Of the 
redistributed land in Bačka, 42.55 percent was communally owned, 
39.9 percent privately owned, and 8.3 percent in Church ownership.
The land reform granted land to 43,500 families, mainly Serbs 
and Montenegrins. Of these 6,175 families received holdings in 
Bačka (6,912 families according to other sources) and 235 did so in 
Baranja. Furthermore, 45 Slovene families from the sea coast were 
resettled in Prekmurje. After the completion of the land reform, 14.1 
percent of the land in Vojvodina remained in Hungarian hands.66
The old Hungarian school system was broken up in the early 
1920s. Of the 71 Hungarian-language secondary institutions, only 
two secondary school departments, an eight-year gymnasium 
in Subotica, and a four-year gymnasium in Senta were spared. 
According to official Yugoslav statistics, there were 1,376 lower 
schools in the Danube Banat in early 1930, with 4,233 departments, 
of which only 528 taught in Hungarian. The number of Hungarian 
elementary school teachers fell from 1,832 before the war to 250 in 
1941. By then there was not a single Hungarian elementary school 
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class in Baranja. Six Hungarian elementary school departments 
were permitted in the Banat region after the Croatian Banat was 
established. A Hungarian department was opened at the teacher 
training college in Belgrade in 1932.
There were five Hungarian-language dailies in the 1930s: 
the Subotica Bácsmegyei Napló (later the Napló), the Novi Sad 
Délbácska (later the Reggeli Újság), the Nép (initially in Novi 
Sad, later in Zagreb), and the Torontál (later Híradó), as well as 
11 weeklies and 13 periodicals. The main literary papers were 
Kalangya and the still extant Híd.67
Austria (Gerhard Baumgartner)
Once the Sopron plebiscite had been held in December 1921, the 
task remained of defining the borders between Austria and Hungary. 
This was done in 1922–1923 by the Entente’s Inter-Allied Border 
Commission, but attempts were made by small units of Hungarian 
irregulars in 1922 to prevent certain villages from being annexed to 
Austria. Such groups occupied, for instance, the German-speaking 
villages of Luising and Hagensdorf, only to be repelled by regular 
Austrian and Hungarian forces. When drawing the border, the 
commission considered the proportions of the national groups among 
the inhabitants and enquired where they wished to belong. This did 
not just affect Germans and Hungarians. The Croatian Cultural 
Association of Burgenland68 feared that the denominational schools 
in the Croat-inhabited villages would be taken over by the Austrian 
authorities, and addressed a memorandum to the Inter-Allied Border 
Commission calling for these villages to remain in Hungary.69 So 
most Croat-inhabited border villages were awarded to Hungary. But 
in Northern Burgenland the border followed the boundaries of the 
great estates and the new border placed the Burgenland Hungarians 
in the position of a minority.
Most of the Hungarian-speakers who remained in Burgenland70 
after 1923 lived in five communities. Three were in the Upper Wart 
district of Southern Burgenland – Oberwart, Unterwart and Siget in 
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der Wart71 – and two in Middle Burgenland – Oberpullendorf and 
Mitterpullendorf. The inhabitants of these villages were descendants 
of border guards of the late Middle Ages. Since they retained their 
petty noble status until the nineteenth century, their awareness of 
being Hungarian equated with their feudal awareness from Early 
Modern times. They had attained petty nobility as Hungarians and as 
petty nobility they retained their Hungarian affiliation.72
The second group of minority Hungarians consisted of those 
inhabiting manorial farms in Northern Burgenland. Eight large 
manorial centers had been established in the second half of the 
nineteenth century on various large noble estates to the east of Lake 
Neusiedl, in the western part of the Waasen district. These were 
settled with tenant-farmer families from Western Hungary, amounting 
to some 300 people – equivalent to the population of an average 
Burgenland village. Several manors had their own church, cemetery 
and Hungarian school. These Hungarians retained a nineteenth-
century romantic national awareness based on the Hungarian state 
ideology conveyed through the school system at the turn of the 
century. Some manors even had Levente groups in the 1920s.73 Since 
the manors in Northern Burgenland formed a Hungarian linguistic 
island amidst the German-speaking villages, and language use was 
correlated with social status, the Hungarian language became a 
negative status attribute for these Hungarian tenant farmers.74
The third group consisted of usually bourgeois German-
speaking or Croatian-speaking families who had turned Hungarian 
at the turn of the century and were known locally as magyarón (pro-
Hungarian).75 They were elderly members of the provincial bourgeois 
elite, who had received a Hungarian education before the First World 
War and identified the Hungarian language with bourgeois culture. 
This symbolic importance had prompted them to teach their children 
or have them taught Hungarian.
In fact there were five language groups in the area that became 
Burgenland: Germans, Hungarians, Croats, Slovenes and Gypsies. 
The Slovenes at that time were living in small numbers in two border 
villages in the Gyanafalva (Jennersdorf) District. The Gypsies, 
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present since the seventeenth century, were living in 130 localities. 
They numbered 9,000 in 1920, and 5,000 of them lived in the Felsőőr 
(Oberwart) District.
Multilingualism had a pace of its own. After the 1880s, a kind 
of equality of rank developed between the German and Hungarian 
languages, with the result that many Western Hungarian Germans 
knew Hungarian as well. Likewise, 57 percent of the Felsőőr 
Hungarians knew German, as the Felsőőr Hungarians played 
an intermediary role between Styria and the small towns of 
Transdanubia, mainly in the wood and timber trade.76 Exchanging 
children was very common: Hungarian families would send their 
children to German villages to study and vice versa. After 1921, the 
Hungarian and German languages exchanged places, so to speak, 
as German became the official language in the province, although 
Hungarian did not lose its prestige in Burgenland automatically. 
Indeed it kept its cachet, despite the campaign in the 1920s waged 
against its official use by the new provincial government.
The languages in a district were arranged hierarchically, with 
German and Hungarian at the top. German-speakers and Hungarian-
speakers did not use the other languages, but the Croats would learn 
the two prestigious languages as well as their own, and Gypsies 
might speak all three in addition to Roma.77
One unusual feature of the Hungarian minority in Burgenland 
was the fact that they belonged to several denominations. For 
instance, the three adjacent Hungarian communities of Siget in 
der Wart, Unterwart and Oberwart belonged to the Evangelical 
(Lutheran), Catholic and Reformed Churches, respectively. They 
organized and operated separate associations and were more likely 
to marry a Croatian-speaking or German-speaking co-religionist 
than a Hungarian of another denomination. The fourth denomination 
was religious Jewry (about 4,000 people), most of whom counted as 
magyarón and in some cases had to leave Burgenland in 1921 for that 
reason.78
Some earlier Hungarian legislation remained in force in 
Burgenland after 1921. The elementary schools were headed, 
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under the Hungarian Education Act, by a board of governors 
empowered, among other things, to decide the language of 
instruction. The Burgenland Social Democrats sought after 1921 
to extend Austrian school legislation to the province, which would 
have separated education from religion. The statutes agreed in 
1924 were a compromise, whereby the school governors were to be 
elected democratically instead of being appointed by the Churches. 
However, the federal Austrian government was led by the Christian 
Democrats and reversed this ruling in 1927, so that Hungarian 
education laws applied in Burgenland up to 1937.79 The teaching of 
German became compulsory under a 1920 statute. Hungarian could 
remain the language of elementary education, church services and 
public administration in minority villages, but further education 
in Hungarian was no longer available. This affected some 16,000 
children. Alfred Wahlheim, Burgenland’s first provincial governor, 
put it like this in 1923: let there be an end to the “Magyar chatter” in 
classrooms! All Hungarians teaching in secondary education were 
warned to stop using Hungarian, because “it is a task of the school 
to raise [pupils] as Germans.”80 The school statistics for Burgenland 
show that some 2,300 Hungarian-speaking children were enrolled 
each year between 1921 and 1931, which means that there must have 
been a cohort of at least 18,400 Hungarian-speaking children aged 
6–14 at the beginning of the 1930s. Instead, the 1934 census recorded 
only 10,442 Hungarian inhabitants in Burgenland, which shows that 
censuses reflected political inclination, not language use.81
The public mood outside the Hungarian-inhabited villages 
became strongly anti-Hungarian, due partly to the activities of 
the Hungarian irregulars and partly to the survival of Hungarian 
education legislation. One mouthpiece for this was the weekly 
paper of the Burgenland Social Democrats, the Burgenländische 
Freiheit, which called for Hungarian junior school teachers and 
public employees to be removed from their jobs in schools, local 
government, the post office and the railways. Some Hungarian 
local government officers left for Hungary in the 1920s for that 
reason. The paper even wanted to ban shopping expeditions to 
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Sopron: “No Burgenlander with any honor in him could go to 
the stores in Sopron and hand his money to such folk as these!”82 
Ludwig Leser, the deputy provincial governor, set the tone in 1931 
at a ceremony to mark Burgenland’s tenth anniversary: “Clean out 
everything that’s still Magyar!”83 Several thousand ministers of 
religion, teachers and officials accordingly left Burgenland in the 
1930s.
An incident in the border village of Hannersdorf in 1927 had 
national repercussions, when local Christian Democrats fired into a 
Social Democratic demonstration and one child and one man died. 
The court in Vienna later acquitted those who had fired the shots, 
whereupon the Social Democrats set fire to the Supreme Court. 
Subsequent street fighting left eighty people dead. The political 
tensions led to civil war in February 1934, causing the collapse 
of the Austrian Republic and declaration of an authoritarian 
Christian Socialist state.84 The new regime was keen to assuage 
the minorities, who were mainly Christian Socialist supporters. 
So a new education act for Burgenland was passed, in which the 
language of instruction in schools depended on the ethnic make-
up of the population. Where a minority group accounted for over 
70 percent of the local inhabitants, instruction was to be in the 
native language; where the proportion was over 30 percent, it was 
to be in two languages.85
Outside Burgenland, there were organized Hungarian 
communities only in Vienna and Graz. The latter had a Hungarian 
Cultural Alliance established in the nineteenth century and also a 
Graz Hungarian Society of Academics funded by the Hungarian 
state. Vienna at the time had a Hungarian community numbering 
tens of thousands. Before World War I, there were 210,000 people 
in the city who had originated from Hungary, while 10,922 people 
declared themselves in the 1923 census to be Hungarian-speaking, 
although the figure in 1934 was only 4,844. Two focal points were 
the newspaper Jövő, founded by Hungarian communists and social 
democrats in exile, and the Collegium Hungaricum, an institution 
established by the Hungarian state in 1924.86 There were several 
other Hungarian societies operating in the city.
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A significant part of the territory detached from Hungary after 
World War I was returned between the autumn of 1938 and the 
summer of 1941. The general basis for redrawing the borders – the 
Czechoslovak–Hungarian one under the First Vienna Award of 
November 2, 1938, and the Romanian–Hungarian one under the 
Second Vienna Award of August 30, 1940 – was ethnic proportions,1 
meaning that the majority of the inhabitants transferred were of 
Hungarian ethnicity. Hungarian foreign policy was flexible and 
well informed about local conditions in the period until the attack 
on the Southern Region in April 1941, and the confidence even of 
Western powers opposed to the Axis had still not been lost.2 But the 
attack, in the wake of a military coup in Yugoslavia, was made as a 
German ally at Germany’s behest, and showed that Hungary’s scope 
for independent policy-making had narrowed, and presaged a future 
within a Third Reich-commanded alliance system as a belligerent 
in World War II.3
The main feature of Hungary’s relations with its neighbors in 
those years was potential hostility, although the countries concerned 
belonged to the same alliance system. Slovakia and Romania 
openly stated their territorial claims against an enlarged Hungary.4 
Influential political figures thought that the factor deciding the 
fate of the disputed areas would be the claimants’ relative zeal in 
the Nazi interest. Just before the attack on the Soviet Union, the 
German chancellor promised both Slovakia and Romania that their 
territorial claims would be met so long as they joined the new war. 
There was also an area disputed between Hungary and Croatia: the 
largely Hungarian-inhabited Prekmurje.5
None of the hitherto minority Hungarians (except a few 
communist cells with a couple of hundred members) were able or 
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willing to escape the general feelings of euphoria. The democratic 
opposition in the Hungarian Parliament and its supporters were 
as sure as the right-wing opposition and the government and its 
voters that the territorial gains were just,6 but the inconsistencies 
in the new situation that soon appeared were interpreted differently 
by the formerly minority Hungarians and the formerly state-creating 
Romanian and Slav national minorities. Some problems stemmed from 
differences of aim between the government and those returning to 
Hungary’s fold, but many were unconnected with central government 
intentions. There was a discernible desire among returnee Hungarians 
to defend regional characteristics from excessive centralization. The 
inhabitants of reannexed territories were faced with an unaccustomed 
economic structure and set of social circumstances, often divorced 
from their markets by the new borders.7 The Hungarian market had a 
glut of some products hitherto readily salable beyond the Hungarian 
linguistic zone. Hungarians and Slovaks who had been transferred 
from Czechoslovakia, with its more orderly and stable social 
conditions, comparable to those of Western Europe, thought that their 
rights would be carried over into Hungary,8 whereas the enlarged 
state set as its priority the creation of a uniform legal environment, 
which meant some curtailments of rights. So Hungary was joined 
by fragments of the nation with different pre-1941 economic and 
democratic backgrounds, building up their communities in different 
ways, and at the same time became a decidedly multi-ethnic state 
again.9
Those problems were soon compounded by wartime economic 
conditions, in which the frames of production and consumption 
– including food rationing – were imposed by an increasingly 
pronounced economic dependence on Germany.10 These applied 
generally, but caused enhanced antagonism among the national 
minorities, who naturally saw themselves as the victims of the 
boundary changes.
Initially, the question of representation of political interests 
seemed to be important. In the case of the Hungarians, only the 
representatives and supporters of former minority Hungarian united 
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parties gained seats in the Hungarian legislature. Although former 
Upper Hungary and Transcarpathia had been returned by then, they 
were not covered by the 1939 general elections (after the fall of the 
Imrédy government) and no further general elections were held 
until after World War II. Instead, the state “invited” representatives 
for each returned territory: for Slovakian Hungarians, the United 
Hungarian Party members who had sat in the Czechoslovakian 
Parliament and provincial assemblies. Again when Northern 
Transylvania was returned, the choice was of members of the earlier, 
now resuscitated Hungarian minority party and its organizations. 
But the national minorities had no united representation – except for 
the Rusyns (known officially at the time as Carpatho-Russians or 
Ruthenians),11 who set up their own parliamentary club – although 
the government made some attempt to bring single prominent 
minority figures into Parliament.
The returned territories remained for various times under 
military administration before changing to civilian rule. These 
took different approaches, according to the sources. The military 
authorities introduced a system that classified the new national 
minorities by “reliability”: the Rusyns scored better than the Slovaks 
or Croats,12 and the Romanians and Serbs worse. There were armed 
clashes between the army and the national minorities in almost 
every territory, especially during the weeks of the takeover. The 
Hungarian troops moving into Transcarpathia in mid-March 1939 
fought with forces of the infant Carpatho-Ukrainian state under 
Avgusthyn Voloshyn. There were insignificant Romanian partisan 
activities in Northern Transylvania, followed by reprisals,13 but more 
serious clashes with irregular Chetnik forces during the occupation 
of the Southern Region. There was no military resistance by the 
Slovaks, but Hungarian gendarmes fired on Slovak demonstrators at 
Christmas 1938 in Šurany, an act also condemned by Hungarians still 
remaining in Slovakia.14 The most dramatic episodes were the raids 
and massacres in Novi Sad and in the Šajkaš district in January 1942. 
In the former, several thousand mainly Jewish and Serb civilians 
were executed by the gendarmerie and the army as reprisals for 
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Serb partisan strikes.15 (Officers responsible for the executions were 
later taken before Hungarian military courts, but they all managed 
to escape to Germany, returning in the spring of 1944 as German 
officers. However, eleven gendarmes were given prison sentences 
of 10–15 years and the Hungarian government began to compensate 
relatives of the victims.)16 Most Czechoslovak and Romanian state 
administrative staff left Hungary after the Vienna Awards, and there 
was also uncertainty among other non-Hungarian settlers, who had 
received grants of land.17 About 200,000 people relocated voluntarily 
or under Hungarian pressure to Southern Transylvania. (This had 
been preceded by attacks on Hungarians living there, leading to 
several tens of thousands of Hungarian departures, voluntarily or 
under pressure from the Romanian state.) The large numbers of 
Serbs who had settled in the Southern Region between the wars 
were forced out after the occupation – holdings vacated in that way 
were reassigned to Hungarians, including some Székelys displaced 
from Bukovina, who at the end of the war had to flee again to the 
territory of today’s Hungary.18
The General Staff during the period of territorial acquisition 
was commanded by pro-German military officers (such as Henrik 
Werth), set upon retaining the reannexed lands and on gaining 
spoils of war.19 Against them stood the country’s prime ministers 
(beginning with Pál Teleki), who sought initially to keep the country 
out of the war or at least minimize the forces sent to the front, and 
later to survive the world conflagration with the least possible losses 
of life, materials and territory.
The aim of Teleki and his followers was to resurrect the 
“Realm of St. Stephen,” a program that could be seen as a nation-
state ideology intended to thwart or sideline demands by national 
minorities. In fact the type of country envisaged rested on the idea 
of a medieval, multinational state in which ethnic communities lived 
and cooperated harmoniously,20 although the Hungarians would 
retain their hegemony. Yet one attempt to dismantle the unified 
nation state came from within the government: Teleki and Horthy 
openly espoused Rusyn autonomy in Transcarpathia.21 This was soon 
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dropped from the parliamentary agenda, due to opposition from the 
military and from county Hungarian interests, and on account of the 
signs of imminent war. The sincerity of the intentions can hardly be 
doubted: as the wartime mood gathered, Teleki said more plainly 
than ever that the building of society called for loyal minorities and 
loyalty had a price. (Rusyn autonomy was to act as a harbinger, a 
pattern for future reorganization of the country.)22
Classification of national minorities by loyalty, mentioned earlier, 
probably suited the purposes of Hungarians living in the returned 
territories as well: they too distinguished their cohabiting nations by 
their degree of responsibility for earlier anti-Hungarian measures. 
The Germans enjoyed a specific position and assessment, with special 
rights as a result of the alliance system, allowing them to organize 
as a Volk, which meant that Hungarian Germans of military age 
were enlisted into the Reich army. The consequent conflicts – many 
Hungarian Germans or Hungarians of German extraction objected 
to enlistment and called in vain for Hungarian aid – were a sign that 
the communities of German origin dwelling in Hungary were not 
all influenced to the same degree by the volksdeutsche program. 
Many turned Hungarian, while others attached more value to their 
loyalty as Hungarian citizens than to their ancestry.23 On several 
occasions there were German–Hungarian disagreements during the 
boundary changes. The Carpathian German Party in Slovakia, for 
instance, opposed holding a plebiscite on where the city of Pozsony 
should belong,24 and plenty of Germans were against Hungary’s 
invasion of Bačka. Incidentally, the idea of recognizing the national 
groups as political entities (as had happened with the German Volk, 
due to pressure from Berlin) was rejected by the public and political 
elite. This was connected with the welcome given to the concept 
of “Realm of St. Stephen,” and the general view that a demand for 
collective minority recognition would play into the hands of the 
Reich. However, in principle equality before the law was enjoyed 
by national minorities, except the Jews, who were styled a “race” 
and hemmed in by legislation and decrees, despite their usual self-
identification as Hungarians.
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According to many documents and most subsequent assessments, 
returnee Hungarian communities were notably democratic and socially 
sensitive, and strongly critical of the “caste spirit” and hierarchical 
structure of society in Hungary.25 They also showed greater 
understanding of and fellow feeling for national minorities. Many 
fine everyday examples could be given to support this assessment, 
but on the other hand, these communities were sensitive to the fate 
of Hungarians who remained within Slovakia and Romania.26 They 
were probably among those who called for reprisals when injuries 
were done to Hungarian minorities in neighboring countries. They 
showed dual behavior. It had not been possible while they were a 
minority for them to develop an officer class experienced in public 
administration. The gap had to be filled from the parent country 
and from “reliable” minorities, especially in Transylvania.27 There 
are many examples of former minority Hungarians condemning the 
conduct of latecomers from Trianon Hungary, for ignoring regional 
values, the “minority mentality” and the demands and sensitivities 
of members of other ethnic groups. On the other hand, these groups 
were expecting the state to strengthen their position in relation to 
the Slavs or Romanians. Few of those who gained positions in the 
returned territories managed to balance the interests of the state, 
former minority Hungarians and new national interests.28
It became clear also that the former minority political elite could 
not or would not further the community interests that it ostensibly 
espoused. A clear example of this was seen in the reform of land 
ownership. Some estates expropriated under the successor states in 
the 1920s were broken up again, but not to general satisfaction. Many 
saw cronyism in the way that the land was redistributed, not rewards 
for services to the community. There were probably divisions also 
over the infrastructural improvements in the returned territories 
and other big investments, and over the economic development 
programs of great importance and the welfare decisions taken.29 
These reinforced the national identity of the fragmentary societies 
in many places, helping to preserve them in the forthcoming 
communist period.
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Then and later, many thought that the returned territories 
should gain a degree of autonomy, or at least that their inhabitants 
should have a say in local matters. There is no knowing what 
results that would have had, but the various options gave a foothold 
for resurrecting the old Upland and Transylvanian parties. The 
United Hungarian Party (Egyesült Magyar Párt) espoused social 
justice and democratic social egalitarianism, but allied itself in 
1938 with Prime Minister Béla Imrédy, who was toying with right-
wing radicalism,30 with the result that Teleki and his group were 
forced later to integrate into the governing party. Teleki in 1940 
promoted the idea of Transylvanian legislators forming a party, to 
maintain a distance from the governing party, which often yielded 
to extreme right-wing pressure.31 In the latter stages of the war, 
the parliamentary opposition was boosted in Transylvania by the 
foundation of a local branch of the Smallholders’ Party, which 
managed to work with young representatives of the Transylvanian 
Party. That allowed the Transylvanians in 1944, when Romania 
turned against the Axis, to propose unanimously to Horthy that 
Hungary bail out of the war, and to back a putative attempt to do so 
in October.32 After the German occupation, Andor Jaross took the 
interior portfolio in Döme Sztójay’s puppet regime, but prominent 
Uplanders and Transylvanians condemned the occupation,33 the 
Jewish deportations to Germany34 and continuation of the war.35
There also appeared among the wartime intelligentsia in 
Transylvania ideas for a Central European federation. In 1944, 
the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs assisted surreptitiously 
in securing publication in Switzerland of plans for a separate 
autonomous Transylvania made by Endre Bajcsy-Zsilinszky, an 
opposition leader who was to be executed by a collaborationist 
firing squad on December 24 that year.36
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2. tHE AutonoMY QuEStIon In trAnScArPAtHIA
Csilla Fedinec
This matter may be divided into periods. Transcarpathia (Carpathian 
Ukraine) was an administrative region under the autonomy 
legislation of Czechoslovakia (Second Republic) from October 11, 
1938, to March 15, 1939, headed by the pro-Hungarian András Bródy 
(Andrej Brody) and then by the Ukrainian-oriented Avgusthyn 
Voloshyn, who sympathized with Ukrainian notions and saw the 
region in terms of the future of its indigenous Slav inhabitants. 
The areas returned to Hungarian administration under the First 
Vienna Award of November 2, 1938, including the cities of Ungvár 
(Užhorod), Munkács (Mukačevo) and Beregszász (Berehovo), were 
placed under their pre-1919 counties. Military action then brought 
the rest of Trianon Transcarpathia under Hungarian rule after March 
15, 1939, and the earlier, smaller area, not contiguous with Trianon 
Transcarpathia and mainly inhabited by Rusyns, was declared to be 
the “Subcarpathian Governorship.” The territory of the region was 
also affected by the Second Vienna Award.1
Under Hungarian military rule the governorship was headed by 
Julius Marina as commissioner, with Béla Novákovits as military 
commander. Then came as governors Zsigmond Perényi (July 
1939–October 1940), Miklós Kozma (November 1940–December 
1941) and Vilmos Pál Tomcsányi (from January 1942). In April 
1944, after the region again became a theater of war, András Vincze 
was both governor and military commander until October 15, when 
Hungarian administration in Transcarpathia ceased.
On October 11, 1938, the Czechoslovak council of ministers 
agreed to appoint an autonomous government for “Podkarpatská 
Rus” (Subcarpathian Rus, or Subcarpathian Ruthenia) known as the 
Council of Ministers of Podkarpatska Rus. Under the First Vienna 
Award, 1,523 square kilometers of Podkarpatska Rus (21.1 percent of 
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the region) was transferred to Hungary. In the remainder, Voloshyn 
established a Carpatho-Ukrainian state with its center in Khust, to 
which Adolf Hitler gave recognition in the form of a consulate. The 
constitutional law granting autonomy to “Podkarpatská Rus” was 
passed in the Prague Parliament on November 22, 1938, having 
been promised for twenty years in the Treaty of Saint-Germain of 
September 10, 1919, and the 1920 Czechoslovak Constitution.2
Hungary did all that it could to recover the whole of 
Transcarpathia. In the autumn of 1938, an incident was directed 
by Miklós Kozma, involving an incursion by the so-called Ragged 
Guard. This was officially halted, but such border incidents 
continued.3 Meanwhile the Poles tried similar tactics to Kozma’s, 
under the command of a professional army officer, Feliks Ankerstein, 
in what was known as Operation Crowbar in late October and 
November 1938. The Polish Consulate in Užhorod became a 
domestic information source.4
The decisive events took place in mid-March, when regular 
Hungarian troops, with tacit agreement from Germany, put paid 
to the Carpatho-Ukrainian state and its resistance forces, the 
Carpathian Sich Guard. Then Voloshyn’s government in Khust 
declared the independence of Carpathian Ukraine on March 15. 
This was merely a symbolic act, as the whole of Transcarpathia had 
been annexed to Hungary by then.5
After the reannexations, the local inhabitants were discontented 
by a relative loss of freedom of speech compared with liberal 
Czechoslovak democracy, for the Hungarian system kept public 
opinion under tight control. This was not just the fault of the 
Horthy regime, for this was a border region of military significance. 
Institutions won in “twenty years’ struggle” were lost or absorbed 
into similar institutions in Hungary. On March 15, 1940, the United 
Hungarian Party was disbanded or absorbed into the Hungarian 
Party of Life. A decision of the Synod of the Reformed Church 
of Hungary in October 1939 abolished the Reformed Church 
Diocese of Subcarpathia, placing it in the Hungarian-based Trans-
Tisza Diocese. The Roman Catholic Apostolic Governorship of 
250 Minority Hungarian Communities in the 20th Century
Subcarpathia was dissolved by papal command in October 1939 
and its area returned to the Diocese of Satu Mare. The authority 
of the Province of Esztergom was restored over the Greek Catholic 
Diocese of Munkács in the summer of 1939. Rusyn secondary school 
teaching was curtailed and most officials were recruited from the 
“parent country.”
Administration of Transcarpathia under Hungarian rule took 
a curious course. The Hungarian-inhabited band of territory 
restored by the First Vienna Award was absorbed into the county 
system, but the Rusyn-inhabited lands beyond remained a special 
administrative area under the Subcarpathian Governorship based 
in Ungvár, with three districts styled Ung, Bereg and Maramarosh. 
One feature was the absence in many parts of clear boundaries, 
meaning that a community might belong to two different 
administrative units. Thus Ungvár was the seat of the governorship 
and of Ung administrative district and of Ung County. Munkács 
was the seat of the Bereg administrative district and part of Bereg 
County, whose seat was Beregszász. In education, institutions could 
be divided even within one building, according to the language of 
instruction, while geographically these might belong to the Košice, 
Satu Mare or Subcarpathian educational district. When the Ungvár, 
Munkács and Beregszász gymnasia were taken over in 1938–1939 
by the Voloshyn government, non-Hungarian students and staff 
were moved into the smaller area of Subcarpathia (Carpatho-
Ukraine), where several new gymnasia began to teach in Ukrainian 
(at Perechyn, Svaliava, Bilki, Rakhiv, Rakoshyno and Velykyy 
Bychkiv). These were either closed in the following school year or 
demoted to civil schools. Ungvár Gymnasium was broken into three 
parts: Hungarian-language gymnasia for boys (Drugeth) and girls 
(Szent Erzsébet) and a Rusyn-language gymnasium. Munkács’s 
was divided into a Rusyn-language and a Hungarian-language 
gymnasium (Árpád Fejedelem). Beregszász was left only with a 
Hungarian-language middle school, while the one in Khust became 
Rusyn- and Hungarian-language. The Jewish Hebrew schools were 
closed after the passage of the Jewish Acts.6
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Even Hungarian inhabitants in the area outside the governorship 
that had belonged to Podkarpatska Rus in the Czechoslovak period, 
and then been brought into the county system, retained a feeling 
for Transcarpathia, expressed, for instance, in 1939 by Árpád 
Siménfalvy, lord lieutenant of Ung County: “Just as Hungarians and 
Rusyns fought jointly for their rights in the years of oppression and 
felt that they belonged as one, so we cannot now raise a Great Wall 
of China between the habitations of the Rusyns, the administrative 
district of Subcarpathia, and the activity of the county administra-
tion. Hungarians and Rusyns have to be brought closer together.”7
Prime Minister Pál Teleki saw it as a moral question, after the 
return of all Transcarpathia to Hungary, to give the Rusyns the 
territorial, linguistic and cultural autonomy long promised to them. 
He saw Transcarpathia as the site of a national policy experiment 
in operating the idea of state of St. Stephen, as he considered the 
Rusyns to be the minority most loyal to the Hungarian state. Several 
meetings on the subject were held in March 1939, and the bill on the 
“Subcarpathian Vojvodeship” and its local government underwent 
several versions before being presented to Parliament in July 1940. 
But, shortly afterwards, the prime minister had to withdraw the 
measure, mainly under the security pressure from the military, and 
the issue died forever. Teleki’s idea of a Subcarpathian Vojvodeship 
had failed.8
It was clear during the debate that the draft had more opponents 
than supporters. The situation is shown clearly in a statement by 
Béla Imrédy, who had been drawn into the preparations, having 
negotiated in September 1938, while still prime minister, with 
András Bródy. He “raised the question of whether we were prepared 
to grant Subcarpathia a measure of autonomy in the case of accession. 
The statement that I made to him then was yes, but we did not detail 
the matter precisely at that time and tried to keep it rather vague, but 
as I say, the undertaking to give them autonomy was made firmly. 
However, I must add that this was stated conditionally, in a case of 
voluntary accession, meaning that an occupation-type accession such 
as this, in my view, substantively alters the situation and absolves 
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us morally from the earlier undertakings.”9 It was mentioned in 
Teleki’s circle that Bródy should again be given some political role 
in Transcarpathia, but in the event, the governorship went to Baron 
Zsigmond Perényi, who had this to say: “It is true that we assured 
them autonomy and drew up plans for it, but we did that against 
the Czechs.”10 Perényi had ties to Transcarpathia as an Ugocsa 
landowner, and took part between the wars in distributing secret, 
politically motivated, Hungarian state subsidies in Transcarpathia.
The Rusyn András Bródy was one of the tragic political figures 
of the period. During his brief period as prime minister in the autumn 
of 1938 he took a policy line sympathetic to Hungary, seeing that as 
most appropriate from the national and state-related points of view for 
protecting the interests of the Rusyns. But he realized after 1939 that 
he had made a bad choice and turned against official Hungarian policy 
(unsuccessfully in the event, as he was unable to achieve anything), 
which had failed to grant Transcarpathia autonomy. Then, under 
the Soviet system, he was executed for having taken a treacherous 
pro-Hungarian stance. (Avgusthyn Voloshyn, who had followed an 
expressly pro-Ukrainian line, also died in a Soviet prison.)
The administrative position of the Subcarpathian Governorship 
was laid down in Prime Ministerial Order No. 6200 of July 7, 1939, 
which it would be mistaken to view as a grant of autonomy.11 The title 
of the order betrays the fact that it was a “provisional” solution to the 
question, valid until autonomy should be granted. Transcarpathia had 
become a difficult issue for the Hungarian government. According 
to the military command, “The favorable mood of the inhabitants 
towards the idea of the Hungarian state begins to become unsettled.”12 
One big burden was the various vetting committees. The fate of the 
Jews was one great tragedy in Transcarpathia. Some were taken in 
1941 to German-occupied areas of inner Ukraine, while others were 
deported in 1944 to certain death in Germany.13 This ethnic group, 
most of whom identified themselves as Hungarians, became victims 
of war. There were 78,272 Jewish inhabitants of the region registered 
in 1941, but only 6,998 in 1946.14
Transcarpathia again became a theater of war in April–October 
1944, before coming under Soviet occupation.
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3. cASE StudIES
romania (Béni L. Balogh and Nándor Bárdi)
The Second Vienna Award of August 30, 1940, restored to 
Hungary Northern Transylvania – two fifths of the territory 
ceded to Romania under the 1920 Treaty of Trianon. The 60,000 
square kilometers of Southern Transylvania remained part of 
Romania. According to 1930 Romanian census figures, 3,155,922 
of the 5,549,806 inhabitants of Transylvania lived in the south, 
of whom 473,551 (15.0 percent) had Hungarian as their native 
language and 481,128 had German (15.3 percent). Territorially, 
the greatest number of Hungarians lived in Arad and Timiş 
Counties (96,756 and 83,423), as well as in Braşov, Hunedoara 
and Turda-Arieş Counties (40,000 each).1 So after the Second 
Vienna Award there remained in Romania (including the Regat) 
over 500,000 Hungarians.
The Hungarians of Southern Transylvania entered a radically 
different existence, as a minority. About 200,000 Hungarians left 
Romania between the Second Vienna Award and February 1944, 
and fled to or settled within the enlarged territory of Hungary. 
The figure includes some 13,200 Bukovina Székely resettled in 
Bačka.2 About half of those who left did so within six months of 
the Second Vienna Award,3 and a similar number of displaced 
Romanians arrived in Southern Transylvania. With permission 
from the Budapest government, almost all Hungarians from the 
Regat moved, and the flight reached alarming proportions in some 
parts of Southern Transylvania as well. As a consequence, by April 
1941, the number of “ethnic” Hungarians had fallen to 363,000, or 
11 percent, from the 440,000 (14 percent) of the 1930 Romanian 
census figures.4
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With permission from the head of state, Ion Antonescu, the 
Romanian Hungarian People’s Community held an inaugural 
assembly in Aiud on November 4, 1940. There a Central Executive 
was formed and leadership positions vacated after the Second Vienna 
Award were filled.5 Elemér Gyárfás (former head of the Catholic 
Status and the Transylvanian Hungarian Banking Association) 
became president and Pál Szász (president of the Transylvanian 
Hungarian Farming Association) vice-president, with Count 
Bálint Bethlen (chief curator of the Reformed Church) and Elemér 
Jakabffy (prominent among the Banat community) as Presidential 
Committee members. Gyárfás also had the support of the Hungarian 
government, but the leadership was riven from the outset. Several 
colleagues accused Gyárfás of running the organization single-
handed and paying little heed to its internal affairs. At a meeting 
at Galtiu on May 25, 1944, his policies were denounced by Áron 
Márton, Roman Catholic bishop of Alba Iulia. Two months later, 
István Haller (a cooperative leader), Pál Szász and Miklós Gál (a 
Unitarian leader), resigned from the Presidential Committee, after 
Gyárfás had used travel difficulties to avoid convening it.6 In the 
event, the activity of the organization was more or less paralyzed 
by the ban on public assembly, the travel problems and the strict 
censorship of mail and the press. It was active mainly in defending 
rights, through its central and local offices, and sent regular reports 
on the Southern Transylvanian Hungarians to the Hungarian 
Consulates in Arad and Braşov. The branches also did welfare work 
when conditions allowed, for the system of granting official permits 
for such activity was becoming stricter. Also operating within the 
ethnic community was the part of the Transylvanian Hungarian 
Farming Association that remained in Southern Transylvania, based 
in Aiud. Its membership had grown from 5,800 to 16,000 by the 
summer of 1942, as it sought to supply cheaper farming implements, 
wheat, fertilizer and breeding stock for peasant farmers,7 but its 
most valuable side, agricultural training, fell victim to regular 
harassment.
The want of social institutions and strict ban on public assembly 
enhanced the importance of the Churches to the Hungarians of 
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Southern Transylvania. The region included about one third of 
the Roman Catholic Diocese of Alba Iulia, with 86 parishes and 
85,000 members.8 Bishop Áron Márton was also in charge of the 
territory ceded to Hungary. Some two fifths of the Transylvanian 
Reformed Church Province remained in Romania, and had 205 
congregations with some 177,000 members at the time of the Second 
Vienna Award, including 51,000 in the Regat. Most of the latter 
left for Hungary and the exodus also meant that the membership 
in Southern Transylvania was hardly more than 100,000 in 1943.9 
Two of the six dioceses in the Királyhágómellék Reformed Church 
District with 55,000 members also remained in Romania.10 The 
Hungarian Lutheran Church Province based in Arad lost only 
four parishes with 5,000 members by the territorial changes. The 
Southern Transylvanian membership of 40,000 included some 
scattered communities, but most lived in a single bloc in the Ţara 
Bârsei district near Braşov.11 The Unitarians were in a predicament. 
Although half their members – 24,000–25,000 people – remained in 
Romania, the seat of the bishop in Cluj went to Hungary, along with 
most of the Church’s assets, both middle schools and the theological 
academy. Unitarian affairs in Southern Transylvania were conducted 
by a Representative Council based in Turda.12
State education in Hungarian almost ceased in Romania. Most 
school departments teaching in Hungarian were closed or continued 
in Romanian. The Hungarian-language denominational schools 
that remained taught only about half of the Hungarian pupils. In 
December 1942, the Hungarian Churches in Romania were running 
seven kindergartens, 179 primary schools, 15 middle schools, one 
theological academy, and two agricultural, three commercial, and 
four apprentice schools.13
Most denominational schools worked under tough conditions, 
funded only by diminishing revenue from Church taxes. The 
departures for Hungary left a chronic shortage of teaching staff, 
and widespread employment of untrained teachers posed a danger 
that schools would be closed or stripped of their right to conduct 
public examinations. Middle school premises were sometimes 
requisitioned as hospitals.
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Intellectual life among the Southern Transylvanian Hungarians 
was hit by the loss of its cultural center at Cluj, then paralyzed by 
the censorship, travel curbs and ban on public assembly. It became 
impossible to hold almost any kind of cultural gathering. Most civil 
associations were dissolved by the authorities and deprived of their 
assets and premises. Hungarian clubs and arts centers closed, choral 
societies were suspended, and there could be no place for plays or 
other performances. Only in the three cities of Arad, Braşov and 
Timişoara did there remain any chance for cultural activity, mainly 
through the libraries. Continuity of Hungarian intellectual life 
depended mainly on the written word: books, almanacs and the 
press, but all periodicals in Hungarian were banned in the autumn 
of 1942. Only in April 1943 could the farming paper Erdélyi Gazda 
appear again, followed in June by the Arad literary journal Havi 
Szemle. Book publication was down to a minimum: 41 titles in 1941, 
mostly pamphlets, scores and booklets.14
Daily life in Romania was governed by the fascist, later 
military, dictatorship of General Ion Antonescu, who took power 
in September 1940, and from June 1941 by martial law. The 
Hungarians suffered also from official discrimination at the central 
and local level and from anti-Hungarian sentiment, particularly in 
the presence of the more than 200,000 Romanian refugees, from 
Northern Transylvania.
The idea of clearing Southern Transylvania of Hungarians 
became Romanian government policy. One way of effecting 
this was what was known as forced opting. The Second Vienna 
Award allowed the Romanians of Northern Transylvania and 
the Hungarians of Southern Transylvania to opt for Romanian 
or Hungarian citizenship within six months. Official Romanian 
organizations encouraged or pressured some Hungarians to sign an 
option statement resigning their Romanian citizenship. The opting 
procedures had not been agreed between the two governments in 
detail, and so the Hungarians did not recognize opting as legally 
binding. At the beginning of June 1941, the Romanian government 
issued a confidential order banning public use of the Hungarian 
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language, and there were moves to dismiss certain categories of 
Hungarian employees. The use of Hungarian was also restricted in 
postal and telegraph services. These measures were later reversed 
officially, but restrictions were reimposed by military commands 
in some districts in 1942. Travel restrictions applied throughout the 
period, except for one or two short breaks. Within a 20-kilometer-
wide restricted border zone, people could not even travel from one 
village to the next without a gendarmerie pass. The Hungarians of 
Romania had no representatives at central or even local level, and so 
no say in matters of direct interest to them. Other serious grievances 
included the inhuman way in which Hungarian men were treated 
during military and labor service, billeting of Romanian refugees 
on Hungarian families, and often unfounded prosecutions in the 
military courts.15 Until 1941, the land, stock and farming implements 
of small-scale and medium-scale farmers were untouched. The 
assets of Hungarian financial institutions surrounding the Auxiliary 
Savings Bank in Aiud and the former People’s Bank in Braşov grew 
steadily.16 The Hangya (“Ant”) cooperative center operated well.17 
But thereafter the Hungarians of Southern Transylvania came under 
mounting economic pressure. The government’s aim after the opting 
requirement was to ruin the Hungarians. This meant overtaxing their 
artisans, traders, lawyers and physicians, establishing summary 
courts, compulsory purchases of reconstruction or reannexation 
loan stock, fabricated charges of economic sabotage, discrimination 
in distributing utility goods, excessive demands for public work, 
restricted cross-border tourism, or repeated requisitions of produce 
or livestock. The Hungarian craftsmen and merchants had no 
representation in the governing bodies of economic life, and most 
of the Hungarian employees of the industry were laid off.
The permanent body for protecting the rights of the Hungarian 
minority was a mixed committee of officers nominated by the 
German and Italian governments, set up in Braşov in February 
1941. An equivalent for Romanian petitioners was set up in Cluj. 
The Braşov committee received 1,518 complaints in two years and 
found 242 (16 percent) of them to be just. In 70 percent of cases the 
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response was evasive or the matter was never considered.18 Almost 
half the complaints were of some kind of assault. Those to do with 
land, public supplies or cultural matters made up 11 percent each.
In May 1942, the Romanian government cited persecution of 
Northern Transylvanian Romanians when proposing to starve 
Hungarian villages in Southern Transylvania and confiscate 
all Hungarian property. Armed force was to be used in cases 
of resistance.19 The Romanians had to back down again after 
investigations by German and Italian special commissioners. 
It proved impractical to remove all Hungarians from Southern 
Transylvania quickly and easily, although the lot of the Hungarians 
continued to worsen in 1943–1944.20
The main aim of the Romanian government was to retrieve 
Northern Transylvania as well, and this was served by its ethnic 
objectives too: to back the Romanians of Northern Transylvania 
and cleanse Southern Transylvania of Hungarians. Meanwhile, the 
German minority was given special privileges and was able with 
Third Reich support to act as a “state within a state,” while the Jews 
were put in a worse situation even than the Hungarians. Budapest 
saw the Second Vienna Award as a partial remedy for the Treaty of 
Trianon – a change of rule accepted and agreed to by the Romanians. 
It could not allow the Southern Transylvanian Hungarians to be 
chased out altogether, because of its further aims of revision. So it 
sought to pursue in Northern Transylvania a reciprocal ethnic policy 
of the kind that was working with the Slovaks. But what ultimately 
decided the system of relations between Hungary and Romania was 
the compulsion to join the Axis, although both countries toyed with 
the idea of bailing out from it.
Slovakia (Árpád Popély)
The First Vienna Award of November 2, 1938, restored most of the 
Upland Hungarians and Hungarian-inhabited areas to Hungary, 
but about one in ten remained under Czechoslovakian and then 
Slovakian rule. According to the Slovakian census of December 
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1938, 57,897 indigenous inhabitants (2.2 percent of the total of 
2,656,426) of the Slovakia that became independent on March 14, 
1939, called themselves Hungarian by national affiliation.
Most Hungarian inhabitants of the new Slovak Republic lived 
in and around Bratislava or in the Zobor district near Nitra, but 
appreciable numbers were found in Slovak towns north of the 
linguistic border, such as Trnava, Zlaté Moravce, Banská Štiavnica, 
Zvolen, Banská Bystrica, Levoča, Spišská Nová Ves, Prešov and 
Michalovce. In social structure, the Hungarian community changed 
greatly after 1938, with fewer agricultural but more industrial and 
office workers, and a sizeable intelligentsia.21
The Slovak Constitution of July 21, 1939, with its Italian 
corporatist structure, classed Hungarians and Germans (but 
not Czechs or Jews) as naturalized national groups. In principle 
Hungarians had a constitutional right to organize politically and 
culturally, even to share in state power through a political party, but 
in practice this was allowed only to the ethnic Germans, who received 
privileged treatment and came to be a state within a state through 
their Deutsche Partei (German Party). The political representative 
of the Hungarians was the Magyar Párt (Hungarian Party). This, 
in a sense the legal successor of the pre-Award United Hungarian 
Party, was long only tolerated by the Slovak authorities and official 
registration was long postponed, on the reciprocity principle laid 
down in the Slovak Constitution, and because the Slovaks of Hungary 
had no official party. Being unregistered prevented the party from 
undertaking the activity required to represent the interests of the 
Hungarian minority.22
The Slovak authorities eventually granted permission for the 
Hungarian Party to operate in November 1941, but it still could not 
do any real political work. The various obstructions meant that its 
work was confined mainly to the cultural and social fields, and to 
some extent to the economic. Not once was there a chance to hold a 
party congress or public mass meeting. The political opportunities 
were limited to occasional meetings of the presiding committee to 
discuss issues of the moment. Its president, János Esterházy, was the 
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sole Hungarian member of the Slovak legislature, where he managed 
to raise Hungarian grievances from time to time and ask for them 
to be remedied. He also sought out the Hungarian government on 
several occasions to request help in persuading the Slovak authorities 
to reduce the pressure on the Hungarian minority.
Among the most important achievements of the party was to build 
up a network of Hungarian Houses and to give welfare assistance 
to poor Hungarian families. The Hungarian Houses set up in cities 
with a Slovak majority became centers of minority social life and 
were central to maintaining the national awareness and preserving 
the traditions of scattered Hungarian communities.23
Despite strong German and Slovak pressures, joined after October 
1944 by pressure from Hungary’s Arrow-Cross, Esterházy rejected 
the idea of reorganizing his party on National Socialist lines. So 
the Hungarian Party managed to retain its conservative, Christian 
socialist character within the frames of the fascist Slovak state. 
Esterházy was also active in assisting the persecuted Jews. His was 
the sole vote in the Slovak legislature on May 15, 1942, against a 
constitutional act on deportation of the Jewish population.
After the Arrow-Cross seizure of power, Esterházy was arrested 
in Budapest in December 1944 and forced to resign as party president, 
although his party re-elected him on February 3, 1945. In the final 
days of World War II, the Gestapo issued a warrant for his arrest 
and he went into hiding. However, he was arrested in the spring of 
1945 by the returning Czechoslovak authorities and handed over to 
the Soviet military authorities. He was then taken off to the Soviet 
Union along with several other leaders of the Hungarian Party and 
other members of the Bratislava intelligentsia.24
In practice, the cultural life of the Hungarian minority in the 
Slovak Republic also became confined to the Hungarian Party. There 
was no state-level institution or budgetary support whatsoever. 
Almost all the associations outside Bratislava were closed. Only the 
Toldy Circle and Béla Bartók Choral Society,25 established several 
decades before, could continue in the capital. The minority’s most 
important cultural organization, the Slovakian Hungarian Cultural 
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Association,26 had been founded in 1925. Its activity was banned in 
the spring of 1939 and it was only permitted to reopen in a highly 
restricted form in 1942, when the presidency was taken by Count 
Mihály Csáky, vice-president of the Hungarian Party.27
In the spring of 1939, there were two daily papers (the 
Hungarian Party’s Új Hírek and the privately owned Esti Újság), 
a cultural journal (Magyar Minerva) and a few provincial weeklies 
to serve the Hungarian minority. Magyar Minerva closed in 1939 
and the provincial papers not long afterwards, while the two dailies 
were banned on the grounds of reciprocity in 1941. However, a 
Slovak daily paper began to appear in Hungary and two Hungarian 
papers were allowed again in Slovakia in December 1941: the daily 
Magyar Hírlap and the weekly Magyar Néplap, both published by 
the Hungarian Party. These were published until the Arrow-Cross 
came to power in the autumn of 1944. The Hungarian press otherwise 
consisted of a few Catholic papers. Finally, the German authorities 
in Bratislava permitted the appearance of a National Socialist daily, 
the Magyar Szó, in February and March 1945.28
The number of schools teaching in Hungarian was not sufficient 
either. According to the law, the presence of 30 school-age children 
was enough to get permission for starting a minority school, but 
the authorities refused on countless occasions to found a Hungarian 
school even though the legal requirements for doing so were met. 
Reciprocity was again the excuse in 1939–1941 for closing several 
Hungarian middle schools, including the Hungarian teachers’ 
training college in Bratislava and the Ursuline Order’s civil school 
for girls. So in the 1941–1942 school year, the Hungarians of Slovakia 
had 35 elementary schools, one civil school, one gymnasium, one 
four-year commercial academy, one two-year trade school and one 
specialist school for women’s occupations.29
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the Banat (Enikő A. Sajti)
The Banat (Bánság) is a term for the parts of the old Hungarian 
counties of Krassó-Szörény, Temes and Torontál lying between the 
Rivers Mureş (Maros), Tisa (Tisza) and Danube, and the Carpathian 
Mountains. It was never a separate political unit. Under the 
Versailles peace treaties, the Banat was divided between Romania 
and the Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom (later Yugoslavia), with a 
small corner of Torontál (the Tisza-Maros confluence) remaining 
in Hungary.
Despite earlier German promises, the Banat was not reannexed 
to Hungary in April 1941, but occupied by German troops. The 
German government’s excuse was the need to avoid a clash between 
Hungary and Romania, a rival claimant to the region. There were 
also fears of domestic crisis in Romania, which had just suffered 
major territorial losses (of Northern Transylvania to Hungary and 
Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina to the Soviet Union). Then there 
were military considerations, as the occupation of the Banat gave 
Berlin control over important routes such as the railway between 
Smederovo and the Danube, the confluence of the Danube and the 
Tisa, and the stretch of the Danube along the Romanian border. The 
German–Italian agreement on the division of Yugoslavia, signed on 
April 24, 1941, in the Imperial Hotel, Vienna, promised the Banat to 
Hungary, but kept it under German military occupation. Yugoslavia 
was divided into German and Italian spheres of influence, with 98,572 
of the 247,542 square kilometers forming the Independent Croatian 
State. Most of Slovenia fell to Germany, while the province of 
Ljubljana became an Italian zone of occupation. Italy received most 
of the Adriatic sea coast and an enlarged Montenegro. Italian troops 
also occupied parts of Yugoslavia adjacent to Albania. Bulgaria was 
granted part of Macedonia (28,250 square kilometers). Bačka and 
the Baranja Triangle went to Hungary without conditions. Hungary 
undertook to hold talks with Croatia and Germany on the future 
of Međimurje and Prekmurje, but in the event simply occupied 
them. The Banat was assigned to Hungary in principle, but with 
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a proviso that it would remain under German military occupation 
for an indefinite period. Additionally, Hungary was promised a free 
port on the Dalmatian coast. Serbia was largely confined to its 1912 
borders, under German occupation.30
According to German figures, the ethnic structure of the Banat 
in 1941 was as follows: 295,000 Serbs, 120,000 Germans, 95,000 
Hungarians, 70,000 Romanians, 18,000 Slovaks and 4,000 Jews. 
Hungarian figures put the number of Banat Hungarians at 108,732.
So the Germans prevented any advance of Hungarian troops 
into the Banat, and the plans for a Hungarian military administration 
were shelved. The Banat Germans held a rally at Pančevo on April 
20, 1941 (Hitler’s birthday) to demand that an autonomous Danubian 
German state be formed out of Bačka, the Banat and Srem. This 
would have proclaimed its accession to the Third Reich. But the 
German government did not support the idea, in the light of the 
Hungarian and Romanian territorial demands and the region’s 
ethnic composition. The Hungarian government, confident that the 
Banat would be reannexed later, tried from the outset to stop ethnic 
Hungarians from being eased out of the administration. An attempt 
was also made to persuade Berlin to allow trained officials to be sent 
into the Banat from Hungary, but this was rejected by the German 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, saying that the local Hungarians 
were demanding more official posts than their proportion in the 
population justified. The collaborationist government of Milan 
Nedić in Belgrade issued an order on October 23, 1941, curbing the 
participation of Banat Hungarians in public administration, which 
elicited a protest from the Hungarian government. For instance, 
none of the posts of mayor in the five cities went to a Hungarian. 
As a result of continuing Hungarian protests, the ethnic proportions 
in official posts were revised at the end of October, with the result 
that Hungarians were appointed as prefects of two districts and as 
a mayor of one city. The privileged position of the Germans was 
unchanged and their role in the economy was enhanced, as the 
Banat became an important German economic bridgehead to the 
Balkans. The failure of Budapest’s endeavors became apparent with 
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the dismissal of Hungarians who had taken jobs in local authorities 
after the collapse of Yugoslavia, hoping for an early move in by the 
Hungarian army. In Veliki Bečkerek, for instance, local Hungarian 
officials and employees were dismissed in mid-April with Germans 
appointed in their stead, and the laying off of Hungarian employees 
and workers from factories in the city also began. The Serbs in 
the Banat villages with a Serb majority did not lose their lower-
ranking jobs there. The German, Hungarian, Romanian and Serbian 
languages were all given official status.31
On June 5, 1941, the German occupation forces decided without 
consulting the Hungarians to annex the territory to Serbia, with a 
separate administrative status. An “auxiliary ban” was appointed 
over it, in the person of a Banat German leader, Josef-Sepp Lapp. 
His responsibilities included the internal affairs of the Banat and 
directing four new administrative departments, whose heads, all 
Germans, were appointed formally by the collaborationist Milan 
Aćimović, prime minister and minister of the interior of Serbia. 
Under an agreement signed by the German occupation forces 
and the Serbian government, the ethnicity of the district, city and 
parish heads was to match the local ethnic proportions, but the key 
positions in the economy were to be held by Germans, in the light 
of the importance of the Banat economy to the German war effort. 
When a new administrative structure was introduced for Serbia 
on December 18, 1941, the Banat became one of the country’s 14 
districts (okrug), although still separated from the rest by a customs 
barrier. Thereafter a deputy to the auxiliary ban was chosen from the 
Hungarian minority, first Ferenc Jeszenszky, then Béla Botka from 
1943 onwards. However, a report from the Hungarian Consulate-
General in Belgrade suggests that there were attempts to isolate the 
Hungarian deputy auxiliary bans, leaving them unable to do their 
jobs.
After some shilly-shallying, the Banat Hungarian Public 
Education Association32 was allowed to operate under Tibor Tallián, 
and then under Ferenc Jeszenszky, the former assistant to the auxiliary 
ban. The respected community leader and former Yugoslav senator 
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Imre Várady was also elected onto the board. The association operated 
at first as part of the Hungarian Public Education Association in the 
Southern Region. On German initiative, the name was later changed 
to the Hungarian Public Education Association in the Danube Region, 
ostensibly to distance it further from Hungary.
The Hungarian Public Education Association was the only 
cultural and representative organization for the Banat Hungarians. 
It successfully intervened, for instance, in the interest of the non-
Jewish Hungarians and prevented taking them for labor service in 
Serbian mines, having them serve in the Banat instead. It was also a 
determining factor in the post-war fate of the Banat Hungarians that 
the association aborted a plan for the establishment of a 500-man 
partisan force among the Banat Hungarians that was to have worn 
German uniforms and have been under German command.33
In the 1942–1943 school year, there were state elementary 
schools teaching in Hungarian in 84 Banat communities, while 32 
had a Hungarian-language kindergarten. Hungarian was also the 
language of instruction in four private gymnasia, two eight-grade 
higher gymnasia and six four-grade lower gymnasia, with a total 
of 900 students, as well as a commercial and a higher elementary 
school, and seven private boarding schools, including the reopened 
College of Our Lady in Veliki Bečkerek, about which there were 
several disagreements during the Royal Yugoslav period. The 
Hungarian schools suffered severe shortages of teaching staff, and 
a disproportionately high number of instructors were untrained. 
These shortages were eventually eased by bringing in teachers from 
Hungary.
The relations of the Banat Hungarians and Germans had their 
grotesque aspect, illustrated by the case of a consignment of school 
uniforms sent to the Banat from Budapest. The German military 
command refused to distribute them until the braid on them was 
removed, arguing that it would only lead to scuffles between 
Hungarian and German students. But the customs office did not 
have enough hands to remove the braid, and the uniforms remained 
in bond for two years.
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Land was not taken from Hungarians when the Yugoslav land 
reform was reversed in the Banat, but the expropriated South Slav 
lands were redistributed only to Germans. The Jewish lands were 
not parceled out, but placed under Reich administration to supply 
the German army.
The Jews of the Banat suffered immediate severe reprisals 
when the territory was occupied. They were deprived of all legal 
rights and dismissed from business jobs, and their property was 
confiscated. They could not hold any public office or even use the 
sidewalks of city streets. In August 1941, they were herded into a 
relocation center and sent out for annihilation. Only a few hundred 
of them returned after the Holocaust.34
Yugoslav partisans and units of the Soviet Army entered the 
Banat at the beginning of October 1944. By the autumn, the partisan 
commander-in-chief, Josip Broz Tito, had set up his command in 
the small Banat city of Vršac, where he ordered Yugoslav military 
rule to be imposed on the Banat, Bačka and Baranja on October 17.
the German reich: Burgenland (Gerhard Baumgartner)
The National Socialist movement was already a significant political 
force in Burgenland by the 1930s. Although illegal in Austria since 
1934, the National Socialist Party (Nationalsozialistische Deutsche 
Arbeiterpartei, NSDAP), had many sympathizers and members 
among the Hungarian-speaking and Croatian-speaking inhabitants 
as well.35 Two days before the March 12, 1938, Anschluss, the 
National Socialists of Burgenland held rallies in the Croatian and 
Hungarian languages, emphasizing the point that their ideology was 
aimed principally against the Jews and the Gypsies. The festivities at 
Oberwart to welcome the entry of the Germans featured Hungarians 
on horseback wearing Hungarian costume. When it came to the 
April plebiscite designed to legitimize the Anschluss, the Hungarian-
inhabited villages joined the rest of the Ostmark (former Austria) in 
voting over 99 percent in favor of confirming the annexation to the 
Reich. The Evangelical pastor at Siget in der Wart, who objected to 
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the open voting system, was branded a communist and dismissed 
by his congregation. When NSDAP headquarters in Berlin called 
for the exclusion of non-German members from the party, the party 
head in Burgenland refused to carry out the instruction, saying that 
if he did so, the party would cease to exist in Oberwart, as everyone 
there was Hungarian.36
The province of Burgenland was itself disbanded on April 14, 
1939. The Northern and Central Burgenland districts joined the new 
Gau Niederdonau (Lower Danube) and the Southern Burgenland 
district of Gau Steiermark (Styria).
By then, the National Socialists in 1938 had expelled the 
Jewish inhabitants, numbering some 4,000, and confiscated all their 
property. Most of the Jews fled initially to Vienna, from where those 
who were unable to obtain foreign visas were sent to concentration 
camps after 1941.37 The Burgenland Jews never returned, and with 
their expulsion the Hungarian-speaking community lost most of its 
middle class and intelligentsia.
In 1939 the Nazi regime established a special concentration camp 
for the Gypsies, at Lackenbach in Burgenland. Almost half the 9,000 
Burgenland Gypsies were sent in 1941 to the Łodz ghetto in Poland, 
while the rest were deported to the Auschwitz concentration camp in 
1943. Only 900 of them survived the war.38 The Nazi extermination 
of the Gypsies was a huge loss to the Hungarian-speaking community 
in Burgenland, of which they accounted for about one sixth.
The Nazis disbanded all the hitherto independent civil 
associations in the former territory of Austria, thus ending any 
cultural activity in the Hungarian villages. An exception was 
Oberwart’s Reformed Reading Circle, which was allowed to continue 
under Church auspices in a restricted form. All the denominational 
schools were expropriated after the Anschluss and continued as 
state schools, which meant that teaching in Hungarian ceased. 
As for the staff of the eight Hungarian-language denominational 
schools, they were transferred to a German-speaking location, 
prohibited from teaching, or expelled from the country. But when 
Berlin proposed to deport the non-German-speaking minorities, 
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this was strongly opposed by the authorities in Burgenland. The 
German and Hungarian governments were actually negotiating on 
a possible resettlement at the time, but the Hungarian government 
never addressed the situation of the Burgenland Hungarians, on 
which it had no specific information.
The papers of the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs include 
only two reports on the position of the Burgenland Hungarians: one 
by a Sopron university student, and one by a gymnasium student 
from Hungary passing through. In 1942, the Political Department 
of the Hungarian Prime Minister’s Office appointed János Almássy 
of Bernstein to preside over the Hungarian associations in the 
Ostmark. He produced a 14-point program demanding the revival 
of Burgenland’s Hungarian elementary schools, bilingual place-
name signs, foundation of a Hungarian-language civil school at 
Oberwart, and conclusion of a cultural treaty between Hungary and 
the Third Reich. But there was no known practical effect of this, and 
Almássy’s reports betray the fact that he was not conversant with 
the situation in Burgenland. Another source, a 1944 report from the 
Hungarian Consulate-General in Vienna, stated that it was hard to 
judge the Burgenland situation from Vienna, and complained that it 
did not interest Hungarian diplomacy in any case.39
There was no express Hungarian resistance to the regime, but 
huge numbers of Hungarians fell victim to Nazi persecution. Not 
long after the Anschluss, two prominent Christian Democratic 
politicians – Ferenc Prónai, deputy mayor of Eisenstadt, and Imre 
Faludy, prefect of Güssing – were taken off to the concentration 
camp at Dachau. Anton von Gömörey, from a noble family in 
Bernstein, was arrested and ordered to leave the country. Ferenc 
Rohonczy, a Lackenbach landowner who saved many Gypsies from 
being sent to a concentration camp, had to flee to Hungary. The most 
prominent victim among the Vienna Hungarians was Zsigmond 
Varga, minister to the city’s Reformed congregation, who was in 
touch with opposition circles in the German Churches. He was 
reported by one of his own congregation, sent to the Mauthausen 
death camp, and never returned.40
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Day laborers on the estates of Northern Burgenland generally 
had ties with the social democratic or communist parties. About 700 
took part in a 1939 strike for higher pay. They would visit nearby 
villages at night to cut down the “Hitler oaks” planted to mark the 
Anschluss and distribute the illegal communist paper. Seventeen 
of those arrested were sentenced to prison, where two committed 
suicide. The peasants, artisans, workers and public employees in the 
underground resistance in Oberwart included some former NSDAP 
sympathizers and members disillusioned with Nazism, including a 
former head of the local branch. They collected money for acts of 
resistance, listened to Entente radio stations, and are said to have 
planned joint sabotage with Soviet parachutists. The group was 
discovered in 1944. Five of the 21 members taken to Graz for trial 
were executed.
Hungarian-inhabited villages all became bilingual under the 
Third Reich. No more registries were kept in Hungarian; Hungarian 
names were Germanicized in personal documents. An Austrian 
citizen who received a passport in 1938 as Gyula Imre was later 
issued with a travel document as Julius Imre.41
The Vienna Hungarians were in a different position from that 
of those in Burgenland, as the Hungarian associations there were 
not wound up. A Hungarian House was founded at the Consulate-
General under an agreement between the German and Hungarian 
governments. The Nazis treated this as a foreign cultural institution 
and did not interfere with its operation. The same applied to the 
student associations in Graz, Innsbruck and Vienna, which were 
funded by the Hungarian state, although Jewish members were 
expelled. The Hungarian House produced a paper called Értesítő 
until 1945.
Many of the 110,000 Jews in Vienna were Hungarian-speaking 
or held Hungarian citizenship. They could turn to the Hungarian 
Consulate for help during the Nazi persecutions. The most famous of 
these was the composer Imre Kálmán, who protested as a Hungarian 
citizen against confiscation of his property.42
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In the winter of 1944, Wehrmacht forces drove Hungarian labor 
servicemen up to the Hungarian–Burgenland border, where they 
were to build a defensive line for the Reich. These labor servicemen, 
some already on death marches from Bor and other labor camps, were 
starved and worked to death under inhuman conditions. Yet the system 
of defenses failed to hold back the Soviet troops for even one day, and 
the fleeing German forces took their labor service prisoners on death 
marches further into the Reich. Those too exhausted, weakened or 
sick to stand the pace were simply killed en masse, for instance on the 
edges of Nickelsdorf, Rechnitz and Deutsch Schützen.43
The Soviet forces crossed the Hungarian border and occupied 
Burgenland on March 29, 1945.
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IV. FroM tHE End oF WorLd WAr II
to tHE coMMunISt tAKEoVEr
1944–1948

1. HunGArY And tHE SItuAtIon oF
tHE HunGArIAn MInorItIES In 1945
László Szarka
Under the post-World War II agreement between Stalin and Churchill 
on Eastern European spheres of influence, formulated at Yalta in 
February 1945, influence in Hungary was to be shared equally 
between the Soviet Union and the West.1 This became unrealistic, 
as Hungary’s sovereignty was reduced by accelerated Sovietization 
in the region in 1946. As for Hungarian minorities, the issue of them 
became marginal in the Soviet sphere of influence.
Preliminary peace plans drafted by American and British 
experts even went so far as to revise Hungary’s Trianon borders,2 
but by the time that the peace conference began, nobody would 
back the territorial corrections that the Hungarians included in 
their draft. Representing the provisional Hungarian government 
was Minister of Foreign Affairs János Gyöngyösi, who signed 
an armistice agreement with the main victorious powers: the 
United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union. It meant 
that Hungary conceded that the war was lost, and undertook to 
disarm the German forces still on its soil, hand German assets 
over to the Allies, intern German citizens, and contribute to the 
war against Germany eight cavalry divisions commanded by the 
Allied (Soviet) High Command.3 Furthermore, Hungary “accepted 
the obligation to evacuate all Hungarian troops and officials from 
the territory of Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Rumania occupied 
by her within the limits of the frontiers of Hungary existing on 
December 31, 1937,” and “repeal all legislative and administrative 
provisions relating to the annexation or incorporation into Hungary 
of Czechoslovak, Yugoslav and Rumanian territory.” Under Article 
19, the Vienna Awards of 1938 and 1940 were “declared to be null 
and void.”4 Hungary was to pay the Soviet Union $200 million, 
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and Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia a total of $100 million over 
six years in war reparations. The Allied Control Commission 
established was chaired by General Kliment Voroshilov, representing 
the Allied (Soviet) High Command, who signed the armistice on the 
Allies’ behalf.
As the Eastern Front advanced across Romania, Czechoslovakia, 
Yugoslavia, Hungary and Austria from August 1944 to May 1945, 
the positions of the Hungarian minorities changed dramatically, 
according to the armistice agreement. But the Soviet occupying 
forces in Transcarpathia declared a state of emergency and would 
not allow the Czechoslovak civilian regime to return, despite a 
prior bilateral agreement. The de facto government there was 
the Carpathian Ukrainian People’s Council, formed under Soviet 
control in November 1944 to operate as a puppet government. In 
the summer of 1945, the Hungarian government made a single timid 
approach in relation to the parts of Transcarpathia with a Hungarian 
majority. The Soviet military responded by extending to neighboring 
areas of Hungary the deportation of Hungarian men already 
underway in Transcarpathia.5 In line with earlier undertakings by 
President Edvard Beneš and in the light of the situation produced by 
the Soviet army, Czechoslovakia signed a treaty on June 29, 1945, 
ceding Transcarpathia to the Soviet Union. Soviet rule and law were 
introduced formally on January 22, 1946, through legislation by 
the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, of which Transcarpathia 
became part. Most of the ethnic Slovaks among the Transcarpathians 
exercised their right to resettle under a Czechoslovak–Soviet option 
agreement. Several hundred ethnic Hungarians sought likewise to 
resettle in Hungary, but the rigid attitude of the Soviet authorities 
meant that very few succeeded.6
There was a similar worsening in the position of the Hungarians 
of Czechoslovakia. The government program adopted in Košice 
on April 5, 1945, sought to eliminate both the German and the 
Hungarian minority, by depriving each of them of its rights and 
setting about deporting each of them en masse to its respective 
parent country.7 The intention was to forestall a repetition of the 
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Czechoslovak carve-up of 1938–1939 by forming a purely Slav 
nation state. Beneš issued a series of decrees making the position of 
the Germans and Hungarians increasingly untenable.8 In Slovakia, 
these decrees were often overlaid by orders of the Slovak National 
Council establishing, for instance, people’s courts and a national 
trusteeship. Discriminatory orders were also issued by the caretaker 
commission acting for the provincial government of Slovakia and 
by individual Slovak commissioners.
There followed a wave of deportations, forcible resettlement 
and internment, along with accompanying deprival of political, 
social and minority rights, which ultimately pushed Hungary into 
negotiations in December 1945 about an exchange of population 
promoted by Prague.9 When negotiating, the government of Ferenc 
Nagy tried to impede the Czechoslovak policies of depriving ethnic 
Hungarians of their rights, resettling them, and forcing them to 
assimilate. The bilateral agreement of February 27, 1946, was 
seen as a move towards an international solution for the Upland 
Hungarians.
Soviet military administration of Northern Transylvania was 
followed on March 8, 1945, by a return to Romanian rule.10 Once 
the Soviet-backed Groza government had formed, representation of 
the Romanian Hungarians was taken over by the left-wing Hungarian 
People’s Union, which committed itself to resolving the Hungarian 
question within Romania. In Hungarian government circles, the main 
aim of Groza’s policy towards the Hungarian minority was seen as the 
attainment of Romania’s peace objectives, meaning that Bucharest 
sought at all costs to reach prior agreement with Hungary. For this 
purpose the Groza government exploited the Hungarian People’s 
Union, whose leaders – Gyárfás Kurkó, Edgár Balogh and László 
Bányai – were influenced by Soviet undertakings and by the realities 
of an East-Central Europe undergoing Sovietization to put their trust 
in an “internationalist” solution within the framework of Romania. 
Many contemporary observers in Transylvania and Hungary saw 
such trust as ill-considered and submissive, but Bányai declared 
the following: “The Realpolitik of the People’s Union has to be 
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continued and adapted to the current situation, if we wish to protect 
the interest of the Hungarian community correctly. Of course, the 
People’s Union would react in the same way to a situation produced 
by a possible change in the border.”11
The clearest alternative to the People’s Union approach was 
one drawn up by Bishop Áron Márton, who pressed for the borders 
to be drawn up in line with the demands of the Transylvanian 
Hungarians. But this too failed, under the circumstances, to promote 
the Transylvanian aims formulated in Budapest during the peace 
preparations.12
Official bodies in Hungary was at that time aware of the revenge 
killings and other atrocities against Hungarians and Germans being 
committed by Tito’s partisan army and OZNA (security agency, 
the People’s Defense Department, Odeljenje za zaštitu naroda) in 
Yugoslavia, but not a single official document has survived that 
expresses any protest by the Hungarian government against the high 
number of Hungarian victims in Vojvodina in 1944–1945.13 Mátyás 
Rákosi, a government member and Communist Party general 
secretary, had been born in Ada in Vojvodina. He held talks in the 
summer and autumn of 1945 in Novi Sad, but no minutes of these 
have survived. The minister of foreign affairs, János Gyöngyösi, 
called only for an end to the internment of male Hungarians in 
Vojvodina. The losses to the Hungarian community there were 
compounded by the flight of over 65,000 of them to Hungary in 
1944–1946, under the option arrangements. Of the many refugees, 
the Hungarian government paid close attention only to the fate of 
those who had been resettled in Bačka from northern Bukovina two 
years earlier and were being moved on to Hungary in April 1945.
Border issues and treatment of minority Hungarians were 
important points as Hungary’s peace preparations began under 
István Kertész in June 1945. The experts involved gained detailed, 
relatively accurate information on the atrocities against Hungarians 
in neighboring countries. Also briefed regularly on the situations in 
Vojvodina, the Upland and Transylvania was the head of the Roman 
Catholic Church in Hungary, József Mindszenty, archbishop of 
Esztergom.14
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There was some possibility of adjusting the interwar borders 
in Hungary’s favor at most with Romania and conceivably with 
Slovakia (now part of Czechoslovakia again). The principle of 
exchanging land holdings as well as inhabitants was advanced by 
Minister of Foreign Affairs Gyöngyösi mainly as a reaction to the 
unilateral deportation ideas in Prague and Bratislava. The left-
wing Hungarians in Transylvania espoused the idea of integration 
into Romania with minority rights. They countered the idea of a 
wholesale transfer of Transylvania to Hungary, advanced by Bishop 
Márton, with the idea of an ethnically based transfer of about 4,000 
square kilometers.15
The Budapest government had no means whatsoever of 
countering the authorities in Yugoslavia, but that does not excuse 
the diplomatic silence over persecution of the Southern Region 
Hungarians.16
The Hungarian government stance towards Yugoslavia and its 
treatment of its Hungarian minority was influenced by three main 
factors: (1) the memory of the “cold days” in northern Bačka and the 
uncertain picture received of the Serbian reprisals, (2) the relatively 
restrained behavior of Tito towards Hungary, compared with that 
of Beneš, and (3) the population exchange agreement based on the 
“land with people” principle, which seemed more acceptable than 
the unilateral transfer envisaged by Prague and Bratislava, with 
mass internal exile and other measures to encourage departure.
From the outset, the Hungarian government addressed 
a succession of submissions to the Great Powers and to the 
Central Control Commission in Hungary on the grievances of 
the Hungarian minorities in Czechoslovakia and Romania. An 
official memorandum addressed to the Soviet government on July 
2, 1945, requested that Moscow “intervene strongly in future with 
the governments of the neighboring states to prevent persecution 
of the indigenous Hungarian population there.”17 The Hungarian 
government spoke out most strongly against “the Hungarian 
persecution in Czechoslovakia applying the most extreme fascist 
measures,” because this was not only unacceptable to Budapest, but 
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a danger to “friendly cooperation among the Danubian peoples.” The 
note pointed out that the anti-Hungarian behavior of neighboring 
countries was also endangering the position of the new Hungarian 
democracy. Observing, and expecting the Soviets to play a role in 
curbing, the anti-Hungarian atrocities that occurred in Northern 
Transylvania, in the Székely Land, and also in parts of southern 
Slovakia, the note also cited the principles behind the nationality 
policies of Lenin and Stalin, socialism and pure democracy
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2. tHE LoSSES oF HunGArIAn MInorItIES
Mihály Zoltán Nagy
The final days of World War II and the next couple of years were 
marked in Central and Eastern Europe by forced migration on a 
vast scale. This applied particularly to the Hungarian-speaking 
populations of territories that had been reannexed to Hungary under 
the First and Second Vienna Awards (parts of Czecho-Slovakia and 
Northern Transylvania) or thereafter militarily (Transcarpathia, 
Bačka, the Baranja Triangle, Prekmurje and Pomurje).
The changes in the legal position of these Hungarian communities 
and the measures taken against them depended on several factors. 
These were the current military situation, the minority policies of 
neighboring governments, the international image of the Hungarian 
minorities, new frameworks of national and international law to 
protect minorities, post-war relations between the three victorious 
powers, and not least the abilities and diplomatic scope for Hungarian 
governments to assert their will.
By the summer of 1944, it was obvious militarily that the 
Allies would win the war. Mass population flights began, alongside 
resettlement measures taken by Hungarian military and civilian 
authorities. The first wave consisted largely of Hungarian public 
servants, above all those who had moved to annexed territories from 
Trianon Hungary. Then came a much larger, disorganized flood of 
refugees fleeing before the Red Army in the east and north and the 
Yugoslavs in the south. In Northern Transylvania, almost 400,000 
Hungarians escaped as the front advanced in the autumn of 1944.1 
In the Southern Region, some 13,000–15,000 Bukovina Székely 
(relocated by the Hungarian government in 1941 in place of Serb 
settlers from southern Serbia brought in after World War I) fled 
before the Yugoslav People’s Liberation Army and Tito’s partisans.
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Violent measures began to be taken in the autumn of 1944 
by the governments of Hungary’s neighboring countries against 
citizens of Hungarian origin, prompted in Czechoslovakia, Romania 
and Yugoslavia mainly by a desire for a homogeneous nation state 
(“pure Slav” in Czechoslovakia, “pure South Slav” in Yugoslavia, 
and a “united national state” in Romania). Drastic steps were taken 
to obtain this as soon as possible. Plans were drawn up by the 
authorities in those countries to resettle or disperse Hungarians, as a 
way of settling the minority question once and for all.2 Another blow 
to the survival and legal status of minority Hungarian communities 
was the fact that the principle of collective responsibility for the 
war crimes of Hitler’s Germany and the outbreak of the war was 
extended from the Germans to the Hungarians – in Czechoslovakia 
throughout the period and in Yugoslavia from the autumn of 1944 
to the spring of 1945.
The newly established civilian and military authorities cited 
pacification as the reason for the internments, which mainly applied 
to Hungarian men of military age (in Romania),3 but affected all 
Hungarians in some countries (Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia).4 
With the Soviet authorities, the main motive was to provide free 
foreign labor for industry and agriculture.5 This participation by 
alien citizens, which extended to whole ethnic groups, was seen 
by Moscow as part of the reparations for war damage. The action 
that came to be known in the Carpathian Basin as málenkij robot 
(short work – as it is known in Hungarian history) was begun by the 
Soviet military and security organizations on November 13, 1944. 
Twenty thousand or more are estimated to have been rounded up 
in Transcarpathia alone and deported to Soviet labor camps,6 but 
several thousand Hungarians were taken from eastern Slovakia 
as well.7 The Hungarian community in Transcarpathia underwent 
a Sovietization that drastically reduced its numbers after the 
Soviet–Czechoslovak treaty of June 29, 1945, legitimized the Soviet 
expansion and the Transcarpathian territory of the Ukrainian SSR 
was officially established in 1946.
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The 15,000–20,000 rounded up in the Southern Region8 and the 
160 revenge killings in Transylvania (far smaller in number but of 
great psychological effect on the Hungarians) clearly had political, 
power-related and social motives. Parties and governments were 
seeking greater support among the majority nation at a time when 
many sought revenge for real and perceived injuries under the 
wartime Hungarian administration.
The legislative institutions in Czechoslovakia9 had full support 
from the bourgeois and left-wing (social democratic and communist) 
parties in basing on the principle of collective responsibility several 
measures that effectively outlawed the Hungarian and German 
inhabitants.10 Deportations from southern Slovakia to the Czech 
provinces and the Czechoslovak–Hungarian population exchange 
greatly changed the territorial distribution of the Hungarians: that 
is, both their proportion of the population in regions and sub-regions 
and their social structure. Estimates of the size of the two waves 
of deportation range from 42,000 to 60,000–100,000 Hungarians, 
including women, children and old people.11 The enforced population 
exchange that ensued between April 1947 and December 1948 
moved 90,000 Hungarians into Hungary and 72,000 Slovaks into 
Czechoslovakia. For the Hungarians of Slovakia this was coupled 
with measures against property rights, such as expropriation of 
land and confiscation of so-called alien property and deprival of 
citizenship. The social declassing of the Hungarians coincided with 
a “Re-Slovakization” campaign (in June 1946) aimed at changing 
people’s social identity. This ostensibly voluntary campaign was 
justified officially by the need to “re-Slovakize” Slovaks who had 
become Hungarianized. Intimidation and hopes of escaping the 
confiscation of their property caused 410,000 Hungarians to apply, 
of whom 326,000 were officially reclassified as Slovaks.12 The 
Hungarians were excluded from the Czechoslovak elections of 1948 
and began only in the following year to regain some of their civil 
rights.
Meanwhile the Hungarians of the Southern Region and 
Transylvania were encountering different minority policies and 
norms of minority rights. The political elite of Tito’s Yugoslavia 
290 Minority Hungarian Communities in the 20th Century
saw the Hungarian question solely in terms of power and political 
interest. After its power had been consolidated, Belgrade began in 
the spring of 1945 to seek a modus vivendi with the Hungarians: 
the communist leadership would look after the Hungarian and 
other minorities in exchange for their loyalty to the regime.13 The 
Hungarians now had greater language rights and more schools 
teaching in Hungarian than in the interwar period, but expropriations 
on the grounds of wartime collaboration and the bias in the land 
reform further reduced the economic potential of the Hungarian 
community. The ethnic structure of the Hungarian-inhabited 
regions was altered radically by the expulsion of the indigenous 
Germans and a wave of settlement accompanying the land reform: 
252,000 Serbs arrived in Vojvodina. In fact the forced and voluntary 
movements of population led to a greater decrease in the Hungarian 
minority of the Southern Region than had occurred after World 
War I. Some 84,800 Hungarian-speaking inhabitants of Vojvodina 
were deported or fled to Hungary. The 1946 Yugoslav–Hungarian 
agreement on population exchange was never implemented, but the 
Southern Region Hungarians in any case lost their intelligentsia and 
middle class.14
The Hungarian question first appeared in Romania in the autumn 
of 1944 as one of state security and administration. Then, as the ter-
ritorial dispute between Romania and Hungary came to a head, the 
Hungarian question became expressly one of security policy, and the 
policy line, legal measures and treatment of the minorities developed 
accordingly. Although the administration declared itself to be friend-
ly toward the minorities, it introduced a number of measures detri-
mental to the Hungarians. Rather than resting on the principle of na-
tional affiliation, these established a special status. For instance, the 
legislation on the land reform introduced the concept of refugees and 
“absentees.” The enabling order setting up the Financial Office for 
the Administration and Supervision of Enemy Property (CASBI)15 
established a category of “putative enemy,” which meant that proper-
ty was confiscated mainly from members of the Hungarian minority. 
But the representatives of the Communist Party were interested also 
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in the idea of resettling 400,000–500,000 Hungarians in Hungary, 
in line with plans drawn up during World War II, on the grounds 
that these Hungarians had moved into Northern Transylvania from 
Trianon Hungary during the 1940–1944 period of Hungarian rule. 
The Romanian proposal for such resettlement by interstate agree-
ment was rejected by Moscow,16 but the 1949 census returns for 
Hungary register more than 134,000 persons of Romanian origin, 
who had left their homes voluntarily or been forced to do so.17
The people’s courts in countries in the Soviet zone became a 
means of legitimizing the new political elite and furthering the day-
to-day policies of the new regimes. War-crime charges were used 
as a pretext for intimidating Hungarians and forcing them to leave 
the countries neighboring Hungary, where the authorities hastened 
to investigate crimes committed by the Hungarian military and 
civilian authorities as evidence that the policy of territorial revision 
had had (ostensibly) inhuman consequences. The court sentences 
in such cases included expropriation of the whole property of those 
convicted.
Nor were the minorities in the region assisted by the new 
frameworks of international law for minority protection. For the 
Great Powers agreed after the war to wind up the minority protection 
system established under the auspices of the League of Nations, 
taking the view that the commitment to universal respect for human 
rights would suffice to protect the minorities as well.18 The result 
was that the minorities were left defenseless.
The voluntary and constrained migrations after World War II 
caused substantial changes to the ethnic patterns, distributions and 
proportions of the Hungarian community in the Carpathian Basin. 
By the end of 1946, 267,430 persons from neighboring countries 
had settled in or been deported to Hungary. The 1949 census returns 
show an even gloomier picture, with 367,000 inhabitants of Hungary 
declaring themselves as refugees from neighboring countries.19 The 
return to Hungary of civilians and military personnel deported to the 
Soviet Union began in 1946. Another factor reducing the proportion 
of Hungarians in neighboring countries was the mass deportation 
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of Jews carried out in the final stages of World War II, when almost 
320,000 Jews identifying themselves as Hungarian were sent to the 
death camps from Transcarpathia, Northern Transylvania, Upper 
Hungary and the Southern Region. The declassing of the Hungarian 
minority speeded up during the war and its social structure changed 
radically, as the landowning and high and middle bourgeois strata 
were lost. The processes were compounded by the introduction 
of the economic system of state socialism, when nationalization 
and collectivization dealt a fatal blow to the ownership structure 
of the Hungarian minorities. Thereafter, the prevention of ties 
with Hungary, the elimination of minority private and collective 
property, and policies of assimilation meant that reproduction of 
minority culture and identity was at the mercy of the Communist 
Parties and the state-creating nation. The end of private ownership 
and constitutional government left it impossible to operate a separate 
system of minority institutions. The minority policies of the four 
countries concerned were also affected by the disappearance of the 
German and Jewish communities, leaving the Hungarians as the 
single substantial target.
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3 cASE StudIES
romania (Csaba Zoltán Novák)
On August 23, 1944, the historical parties in Romania (the 
National Liberal and National Peasants’ Parties) managed to 
oust the military dictatorship of Ion Antonescu and bail out of 
the war, through a coup headed by King Michael. This move and 
the September 12 armistice with the Allied Powers (the United 
States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom) was backed by 
the National Democratic Bloc initiated by the Social Democrats 
and Communists, which joined the new government, headed until 
December 2 by General Constantin Sănătescu, which otherwise 
consisted mainly of military men.1 Meanwhile the Transylvanian 
Hungarians returned to active politics through the Hungarian 
People’s Union formed on October 16, 1944, in Braşov, with the 
author Gyárfás Kurkó as its first president.2
The historical parties and the Romanian administration 
returning to Northern Transylvania treated the Hungarian and 
German populations there as war criminals. The legislation that 
established the Administration and Supervision of Enemy Property 
(CASBI) meant that very large numbers of Hungarians and 
Germans lost their wealth. All those who had fled to or resettled 
in Hungary from Northern Transylvania or Romanian territory 
before the Hungarian–Romanian armistice agreement of September 
12 had their entire property sequestered by CASBI. The law 
was detrimental to Hungarian citizens and businesses and to 
assets of the Hungarian state in Northern Transylvania and 
Romania. A campaign was launched in the autumn of 1944 against 
cooperatives owned by the Hungarian community, some of which 
were placed under CASBI supervision on the grounds that they 
had received funding from the Hungarian state. There were severe 
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consequences from a resolution passed at the Bucharest congress of 
cooperatives in 1945, forbidding the formation of cooperatives on 
ethnic grounds. This left the Hungarian cooperatives with no option 
but to join the state cooperative center in July 1947.3
The fears of the Hungarian community were raised by atrocities 
committed by “volunteers,” Iuliu Maniu’s paramilitary Guardists, 
and the gendarmerie. Volunteer units formed originally to ensure 
law and order behind the front set out for the Székely Land to destroy 
rumored secret arsenals. Volunteers from Braşov arrived in the 
Sfântu Gheorghe district in the second half of September to sack and 
pillage several villages and mistreat their inhabitants. Eleven people 
in Aita Seacă were slaughtered. The Guardist trail of destruction had 
reached Gheorgheni before it was ended by the military command of 
the Red Army, which occupied Northern Transylvania in the autumn 
of 1944.4 Even more serious than the volunteers’ atrocities was the 
herding of many Hungarians into internment and labor camps at 
Târgu Jiu, Focşani and Feldioara, where the inhuman treatment and 
conditions led to the loss of several thousand lives.5
The Romanian–Hungarian incidents prompted the Soviets 
in November 1944 to expel the Romanian administration from 
Northern Transylvania on security grounds. News of the atrocities 
also reached foreign countries. The Romanian government’s 
response was to set up a Ministry of Minority Affairs and devise 
a minority charter that was an advance on the arrangements before 
the war, except that its implementation was blocked by Romanian 
officials.
Pressure from the Soviet-backed Romanian Communist Party 
made for a political situation in which the Sănătescu and ensuing 
Rădescu governments soon succumbed to crises that the left wing, 
led by the communists, employed to gain further key governmental 
and administrative positions. By March 6, 1945, the political 
situation was so dire and Soviet pressure was so strong that King 
Michael – blackmailed over the future of Transylvania – agreed to 
a government headed by Petru Groza of the communist-influenced 
Ploughmen’s Front. The historical parties went into opposition, but 
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Romanian administration of Transylvania was restored, although 
the new regime promised full equality for all national groups 
in Romania. The first move in this direction was to replace the 
expression “minority” with “nationality” – in other words national 
community – in line with the terminology of national delimitation 
(размежевание) introduced in Soviet Russia in 1917. There was a 
favorable turn in education, with an independent Hungarian education 
directorate operating until 1948, issuing its own textbooks and a 
separate syllabus for Hungarians. Almost 100 percent of Hungarian 
schoolchildren were able to study in their native language, and several 
Hungarian institutes of higher education received permits to operate, 
including the Bolyai University in Cluj and the Institut Medicine- 
Pharmacy in Tărgu Mureş.6 But this educational autonomy for 
the Hungarians was provisional. It earned the Groza government 
support from the Hungarian People’s Union. Most Hungarians had 
hopes up to the time of the peace negotiations that the Great Powers 
would allow some territorial concessions to Hungary. The Union 
leaders at a meeting in Tărgu Mureş in November 1945 issued a 
statement as follows: “The nationality question in Transylvania is 
not a border question.” The statement had no effect on the Great 
Powers dealing with the final delineation of the border, which in 
practice restored the Trianon borders, causing outrage among the 
Hungarian public in Transylvania.7
Although the Groza government’s policy towards the 
Hungarians had some positive aspects, it proved to be ambivalent 
in many respects. The Hungarians were adversely affected by the 
land reform. It was aimed at “landowners” with over 50 hectares, 
but the legislation included other categories that were to be 
deprived of their holdings: those residing beyond the country’s 
borders, as well as “collaborators” (with the Hungarian wartime 
administration) and “fugitives.” These categories were ill-defined 
and were applied in practice exclusively to Romanian citizens of 
Hungarian or German “nationality,” based on simple declarations. 
The effect in many mixed communities was the tendency for 
local land distribution committees, consisting of Romanians, to 
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confiscate the property of Hungarians. It emerges from the 1946 
report from the Ministry of Agriculture that 87 percent of all land 
confiscated in Cluj County had been Hungarian-owned, but only 
35 percent of those granted land were Hungarian.8
Another Hungarian grievance was legislation that only 
recognized the Romanian citizenship of Northern Transylvanian 
residents who had been domiciled in Romania before the Second 
Vienna Award of 1940 and who were Romanian citizens under the 
law applicable at that time.
The general elections of November 19, 1946, had great importance 
for the country: there was obvious ballot-rigging behind the 84.58 
percent of the votes that went to a so-called Bloc of Democratic Parties 
formed by the communists, consisting of the Romanian Communist 
Party, the Social Democratic Party, Tătărescu’s Liberal Party, the 
Ploughmen’s Front, the People’s Party and the Alexandru faction 
of the Peasants’ Party. The Hungarian People’s Union received 7.22 
percent. The communists markedly strengthened their position in 
the new Groza government and began to strive for exclusive power, 
increasing their attacks on the opposition and using so-called salami 
tactics to squeeze out their coalition partners. The communists were 
able gradually to eliminate, one by one, their political opponents 
and the organizations ostensibly allied with them.9
The Romanian Communist Party set about obtaining a monopoly 
of state power by methods paralleled in several other Soviet bloc 
countries at that time. The National Peasants’ Party was shaken 
in July 1947 by the arrest and imprisonment of Iuliu Maniu. The 
National Liberal Party became moribund during the same summer. 
Having decapitated and eliminated the historical parties, the 
communists turned on their coalition partners. By the end of the year, 
the Hungarian People’s Union, as the organization representing the 
interests of the country’s Hungarians, had become little more than a 
formality. Its county and central leaderships were reorganized and 
its main institutions moved in June from Cluj to Bucharest, which 
much reduced their effectiveness. Several intellectuals previously 
prominent in the Union and on the Hungarian cultural scene in 
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Transylvania were arrested in the period between 1948 and 1952 
and spent years in prison.10
The final stage in the communist takeover came with the abdica-
tion of King Michael on December 30, 1947. The Romanian People’s 
Republic11 was proclaimed on the same day. Victory for a National 
Democratic Front (consisting of the communists and their allies) 
was engineered in general elections held in March 1948, as was a 
February merger of the Romanian Communist Party and the Social 
Democratic Party, to form the Romanian Workers’ Party. Parliament 
and the government issued a string of measures in 1948 that consoli-
dated absolute political and economic power for the communists un-
der the label of proletarian dictatorship. Large-scale industrial, min-
ing, insurance and transport companies underwent nationalization in 
June. Under a reform of education and schools in August, the Church 
schools were nationalized to ensure a communist monopoly over the 
ideological education of young people. The surge of nationalization 
also swept away the Hungarians’ autonomous economic and cultural 
institutions. These measures seemingly applied to the whole popula-
tion alike, but the loss of civil institutions was especially grave for the 
minorities, in the light of their role in preserving their national aware-
ness, whereas the national identity of the majority nation was still 
furthered by the state. Also founded in 1948 was the Securitate, an 
enhanced system of secret police modeled under the direction of its 
Soviet counterpart, the NKVD (People’s Commissariat for Internal 
Affairs, Narodnyj komissariat vnutrennyh del). That was followed 
by replacement of the police force and gendarmerie with a uniform 
militia. In 1949, full communist control over local administration was 
gained through a system of people’s councils.12
czechoslovakia (Árpád Popély)
The World War II émigré community headed by Edvard Beneš 
laid the blame for Czechoslovakia’s break-up in 1938–1939 on the 
Germans and the Hungarians. The intention of what came to be 
recognized as a government-in-exile by the Allies was to deport 
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the German and Hungarian minorities after the war and create a 
Slav nation state. But the idea of chasing the Hungarians from their 
Upland homes as the front advanced was thwarted by the course 
that the war took. The Czechoslovak leadership also failed to obtain 
endorsement from the Great Powers for displacing the Hungarians or 
to have the January 20, 1945, armistice with Hungary stipulate that 
the Hungarian population should be expelled from Czechoslovakia. 
All that it stated was that administrative officials sent in during the 
period of Hungarian rule were to be withdrawn.
While diplomatic moves to expel the Germans and Hungarians 
took place, legislation aimed at the two minorities was also being 
prepared. The first measures to deprive them of their rights came 
during the Slovak national uprising that broke out at the end of 
August 1944, when the Slovak National Council heading it issued an 
order dissolving Slovakia’s Hungarian Party, led by János Esterházy, 
and placing restrictions on education and religious services in 
Hungarian and German.
What became the basis and source of reference for measures 
against the minorities was the Košice Program, adopted on April 
5, 1945, by the new government of the Social Democrat Zdeněk 
Fierlinger. Chapter VIII cited the principle of collective guilt in favor 
of depriving the Germans and Hungarians of their Czechoslovak 
citizenship, while Chapter IX covered their responsibility and 
punishment, Chapters X and XI expropriation of their property, and 
Chapter XV closure of their schools.
Publication of the program was followed by a stream of 
presidential decrees, acts of Parliament, and orders of the Slovak 
National Council, placing the Hungarian and German minorities 
beyond the protection of the law. The presidential action of most 
consequence was Constitutional Decree No. 33 of August 2, 1945, 
depriving both targets of their citizenship. Other orders announced 
confiscation of the property of the Hungarians and Germans, 
dissolution of Hungarian associations, dismissal of Hungarians 
from their jobs, withdrawal of their pensions and state benefits, 
and expulsion of them from universities and colleges and from 
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local government national committees and political parties. The 
Hungarians were deprived of the vote. Hungarian schools were 
closed. Use of the Hungarian language in public life was forbidden, 
as were publication and importation of Hungarian books and 
newspapers. In several places, use of Hungarian in public places 
was also banned. Hungarians were not allowed to own radios. They 
could be ejected from their housing or obliged to do public work at 
any time.13
The authorities closed the Hungarian schools in the spring 
of 1945, and thereafter not a single Hungarian school operated in 
Czechoslovakia until the autumn of 1948. This left about 100,000 
Hungarian children unable to study in their native language. Even in 
purely Hungarian villages only Slovak schools operated, and many 
were left with no school at all, with the result that illiteracy became 
rife among Hungarian children, even at the age of ten or older. 
The teaching of Hungarian could only be continued illegally by 
volunteers – dismissed Hungarian teachers and priests prepared to 
risk official reprisals. Some middle school students would regularly 
cross the closed border to continue their studies in Hungary.
The gravest action was taken in Bratislava, where several 
thousand Hungarians were interned on May 3, 1945, at a camp in 
Petržalka. At the same time, the armistice terms were cited as the 
reason for arresting, interning and deporting Hungarians who had 
arrived in other parts of Slovakia since November 1938. According to 
Czechoslovak figures, this had been inflicted on 31,780 Hungarians 
by the end of June 1945, each being allowed to take with them only 
baggage weighing up to 50 kilograms.14
The United Kingdom and the United States refused at 
the Potsdam Conference of July–August 1945 to countenance 
unilateral deportation of Czechoslovakia’s Hungarian minority of 
more than 600,000, although they agreed to the expulsion of the 
German minority of 3.5 million. The government then sought to rid 
Czechoslovakia of its Hungarians by forcing a population exchange 
on Hungary. The agreement signed in Budapest on February 
27, 1946, by the Hungarian minister of foreign affairs, János 
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Gyöngyösi, and the Czechoslovak state secretary for foreign affairs, 
Vladimír Clementis, allowed for as many Slovakian Hungarians 
to be removed to Hungary as Hungarian Slovaks volunteered for 
settlement in Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovakia was also empowered 
to unilaterally deport Hungarians who had been declared war 
criminals by the Slovak people’s courts.15
That encouraged the Slovak people’s courts to fabricate 
thousands of charges. Of the 8,055 persons condemned by the courts 
up to the end of 1947, 4,812 (over 60 percent) were Hungarians. By 
establishing that the Hungarian minority was guilty of war crimes, 
the authorities hoped to justify the confiscations and deportations. 
The severest sentence was passed on János Esterházy, who was 
condemned to death by the Slovak National Court in Bratislava in 
September 1947. (The sentence was not carried out, as Esterházy 
had been taken prisoner by the Soviets in 1945. On his extradition in 
1950, it was remitted to life imprisonment.) The biggest of what often 
became mass trials was the Košice trial, in which several hundred 
Hungarians were sentenced to imprisonment and full confiscation of 
their property in August 1946.
Under such circumstances, the Hungarian government would 
not agree to begin the population exchange until forced to do so 
by Czechoslovakia, which began to impose a policy of internal 
resettlement on its Hungarian population, this meaning deportation 
to the Czech provinces, justified by their shortage of labor and by 
the Beneš decree No. 88. Such “recruitment of labor” began on 
November 1946 and lasted until February 1947, and according to 
official Czechoslovak records 41,666 Hungarians, including women, 
children and the elderly, were deported to Czechoslovakia under 
inhuman conditions in unheated freight cars. The property that they 
left behind in Slovakia was expropriated and reassigned to Slovak 
settlers.
Then came the population exchange, between April 12, 
1947, and December 1948. Altogether 71,787 Slovaks resettled 
in Czechoslovakia and 89,660 Hungarians were moved from 
Czechoslovakia to Hungary. The Czechoslovak authorities tended 
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to move wealthier Hungarians, and so there was a huge difference in 
aggregate values of property left behind, the Slovaks from Hungary 
abandoning 15,000 cadastral hold (8,500 hectares) of land and 4,400 
dwellings, while the Hungarians from Slovakia left behind 160,000 
hold (91,200 hectares) and 15,700 dwellings. Some 23,000 Slovaks 
from other parts of Slovakia were also sent to southern Slovakia. 
They and 47,000 local Slovaks together received 71,000 hectares of 
confiscated land and 2,507 dwellings.
The post-war Czechoslovak government went further than 
demanding the restoration of the Czechoslovak–Hungarian border 
and resettlement of the Hungarian population. It also made further 
territorial demands on Hungary at the Paris peace conference that 
opened in July 1946. It sought to broaden the Bratislava bridgehead 
on the south side of the Danube by annexing five Transdanubian 
villages, arguing that this would help to protect the Slovak capital 
from Hungarian artillery attack. In the event, the peace conference 
awarded to Czechoslovakia only three of the five – Dunacsún 
(Čunovo), Horvátjárfalu (Jarovce) and Oroszvár (Rusovce) – leaving 
Rajka and Bezenye in Hungary.16
Another move designed to reduce the size of the Hungarian 
minority in Slovakia was the “re-Slovakization” campaign 
announced on June 17, 1946. This officially concerned former ethnic 
Slovak families that had become Hungarian, but the volunteers 
running the campaign made no secret of the fact that Hungarians 
“re-Slovakizing” themselves would receive back their citizenship 
and be immune from property confiscation and resettlement, while 
those continuing to declare that they were Hungarians would remain 
without legal rights. The none-too-surprising result of this was that 
410,820 persons reclassified themselves as ethnic Slovaks, of which 
326,679 were recognized as such.17
Czechoslovakia did not manage to disperse the whole Hungarian 
minority, but the resettlement of some Hungarians and the 
importation of several hundred domestic and foreign Slovaks into 
southern Slovakia brought about a big change in the ethnic structure 
of what had been a homogeneous piece of Hungarian linguistic 
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territory before the war. In addition, it left still visible marks on 
the social and cultural structure of the Hungarians of Slovakia, for 
those targeted were the urban bourgeoisie and intelligentsia who 
traditionally had been the creators and vehicles of Hungarian culture, 
along with owners of large and medium-sized rural landholdings.
the Soviet union (Csilla Fedinec)
Transcarpathia belonged from 1945 to 1991 to the Soviet Union under 
the official name of the Transcarpathian Territory (Zakarpatskaja 
oblast’). A territory or oblast is a unit resembling a Hungarian 
county, subdivided into districts or rayons (rajonov), with these 
rayons further subdivided into communities (cities, towns and 
villages). The region progressively became part of the Soviet system 
from the start of military conquest in the autumn of 1944 until 
conclusion of the international treaties at the end of 1945.
The Soviet-directed partisan activity that began in 
Transcarpathia in 1943 was followed by military intervention in 
September and October 1944. Heavier fighting took place before 
the capture of the town of Chop, as the 18th Army on the Fourth 
Ukrainian Front advanced northwest.
Three powers competed in the autumn of 1944 for control 
over the region’s inhabitants: the local people’s committees, the 
command of the Red Army and the returning Czechoslovak state 
administration. The Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia had signed 
agreements in 1941 and 1943 recognizing pre-war borders. Then 
on May 8, 1944, it was decided that the Soviet armed forces should 
hand liberated Czechoslovak territories over to the Czechoslovak 
civilian authorities, but this was not done in Transcarpathia. 
There the Soviet military backed preparations for a first congress 
of the People’s Committees of Transcarpathian Ukraine, held in 
Mukachevo on November 26, 1944. The delegates arriving for the 
congress had not been elected legally in all cases; most communities 
were left unrepresented. On the other hand, the congress was 
attended by numerous invited partisans, representatives of the 
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command of the 18th Army and several dozen representatives of 
Soviet internal security, the NKVD. Not even these preparations 
could ensure that delegates’ opinions were unanimous: there was a 
proposal for a referendum to decide the territory’s post-war status 
and Transcarpathia’s independent statehood. Finally a motion was 
passed that the inhabitants would request “reunion” with their 
brethren across the Carpathians, the Ukrainians. The request, in 
the form of a manifesto, was signed also by some members of the 
local authorities, the people’s committees. Where such committees 
would not do so, they were dissolved and replaced.18
Measures were taken accordingly, and the region was reorganized 
on Soviet lines. The kind of transition that occurred in Hungary in 
1945–1948, for instance, took place in Transcarpathia at the end of 
1944 and in 1945.
There was a big change in the social structure. The intelligentsia 
and some of the officials departed for Hungary or Czechoslovakia. 
Even before the Mukachevo congress, Hungarian and German men 
aged 18–55 were called up by the Soviet military command for three 
days’ labor, but were actually sent to the Svaliava concentration 
camp and then to labor camps in Siberia that the majority did not 
survive. Those who did returned home only after several years. 
The German inhabitants fled or were relocated by the Soviets. The 
Romanians were classified as Moldavians and had to change from 
the Roman to the Cyrillic alphabet, a situation that was reversed 
only in the 1990s. The Rusyns were not recognized as a separate 
nation and were registered as Ukrainians.19 The size of the Russian 
community increased strongly, mainly through migration. Of a 
population of 775,116 recorded in 1946, 527,032 were Ukrainians, 
134,558 Hungarians, 72,176 Russians, 12,420 Romanians, 6,998 
Jews, 2,774 Czechs and 2,338 Germans.20
In education there was continuity of teaching in Hungarian, 
but only in lower elementary schools in the 1944–1945 school 
year, which began late. Hungarian general schools also opened in 
the autumn of 1945, but middle schools did not follow until 1953. 
There were also Hungarian groups at the teachers’ training college 
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in Mukachevo. The first institute of higher education in the territory 
was the Uzhgorod State University, which opened in October 
1945, but taught in Russian, as the language of inter-communal 
communication in the Soviet Union.
The school system was reorganized, with elementary (lower 
primary), general and middle schools instead of people’s schools, civil 
schools and gymnasia (academically oriented secondary schools). 
All previous textbooks were locked away and the literature syllabus 
was revised as well. The first Hungarian literature textbook of the 
Soviet period appeared only in 1950, but the majority nation did no 
better: Ukrainian literature textbooks were banned for “idealizing 
the recent past of Ukraine too much.” The history taught was Soviet 
history, not those of the various nations in the territory.21
The one Hungarian-language paper was the Munkás Újság, 
which appeared for a few months in 1945 before ceasing publication. 
Thereafter a territory paper and a district paper were translated into 
Hungarian from Ukrainian, under the titles Kárpáti Igaz Szó and 
Vörös Zászló.
The Churches went through hard times in an officially atheist 
country. Their property was confiscated. In 1949, the Greek Catholic 
Church was suppressed and its churches were handed over to the 
Orthodox Church, the last Greek Catholic bishop in Transcarpathia, 
Teodor Romzha, having been murdered in 1947.22 All aspects of 
religion were curtailed. Teachers, those in the uniformed services 
and those in leading positions could not attend church, or even have 
a church wedding or hold a baptism.23
The prime task for the new regime was nationalization. This 
covered all denominational schools and other Church property. 
All but the most rudimentary forms of private economic activity 
were collectivized, as was the farmland, where the peasants were 
forced to join their local kolkhoz and hand over their implements 
and livestock.24
Representatives of the Soviet Union and a still semi-democratic 
Czechoslovak Republic signed a treaty on June 29, 1945. Hungary 
was said to have yielded its claims to Transcarpathia under the 
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armistice of January 20, 1945, while Czechoslovakia would “out of 
friendship” bow to the will of the people and allow “reunion” of the 
territory.25 The Transcarpathian Territory of the Ukrainian Soviet 
Socialist Republic was officially constituted on January 22, 1946.
Yugoslavia (Enikő A. Sajti)
Evacuation of Hungary’s military and civilian administration in the 
Southern Region began at the end of September 1944. On October 
17, Josip Broz Tito, commander-in-chief of the partisan army and 
leader of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, ordered military 
rule of the Bačka, Banat and Baranja territories, which lasted 103 
days. Thus Yugoslav public administration and the establishment 
of anti-fascist people’s committees began in the Southern Region, 
as elsewhere, under strict military and Communist Party control. 
Initially, the Hungarians were expressly excluded from the people’s 
committees. On October 18, total expulsion and internment of the 
German minority was ordered. Camp internment of the Hungarians 
began two days later. There were 40 camps set up in Vojvodina, 
including two notorious labor camps at Bački Jarak and Bukin. The 
whole Hungarian population was moved out of some villages, for 
instance Mošorin and Čurug.26
There were indiscriminate revenge murders of Hungarians 
during the autumn and winter of 1944, committed by the advancing 
armed forces, notably the security units, with the assistance of local 
Slavs. Exactly how many innocent Hungarians were executed during 
these “even colder days” is still strongly debated. Figures from the 
People’s Defense Department (OZNA), which performed internal 
security functions, record that 2,982 Hungarians were executed in 
Vojvodina. Other sources put the likely figure between 15,000 and 
20,000. The tribunals set up to investigate war crimes condemned 
899 Vojvodina Hungarians to death in 1944–1945. Death sentences 
were meted out by military courts early in 1944 to the Hungarian 
army officers who had led the deadly raids in Novi Sad and southern 
Bačka early in 1942: Ferenc Feketehalmy-Czeydner, József Grassy 
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and Márton Zöldy. The circumstances have still not been clarified 
in which Ferenc Szombathelyi, army chief of staff at the time, was 
condemned to death and executed, although he had been sentenced to 
life imprisonment earlier by the Hungarian People’s Court. Several 
leading Hungarian political figures in the Southern Region met the 
same fate, including Lord Lieutenant Leó Deák, Gyula Kramer, 
who had chaired the Hungarian Cultural Association of Southern 
Region, and Mayor of Novi Sad Miklós Nagy.27
In line with the armistice terms, the Yugoslav authorities 
deported on a mass scale the Hungarians who had settled in the 
Southern Region since April 1941. Tens of thousands of others fled 
for fear of reprisals, including the Bukovina Székely settlers in Bačka. 
The number of Hungarians who fled or were expelled in the autumn 
of 1944 is put at 84,800 – more than twice as many as in 1918.
On the communist side, a Hungarian partisan unit named after 
Sándor Petőfi had formed in August 1943 at Zvečevo in Croatia. Early 
in November 1944, the Yugoslav Liberation Army began to organize 
a Petőfi Brigade of some 15,000 volunteers, mostly enlisted men from 
the Hungarian ranks. Over a thousand of these were killed before the 
end of the war.
While the Paris peace talks were going on, the head of the Yugoslav 
peace delegation, Minister of Foreign Affairs Edvard Kardelj, turned 
to the Hungarians on August 16, 1946, with an unexpected proposal for 
a voluntary, mutual population exchange agreement. This envisaged 
exchanging about 40,000 Hungarians in the Southern Region for 
members of the South Slav minorities in Hungary, but no agreement 
was ever ratified or put into practice.28
Elections of November 11, 1945, for a National Constituent 
Assembly were held by secret ballot, with women voting for the 
first time. However, the vote was denied to “enemies of the people.” 
Obviously the Germans, as an ethnic group considered to be 
collectively guilty of war crimes, were excluded, but so were large 
numbers of Serbs, Croats and others, on the grounds that they had 
collaborated with the occupiers, as were “Hungarian fascists,” a 
category that covered not only the Arrow-Cross but even members of 
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the wartime Hungarian Public Education Association. The elections, 
under the close control of the new regime, brought five politically 
reliable Hungarians into the legislature. According to the official 
returns, 90.8 percent of a poll with an 88.7 percent turn-out voted 
for the People’s Front. In Vojvodina, 14.6 percent voted against the 
People’s Front, but this reached 40 percent in some constituencies 
inhabited by Hungarians.29
The National Constituent Assembly abolished the monarchy on 
November 29, 1945, and proclaimed the Federal People’s Republic 
of Yugoslavia. The federative Constitution, adopted on January 31, 
1946, placed the multi-ethnic region of Vojvodina under Serbia as 
an internally autonomous province. In the Vojvodina provincial 
assembly of 1945, 37 of the 150 members were Hungarian, as were 
26 of the 110 members of the Serbian Parliament.
The Hungarian Cultural Association of Vojvodina (Vajdasági 
Magyar Kultúrszövetség) was permitted to operate on July 22, 1945, 
and soon became a national organization. The High Commission of 
the People’s Liberation of Vojvodina stated in 1945 that Hungarians 
had equal status in administrative and public life. The Serbian, 
Croatian and Slovenian languages were not declared official state 
languages as they had been in the Kingdom. The 1946 Constitution 
ensured cultural development and the right to the free use of 
language to national minorities as well.
The Yugoslav state socialist system, modeled on the Soviet one, 
oversaw the opening of schools teaching in Hungarian, although they 
were hampered by an acute shortage of staff. According to official 
figures, there were 635 Hungarian elementary school sections in 
Vojvodina in the 1947–1948 school year, with 30,706 pupils, and 
only 519 teachers, most of them with only a four-year middle school 
education, or in some cases a one-year or even just a three-month 
period of teachers’ training behind them.
Also opened were three higher and 20 lower high schools for 
Hungarians. Junior school teachers were trained in Subotica and in 
Novi Sad, where the College of Pedagogy also trained Hungarian 
secondary school teachers.30
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Eighty percent of private companies and financial institutions 
were expropriated and nationalized in 1945 on the grounds of 
collaboration with the occupying forces or as alien property. Owners 
and managers were dismissed and imprisoned. The collectively 
guilty ethnic Germans had all their goods and property confiscated, 
as did the Hungarian settlers in Čurug and Žabalj.
The land reform affected all private holdings of over 45 hectares, 
rented land in excess of 25–35 hectares, and bank and corporate or 
Church holdings of over 10 or 30 hectares respectively. Local people’s 
assemblies played a big part in carrying out the reform, alongside 
the state bodies assigned to the task, which often meant that laws 
and regulations were interpreted strangely, or that much of the land 
was confiscated by order of the people’s courts. Of the land for 
redistribution, 40.58 percent lay in Vojvodina, of which more than 
half (58.2 percent) had been confiscated from Germans, as opposed to 
37.78 percent in the country as a whole. Nationally, 44,116 families of 
so-called external or federal settlers received land, of whom 93 percent 
of whom settled in Vojvodina. The families of the so-called internal 
Vojvodina settlers numbered 7,031. The total number to be settled in 
Vojvodina can be estimated at around 252,000, which immediately 
increased the proportion of Serbs in the province. Almost 300,000 
new holdings had been created under the reform by the end of 1947. 
The resulting national holding structure was dominated by dwarf 
holdings – 65.6 percent had areas between 0.5 and 5 hectares.31
Relations between Hungary and Yugoslavia went well from the 
start. A Hungarian–Yugoslav Society was founded in October 1945 
on the initiative of the two governments. In January 1947, diplomatic 
relations were resumed at legation level. A Hungarian–Yugoslav 
cultural agreement was signed in Belgrade on October 15, 1947, and 
was soon ratified by the Hungarian Parliament. This bound each to 
further the culture of the other’s minorities in its territory and set 
up related research institutes and university departments. It allowed 
for study in each other’s countries, and exchanges of experts and 
of scientific and cultural works. On December 6, 1947, President 
Josip Broz Tito visited Budapest; a treaty of friendship and mutual 
assistance was signed two days later.
Case Studies (1944–1948) 311
Austria (Gerhard Baumgartner)
There were 679 Burgenland lives lost as Soviet troops occupied the 
whole of eastern Austria in March 1945. The country was divided 
into four zones of occupation, with Burgenland in the Soviet zone. 
Public administration was reorganized by an Allied Commission 
for Austria, under a four-power agreement signed on July 4,32 but 
the Soviet military authorities had already called on President 
Karl Renner in April to form a government. This new government 
reestablished the province of Burgenland under a constitutional law, 
and the provincial administration began to operate on October 1.33 
Legislation on war crimes had already been passed in the summer.34 
Former Nazi functionaries were accordingly excluded from public 
life and several hundred suspected war criminals were charged.35 
The general and provincial assembly elections in November led 
to the formation of governments of national unity at both levels, 
headed by the Social Democrats and the Christian Socialists, with 
Communist Party cooperation.
In the Soviet zone, the occupiers confiscated so-called German 
property under Order 17 of High Commissioner Vladimir Kurasov. 
Several large factories and installations came into Soviet hands, 
along with tens of thousands of hectares of the Esterházy estate in 
Burgenland, some of which became a state farm, while the rest was 
distributed among small-scale farmers and farm laborers in northern 
Burgenland, so strengthening left-wing support among Hungarian 
inhabitants of manorial estates there.36 As the Cold War set in, the 
Soviet authorities took about 120 Burgenlanders off to the gulags on 
the grounds that they were spying for the Americans. Meanwhile a 
start was made to restoring Jewish property confiscated in 1938–
1945, but few of the Jews who had now settled in America or Israel 
returned to the province37 – only one of ten religious congregations 
was revived after 1945.
The so-called National Socialist Act of April 194738 rehabilitated 
and restored the franchise to most former Nazis. That autumn, the 
first prisoners of war returned from the Soviet Union, where almost 
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half a million Austrian citizens had been taken prisoner since 
1941. The basis for Austria’s post-war economic recovery was the 
Marshall Plan, under which it received USD 960 million.39 Neither 
the Austrian government nor the Western powers wanted to see this 
invested in the Soviet zone. Furthermore, Burgenland had scarcely 
any industry. The upshot was that Burgenland, home to 4 percent of 
the country’s population, received only 0.33 percent of the American 
aid.40
As the Iron Curtain came down along the Austro-Hungarian 
border in 1948, Burgenland was cut off from the east and became 
for decades Austria’s most backward border region. Restoration of 
sovereignty under the Austrian State Treaty signed on May 15, 1955,41 
was conditional on the country’s becoming a neutral state. Soviet 
occupation forces left Burgenland in the same year. The post-war 
revival of Burgenland was hindered further by the absence of many 
adult men, for 17,600 soldiers failed to return after 1945 and another 
38,000 remained prisoners of war. This contributed in Hungarian 
villages to a sudden increase in ethnically mixed marriages.42
At the beginning of 1945, whole Hungarian units retreated into 
Austrian territory with the German army. However, they did not 
settle in Burgenland or the Vienna district, but in Upper Austria, 
in the American zone of occupation. This led, for instance, to the 
growth of a sizeable Hungarian community in Linz. Another wave of 
migration towards Austria came with the deportation of Hungary’s 
indigenous Germans, many of them families who were bilingual in 
German and Hungarian. Some chose to settle in the border villages 
of Burgenland. Yet another wave arrived with the 1948 communist 
takeover in Hungary, most of them making for Vienna.43
The most important post-war change for the ethnic Hungarians 
of Burgenland was the reinstatement of the 1937 Schools Act. This 
meant that teaching in Hungarian could resume in six elementary 
schools (at Oberwart, Unterwart, Siget in der Wart, Mittelpullendorf, 
Albrechtsfeld and Kleylehof). But these turned out to be a blind 
alley in the Austrian education system, as there was no secondary or 
higher education in Hungarian available. Parents intending to send 
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their children to gymnasia had to enroll them in nearby elementary 
schools that taught in German. Local societies continued to function 
in Hungarian-inhabited manors and villages, but there were no 
provincial-level Hungarian bodies even in the 1950s.
There were seven variant languages to be found in post-
war Burgenland. Alongside the Roma language, the three main 
languages of the province were found in standard and dialect 
forms. The typical mother tongue spoken in Burgenland was a rural 
dialect, but other languages would be used in the standard form. 
A typical Croat farmer would use a local Croatian dialect in the 
home, but read the Croatian newspaper in the standardized regional 
gradišćansko-hrvatski (Burgenland Croatian) language, and speak 
German or Hungarian in a standardized literary form.44
The Burgenlanders who were bilingual in Hungarian and 
German used five language variants: standard Hungarian, literary 
Hungarian, local Hungarian dialect, standard literary German, the 
dialect of local German villages and a kind of pidgin Hungarian that 
lay between the local dialects of the two languages. The last was 
found only in the Hungarian villages. As for the local dialects of 
Hungarian, they were of seventeenth-century origin and preserved 
the vocabulary and grammar of the early modern Hungarian 
language, including variant terminations, the diphthongization 
found in all language dialects spoken in Burgenland, and some 
altered vowel sounds.45
The “pidginization” of Hungarian took place through the 
presence of abundant German loan words, not only for modern 
institutions and objects that had arisen since the isolation from 
mainstream Hungarian,46 but also for verbs and other parts of speech, 
more commonly in their dialect forms than in those of literary 
German. These loan words were used with Hungarian prefixes and 
suffixes.47
Not everyone in the Hungarian villages was fully bilingual. 
Older people would use standard Hungarian, Hungarian dialect 
and occasional pidgin forms, and spoke German in the local 
dialect. Those who attended Hungarian elementary school and then 
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German secondary school were conversant with the full range. This 
had become restricted among the younger generation, who spoke 
excellent literary German and German dialect, but Hungarian only 
in the pidgin dialect form. Similar linguistic developments occurred 
among Burgenland’s Croats and Gypsies.48
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1. tHE ModELS For coMMunISt
MInorItY PoLIcY
Stefano Bottoni and Zoltán Novák
The East-Central European countries were engaged after 1948 in 
building up a Soviet-type socialist system. The biggest political 
change was to a single-party system. The opposition parties were 
banned and their leaders arrested and sentenced to imprisonment, 
or they were forced into exile. The social democratic parties were 
submerged into the communist parties. Even in Czechoslovakia and 
Poland, where smaller left-wing parties still operated formally, real 
power was held exclusively by the Communist Party.1
These political changes affected the way in which these 
countries were run. The main political decision-making bodies in 
a communist party state were the Secretariat and Politburo of the 
Communist Party Central Committee. The Council of Ministers 
and its portfolio ministries became responsible to the Communist 
Party, not the legislature, and were confined to administrative 
tasks or executive assignments specifically delegated to them, not 
to the Parliament. The result was a highly centralized system of 
state administrative bodies, duplicated at most levels by Communist 
Party organizations designed to oversee them. Furthermore, the fear 
of the party’s dictatorial power meant that quite trivial questions 
would be passed up the hierarchy and decided at the top.2
Drastic efforts were made by the party state to gain control 
over the economy. By 1948, almost all private factories, banks 
and mines had been nationalized without compensation. This was 
followed by the forced collectivization of agriculture into producer 
“cooperatives.” Strong peasant resistance to this, notably in Poland 
and Romania, led to bloody reprisals (fines, imprisonments, 
deportations to labor camps and even executions).
323
324 Minority Hungarian Communities in the 20th Century
This command economy rested on highly detailed, centrally 
devised plans “disaggregated” down to the lowest production units.3 
Until Stalin’s death in 1953 the driving aim of the economic policy was 
a forced rate of industrialization, especially heavy industry devoted 
to arms manufacture and other military equipment. International 
relations were very tense in that period. It was assumed that a third 
world war could occur at any moment.
The official, so-called Marxist-Leninist, ideology of the 
communist system was imposed on scientific, scholarly and cultural 
life, from the arts to mass public information.4 Confessional schools 
were nationalized and a standard curriculum was introduced, 
making Russian the compulsory foreign language and introducing 
subjects such as dialectical materialism and political economy. The 
brief history of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union taught 
was written by Stalin himself. Children of “class aliens” (not of 
proletarian or poor peasant origin) were deprived of higher education. 
The position of the intelligentsia became equivocal. University and 
medical staff, and state employees suffered continual purges, as did 
the Communist Party apparatus itself. Meanwhile, many children of 
poor families were given special chances for rapid educational and 
career advancement, and came later to form an elite giving stalwart 
social support to the system. Fear and coercion were essential to the 
working of the Stalinist system, after other incentives and brakes 
had been removed.5
The press and mass media were subject to strict censorship. 
Daily papers, arts journals and radio stations became mouthpieces 
for the policies or opinions of the state leadership. They spread the 
“cult of personality”, under which the near-worship of the party 
leader was orchestrated from Moscow. This implied not just the cult 
of Stalin, but also of the leaders of each satellite Communist Party 
as well. The cult took facile forms: vast statues and other artworks 
of Stalin and his equivalents in each “fraternal” country, which had 
cities, factories, streets and squares named after them.
One myth that obscured the communist image of society was 
that of the imminent development of an internationalist proletariat 
freed of national fetters. Yet the civil war that followed Russia’s 
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1917 Revolution presented the new Soviet state with a jumble of 
nationalities. The concomitant ethnic antagonisms persisted as 
potentials for conflict despite communist denials of their existence 
or reinterpretation of them as class struggle.
Similarly to the Soviet Union, the satellite states of Eastern 
and Central Europe faced ethnic problems during and after World 
War II.6 Policies towards minorities in 1945–1948 ranged from 
efforts to integrate them to blatant discrimination, the worst case 
being the way in which some nine million indigenous Germans 
in Poland and Czechoslovakia were shorn of their property, left 
stateless, and expelled, having been condemned collectively for 
collaborating with the Nazis.7 It was only on October 25, 1948, that 
the legislation restored to members of Czechoslovakia’s Hungarian 
minority their citizenship and the restricted range of political and 
civil rights to which citizens were entitled in a communist-run 
society.8 In the 1950s, the authorities put an effort into integrating 
the Hungarians of southern Slovakia, much of it channeled through 
a Cultural Association of Hungarian Workers of Czechoslovakia 
(CSEMADOK)9 founded in 1949. Hungarians became eligible for 
Communist Party membership, and teaching in Hungarian was 
resumed at some elementary and middle schools.10
Romania, on the other hand, pursued from the outset a policy of 
political and social integration of ethnic minorities. In 1945, the pro-
communist government headed by Petru Groza declared that the 1.5 
million indigenous Hungarians had equal rights with the majority. The 
Hungarians made some headway in rights of language use – some of 
the linguistic ground gained under Hungarian rule in Northern Tran-
sylvania in 1940–1944 was retained. From 1945, Hungarian became 
an accepted language of the public administration in areas inhabited 
by the same minority, while the university teaching in Hungarian lan-
guage continued in Cluj, in the frame of a Romanian state university. 
There was state support for the Hungarian language in schools and 
in cultural life. Political representation of the minority was assumed 
by the Hungarian People’s Union, which supported the leftist govern-
ment. Tens of thousands of Hungarians joined the Romanian Com-
munist Party and came to form 12 percent of the membership.11
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As the communists took over power across Eastern Europe in 
1948, minority policy became an internal affair. That, along with the 
end of grievance procedures of the League of Nations, the post-war 
acceptance of the principle of collective guilt, and a tight day-to-day 
control from Moscow, left the Hungarian party state powerless to 
influence the minority policy of its neighbors, although the Soviets 
expected the latter to cease open discrimination.
In Czechoslovakia, the Hungarians regained their citizenship, 
and the 44,000 people deported to the Czech lands in 1946–1947 were 
allowed to return home, where Hungarian schooling was permitted 
up to secondary level and a Hungarian-language newspaper 
appeared as well. This was a start to the process of integrating the 
Hungarian community.12
1948 brought radical changes in the education and cultural life of 
the Hungarian minority in Romania. Hitherto the Churches and vol-
untary institutions had played a central role in the organization and 
financing of the education and cultural life. The schools with educa-
tion in minority languages were run by the so-called “historical” 
Churches (Catholics, Reformed, Unitarians and Lutheran Evangeli-
cals). However, in 1948, almost 2,000 properties and other Church 
assets were nationalized, and education came under tight state con-
trol. The great voluntary institutions – the Transylvanian Museum 
Society, the Hungarian Cultural Society of Transylvania and the 
Transylvanian-Hungarian Economic Association – were closed. 
Running theaters and museums, and publishing of periodicals and 
books, became a state prerogative, which left the Hungarian com-
munity and its institutions dependent on the whims of state policy.13
The Hungarians of Yugoslavia, classed collectively as war 
criminals, suffered marked demographic losses. Reprisals by the 
Yugoslav partisan troops in the autumn of 1944 cost some 15,000 
lives. Over 80,000 ethnic Hungarians left the country, mainly for 
Hungary. As tempers cooled, Tito’s Yugoslavia announced a new 
minority policy: the Hungarian Cultural Association of Vojvodina 
was founded on July 22, 1945, and a daily paper called Magyar 
Szó, was launched. Furthermore, over 18,000 poor Hungarian 
families were granted land. The post-war Yugoslav leadership and 
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legislature in fact paid little heed to the minority question. Nor did the 
1948 breach with the Soviets change much in the minority policy of 
the Yugoslav Communist Party. The worker self-management system 
introduced in 1950 was extended by the 1953 Yugoslav Constitution 
to cultural and social activities as well.14
The minority question was declared to be solved, but it came up 
again in the détente period after Stalin’s death. The process began 
with the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union, held on February 14–25, 1956, in Moscow. The criticisms 
of Stalinism voiced by General Secretary Nikita Khrushchev in his 
secret speech had been preceded by the release of several millions 
of prisoners since Stalin’s death in 1953, but the speech instigated 
further political reforms. The strongest reactions to it came from 
Poland and Hungary, which had experimented with Moscow-
approved reform programs in 1953. The first Imre Nagy government, 
installed in Hungary on July 4, 1953, at Soviet behest, had reversed 
the forced industrialization of the Mátyás Rákosi regime, allowed 
peasants to back out of the collective farms that they had been 
forced to join, and freed an estimated 15,000 prisoners. The speed 
of the détente process prompted the Soviet Union to apply the brake. 
Rákosi returned to power in 1955, but public oppositionism, notably 
by the intelligentsia, could not be remedied.
The changes brought about an increasing Hungarian interest 
in the minority problems as well. Visits between Hungary and its 
neighboring countries had been possible since 1948 only for official 
delegations, but the Hungarian radio broadcasts could be heard 
throughout the Carpathian Basin and people could subscribe to papers 
from Hungary. (The comic Ludas Matyi and the popular science 
magazine Élet és Tudomány each had 10,000 subscribers in Romania 
alone.) Hungary’s borders with Romania and Czechoslovakia were 
opened for private visits in August 1956, giving a chance to visitors 
to experience the change of mood in Hungary.15
However, the reception of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution by 
Hungarians in neighboring countries was ambivalent. Many hoped 
that the Revolution’s democratic and national demands could 
be realized, but at the same time it was feared that reprisals for 
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failure might spread to all Hungarians who had shown sympathy. 
Still, there were some small initiatives, although the rebels in 
Budapest had not voiced any demands for the minority Hungarians. 
Students demonstrating in Timişoara, Cluj and Bucharest voiced 
mainly political and social demands. The Roman Catholic priest 
Aladár Szoboszlay set about organizing a nation-wide conspiracy 
to overthrow the communists and achieve a Romanian–Hungarian 
confederation. This was soon broken up by the Romanian secret 
police, the Securitate, who arrested the plotters. When they came 
to trial in 1958, ten members of the group were executed and other 
47 received sentences of several years’ imprisonment or hard 
labor. There were protests around Oradea and in the Székely Land, 
organized by the Transylvanian Hungarian and Székely youth 
associations, which consisted mainly of secondary school pupils. 
Starting from November 1956 to the early 1960s, the intervention 
of the Romanian Communist Party and the Securitate led to severe 
reprisals for all who had shown sympathy for the Hungarian cause. 
Young people, among whom some under-age, were also arrested 
and condemned for trying to cross the Hungarian border to join the 
struggle. One female student from Cluj received a ten-year prison 
sentence for sending a letter to a friend into which she had copied 
the poem “A Word about Tyranny” by the Hungarian writer Gyula 
Illyés. Initially the reprisals targeted all ethnicities, but from 1958 
onwards they were imposed disproportionately on Hungarians, 
Germans and Jews, and above all on the Hungarian intelligentsia. 
Recent research points to more than 32,000 people in Romania 
being sentenced to forced labor or internal exile between 1956 and 
1964, of whom at least one tenth were ethnic Hungarians.16
In Slovakia newspapers from Hungary were banned right 
after the Revolution broke out. Although the protests were smaller 
than in Romania, there were gestures of sympathy in Bratislava, 
where ethnic Hungarians and Germans tried to collect money 
for the revolutionaries. As in Romania, students were to the fore. 
Hungarian students in Bratislava managed to hold meetings through 
CSEMADOK declaring their refusal to condemn the Revolution. 
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Sympathizers underwent heavy reprisals in subsequent months, 
with several hundred arrests and a number of people (including 
soldiers and officers) receiving custodial sentences of several 
years.17
In Ukraine, the Hungarian Revolution reinforced the criticism 
of the authorities that had begun with the Twentieth Congress. There 
were several meetings in Transcarpathia where social and other 
discontent was expressed. Groups sympathetic to the Hungarian 
Revolution were formed. Several of those who joined them later 
received prison sentences.18
The reactions among the Vojvodina Hungarians were relatively 
feeble, due partly to the generally favorable minority policies of the 
Tito regime, but also to traumatic memories of partisan violence 
in 1944. Yugoslavia played a positive role in November 1956 by 
accepting some 20,000 refugees from Hungary, many of whom 
traveled on to the West, although some settled in Hungarian-inhabited 
areas of Vojvodina.19
The 1956 Revolution brought about a change in minority policy 
mainly in Romania, where the minority elite had made a far more 
active contribution to local and national administration than in the 
other neighboring countries. The moral of 1956 for the Romanian re-
gime was that ethnic Hungarians still saw Hungary as their parent 
country, despite all the concessions and ostensible privileges given to 
them, and showed no desire to integrate into the Romanian state. So 
they had to be classed as an unreliable element even if they posed no 
direct threat to the country’s territorial integrity. In 1959, the Bolyai 
University in Cluj with education in Hungarian language was merged 
into the Babeş University with teaching language in Romanian. At 
the united university, Hungarian language became secondary to 
Romanian. In 1960, elementary and secondary schools teaching in 
Hungarian began to be merged with Romanian schools. Meanwhile, 
Hungarian-language technical training was winding up and measures 
were being taken to alter the ethnic proportions of the urban popula-
tion. The hitherto large number of Hungarians working in the party 
and state apparatus found themselves squeezed out, along with the 
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Jewish-born officials who were Hungarian in culture. The secret po-
lice used blackmail and other methods to recruit several thousand 
ethnic Hungarians as informers on other members of the Hungarian 
community. This was applied particularly in the sector of arts, uni-
versity and media, but it extended to factories and public institutions 
as well. Romania’s minority policy in the 1960s was characterized by 
the so-called nation-building stage in the transformation into a com-
munist society. Gheorghiu-Dej and his successor Nicolae Ceauşescu 
gained greater freedom as leaders after the withdrawal of Soviet oc-
cupation forces in 1958, the economic confrontation with the Soviet 
Union over the Valev Plan in 1962, and the “declaration of indepen-
dence” by the Romanian Workers’ Party in April 1964.20
Czechoslovakia’s 1960 constitution defined the country as a 
“socialist republic.” It contained the first constitutional guarantee of 
equality of rights, and stated that minorities had a right to education 
and training in their own language. However, the Hungarian minority 
lost ground in the simultaneous reforms of public administration 
that merged local administrative units (such as the districts of 
Dunajská Streda and Komárno), reducing the number of those where 
Hungarians were in a majority. The subsequent process of détente 
and reform – Alexander Dubček was elected as Communist Party 
general secretary on January 5, 1968 – pushed the loyalist Hungarian 
leaders into calling for extended minority rights. A proposal was put 
out through CSEMADOK on March 12, 1968, for self-determination, 
codification of minority rights, a proportionate Hungarian presence 
in organs of power, the amendment of the 1960 local administration 
reform that resulted in centralization, and the abrogation of the 
discriminatory Beneš decrees introduced in 1945.21
The deep concern felt in Moscow and other Eastern European 
capitals for Prague’s commitment to reforms was expressed 
retrospectively, after the August 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia 
by the Soviet and other Warsaw Pact forces, in the Brezhnev 
Doctrine, expounded fully in a Pravda article in September 
1968 by S. M. Kovalev, and reiterated in a Brezhnev speech to 
the Polish Communist Party Congress on November 13. The 
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intervention had been “dictated by necessity,” but “when internal 
and external forces hostile to socialism are threatening to turn 
a socialist country back to capitalism, this becomes a common 
problem and a concern of all socialist countries.” The Soviet 
Union, as “the strongest and most developed socialist power,” had 
a right to intervene in the internal affairs of a “fraternal country.” 
The efforts to restore Soviet hegemony culminated in the Moscow 
conference of communist parties on June 5, 1969. The contributions 
made to the invasion of Czechoslovakia by Hungary and three 
other satellite countries were largely nominal but had strong 
political significance. One aspect of the “normalization” process 
that followed was an attempt to settle the Hungarian and Slovak 
questions. The constitutional act on the minorities of October 27, 
1968, granted broader rights for the use of minority languages. On 
January 1, 1969, Czechoslovakia became a federal state consisting 
of Czech and Slovak republics, and in the new Slovak government 
László Dobos, an ethnic Hungarian, was appointed as minister 
without portfolio for minority affairs.22
The political changes in the Soviet Union, the spreading cult of 
personality surrounding Brezhnev, and a number of new policies 
that affected various national minorities had repercussions also in 
the satellite countries and on the Hungarian communities there. 
The policy aim of rapprochement and development for minority 
groups appeared in the mid-1960s and gained momentum in the 
1970s. This rapprochement taking place in a new phase in the 
development of socialism would lead to the appearance of a new 
nation – the Soviet nation. In the Soviet Union this resulted in an 
increasing Russification of education and public life. The aim was 
not to revive the traditional concept of the nation, but by developing 
it to lend legitimacy to the existing power arrangements.23 This 
Soviet influence led to emphasis on the national element and 
national interests in the policies of Hungary’s neighboring 
countries towards their Hungarian minorities, but neither in 
Romania nor in Czechoslovakia did this work to their benefit. The 
nation-building of the former was limited to the Romanians, while 
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in federal Czechoslovakia the Slovaks were better placed than ever 
to counter efforts by the indigenous Hungarians at nation-building 
and emancipation, despite some protests from leaders of Hungarian 
minority institutions and from Hungarian elites integrated into the 
socialist system.
The period between April 1969 and November 1989, when 
Gustáv Husák was Communist Party leader (and from 1975 also 
head of state), was marked by a return to “normal socialism” (in 
other words Soviet-style communist rule). Dubček’s replacement 
by Husák in April 1969 brought about a great wave of such 
“normalization,” a surreptitious terror that eschewed executions. 
This had its effects also among the influential Hungarians who 
had come out in favor of the Dubček reforms and were running 
CSEMADOK. The Slovak government set up a Council of Nations 
consisting of working committees on social policy, education and 
cultural affairs for each minority (Hungarians and Ukrainians).
The 1970s witnessed a departure from the minority policy 
efforts originally proclaimed. One of the first casualties was Rezső 
Szabó, relieved of his posts as deputy speaker and member of the 
Presidency of the Slovak legislature. Then László Dobos’s position 
of minister for minority affairs was abolished in 1970. Meanwhile, 
CSEMADOK had to desist from its limited, implicit representation 
of the Hungarians’ political interests. It was dropped from the 
umbrella National Front in 1971 and operated thereafter solely as a 
cultural body.24
The educational and language-use rights of Czechoslovakia’s 
Hungarians were also curtailed in the early 1970s. The Ministry of 
Education made several efforts to introduce Slovak as a teaching 
language in the Hungarian schools. This was a time when Hungary 
and Czechoslovakia disagreed on a number of political issues. 
Opposition activity began in the later 1970s in the Slovakian 
Hungarian intelligentsia.25 By the early 1980s there had emerged 
a generation that rejected the communist system as a whole. The 
activity of the Charta ’77 opposition movement in Prague led to 
the formation of a Committee for the Protection of the Rights of 
the Hungarian Minority in Czechoslovakia26 under the leadership 
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of Miklós Duray, which contacted opposition figures in Hungary. 
The authorities responded with arrests and interrogations. An 
independent group of young Hungarian writers, Iródia, was formed in 
1983. Meanwhile, the proportion of Hungarians in several Slovakian 
areas sank, due to settlement connected with industrialization.27
The events in Czechoslovakia in 1968 led to some ostensible do-
mestic liberalization in Romania. Party General Secretary Nicolae 
Ceauşescu was opposed to the Prague reforms but gained capital in 
the West by condemning the Soviet intervention. Despite the liber-
alization, the Communist Party’s minority policy remained ambiva-
lent. Ceauşescu, addressing the Ninth Congress in July 1965, called 
the “nationality question” a problem that had finally been resolved. 
In June 1968, he denied the need for new legislation on the Hun-
garian minority. The Council of Workers of Hungarian Nationality28 
that he founded soon proved to be a formalized gathering of advisers 
with no right even to convene a plenary session. It failed to exert any 
specific influence on Romanian Communist Party minority policy in 
the period between 1969 and 1980, and was then confined to discuss-
ing a few aspects of social, cultural and economic activity. However, 
1970 saw several cultural developments of practical importance for 
the Hungarian minority, for instance the foundation of the publishing 
house Kriterion and the launch of the weekly magazine A Hét.29
Visits to China and North Korea inspired Ceauşescu to announce 
in 1971 the “July theses” that opened an era of radical re-Stalinization 
and a renewed cult of personality. The outcome for the Hungarian 
minority was a dramatic, mercilessly imposed program of “national 
communism” designed to create an ethnically homogeneous state 
by forced assimilation. The remnants of Hungarian education 
began to disappear. Hungarians were squeezed out of high-prestige 
professions. Transylvanian cities with a Hungarian majority 
underwent homogenization via massive housing construction and 
industrialization. In 1984 the concept of “coexisting nations” began 
to give way to “Romanian workers of Hungarian origin.” Even the 
toothless Council of Workers of Hungarian Nationality added the 
word “Romanian” to its name. Anti-Hungarianism became strident 
as the economy and living standards fell.30
334 Minority Hungarian Communities in the 20th Century
The Hungarian community’s response to this accelerating 
process ranged from intellectual opposition movements to mass 
illegal or lawful emigration to Hungary or the West. In some cases 
the activities of the Securitate drove Hungarians to suicide. Other 
persons were reported to have been killed by “car accidents”.31
The solution adopted for the minority question in the ethnically 
more diverse Yugoslavia was focused on federalism and autonomy. 
This was not a window-dressing type of solution as the Soviet 
federalism, but a real system of social organization that worked 
until the 1980s. Recognized “nations” – Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, 
Montenegrins, Macedonians and later Bosnian Muslims – could form 
their own republics. Communities classed as “nationalities” under 
the self-management system – Hungarians, Romanians, Slovaks, 
Turks, Czechs, Bulgarians and Rusyns – had various language and 
cultural rights. The Albanians of Kosovo and Hungarians of the 
Banat and Bačka lived in provinces of Serbia that had territorial 
autonomy as well. Scattered ethnic groups – Jews, Russians or Vlachs 
(as Romanian-speakers were officially called) – were or were not 
granted cultural rights according to their degree of dispersion. There 
was not a chance for vertical only for horizontal organizations: it was 
not possible to create self-governing organizations of minorities, only 
professional ones.32
From 1981 to 1991, the official political status of the Roma in 
Yugoslavia was that of “nationality.” Yugoslavia had a three-level 
system: the “nations” of Yugoslavia were Croats, Serbs, Slovenes, 
Bosnians and Macedonians; the “nationalities” included Turks, 
Albanians and Hungarians; the rest were “other nationalities and 
ethnic groups,” such as Vlachs and Jews. In practice, however, most 
of the republics that had their own constitutions considered Roma to 
be an “ethnic group.” For example, in the 1981 Macedonian census, 
Roma were still considered an ethnic group, and this designation is 
precisely one of the factors which mobilized Macedonian Roma to 
political action in the 1980s.
The Hungarians had broad language and cultural rights in 
Vojvodina Autonomous Province, where Hungarian was one of the 
five official languages. They made up 22 percent of the population. 
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There was a Department of Hungarian Studies at the University of 
Novi Sad  and a College of Pedagogy in Subotica. Street names 
were written additionally in any local minority language. Vojvodina 
Hungarians lived in better circumstances compared to Hungarian 
minorities in other socialist countries, because farmers could work 
on their own land and there was greater openness to the West. 
The weakness in the Yugoslav model was the rivalry between the 
republics and an obvious Serb hegemony in many fields.
The 1974 constitution decentralized power and handed it to 
the republics, creating a regional/national pluralism instead of 
a political/ideological one. Tito acted firmly against separatist 
national aspirations, coming especially from the Croats. But the 
Yugoslav model entered a crisis after Tito’s death in 1980, as real 
power passed from the federal bodies to the republican elites. This 
political problem was compounded by a deep economic crisis.
The critical situation affected the Vojvodina Hungarians as 
well. The Serbian elite succumbed to a revived Serbian nationalism 
and steadily eroded the language and cultural rights won by the 
minorities. In 1983 there came the break-up of the board of the 
periodical Új Symposion, headed by János Sziveri, which had 
played a progressive cultural role among the Hungarians. In October 
1988, the “yoghurt revolution” carried out by Slobodan Milošević 
reinforced the Serbian elite, and led to the end of the autonomy 
of Kosovo and Vojvodina in 1989. Up to then, no institutions had 
developed to represent Hungarian minority interests. The political 
elite headed by Nándor Major, last head of the Vojvodina autonomous 
region, sought to assert Hungarian interests through that body and 
through the spirit of Yugoslavism.
The policies of Czechoslovakia and Romania towards their 
Hungarian minorities became an increasing problem for Hungary’s 
foreign policy, intent on preserving unity in the Soviet camp. This 
prompted the Hungarian Communist Party to redraft the basic 
theses of Leninist nationality policy, to stress the bridging role that 
the minorities might play in relations between Hungary and its 
neighboring countries.33
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2. HunGArY And tHE HunGArIAnS
BEYond ItS BordErS
Nándor Bárdi
The Soviet Union was a dominant influence on Hungarian foreign 
policy for forty years. The October 1956 declaration by the Imre 
Nagy government of Hungary’s neutrality and withdrawal from the 
Warsaw Pact could not lead to independence in a world divided into 
two camps. After the Soviet military reoccupation of November 4, 
1956, the imposed Kádár government struggled hard to gain any 
international acceptance until 1963. Then there began a process of 
divergent development by the Soviet bloc countries, with mounting 
assertion of national interests and competition for access to Western 
technology and economic contacts. But there was still no appreciable 
policy on the Hungarians in the Rákosi period or most of the Kádár 
period. Only in the 1980s did Hungary gain the required freedom of 
foreign policy and did it become politically acceptable to view the 
Hungarian cultural nation as a unit with boundaries different from 
those of the Hungarian state.1
The Treaty of Paris left no means of ensuring the unity of the 
Hungarian cultural nation. The Left saw the only prospects of 
doing so in a confederal scheme based on the shared destiny of 
Central European peoples and in expanding bilateral relations. Yet 
the underlying reason behind COMINFORM’S 1948 breach with 
Yugoslavia was precisely the fact that Stalin would stand for no 
regional offsets or autonomous organizations within the communist 
movement. That left open only appeals based on Leninist nationality 
policy (language and individual rights for the minorities engaged 
in building socialism and accepting democratic centralism and 
Communist Party leadership). However, other ideological reasons 
took precedence over nationality policy. One such was the principle 
of automatism, whereby the class war ends national antagonisms 
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and the minority question becomes an internal one for each country, 
as the relation to socialism overrides all national differences. The 
elite owes its allegiance to communism, not national identities. 
After Stalin’s death, and the resumption of peaceable relations with 
Yugoslavia in 1955, there began efforts aimed at independent action 
within the socialist world system. That was followed by divergence 
of state and regional interests between countries with varying socio-
economic features. An attempt to integrate these was made through 
the economic organization COMECON, offering a systematic 
division of labor. Hungary tried through this in 1962–1968 to 
strengthen regional cooperation, but found no partners for doing so.
Kádárite foreign policy marked a departure from that of the 
period up to 1956. It rested on constructive loyalty – Hungary’s 
internal structure had departed furthest of any in the socialist 
camp from the Soviet model, but in foreign policy it remained 
loyal to Moscow.2 So raising the question of Hungarians abroad 
and of neighborly relations in general came second to defending 
the unique Kádárite (Hungarian) model. Hungary had no success 
with the Romanian or the Czechoslovakian Communist Parties in 
seeking to promote the Leninist norms of nationality policy or to 
gain acceptance for the purported bridge-building role of minorities. 
Only bargains struck with various elite groups in Hungary led by 
the mid-1980s to a policy that incorporated the collective rights of 
such minorities.
The restricted public discourse of the 1947–1949 period, 
discussing the Czechoslovak–Hungarian population exchange, 
presented the problem of Hungarians abroad as a conflict. Then 
the subject vanished from the press up to the autumn of 1956. 
Propaganda after the defeat of the Revolution presented it in a context 
of condemnation of nationalism and attempts at territorial revision. 
The matter of the minorities became a subject again at the end of the 
1960s for Gyula Illyés and some other members of the cultural and 
scientific elite. Discrimination against them then appeared in the 
illegal publications of the democratic opposition (Beszélő, Párizsi 
Magyar Füzetek) as a human rights issue. The critical situations, 
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particularly in Romania, began to be publicized in ever more varied 
ways in 1983.3
The government’s foreign policy role was assumed in the 
Rákosi years by the Communist Party leadership. The Communist 
Party, having failed to influence the treaty terms or forestall the 
Hungarian–Czechoslovak population exchange, trusted after 1948 
that it could defend Hungary’s state and cultural interests through 
talks with other countries’ communist leaders (with local Hungarian 
communists alongside them). There was a measure of success 
with the Czechoslovaks, due more to international relations than 
to “comradely” ones. The population exchange was halted at the 
end of 1948; deportations of Hungarians from southern Slovakia 
ceased in October 1949. This was helped along by the Soviet policy 
of promoting stabilization. Claims of financial compensation were 
abandoned in favor of pressure to restore the Hungarian school 
system and ensure real choice of identity for the Hungarians who had 
been forcibly Slovakized, while Slovakian Hungarian communists 
appealed against the nation-building, expansionist efforts of the 
Slovak communists to the party leadership in Prague, which was 
struggling against Slovak particularism in any case.4
Relations with Romania were frozen after the king’s abdication 
and the nationalizations, rather than revitalized as they were in 
Czechoslovakia. The two leaderships vied at the peace talks to 
promote their countries’ claims regarding to Transylvania, hoping 
to gain domestic prestige thereby. That worked only for Bucharest, 
as the Soviet Union came down firmly on Romania’s side. Attempts 
were made to assuage Hungarian bitterness at the return to the 
pre-war borders with propaganda about cooperation, and to dispel 
unease among Hungarians in both countries by displaying the 
ostensible successes of the Hungarian People’s Union.5 But the 
Romanian communists as state leaders saw in their Hungarian 
colleagues enemies who had pushed territorial claims only three 
or four years before. After the excommunication of Yugoslavia 
and the nationalizations, the policy of presenting the position of 
Transylvania and its Hungarians in a good light gave way to one 
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of isolating them from Hungary. The two sides could not agree on 
the nationalized assets of the Hungarian state and legal entities. 
The negotiations ended with mutual abandonment of such claims, 
causing a loss of over $200 million for the Hungarian state.6 After 
1949, those with property in both countries could no longer cross the 
border. Personal visits virtually ceased and bilateral trade fell back. 
Rákosi cited Moscow’s directives when complaining in 1949 that the 
border situation was worse than it had been before the Hungarian 
annexation of 1940, but the Romanian leadership (including the 
ethnic Hungarian minister of finance, László Luka) pleaded a need 
for vigilance,7 against internal class enemies and up to 1955 for fear 
of inimical Yugoslav action. Hungary after 1949 was in the forefront 
of socialist countries for propaganda against Tito. Yugoslavia by 
that time was building up a new minority Hungarian cultural elite 
and providing a network of schools and cultural institutions, while 
Hungary practiced severe discrimination against its much smaller 
communities of indigenous Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and began 
running down the already modest system of South Slav minority 
institutions.
In the personal and power struggles that ensued after Stalin’s 
death, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, as party chief and prime minister in 
Romania, presented Rákosi as a Hungarian nationalist as opposed to 
Imre Nagy. Even after the rapprochement brokered with Khrushchev, 
Tito refused to meet Rákosi because of the extreme anti-Yugoslav 
campaign that he had waged earlier.8
Never once right up until the 1980s was the issue of the 
Transcarpathian Hungarians raised in Soviet–Hungarian relations.9 
Nor did the Hungarians abroad feature in the revolutionary demands 
made during the two weeks of the 1956 Imre Nagy government. 
Territorial changes were not raised at governmental or local level, 
despite later propaganda claims to the contrary. The main aim was to 
consolidate the political leadership and institutionalize the country’s 
independence. Yet the Revolution had a marked effect on policy 
towards Hungarians abroad, in two ways. First, it emerged that 
Hungarians in Romania, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet 
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Union, following the news on the radio, identified strongly with 
events in Budapest and their ideological and political implications. 
This “lack of integration” of views turned minority Hungarian 
endeavors in Transcarpathia, Slovakia and Romania into a matter of 
state security, in the eyes of the communist leaders of the majority 
nation. This later gave a pretext for institutional, educational and 
language-use measures aimed at homogenization and discrimination 
under the guise of integration. Secondly, the consolidation process 
after the defeat involved political and economic help (trade credits and 
loans) from neighboring countries to the Kádár regime, including the 
breach of the asylum granted to Nagy in the Yugoslav Embassy and 
his handover to Romania, support in the UN and the communist 
movement, the participation of activists from Transcarpathia and 
southern Slovakia in party work inside Hungary, and imports of 
Hungarian-language papers and books from neighboring countries.10
Events in the Kádár period to do with Hungarians abroad may 
be divided into four phases.
The phase of political consolidation lasted from November 
1956 until July 1963, when the “Hungarian question” was dropped 
from the UN agenda and Western recognition ensued. János Kádár, 
Ferenc Münnich and Gyula Kállai headed a party and government 
delegation to tour neighboring socialist countries in 1958 to thank 
them for their assistance since 1956. They stressed the point that 
Hungary made no territorial claims and saw the position of the 
Hungarians as an internal matter for each country,11 thereby conceding 
that the achievement of socialism transcended national cultural 
characteristics and the principle of unity. This concession allowed 
neighboring countries’ leaders to narrow the range of Hungarian-
language institutions, with their separatist potentials. The new 
Hungarian regime was striving for outside acceptance and internal 
consolidation, and lacked the means to prevent such curtailment of 
the Hungarian minority institutions even had it wanted to. Examples 
included the March 1959 merger of the Romanian-language Babeş 
and Hungarian-language Bolyai universities in Cluj, alteration of 
the borders of the Hungarian Autonomous Province to increase 
the Romanian proportion of inhabitants, and replacement of 
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Hungarians with Romanians in leading positions (December 1960). 
The 1958 education act in the Soviet Union turned schools teaching 
in minority languages into bilingual schools, as part of a drive for 
Russification. Such minority schools were also changed in Hungary 
in the 1960–1961 school year, after which only arts subjects were 
taught in the minority language, on the grounds that pupils needed 
to be conversant in the state language in practical daily life.12
That change was a tragic one for minorities in Hungary, 
conforming as it did to tendencies towards uniformity and 
homogenization throughout the Soviet bloc in the 1960s. Nor 
was there in Hungary any trade-off like the one in Romania or 
Czechoslovakia – national traditions of independence were not 
strengthened by it, and nor did the authorities gain any legitimacy 
through national symbols or rhetoric. For one thing, a regime that 
had endorsed the presence of Soviet occupation forces could not 
talk credibly of Hungarian national independence. For another, 
the situation in Hungary differed from that of in the other socialist 
countries, due to its particular form of internal legitimation, resting 
partly on a freeing of society from ideology and on an expansion 
of private freedom. This is precisely why the Kádár period may 
also be called the “Kádár-regime”. The emphasis came to be on 
a higher standard of living, not on national independence, as the 
prime national value.13 Thirdly, it should be noted that Kádár as 
head of the single-party system held such a plebeian conception 
about the nation, in which national sentiment was identified with 
the revisionist/nationalist, manipulative rhetoric and legitimation of 
the Horthy system. He saw the reappearance of the national symbols 
in the 1950s and 1960s as a return to pre-1945 nationalism. His 
insensitivity to the fate of the Hungarians in neighboring countries 
can be put down to the same fear. Finally, questions involving 
Hungarians in neighboring countries could not be raised in Hungary 
before the second half of the 1960s, because the party leaders were 
committed believers in supranational socialist integration, for 
instance in COMECON division of labor. Thus nationalism took 
its place alongside ideological revisionism as the main ideological 
threat.14
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Tying in with this was the “nation debate” initiated by Erik 
Molnár in 1966, in which national independence struggles were 
contrasted with the modernizing, supranational role of integration 
and economic development found in the Habsburg realms. But 
paradoxically, it was the public debates on this that restored 
acceptance of the history-forming role of the “nation.”15 In policy 
terms, change ensued when Romania countered Soviet integration 
efforts with its own 1944 policy of a separate road, separate paths of 
development (heavy industry priorities), and separate foreign policy 
interests (in relation to China and Western Europe). Furthermore, 
the Romanian press began to emphasize the Romanian nature of 
the parts of Moldavia annexed by the Soviet Union in 1964. So 
moves by the Hungarian party leadership on the Transylvanian 
Hungarians suited Soviet interests as well. This all became public 
in 1967–1968, when Romania was the only socialist country that 
failed to break off diplomatic relations with Israel, when it was the 
first to recognize the Federal Republic of Germany, and when it 
condemned the Soviet military intervention in Czechoslovakia in 
1968. At that point, the Hungarian Writers’ Union held its first debate 
on the bodies of literature of Hungarian communities abroad and 
stated the responsibility that Hungary bore towards them.16 Open 
discussion of the Hungarians abroad was no longer condemned as 
nationalism.
The Communist Party took the matter up as well. The Central 
Committee’s Agitprop Committee met in March 1968 to discuss 
the relations with Hungarian literary life abroad, seen as part of 
Hungarian culture. It called for responsibility for it and greater 
support. By August 1969, the committee was discussing not 
only literature but the whole cultural situation of the Hungarian-
speaking communities in neighboring countries. The practical tasks 
came before the Politburo as well.17 Officially the ideology of dual 
affiliation was proclaimed. Minorities in Hungary and Hungarian 
minorities in neighboring countries had ties to their national 
culture and to that of their country of citizenship. They formed a 
bridge between the two nations, a means of overcoming historical 
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prejudices. That did not change the domestic nature of the nationality 
question, but culture and education for Hungarians abroad became 
prominent in private inter-party and diplomatic discussions with 
neighboring countries. Minority-related contacts with Yugoslavia 
increased so intensively that a brake was put on information about 
them. Czechoslovakia would not accept the notion of a bridging role, 
and once local Hungarian prominents in 1968 (such as László Dobos) 
had been dismissed, minority-related ties fell back. Silence over the 
Transcarpathian Hungarians continued at Soviet–Hungarian talks, 
but cultural relations improved.
The greatest degree of conflict was to be found in relations with 
Romania. Up to 1968, the Romanian Hungarian literary elite had 
objected to Hungarian Writers’ Union interference, but by the mid-
1970s protests to the party center in Bucharest were being coupled 
with appeals to the makers of Hungarian cultural policy, headed 
by György Aczél. What precipitated this was the burden on the 
Romanian Hungarian community placed by Ceauşescu’s declared 
policy of homogenization, new obstacles to starting classes in 
minority schools, and new curbs in 1974 on offering lodging to 
visitors of non-Romanian origin.
An important stage in this transformation of policy was a 1972 
constitutional amendment, which treated the national minorities 
of Hungary collectively and declared their equality of rights. Still 
more decisive was an Agitprop committee statement in 1974, 
which cannot be interpreted outside the context of the problems 
of Hungary’s minorities abroad. It drew a distinction between the 
political nation and the cultural nation (Hungarian citizens and self-
declared Hungarians), recognized a right of dual affiliation, and 
stated that a prior requirement for the practical implementation of 
collective minority rights was good cooperation among the socialist 
countries.18 The thesis was first aired in Hungarian diplomacy at a 
UN conference on minority protection held at Ohrid, Yugoslavia, 
in July 1974.19 It sought to make bilateral discussions of the issue 
compulsory. János Kádár first alluded to the 1,100-year presence of 
the Hungarians in Europe and to the loss of territory after World War I 
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in a widely noticed address to the Helsinki Conference on July 31, 
1975. More importantly, the Helsinki Agreement gave neighboring 
countries a further guarantee of the inviolability of their borders, 
and the Third Basket provided a basis for Hungary to maintain ties 
with Hungarians abroad, through its principle of the free flow of 
ideas. A year later, in December 1976, the problems of Hungarians 
in neighboring countries came before the highest executive body of 
the Communist Party, the Politburo. It was still considered to be an 
internal issue, but at the same time it represented a foreign policy 
task for Hungary. The most appropriate means of advance were to 
raise it at bilateral interparty discussions, to ensure that Hungary’s 
minorities were treated in an exemplary way, and to arrange the 
appropriate state budgetary coordination for the purpose.20
This new concept was promoted at a summit meeting of Kádár 
and Ceauşescu in June 1977. The Romanians had pressed for such a 
meeting, while Hungary’s party leaders insisted that such a summit 
should follow specialist talks from which concrete agreements 
could emerge. There was some success in this respect on the 
question of each country opening consulates, but nothing shifted in 
Romania’s increasingly centralized policy of homogenization and 
discrimination against the Hungarians.
Four reasons can be posited for the changed treatment of the 
question of the Hungarians abroad in the period after the Kádárite 
consolidation and attempt at supranational socialist integration. The 
most important was the Soviet permission to criticize Romania’s 
separate road. Then came the need to formulate Hungary’s own 
interests as its foreign policy became more professional, in 
response to its separate development path and need to acquire 
Western technology. The third reason was the fact that the Kádár 
regime sensed in society a tension that had to be dispelled, or to 
put it another way, an increase in the bargaining power of certain 
elite groups. This meant primarily Gyula Illyés, Sándor Csoóri and 
the népi writers.21 They acted as intermediaries over the problems 
of the minority Hungarians, which earned the latter a publication 
ban in the 1980s. The international reputation and connections of 
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the democratic opposition in the 1980s allowed them also to exert 
strong pressure at home and abroad, presenting the problem as 
one of human rights and airing it frequently in samizdat literature. 
To the same period belong the editors of the Transylvanian 
Hungarian samizdat publication Ellenpontok (Counterpoints) and 
the members of the Duray Committee. (Miklós Duray founded the 
Legal Aid Association of Hungarian Minority in Czechoslovakia. 
As a result he was imprisoned in 1982–1983 and 1984–1985. 
The group protesting against that in Budapest was the Duray 
Committee.) One influence on Romania’s image in Western eyes 
was the Hungarian Press of Transylvania, which worked with the 
Hungarian Human Rights Foundation to keep the international 
public informed of the situation with regard to human rights.22 
Another factor in the change to more forceful representation of 
the national interest and the problems of the cultural nation was 
the publicity and connection-building work done in Hungary by 
members of Hungarian elites abroad.
Conditions changed in several ways in the 1980s. It was 
important that the Czechoslovak and Romanian Communist 
Parties came largely to ignore Leninist norms of nationality policy, 
making it steadily less effective for Hungarian party leaders to 
call them to account in those terms. There arose new groups of 
Hungarian minority elite, which recognized how the minority 
question could not be handled within the anti-democratic frames 
of state socialism, an opinion shared increasingly by opposition 
groups in Hungary.23 Also important was the fact that the debates 
on historical, national, and human rights matters were largely taking 
place in public. This tied in with the way in which the increasingly 
rigid Romanian and Czechoslovak systems defended themselves 
ideologically and from the weakening dictatorship of Hungary and 
built up an enemy image of it.
The period that began in 1975–1977 reached a turning point in 
1982, when an extremist anti-Hungarian work appeared in Romania 
with official backing. Ion Lăncrăjan’s Cuvint despre Transilvania 
(Thoughts on Transylvania) dubbed as territorial revisionists not 
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only the Hungarian left-wing of Romania, but also János Kádár. In 
the autumn came the arrest and exile of the editors of Ellenpontok. 
In the same week Duray was arrested in Bratislava. All three events 
attracted strong attention abroad and protests in Hungary,24 but the 
official Hungarian government response was subdued, showing a 
desire to avoid conflict and to renew negotiations. The Hungarian 
party leaders were reluctant to embroil themselves in international 
debates, and to speak out in favor of Duray or the Ellenpontok editor 
Géza Szőcs would be to defend Eastern European dissidents and 
declared opponents of state socialism. Furthermore, this became 
linked in Czechoslovakia’s case with the protests over the joint 
Gabčíkovo–Nagymaros barrage scheme on the Danube, which 
had become a domestic issue in Hungary as well. In 1985, Kádár 
received help from Prague against the Bratislava leadership on the 
issues of bilingual schooling and place-name usage. Rather than 
engage in historical polemics with Romania, the three-volume 
Hungarian History of Transylvania that appeared in 1986 after 
five to eight years’ work sought to present “scientific truth.”25 The 
same intention lay behind the foundation in 1985 of the Group (later 
Institute) for Research into Hungarian Studies. Such measures had 
a liberating effect on the Hungarian public at home and abroad, and 
enhanced their sense of nationhood.
That does not mean that the whole party leadership identified 
with the cultural nation, the concept of human rights claims, or the 
tasks arising from them. The key figures were Mátyás Szűrös and 
Csaba Tabajdi, heads of the MSZMP Central Committee Foreign 
Affairs Department, under pressure from the népi writers and the 
democratic opposition. Hungary made clear at the Helsinki follow-
up meetings in 1985–1988 the stress that it placed on the problems 
of Hungarians abroad, the bridging role that it ascribed to minorities, 
its rejection of forcible assimilation, the need for positive discrimi-
nation in minority policy, minority contacts with their kin-state, the 
continuing attention that the problems required, and the status of 
this as a gauge of democracy. As mounting numbers of refugees 
arrived from Romania, these were the grounds on which Szűrös 
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stated on the radio in January 1988 that the Hungarians beyond 
Hungary’s borders were part of the Hungarian nation and the Hun-
garian government bore responsibility for them.26
Just a few months later, permission was given for a demonstration 
in Budapest in June 1988 against the Romanian plans to destroy 
villages. It was the first unofficial mass protest allowed since 1956. 
Romania responded by closing the Hungarian Consulate-General in 
Cluj-Napoca. The new party general secretary, Károly Grósz, tried 
to remedy matters at a summit meeting with Ceauşescu in Arad, 
but without success. As the grievances in Transylvania and Slovakia 
built up and Soviet glasnost made it possible to undertake more in 
Transcarpathia, there was a need for a standing body to coordinate 
government action. An advisory National Minorities College with 
an invited membership was formed in the autumn of 1989, but was 
soon replaced by a College of National and Ethnic Minorities under 
the Council of Ministers, headed by Tabajdi. This brought to fruition 
the institutionalization of Hungary’s policy towards Hungarians 
abroad.27
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3. dEMoGrAPHIc FEAturES
Patrik Tátrai
The communist takeovers in East-Central Europe came shortly 
after the Treaty of Paris had reinstated Hungary’s post-Trianon 
borders (with a small adjustment in favor of Czechoslovakia). For 
the many Hungarians living as a minority, this marked the end of 
a post-war campaign of collective vengeance, reprisals and exiles. 
The first post-war censuses of 1948–1951, taken in an atmosphere 
antagonistic towards minorities, recorded 2.4 million people outside 
Hungary whose head of household declared them Hungarian. 
Wartime fatalities, the extermination of Hungarian-speaking Jews, 
mass post-war flights of population, and other events such as re-
Slovakization, population exchange and deportations had reduced 
the aggregate number by almost a million people.
The number of Hungarians rose again as times became more 
peaceful. This was due not only to demographic factors, but also to 
the return of prisoners of war and deportees. The rise in the absolute 
number continued until the early 1980s, with strong regional 
differences of course, amounting to about 450,000 over thirty years, 
but the proportion of Hungarians in the population had fallen. In 
the last decade of communist rule, absolute numbers of Hungarians 
decreased everywhere except in Slovakia and Burgenland, as 
did the population of Hungary itself. By about 1990, the number 
of Hungarians in neighboring countries was down to some 2.7 
million.
The main factors influencing the demography of these 
Hungarians were their status as a minority and the area in which 
they dwelt. Both strongly affected their rates of natural increase and 
of migration.
The post-war rate of natural increase among Hungarians in all 
neighboring countries was below the rate of the population as a whole. 
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Up to 1961, births exceeded deaths among Hungarians in all the four 
largest communities (of Slovakia, Transcarpathia, Transylvania and 
Vojvodina), but this was reversed, first in Vojvodina and then in 
Transylvania, producing a natural decrease. In Croatia, Prekmurje 
and Burgenland, the number of Hungarians had been stagnating or 
falling ever since Trianon. This can be explained in terms of their 
small numbers, and also, especially in Slavonia and Burgenland, by 
their scattered settlement pattern.
The demographic data in Slovakia show that the rate of natural 
increase remained positive until the end of the communist period, 
even among Hungarians, mainly because of high birth rates in Žitný 
ostrov. The highest figures, recorded in the 1950s, were followed 
by a steady fall that became drastic in the mid-1980s. Like Žitný 
ostrov, Medzibodrožie in southeastern Slovakia also had high 
rates of natural increase, but aging and decline were and are long-
established trends in the Levice and Veľký Krtíš districts.1
Traditionally the rate of natural increase in Transcarpathia was 
high, as it was throughout the northeast of the Carpathian Basin. 
Data by ethnic group are lacking, but the mainly rural Hungarians 
certainly maintained a positive rate of increase until the change of 
system, although the 1989 census showed a decrease in absolute 
numbers, explainable by assimilation and by migration to Hungary 
in the 1980s.
The Hungarian inhabitants of Transylvania, like the population 
of Hungary, stopped increasing in the early 1980s, although the rate 
of natural increase stayed positive in the Székely counties until the 
turn of the millennium. Natural increase did not turn into decrease 
in northwestern Romania (Satu Mare and Sălaj Counties) until 10–
15 years later than in the rest of Transylvania.2 So the loss of some 
100,000 Hungarians from the province between 1977 and 1992 was 
probably due mainly to emigration. Only 63,427 Hungarians left the 
country legally in that period, but it is thought that there were about 
30,000 illegal departures.3
At the opposite extreme to the high fertility of northwestern 
and northeastern Transylvania is the low family size in the Banat, 
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where the indigenous Swabian (German) custom of only children 
was soon adopted by Hungarians and Romanians as well. These 
demographically unfavorable figures spread across the frontiers to 
the southeastern corner of Hungary and much of Vojvodina.
It follows from this that the Vojvodina Hungarians have shown 
some of the worst population data (birth rate, death rate) for decades. 
Their numbers have been eroded by natural decrease since 1969.4 
This has been exacerbated since the 1960s by migration abroad, 
mainly of people of productive age, which accelerated the aging 
further.
Only Yugoslavia became a large exporter of labor in the 1960s. 
The policy of closed borders in Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union 
and Romania up to the 1980s meant that migration was mainly 
internal and due to “socialist” urbanization offering jobs and better 
living conditions. The main goal of this urban development was a 
process of modernization that drew vast numbers of people from the 
countryside into the cities, through a forced rate of industrialization 
(especially in heavy industry) that soaked up the spare rural labor. 
This coincided with agricultural collectivization in the 1950s and 
early 1960s, as larger-scale farming made smaller labor demands.5 
Spatial mobility was accompanied by social mobility, which in turn 
increased the number of ethnically mixed marriages and the rate of 
assimilation, especially in urban areas. Characteristic of the period 
was monocentric development based on county and district capitals. 
Romania was unusual in having closed cities (such as Târgu Mureş), 
where only the favored (usually from the majority nation) could settle. 
Urbanization in the neighboring countries also served the implicit 
purpose of altering the prevailing ethnic structure.
Except in Slovakia and Austria, the Hungarians were 
overrepresented in urban areas at the beginning of the period, 
compared with the majority nation. This was changed by the 
processes just described. The Hungarian minorities with the 
highest level of urbanization in 1990 were in Vojvodina and 
Transylvania (58.7 and 56.1 percent respectively). In other regions 
the proportion of Hungarians in urban areas fell far short of that of 
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the total population (Prekmurje 15.9 percent, Croatia 35.8 percent, 
Transcarpathia 37.7 percent, Slovakia 39.5 percent).
Urban development in Slovakia was focused on the two big centers 
of Bratislava and Košice, but in general development was almost 
wholly in Slovak-inhabited areas or along the language border. The 
cities in the latter (Nové Zámky, Levice, Lučenec, Rimavská Sobota 
and Rožňava) were targets of Slovak colonization. The Hungarians 
lost their majority there in the post-war years,6 and although large 
numbers of Hungarians also moved there from the 1960s onwards, 
this did not greatly increase their proportion. Meanwhile, growing 
numbers of Hungarians also moved to Slovak-inhabited cities, 
where communities of a few hundred were rapidly assimilated. The 
same applied to migrants to the more developed Czech regions.
The main targets of migration in Transcarpathia were cities on the 
language border that had once had Hungarian majorities (Uzhgorod 
and Mukachevo) and the old county capital (Beregovo) which lay 
in the Hungarian-speaking area. These urban areas were within 
commuting distance of Hungarian-speaking villages along the 
Hungarian border, and the area retained its ethnic homogeneity, but 
the number and proportion of Hungarians in urban areas stayed low 
except in Beregovo and Chop. The Hungarian community increased 
by only 10,000 in 1959–1989, due to simultaneous emigration to 
Hungary and Soviet destinations outside Transcarpathia (in the 
case of relatively skilled labor).7
Urban development was greater in Romania than it was in 
other socialist countries. Transylvania’s urban inhabitants, a little 
over 1.1 million in 1948, had increased fourfold by 1992. Their 
proportion rose from 19 percent to 57 percent. The increase, fastest 
in the 1950s and 1960s, typically took the form of directed internal 
migration, whereby an estimated 800,000 ethnic Romanians 
arrived in Transylvania from beyond the Carpathians, most of them 
(80 percent) settling in Southern Transylvanian cities. Meanwhile 
far fewer – an estimated 250,000 – migrated across the Carpathians 
from Transylvania. One geographical feature of the development 
is a divide between Northern and Southern Transylvania. The 
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south developed a greater concentration of industry (the Jiu Valley, 
the Karaş–Severin industrial area, and the Braşov–Sibiu–Deva–
Timişoara axis) that attracted settlers to a greater extent, while in 
Northern Transylvania the fastest population growths were in the 
county capitals, with the industrial center Baia Mare prominent.8
Ethnic politics can be seen behind urban development in 
Vojvodina as well. Novi Sad, close to Belgrade, was chosen for the 
provincial capital. Rapid development there has been matched in 
Zrenjanin and in the Belgrade satellite town of Pančevo, both lying 
in Serb-inhabited areas. Meanwhile the population of Subotica, 
where Hungarians are still in a majority, is about the same as it 
was between the world wars. However, it was not the urbanization 
in Vojvodina that lay behind the drastic change in ethnic structure. 
The decisive factor was emigration, in which the Hungarians were 
overrepresented. The effect of the concurrent immigration from less 
developed republics (Macedonia and Montenegro) was not primarily 
on Hungarian-inhabited areas.
The main post-war alterations in spatial ethnic structure 
occurred in the cities. Meanwhile, the rural Hungarian-speaking 
territory shrank in size only in certain areas, mostly where attempts 
were made to intrude settler villages into it during the land reform.
Deportations and population exchange in Slovakia pushed 
the language border southward from Levice. There were marked 
advances by the Slovaks around Košice, southward from Trebišov, 
and in the Nitra district. Efforts were made to break up the bloc of 
Hungarian habitation by founding settler villages on the Danubian 
Plain (Podunajská Rovina). Cities such as Senec, Galanta, Šal’a, 
Nové Zámky, Levice, Lučenec, Rimavská Sobota, Rožňava and 
Košice still had Hungarian majorities in 1941, but had Slovak 
majorities by about 1950.9 These changes tended to blur what had 
been a sharp Hungarian–Slovak ethnic divide, turning a Hungarian-
inhabited bloc into one of mixed population. Around 1990, the 
Hungarians still formed an absolute majority in twelve cities and a 
plurality in one, Moldava na Bodvou, where the Slovaks have since 
become a majority.
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In the rural areas of Transcarpathia, there has been substantial 
change only in the parts that belonged to the Hungarian county 
of Ugocsa (the Vinogradovo district), where the Greek Catholic 
community, with its dual identity, tended to declare themselves 
Ukrainian after the change of system. Of the cities, Uzhgorod 
and Mukachevo underwent a rapid change in ethnic structure 
due to the deportations and high immigration by Ukrainians and 
Russians. The Hungarians also lost their majority in Vinogradovo 
and Tyachevo, but retained it in Beregovo and Chop. At the time of 
the collapse of the Soviet Union, the vast majority of Hungarians 
were still living in a relatively homogeneous bloc along the plains 
bordering Hungary.10
In terms of ethnic topology, Transylvania differs greatly from 
the regions mentioned so far, as the Hungarian community is less 
compact. There are two major blocs (the Székely Land and the 
areas along the borders of north Bihor, Satu Mare and Sălaj with 
Hungary) separated by a zone of sporadic Hungarian settlement in 
isolated groups of villages (such as Ţara Călatei). Transylvania’s 
larger cities have sizable Hungarian communities, but they make up 
only 10–25 percent of the inhabitants. In Satu Mare County there is 
a mounting German identity among Hungarian-speaking Swabians, 
while throughout the province there has been a tendency for the 
Hungarian-speaking Gypsies to see themselves as distinct.11
Of all Hungarian-speaking regions, the contraction has been 
greatest in the area between the Székely Land and the Partium, 
especially the Banat and Câmpia Transilvaniei. The best measure of 
how scattered the community is can be derived from a comparison 
of the figures for native language and national affiliation. 
Unfavorable assimilation processes can be assumed to be at work 
in areas where the latter exceeds the former. The native-language 
figures are strongest in the bloc of Hungarian-inhabited territory 
that consists of Covasna, Harghita, Mureş, Sălaj, Satu Mare and 
Bihor Counties. (A native-language majority is typical of all the 
Hungarian communities in neighboring countries except those of 
Croatia and, since the Yugoslav wars, Vojvodina.)
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The forced industrialization and urbanization in Romania began 
in the 1950s to decrease the Hungarian proportion of the urban 
population, and the Romanians became the majority in the large 
cities. (This happened successively in Baia Mare, Cluj-Napoca, 
Oradea, Satu Mare and Târgu Mureş.) About 1990, 13 cities in 
the Székely Land still had a Hungarian majority (of which Târgu 
Mureş has since gained a Romanian majority), but only four with a 
Hungarian majority and one with a Hungarian plurality elsewhere: 
Salonta, Valea lui Mihai, Carei and Cehu Silvaniei. The Romanians 
have since become a majority in Marghita.
During the socialist period in Vojvodina, western Bačka and 
the middle and south of the Banat were the districts where the 
rural Hungarian ethnic territory shrank fastest. Novi Sad, as the 
provincial capital, soon became Serbianized and the proportion of 
Hungarians sank below 10 percent. Much ground was lost in other 
cities as well, such as Temerin. Around 1990, the Hungarian ethnic 
territory extended over northern Bačka and the northern part of the 
Banat, from the border down to Temerin in the south. Except in the 
bloc along the River Tisa, the break-up was accelerating. According 
to the 1990 census, Hungarians still made up a local majority in 
nine cities of Vojvodina, but only a plurality in Subotica.
The processes of urbanization and migration in Croatia, 
Slovenia and Austria affected the Hungarian community only 
to a moderate extent. In Croatia, the only places to retain their 
Hungarian complexion were the villages of the Drava Triangle 
(Baranja) by the Danube and a couple of places in Slavonia, but 
the majority of Hungarians in Croatia live as a local minority. The 
Hungarian-inhabited villages along the border in Prekmurje have 
rising numbers of Slovene inhabitants, but the Hungarians are 
still in a majority in most of them. The only two places in Austria 
with a Hungarian majority, Unterwart and Siget in der Wart, are 
both in southern Burgenland, whereas the more recent, post-1956 
immigrants have mainly settled in the economically more prosperous 
northern Burgenland, with the result that the spatial concentration 
of the Hungarians has continued to decline (see Table 1).
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4. coLLEctIVIZAtIon And rurAL cHAnGE
Nándor Bárdi and Márton László
The communist accession to power in all Central European 
countries except Austria began a process of social and economic 
transformation according to the Soviet system of central planning 
and absolute state control. The nationalization of banking, industry 
and commerce left the peasantry in the rural areas as the largest 
stratum by far of private owners working independently of the state. 
Official state socialist ideology ordained that the agrarian revolution 
should occur in two stages: land reform (redistribution to eliminate 
feudal inequalities), then collectivization. The Communist Party 
leaders of all these countries except Yugoslavia hesitated to begin 
the latter for fear of encountering strong resistance and endangering 
food supplies. The Soviet Union, however, wanted to speed up the 
transformation of Central and Eastern Europe, as a response to the 
Cold War and in the interest of homogenization. So COMINFORM1 
at its meeting in June 1948 bowed to Soviet pressure and issued a 
resolution calling for collectivization to begin. The process in most 
countries took over ten years and was spread over three stages, in 
1948–1952, 1953–1956, and 1957–1962.2
The aim of collectivization was to gain party state control over 
as much rural private property as possible. It was also designed to 
break the economic power and social status of the kulaks or rich 
peasantry, as the land reform had that of the large-scale landowners. 
For the relative prosperity and better farming methods of the kulaks 
gave them a social and cultural leadership in rural society that the 
Communist Party sought for itself. The resistance to collectivization, 
assumed to be kulak-led, was to be broken and the poor and landless 
peasantry ostensibly empowered like the urban proletariat.3 In other 
words, collectivization was part of a process of institutionalizing 
the party state and imposing its authority. In some minority areas 
366
Collectivization and Rural Change 367
such as Slovakia and Transylvania, land reform and collectivization 
further weakened the relative social position of the Hungarian ethnic 
group, which was more strongly represented in the landowning class 
and rich peasantry than in society as a whole.
The collectivization process included eliminating the institutions 
of economic and social autonomy in the village (such as village 
magistrates), while commandeering others for propaganda purposes 
(such as peasant circles). Collectivization also covered the assets of 
earlier forms of communal property (common forest and farmland, 
vineyard associations), which were abolished. This mimicked the 
earlier elimination of civil and voluntary society in the cities, to 
further social homogenization. It included most bodies that served 
to foster awareness among the minority Hungarians.
Traditional rural society in most Hungarian-inhabited areas in 
the later 1940s was economically stratified, but diligence and sound 
farming could earn social respect. Sons of such richer peasants could 
be sent to urban schools to qualify for rural professional positions: 
schoolteachers, priests, or village notaries. The elimination of this 
peasant elite altered the traditional paths of social mobility and 
leader recruitment in the countryside. Leading positions in villages 
and collective farms in the 1950s went to landless or poor peasants 
who were loyal to the new regime but lacked standing in their 
communities.
The huge numbers of young people whom collectivization left 
without land or work had to move to urban areas, where forced 
industrialization had caused a chronic shortage of labor. This reduced 
the rural population and steadily modified its age structure, while 
weakening the cohesive traditions and customs of rural society. 
Also weakened was the principle that “land marries land.” The 
1960s brought erosion of the three-generation social and economic 
model, at various speeds in various countries. Public education was 
mixed with ideological propaganda, not least against the Churches, 
whose assets had already been confiscated, so that the traditional 
values of rural life broke down. Church-related customs died down 
or died out, for instance in Roman Catholic villages the Good 
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Friday processions, the blessing of the wheat, and beating of the 
parish bounds. Centrally directed pursuits played an increasingly 
important role in rural popular culture.
In Romania, the March 1945 land reform act ordered the 
expropriation of the lands of those who had fled the country or were 
“absentees.” This affected the Hungarian community badly. There 
was relatively little land in Northern Transylvania to redistribute 
among some 100,000 applicants, but about 80 percent of it was 
Hungarian-owned. The ethnic proportions in the Székely Land 
were little affected, as most of the applicants were Hungarian too, but 
redistribution weakened the community considerably in areas where 
the Hungarians were not in a majority. The members of the local 
land distribution committees had a direct interest in maximizing the 
redistribution, as they too were applicants.4
In April 1946, the two Hungarian cooperative centers5 
complained at a joint congress that the government backing for the 
cooperative movement had all gone to the Romanian cooperatives, 
while Hungarian cooperatives were being intimidated in some 
parts of the country. The government plan was to subordinate the 
Hungarian movement to the Romanian one by obliging Hungarian 
cooperatives to join the Romanian county centers to gain access 
to goods. Then in June 1947, the national cooperative movement 
ordered that 57 out of the 537 mainly consumer cooperatives were 
to be wound up. Hungarian members of the national movement 
were supposed to retain their independence after joining and be 
able to supply villages with cheap consumer durables and credit, but 
in addition they had to submit to a purge of officers in the name of 
“internal democratization.”6
Similarly important was the restoration of the legal status and 
assets of the Ciuc Private Properties7 (over 60,000 hold – 34,200 
hectares – of forest and significant holdings of real estate and factories), 
but this was done in a way that prevented them from becoming the 
independently managed property of the Ciuc County villages. They 
were renationalized in 1948 and distributed to several state-owned 
enterprises.8
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Collectivization in Romania proceeded in four phases. In the 
first, full-scale collective farms were set up forcibly in 1949–1953, but 
they met strong nationwide resistance. The process was not forcibly 
continued in 1954–1955, but attempts were made to form looser 
associations. In 1956–1957, collectivization reemerged in political 
rhetoric as an expectation, and forcible methods of organizing the 
peasants into cooperatives resumed in the summer of 1958.9 By April 
1962, 94 percent of the agricultural land was farmed collectively by 
cooperatives or state farms (in other words state-owned enterprises). 
Peasant holdings in Romania averaged less than 10 hectares in area 
and had very little equipment. Some 76 percent of the population still 
lived in rural areas in 1948.10
One weapon used in 1949 to force peasants to collectivize 
was a system of fixed depressed prices far lower than market 
prices. The compulsory deliveries at these prices, coupled with 
various taxes and levies, expropriation of equipment and land, and 
discriminatory financial regulations, kept rural society in fear and 
under great pressure. There was persecution of those on the kulak 
lists, including deportation and imprisonment, that affected almost 
170,000 peasants in 1949–1953. Collective farms paid lower rents 
to machinery depots, received preferential state loans, sold produce 
at higher prices, and had access to consumer durables. They 
also enjoyed two tax-free years with a 20 percent cut in delivery 
obligations. Yet only 8.2 percent of farmland in 1953 belonged to 
the “socialist” sector, including the 300 state farms.
The looser associations of the next phase meant that members 
did not have to make over their land. They just worked it communally 
and received tax concessions. Often such associations existed only 
formally as a defense against discrimination. Other concessions were 
also made. The targets of the five-year economic plan were halved in 
1953 and consumer rationing ceased in 1954. At the end of 1956, the 
system of forced deliveries of crops, fodder and milk was replaced 
by purchasing. Furthermore, collective farms, associations, and 
those tilling less than one hectare of land were exempted from meat 
delivery quotas. However, all Soviet bloc countries except Poland 
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resumed forced collectivization after a meeting of Communist 
Party delegations in Moscow in November 1957. This coincided 
in Romania with hardening of the political system in 1958–1959, 
involving violence labeled as class struggle, backed by security police 
methods. As a result, 94 percent of Romania’s farmland belonged to 
the “socialist” sector by April 1962.11
The process had few features specific to one ethnic nation or 
another, but the superior local institutionalization of Hungarian 
villages and the many commonly owned estates in the Székely Land 
may have been extra sources of conflict. But the Hungarian regions, 
unlike several Romanian-inhabited counties, saw no open rebellion. 
Other methods were used. According to historian Sándor Oláh, the 
method of survival consisted of unofficially retrieving property 
rights, recording false data, simulating ignorance, postponement 
and passiveness, shifting the burden onto other institutions and 
persons, holding back performance, theft, building up networks of 
cooperation and mutual assistance, and denying obligations. What 
was needed to prevent collectivization turning into national conflict 
was that the state and the party at local levels be represented by 
ethnic Hungarians. So the elimination of private ownership and 
the political and economic control over the district all took place in 
Hungarian language.12
In Czechoslovakia, there were close links between land reform 
and denial of rights and deportation of minorities. A presidential 
decree of June 21, 1945, placed all agricultural holdings over 50 
hectares and all forest holdings over 100 hectares in state hands. 
Most expropriated land belonged to indigenous Germans and 
Hungarians. It was redistributed solely to Slav applicants. By October 
1946, 293,000 hectares had been seized in Slovakia: 108,000 from 
Hungarians, 56,000 from Germans, 33,000 from Hungarian and 
German firms, and 95,000 from “traitors and enemies to the Slovak 
nation.”13
Expropriation of estates over 50 hectares was also decreed by 
the land reform act of the spring of 1945. However, most of the 
estates concerned were not redistributed, but incorporated into the 
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state farms and agricultural cooperatives that were being formed. 
There were some 900,000 producers in Slovakia in 1946, of which 
35,000 had holdings of 20–50 hectares. Tax obligations and delivery 
quotas that were almost impossible to meet, coupled with the stigma 
of the kulak lists, meant that these farmers were keen to hand over 
their estates to a state farm or cooperative as fast as possible. The 
formation of cooperatives began in Slovakia in September 1948. 
A few weeks later, redistribution of land seized from Hungarians 
stopped and organization of cooperatives began in Hungarian-
inhabited villages as well, mainly with Slovak leaders. According to 
Slovak Communist Party ideology at that time, the Slovak peasantry 
had been squeezed out of the southern lands for centuries and it was 
time for them to get their own back. The population exchange sent 
most of Slovakia’s Hungarian medium-scale and large-scale peasant 
farmers to Hungary, or in some cases the Czech lands. They made 
way for repatriating Slovaks or the landless from the north of the 
country, but the newcomers lacked the requisite equipment and in 
some cases basic farming skills. These groups were won over to 
collectivization more easily than those who were told to hand over 
to Slovak or Hungarian small-scale peasants the farmland and forest 
that they had bought or inherited themselves.14
Recruiting Hungarians into cooperatives was a prime task for 
the newly organized CSEMADOK. For this purpose János Kugler, 
a Hungarian, was appointed as head of the Agriculture Department 
of the Slovak Communist Party Central Committee and editor of a 
new Hungarian-language farming daily called Szabad Földműves 
[Free Cultivator]. In April 1950, CSEMADOK head Gyula Lőrincz 
took the campaign against bourgeois nationalism so far as to discern 
Hungarian nationalism in the ethnic basis on which Hungarian 
cooperatives were run.15
From 1951, agricultural cooperative members were granted 
plots of land of half a hectare each, but organization was still slow. 
The gradualism (four types of cooperative introduced successively) 
and the voluntary principle were just a formality. When the pressure 
was relieved somewhat in 1953–1954, there were withdrawals on a 
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mass scale in eastern Slovakia, and in the southern, Hungarian-
inhabited, districts two thirds of the cooperatives collapsed. This 
can be ascribed not only to social resistance, but also to lack of 
state support and agricultural expertise. Collectivization picked up 
again in 1957–1958. By 1960, 88 percent of the agricultural land 
in Slovakia belonged to the “socialist” sector. Later came mergers 
(after the Soviet pattern) that produced massive collective farms 
covering several settlements.16
The Slovaks who settled in Hungarian villages after the 
population exchange and deportations to the Czech lands included 
the new leaders of the cooperatives. Their ignorance of local 
conditions, the lack of state funding, and the passive survival 
tactics of locals meant that production failed to reach even wartime 
levels. Rural living standards dropped in the early 1950s. The other 
big change was the ensuing mechanization of farming, which led 
to a mounting surplus of labor. This affected as much as a third of 
the Hungarian population, and led to migration to the cities: to the 
mining and industrial centers of the Czech lands and to Bratislava. 
Long-distance daily or weekly commuting became common.17
The end of the war of liberation in Yugoslavia was followed in 
July 1945 by a freeze on sales or transfers of land, and a month later 
by legislation on land reform and resettlement. The maximum award 
was to be 20 hectares. Land expropriated from indigenous Germans 
and from “enemies of the people” – a category interpreted to include 
many Vojvodina Hungarians – went in a Colonization Land Fund. 
Another 500,000 hold (285,000 hectares) were set aside for certain 
settler categories, notably veterans of the Yugoslav People’s Army. 
A quarter of the confiscated land came from deported Germans 
and the great landowners. The colonization program brought into 
Vojvodina 50,000 Serbian families, numbering about 250,000 
people. Such settlers from other parts of the country were assigned 
about 33 percent of the land; 26 percent went to state farms. One 
difference from the 1921 land reform was that some landless 
Hungarian peasants also benefited. About 670,000 hectares of land 
– 45 percent of the farmland in the province – was seized from 
about 90,000 owners.18
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The Yugoslav Communist Party was the first in the region to 
launch a collectivization campaign in 1946. By the end of the year, 
20,012 farms had joined 248 cooperatives. The number reached 
730 in 1951, then began to decline. The proportion of cultivated 
land still in private ownership was 41.7 percent in Vojvodina, 91 
percent in the rest of Serbia, and 77 percent in Yugoslavia as a 
whole.19
This eventually unsuccessful campaign was backed from 1946 
by a system of compulsory deliveries explained on a propaganda 
level by the need to supply the cities. In practice huge demands 
were made of a chosen two or three dozen richer peasants in each 
village, with confiscation and prison awaiting those who failed to 
meet their quota. Altogether 2,295 persons in Vojvodina received 
such sentences in 1946–1950, yielding 21,500 hectares of land 
for transfer to the cooperatives. This bankrupted the homestead 
economy, as unoccupied buildings were rapidly stripped. The 
peasants of Hungarian-inhabited areas were overrepresented 
as victims, compared with the Serbian-inhabited Srem region 
of Vojvodina. The March 1951 amnesty came as a huge relief: 
remaining prison sentences were waived and total expropriation of 
land replaced by a partial one.20
The fact that the Yugoslav leadership, at odds with the Soviet 
Union and its satellites after 1948, was unable to collectivize the 
country’s agriculture was recognized officially in March 1953, and 
the cooperatives (to a large extent in Vojvodina) were disbanded. 
Two months later the maximum landholding was reduced from 20 
to 10 hectares, and a further 102,000 hectares of confiscated land 
was transferred to the agricultural combines (state farms). The state 
promised compensation in 30 installments spread over 30 years, 
but it was never paid.21
The rationalization of land boundaries that ensued in the 1960s 
and 1970s was intended to group smaller holdings into one or two 
tracts. In practice the boundary commissions showed a preference 
for large-scale farms, granting them huge tracts of more fertile 
land. Peasants with larger holdings were also at an advantage if they 
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were contracted to supply large agricultural concerns. Peasants 
who farmed smaller holdings were generally given a single tract 
of poorer land at some distance from the settlement. By 1978, 
boundary adjustment had affected a quarter of the arable land in 
Vojvodina. The agricultural combines also gained an advantage 
from the prior rights of land purchase that they enjoyed until the 
later 1980s.22
About one third of the Hungarian households in Vojvodina were 
farming individually at the end of the 1980s, but half the farming 
households combined it with commuting to work. The number of 
small holdings in northern Bačka, mainly inhabited by Hungarians, 
rose continually to around 100,000. This was influenced to some 
extent by a 1988 amendment to the federal constitution raising the 
maximum holding size from 10 hectares to 30. A change of outlook 
towards the villages and peasantry appeared in the “green plan” 
financed from foreign loans, which offered preferential credit for 
mechanizing private farms and introducing livestock farming.
The Hungarians in Transcarpathia, the Transcarpathian oblast 
of the Ukrainian SSR in the Soviet Union, largely occupied the most 
valuable land along the River Tisa. At the end of the 1960s, 66 percent 
of the population was living in villages, but the proportion engaged 
in agriculture was much lower, as sizeable numbers commuted to 
the chemical, precision engineering and other works of Uzhgorod, 
the engineering and timber-processing factories of Mukachevo, 
the brick, furniture and canning factories of Beregovo, the rail 
transshipment depots of Chop and Bat’ovo,23 or seasonal work further 
north.
It was May 1946 before the return began of the Transcarpathian 
Hungarians aged 18–50 who had been sent to forced labor after 
the war. By that time the local Communist Party apparatus was 
compiling kulak lists, collecting compulsory state loans, and 
imposing delivery quotas. The least resistance was punished by 
forced labor in the Donets Basin.24
The first kolkhoz was set up at Eseny in 1945 with scant 
equipment. By 1947, 68,500 hold (39,000 hectares) had been taken 
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from Church and secular estates and redistributed. As grants were 
made, “land communities” and “production groups” were set up – 
630 of them by 1947. By 1948, the number of kolkhoz had risen 
from 27 to 188. A year later the regular kolkhoz numbered 478 and 
collectivization was over. Subsequent mergers left 168 kolkhoz 
and 16 state farms in the oblast in 1968.25 The most important 
agricultural concerns were in the Hungarian-inhabited areas in the 
1960s. Each kolkhoz covered three or four villages. The Beregovo 
district had 14 kolkhoz and three state farms (two for vineyards and 
one for stockbreeding). About 10 percent of the 90,000 hectares were 
vineyards or orchards. The two foremost kolkhoz were the Lenin in 
the Beregovo district and the Border Guard in Vinogradovo.26
By the 1980s, peasants from Velyka Dobron’ were growing 
early produce under plastic sheeting and selling it in city markets, 
for, despite the collectivization, crops grown on household land 
still made a big contribution to family income. Most land was used 
as orchards, vineyards or vegetable plots. The supply difficulties in 
the Soviet Union meant that the rural population still met many of 
its own needs until the end of the 1980s.27
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5. tHE EducAtIon QuEStIon
Csilla Fedinec
It became urgent in February 1948 for Czechoslovakia to settle its 
relations with Hungary, as a new period of Stalinist single-party 
dictatorship and membership of the socialist camp opened.1 So the 
reintroduction of Hungarian-language teaching gained exceptional 
symbolic significance. In the autumn of 1948, Slovak-taught 
schools opened parallel Hungarian classes, but two years later, 
separate Hungarian schools opened as well. Much was done to 
further them by the Cultural Association of Hungarian Workers 
of Czechoslovakia (CSEMADOK) and by the Communist Party of 
Slovakia Central Committee’s Hungarian Committee. The result 
was a broad system of schools that taught in Hungarian in the early 
1950s: almost 600 elementary schools, and by the 1960s, also 22 
Hungarian gymnasia (high schools).
The position of the minorities was affected by the Prague 
Spring of 1968, for the Slovak demands for greater autonomy fed 
Slovak nationalism, but the leadership stood firm on minority rights 
legislation and called for proposals from the minority organizations. 
The memorandum that CSEMADOK compiled in March 1968 
included a demand for an autonomous Hungarian school system. 
This process was halted and indeed reversed by the Soviet-led 
invasion by the Warsaw Pact countries in the autumn.
The period of normalization under Gustav Husák brought several 
attacks on the educational and language-use rights of the Hungarian 
minority. Hungarian-language teachers’ training was run down, 
and the number of Hungarian gymnasia was reduced to 18 at the 
turn of the 1980s, while mergers of Hungarian elementary schools 
had reduced their numbers by half by 1989. There was an attempt to 
reduce the use of Hungarian in schools. Several Hungarian middle 
schools changed to teaching certain subjects in Slovak. In the second 
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half of the 1970s, elements in the Slovak government drew up a 
plan to allow Hungarian-taught education to wither away, which led 
to the formation of a Hungarian dissident movement in Slovakia. 
The Legal Defense Committee of the Czechoslovakian Hungarian 
Minority2 was founded to draw public attention to the minority’s 
grievances and to use what means it could to combat them. The 
leading figure was the young Bratislava intellectual Miklós Duray.
Higher education in Hungarian was provided in the Hungarian 
language and literature teachers’ training faculty at Comenius 
University in Bratislava and in the teachers’ training program at the 
University of Nitra.
The Hungarian-taught school system in Transcarpathia, ceded 
to the Soviet Union in 1945, continued uninterrupted.3 Hungarian-
taught lower elementary education in 1944–1945 was extended 
in the following year to the eight years of elementary school. The 
Moldavian schools also counted as minority schools, as did one 
school teaching in Slovak that closed after a year, but for almost 
twenty years, the Ministry of Education of the Ukrainian Soviet 
Socialist Republic preferred to refer to such schools obliquely as 
“non-Ukrainian- and non-Russian-taught schools.”
The first minority middle schools, four Hungarian and four 
Moldavian, opened in 1953–1954. Thereafter the number of 
Hungarian-taught middle schools continued to rise, but the overall 
number of Hungarian-taught schools remained between 90 and 
100. That year, classes that were taught in Russian or Ukrainian 
were opened for Hungarian children, in an effort to increase the 
effectiveness of Russian teaching, already a compulsory subject. In 
1966–1967, a quarter of all Hungarian-taught schools included such 
parallel classes. By 1989 there remained 50 schools teaching solely 
in Hungarian.
Hungarian teachers’ training began in 1947 in Khust and 
1950 in Mukachevo, as did a faculty of Hungarian language and 
literature at Uzhgorod State University in 1963, but all three taught 
only specialist subjects in Hungarian, and so Hungarian-taught 
education effectively ended with high school. There were no official 
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Hungarian kindergartens, but Hungarian would have been used by 
nursery teachers in Hungarian-inhabited villages.
The Soviet system established over about twenty years the 
conditions for native-language schooling, but thereafter there was 
no development, but rather in fact something of a retreat at the 
end of the 1980s. The textbooks came from an office of the state 
textbook publishing enterprise in Uzhgorod, as they do today. 
These, apart from those for Hungarian language and literature, are 
translations of the officially set Russian or Ukrainian textbooks. The 
first textbook for Hungarian literature was written by the Hungarian 
writer Antal Hidas, who lived in Moscow, and appeared in 1950. 
Later textbooks were penned by teachers, writers and editors in 
Transcarpathia. These literature books provided the only available 
information for schools on Hungarian history, as this was not taught 
at all before 1989. They also included (in Hungarian) information on 
Ukrainian literature, but Russian literature was taught separately. 
In Hungarian literature, the emphasis was on the Moscow émigré 
writers (Máté Zalka, Béla Illés, Sándor Gergely and others), while a 
quarter concerned the “outstanding figure in the world revolutionary 
movement” Sándor Petőfi. There was hardly a mention of any 
Hungarian writing after World War II.
Educational autonomy was won by the Hungarians of Romania 
under the Groza government of 1945–1948, which was friendly 
towards them,4 but this changed with the nationalization of education. 
The education act of August 3, 1948, applied the Soviet model to 
Romania’s whole education system. Some Hungarian middle schools 
closed, but for higher education the years 1948–1950 marked a peak, 
with native-language teaching at Bolyai University, the separate 
Hungarian Arts Institute, and the agricultural and technical colleges 
in Cluj-Napoca, as well as a new Hungarian medical university in 
Tărgu Mureş.
The Hungarian-taught system of education began to shrink 
in the 1950s. First Hungarian-taught engineering courses ceased, 
and then a party and government resolution in 1956 called for 
the Romanianizing of minority elementary and middle schools. 
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Finally, in March 1959, Bolyai University was subsumed into Babeş 
University. The medical school in Tărgu Mureş closed in 1962. 
By the mid-1960s, the Hungarian-taught options remaining were 
the Protestant and Roman Catholic theological colleges and the 
Tărgu Mureş Drama College. Native-language vocational training 
also ceased and most Hungarian middle schools had a mixture of 
Hungarian- and Romanian-taught classes. There was still some 
teaching in Hungarian in the Hungarian, philosophy and history 
faculties at Babeş University.
Some educational grievances were redressed under the influence 
of the 1968 events in Czechoslovakia. Some middle schools returned 
to teaching only in Hungarian in 1968–1971. Hungarian-taught 
classes or departments were started at a handful of vocational 
secondary schools.
But Act 273 of May 13, 1973, discriminated directly against 
minority elementary schools in stipulating that 25 pupils were 
necessary to start a fifth-grade class and 36 for a secondary school 
class, whereas in every place where schools working in languages 
of “cohabiting national communities” existed, Romanian-taught 
departments or classes had to be provided irrespective of the number 
of pupils requiring them. So a rising proportion of Hungarian 
elementary and secondary students had to study in Romanian.
In the 1980s it became the practice to send newly qualified 
Hungarian teachers to Romanian-speaking districts. The mid-1980s 
marked a low point in Hungarian education in Romania. Separate 
Hungarian middle schools closed and Hungarians hardly won any 
places in higher education. It seemed that a truncated society was 
developing, with no intelligentsia of its own.
In Yugoslavia5 minority schools were allowed to open in August 
1945, right after the post-war executions and deportations that the 
Hungarians had suffered. The message was that they could expect 
to gain their minority rights “despite their crimes,” but only from 
the new communist regime, not via separate minority bodies or 
support from the parent country. Yet most Hungarian elementary 
and middle school teachers were deported or fled the country. The 
The Education Question 383
acute shortage could be eased only with crash courses for untrained 
replacements. Attendances at Hungarian-taught primary schools 
reached a post-war peak in the mid-1950s and then declined 
steadily – by 35 percent between 1966 and 1986. The contributing 
factors included the ageing and dwindling of the minority and the 
opening of bilingual (or more rarely trilingual) schools. The number 
of teaching staff, on the other hand, rose rapidly until the mid-1970s 
before beginning to fall slowly, so that pupil/teacher ratios and 
school standards were high. By the early 1960s there were chances 
also for those not studying in Hungarian to improve their language 
abilities. Initially, the backbone of the middle school system 
consisted of classic gymnasia – six such schools were teaching in 
Hungarian in the early 1950s. However, mergers between schools 
teaching in different languages soon followed, concealed behind 
a “fraternity – unity” slogan. The Serbo-Croat- and Hungarian-
taught schools were combined into school centers in 1956. The 
1975 education reform replaced the classic gymnasia by “two-plus-
two” middle schools – two years of academic education plus two 
of vocational training. This meant that middle schools could open 
in larger villages that had never had one, but it led to a decline in 
quality. By the end of the 1980s, only 63.8 percent of Hungarian-
taught middle school graduates continued their studies. The forced 
spread of vocational training was abandoned in favor of standard 
four-year (ninth to twelfth grade) middle schools. Despite some 
advantages, the bilingual system had the drawback of assisting in 
the assimilation of the minority.
One big advance in higher education was the foundation of 
Novi Sad University in 1954, followed by a Hungarian faculty in 
1959 and an Institute of Hungarian Studies in 1968. Several other 
colleges and university departments began to teach in Hungarian: 
the Novi Sad Academy of Drama in 1972, and a Hungarian-
taught department at Maribor in 1966, followed by a department 
of Hungarian language and literature in 1980. Hungarian training 
of infants’ school teachers began in Novi Sad at secondary level 
in 1952 and rose to college level in 1973. Hungarian teachers were 
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trained from 1945 onwards in Subotica, where the college taught 
in Hungarian for a decade before turning bilingual. College-level 
teachers’ training commenced in Novi Sad in 1946 and moved 
to Subotica in 1978, where teachers of mathematics, physics, 
chemistry, Hungarian and Serbo-Croat were trained. From 1973 
there was uniform (elementary and secondary) teachers’ training 
in Hungarian that included education, psychology, sociology, 
methodology, Marxism-Leninism and civil defense. Wider self-
management under the 1974 Constitution gave greater powers to 
minority provincial and local management of education, for instance 
through the Vojvodina Education Council.6 It became possible to 
give more emphasis to Hungarian language, history, music and art. 
The progress ended with the wave of Serbian nationalism at the 
beginning of the 1980s and the fragmentation of the country during 
the Yugoslav wars.
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6. tHE dEVELoPMEnt oF cuLturAL, ArtIStIc
And ScIEntIFIc InStItutIonS
Tamás Gusztáv Filep
The socialist ideology of the post-war Soviet camp took a strong hold 
on culture. No end was served by parallel literary languages, or artistic 
trends or scientific schools that differed from official ones. Not even 
the term “minority” was acceptable, as all citizens were ostensibly 
equal in a socialist country. Although several minorities in East-
Central European countries belonged to ethnic groups dominant in 
another country, socialist ideology attached no importance to this: 
they were severed automatically by the political borders. Defending 
the interests of Hungarians outside Hungary became the task of 
the party state under which they lived, to be carried out by ethnic 
Hungarian members of that party or other activists in Hungarian-
inhabited areas. There were functions in political and cultural life 
only for those who accepted and conformed to the new order. The 
minorities were denied their historical and cultural traditions until 
the 1960s, when selected elements and fragments were restored as 
parts of a distorted “progressive tradition,” significant only if seen 
as antecedents of the new order.1
The minority communities were shorn of their leaders. Many 
of the intelligentsia who had traditionally fulfilled that role had left. 
Educational and cultural institutions were nationalized and Churches 
were placed under tight control. Books, newspapers and periodicals 
conformed to the system and relied on state funds. Large numbers 
of cadres with a peasant or worker background were shot into 
professional, cultural and educational posts at the whim of the new 
elite. The bourgeoisie in an organized form vanished, along with the 
private sector that supported them. The cultural elite, hitherto open 
to influences from Western Europe, had to abide by the tenets of 
socialist realism, or at least its outward forms and expressions.2 The 
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exception was Yugoslavia, after the 1948 break with Moscow, where 
parallel cultural idioms and modernist literary trends appeared as 
early as the 1960s.3
Politics assigned to the arts and sciences a propaganda role, and 
gave a spurt of growth to mass culture for similar reasons. Such 
aims lay behind the Hungarian radio and television services set up in 
neighboring countries.4 The broadcasting hours assigned them were 
often derisory, but they were part of the window-dressing, and at the 
same time opportunities for indigenous Hungarian intelligentsia to 
seize or even exploit.
There was a similar mechanism behind the movement of 
successive intellectual generations from the state’s politicized 
system of education into the minority cultural institutions. Native-
language higher education was confined to Hungarian departments 
of universities and to teachers’ training, except in the first decade 
in Romania, when there were also Hungarian art and agricultural 
colleges, for instance. But on the whole the neighboring countries 
cut back such provisions. The statistics show a smaller proportion 
of Hungarians with a higher education (and in the professions for 
which such qualifications were required) than of the population as 
a whole. Minority education and culture were skewed towards the 
humanities and literature, which left the minority technical and 
scientific intelligentsia unable to contribute to their own culture.5
Cultural freedom varied among state-socialist countries, yet 
the most difficult situation was faced by the indigenous Hungarian 
minority of Burgenland in Austria, the one neighboring country 
with a democratic system (despite the Soviet military and political 
presence in the east of the country up to 1955). The Burgenland 
Hungarians were fragmented.6 Their cultural activity was confined 
to the Churches, state Hungarian-taught elementary education, and 
voluntary local bodies, night schools, and basic literacy. Not until 
1968 was there a Burgenland Hungarian Cultural Association, or 
until 1977 a Hungarian National Council (formed under the Act on 
Ethnic Groups). In the 1980s, the University of Vienna began some 
teaching in Hungarian, so that new schoolteachers could be trained. 
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In 1988, a Hungarian Institute was founded in Unterwart, mainly 
for research into community documents, as the product of a period 
during and after the Cold War when Burgenland Hungarians could 
make contact with Hungary again.7
By then there were institutions for minority research in several 
successor states. Yugoslavia had its Institute of Hungarian Studies, 
and an Institute for Ethnic Studies in Ljubljana, focusing on Slove-
nia’s Italians and the small Hungarian population. In Romania there 
was a little group of minority researchers at the Nicolae Iorga Institute 
of History, Romanian Academy of Sciences in Bucharest, but it was 
disbanded in the 1980s. Czechoslovakia also had an Academy Insti-
tute in Košice.8 The findings of such groups hardly registered with 
the Hungarian public, and the attitude of their founding authorities 
remained passive, as exemplified by dissipation of the initial interest 
in the Institute of Hungarian Studies. Private scholarly initiatives 
and efforts led to the formation of unaffiliated, in some cases illegal, 
groups, concerned more with defending than with researching their 
communities. Among the best known were the Czechoslovak Com-
mittee for Protection of the Rights of the Hungarian Minority,9 and 
the Limes Circle formed in Bucharest in the later 1980s.10 Efforts 
towards Hungarian cultural cohesion in Yugoslavia were made by 
the Hungarian Language Society of Vojvodina until it was banned 
in the early 1970s.11 The most promising group of theorists were 
those who gathered round the Cluj-Napoca philosopher and essayist 
György Bretter at the turn of the 1960s and 1970s, but successive 
members left Romania after Bretter’s death.12 Ernő Gáll and József 
Aradi, as editors of the periodical Korunk in the 1980s, brought 
forward a number of younger social researchers.13 The WAC-Center 
for Regional and Anthropological Research in Miercurea-Ciuc was 
a semi-legal organization, serving a purpose shared by the scientific 
theory circle in Sfântu Gheorghe.14 The greatest number of results 
in minority research in all the neighboring countries was obtained 
in the fields of Hungarian literature and language, the history of 
narrower periods, some areas of cultural anthropology, and the in-
stitutional history of culture.15
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Books in Hungarian reappeared in Czechoslovakia in 1949: the 
publishers Pravda produced a series in 1949–1952. The role was taken 
over in 1953 by another state publisher that was subsumed into a third 
in 1956 and continued as Tatran in 1963.16 The Hungarian branch 
of that became the publisher Madách in 1969. Hungarian books 
appeared in Transcarpathia from Kárpáti and the textbook concern 
in Uzhgorod. The firm Józsa Béla Athenaeum operated in Romania 
from 1944 to 1948, when a state publishing enterprise was formed. 
This had a minority division from the outset and assumed the name 
Literary Publishing in 1960.17 Others included Kriterion – expressly 
for minority publications and the main firm in the field throughout 
the period – and Hungarian sections at three other firms.18 Three 
publishers produced Hungarian books in Vojvodina,19 followed later 
by two others.20 No books in Hungarian appeared in the Prekmurje 
district of Slovenia until 1961, when the task was taken up by the 
local Hungarian association.21
The range of newspapers and periodicals narrowed, especially 
the latter, where a single pattern prevailed. In Yugoslavia, the pre-
war left-wing paper Híd resumed publication in 1945. There also 
appeared the periodical Új Symposion, which represented literary 
modernism and was of interest over the whole Hungarian-speaking 
area, although its influence was equivocal, and a couple of other 
journals with narrower readerships.22 In Romania there was only 
a literary weekly initially, followed by two others in Târgu Mureş, 
and a lively weekly in Bucharest capable of discussing social and 
cultural issues.23 Only in 1958 was it possible in Czechoslovakia to 
start a periodical resembling an almanac that grew into a review 
appearing ten times a year.24 There was no Hungarian periodical 
in Transcarpathia during the Soviet period, although the Kárpáti 
Kalendárium25 and various almanacs helped to substitute for this. 
The press palette in each country included an official Hungarian 
daily and other publications for children, youth, professions (law, 
natural history, politics), and the arts (Transcarpathia was poorest 
in this respect), but all were required to reflect official ideology. The 
language in science magazines was much criticized, often because 
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Hungarian expressions for concepts to do with subjects not directly 
linked to minority life were not widely known.26
Literature and literacy in a broader sense play a big part in 
minority life and in preserving identity. The greatest scope for this 
between the two world wars lay with the népi literary movements, 
which concentrated on the lives of rural people and were blended with 
the heritage of the labor movement. The népi writers of a socialist 
type gradually drew towards socialist realism, questioning the 
deeper national commitments of the working class. The other canon 
opposing this was modernism in literature, outstanding examples 
of which were able to address the century’s overall problems of 
existence, although the mass of linguistic experimentation leading 
up to this drew the charge that its failure to consider communal 
problems counted as desertion in the face of the problems of destiny. 
The contradictory reception of this can be traced to the post-war 
elimination of the literary language variants and to the exclusion 
from culture of many of the layers of tradition. Contributions also 
came, of course, from the many contradictions to be found in mass 
culture.
The valuable literary works often described the restrictions 
on rights and freedoms, regardless of whether they slotted into 
existentialism, or the absurd, for example, or the trends dominant 
in Western Europe at the time, or whether they found their means 
of expression in the local milieu and subject matter. Furthermore, 
seemingly more abstract language often increased the permitted 
scope for expressing opinions on social matters.27 Direct allusions 
to the minority situation often called for abstraction on grounds of 
censorship or self-censorship. Nor were they free of ambiguities and 
euphemisms. It should be noted that the life’s work of some authors, 
built up over decades, can be fitted into one trend or another.28
How far acceptance in Hungary affected the creation of a 
minority canon is something on which research is only beginning. 
The reception in Hungary for one or two exceptional such writers 
played an important part in drawing the parent country’s attention to 
minority literature.29 General agreement developed in the 1970s and 
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1980s about the most valuable features of minority literature. Pride 
of place in Yugoslavia went to the works of Nándor Gion, who gave 
epic form to the history of the Southern Region Hungarians from 
the turn of the century to the early 1940s. Similar appreciation went 
to novels by László Dobos, Gyula Duba and others on the period 
of rights deprivation in Czechoslovakia from the end of the 1960s. 
More popular in Hungary at the time were the essays and historical 
plays of András Sütő, who opened a new stage in his career with an 
essay-novel on his home village and villagers entitled My Mother 
Pledges Easy Dreams.30
Hungarian theater abroad ranged from traveling players to 
bricks-and-mortar theaters with permanent companies. Full theater 
life was confined to Romania:31 Timişoara, Oradea, Satu Mare, 
Cluj-Napoca, Târgu Mures and Sfântu Gheorghe, as well as a 
Hungarian opera and puppet theater in Cluj-Napoca. Most of these 
survived through the communist period, despite some organizational 
changes – Hungarian and Romanian sections were often merged 
in the Ceauşescu period. Romania was also the only neighboring 
country that trained Hungarian actors and directors, at the István 
Szentgyörgyi Drama Institute,32 founded in Târgu Mures in 1948 
from the drama section of the Arts Institute in Cluj-Napoca. A Ro-
manian section was added in 1976. Annual colloquia of minority 
theaters in Romania began in 1978, based at the State Hungarian 
Theater in Sfântu Gheorghe. The Hungarian People’s Theater33 in 
Subotica, Yugoslavia, was founded in 1945, sharing its management 
from 1951 with the Croatian People’s Theater. In Novi Sad there 
were amateur performances, and a number of public performances 
between 1953 and 1973 by the Hungarian drama department of 
Novi Sad Radio. This developed into the Novi Sad Theater founded 
in 1974 and later a separate company.34 The Slovakian State Village 
Theater founded in 1950 had a Hungarian section that in 1952 
became the Hungarian Regional Theater based in Komárno.35 One 
gain from the Prague Spring was the Thália in Košice, which opened 
in 1969. Transcarpathia had only amateur drama in Hungarian, at 
Beregovo’s People’s Theater. Theater companies in all neighboring 
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countries toured. Attempts were made to foster a modern dramatic 
idiom, notably by the Romanian theaters and those of Novi Sad 
and Košice. They often premiered local Hungarian drama, which 
flourished in the 1970s in Transylvania, and to some extent in the 
Southern Region. One great achievement of the period was the life’s 
work of the Cluj-Napoca director György Harag.36
Czechoslovakia was the only neighboring country with a 
dedicated Hungarian cultural organization.37 Apart from acting 
as a channel for ideological control, it organized and promoted 
commemorations, camps, and other regional and local events. In 
the other countries, the Hungarian institutions were not separate, 
but cultural events in majority Hungarian-speaking areas were held 
in Hungarian, with varying provisos.
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7. cASE StudIES
romania (Stefano Bottoni and Csaba Zoltán Novák)
The history of the Hungarian minority in 1945–1989 may be 
divided into five main periods, according to changes in domestic 
politics affecting them and to developments in the Romanian 
Communist Party’s (PCR) minority policy. The years 1945–1947 
can be seen as a transition: the communists needed Hungarian votes 
in Transylvania to combat the Romanian bourgeois parties, while 
the Paris peace negotiations called for a wholly different minority 
policy from the one before 1940. These changes were made through 
the Hungarian People’s Alliance (MNSZ),1 as a communist partner 
organization. Then in 1948–1956 came Stalinist-type integration 
of the Hungarians, followed in 1957–1965 by a period dominated 
by reprisals for the internal repercussions of the 1956 Hungarian 
Revolution. The Communist Party’s minority policy in 1965–1971 
was one of seeming liberalization. Then from 1971 up to 1989, 
especially in the mid-1970s, came the erection of Ceauşescu’s 
totalitarian dictatorship. This national communism, stained with 
neo-Stalinism, was accompanied from 1983 by increasingly open 
conflict between the communist leaders of Romania and Hungary.2
Apart from the instauration of the socialist system, the biggest 
change for Hungarians in the post-war period was in the ethnic 
structure of the big Transylvanian cities,3 with the disappearance 
of the Jews and Germans,4 and the dismantling of the traditional 
Hungarian social and economic institutions.5
Under the communist regime, political integration of Romania’s 
Hungarian community into the state structure involved various 
institutions. In the initial stage (1945–1948) it was undertaken 
by the aforementioned Hungarian People’s Alliance, a minority 
organization that became in 1948, after the communist seizure of 
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power, a mere “conveyor belt” for the single-party state’s instructions. 
In 1953 the organization was even encouraged to “dissolve itself.”6
The Transylvanian Hungarians, with their own system of 
minority institutions, were affected more than the rest of the 
population by the economic, cultural and social changes introduced 
by the communist authorities. The party denied any need for 
collective rights and emphasized a policy of individual integration. 
Denominational schools felt victim to the education reform of 1948, 
ending a parallel system that had given relative autonomy to schools 
teaching in Hungarian. A total of 468 Catholic, 531 Reformed, 34 
Unitarian and 8 Evangelical schools were nationalized with all their 
assets.7
A turning point for minority policy came in 1952, when Romania, 
on Soviet insistence, created a Hungarian Autonomous Region 
(RAM)8 in the Székely Land, but at the same time, Hungarians in 
positions of authority outside the Hungarian Autonomous Region 
began to be systematically removed. The autonomous region reflected 
the Soviet Leninist principles of territorial federalism; according to 
the Soviet constitution, national minorities were granted areas in 
which to enjoy linguistic and cultural rights. The idea was mooted on 
September 7, 1951, by two Soviet advisers seconded to Romania, P. 
Arkhipov and P. Tumanov, in a memorandum addressed to General 
Secretary Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, outlining two possible forms 
for the new region to take. One was to have covered about one fifth of 
Transylvania (the Székely Land and the Mezőség: Ţinutul Secuiesc 
and Câmpia Transilvaniei), with about one million inhabitants 
and the city of Cluj as its seat. The other covered only the smaller, 
ethnically more homogeneous area of the Székely Land (the former 
Mureş-Turda, Ciuc, Odorheiu and Trei Scaune Counties). After long 
discussions the second was chosen, and the region’s creation was 
confirmed by the new Constitution issued on September 21, 1952. 
According to the 1956 census, its 13,500 square kilometers contained 
731,387 inhabitants, of whom 565,510 (77.3 percent) declared 
themselves to be of Hungarian ethnicity. In the regional capital 
Târgu Mureş (Marosvásárhely), a similar proportion of Hungarians 
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(74 percent) could be found. Hungarians also provided some 80 
percent of the party leadership and public officials, including the 
Communist Party first secretary (Lajos Csupor), the president of the 
People’s Council/Consiliul Popular  (Pál Bugyi) and the provincial 
head of the Securitate or secret police (Mihály Kovács). These men, 
though, owed their first loyalty to the Romanian party state and did 
not pursue politics on a national basis.9 “Autonomy” in this case did 
not mean self-determination: the Hungarian Autonomous Region 
was under the same tight control as the other Romanian provinces, 
and had to implement decisions taken by central authorities. The 
only substantive difference was that Hungarian could be used freely 
at all levels of administration, and several cultural institutions were 
founded in the 1950s in Târgu Mureş: the State Sekler Theatre, the 
István Szentgyörgyi Academy of Dramatic Art, the literary journal 
Igaz Szó, and the bi-weekly cultural paper Új Élet, followed in 1958 
by a radio station broadcasting mainly in Hungarian.
The new direction that Romanian minority policy took in the 
aftermath of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution brought with it in 
1958–1959 criticism of the region’s ethnic Hungarian leaders. The 
main charge was of turning a blind eye to so-called “Hungarian 
nationalism.” In the end the Parliament, on December 24, 1960, 
passed a constitutional amendment altering the region’s boundaries. 
To be known henceforth as the Maros–Hungarian Autonomous 
Region10 (RMAM), its territory and ethnic composition were 
substantially altered. Two Székely districts were transferred to the 
Braşov region, and the districts of Sărmaş, Târnăveni and Luduş, 
with a Hungarian proportion of around 20 percent, were annexed 
to the Maros–Hungarian Autonomous Region, making it a larger 
region with about 800,000 inhabitants, of whom 61 percent were 
Hungarian and 35 percent Romanian.11 A politically driven change 
of elite during 1961 replaced most of the Hungarian and Jewish 
functionaries with Romanian cadres.12
Although the Romanian authorities were forced by Soviet 
pressure into agreeing in 1952 to set up the Hungarian Autonomous 
Region, they made good use of it in subsequent years to justify 
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pursuing homogenization in other parts of Transylvania, mainly in 
the cities, and refusing to recognize the minority’s specific cultural 
and social heritage and needs. There was a similar intention behind 
the merger of Hungarian-taught educational institutions after 1956, 
ostensibly to end segregation, and behind the abolition in 1959 of 
the National Minority Committee within the Romanian Communist 
Party Central Committee. Classes taught in Romanian were added 
to Hungarian educational institutions at lower and higher levels. 
Mergers of schools in multi-ethnic communities resulted in parallel 
sections and classes, while Romanian-taught classes were introduced 
into hitherto Hungarian-taught schools. The direct outcome was a 
fall in enrolment in Hungarian-taught secondary education.13
As ideological pressures mounted after 1956, they were felt 
most forcefully by the minorities. The nationalist turn of Romanian 
communism was also reflected in new terminology referring to non-
Romanian ethnic groups. In 1959, the term “national minority” and 
the previously frequent references to the “multinational” character 
of the Romanian state were ousted by a new definition, “the 
Romanian people and the cohabiting national groups.” According 
to party ideologists, “national minority” implied forming a separate 
cultural nation. Nationhood would have given its members equal 
rank with the state-creating Romanian nation, despite their smaller 
numbers. The new formulation made it plain that the cohabitants 
were subordinate to a “master nation.” Also designed to stress the 
primacy of the Romanian nation was the revived national dogma of 
Daco-Roman continuity: the formation of the Romanian nation was 
said to have occurred under the Roman Empire, so that the Romanians 
were also the sole indigenous ethnic group in Transylvania, joined 
there only in the Middle Ages by the conquering immigrant 
Hungarians and colonist Germans. This outlook was reflected in 
the first comprehensive history of Transylvania to appear since the 
war, under the auspices of the Romanian Academy.14
After Gheorghiu-Dej’s death, the post of Communist Party 
general secretary went on March 22, 1965, to Nicolae Ceauşescu, 
whose foreign policy of moderate independence from the USSR 
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was accompanied up to 1971 by a certain degree of intellectual 
liberalization. That not only reinforced Romanian nationalism, 
but also gave greater scope to Hungarian cultural institutions. The 
separate foreign policy road had started under the Dej leadership, 
which in 1964 rejected an economic plan for Romania (and Bulgaria) 
to serve as a granary for the Soviet bloc, and issued on April 27 
a Declaration of the Romanian Workers’ Party’s Position on 
Questions of the International Communist and Workers’ Movement, 
expressing the country’s relative independence within the socialist 
camp.15 This independent policy emerged strongly in 1968, when 
Romania refused to join in the Warsaw Pact’s military intervention 
in Czechoslovakia, and denounced it as imperialist aggression. 
Later in the 1970s Ceauşescu developed this relatively autonomous 
foreign policy into a framework for the whole political system. 
While canvassing for public support, the party leaders in June 1968 
held a meeting with prominent members of the ethnic Hungarian 
intelligentsia. Ceauşescu rejected a request for a minority statute, 
but progress was made on several other matters (new institutions, 
periodicals, language-use rights).16 Hungarian-language TV 
broadcasts began, and in Bucharest a minority publishing house 
(Kriterion, headed by Géza Domokos) and a modern weekly cultural 
paper (A Hét) were started. On the other hand, the Maros–Hungarian 
Autonomous Region was abolished, due to a more general change 
in local government structure driving it back to the earlier county 
system. Although plans were issued for a “grand Székely county” 
covering the newly established Harghita, Covasna and Mureş 
Counties, ructions in the national and regional party leaderships led 
to a compromise. There would be no “grand Székely county,” but 
the disputed districts of Târgu Secuiesc and Sfântu Gheorghe would 
not be transferred to Braşov County, leading to the creation of the 
country’s smallest county, Covasna. With slight adjustments, the 
three counties of Harghita, Covasna and Mureş resulted from the 
old Hungarian Autonomous Region.17 There was a strong Hungarian 
majority in the first two (85 percent in Harghita and 78.4 percent in 
Covasna, according to the 1977 census), but the proportion in the 
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new Mureş County (the three districts of the Câmpia Transilvaniei 
– Sărmaş, Târnăveni and Luduş – plus Sighişoara district) was 
only 44.3 percent. That circumstance allowed central authorities to 
speed up the homogenization program that had started in the early 
1960s in Mureş County, and especially in the city of Târgu Mureş. 
Cultural and political leadership within the Hungarian community 
of Transylvania moved from Cluj and Târgu Mureş to smaller 
Székely cities such as Sfântu Gheorghe and Miercurea-Ciuc.
Another development in 1968 was the formation within the So-
cialist Unity Front of a Council of Workers of Hungarian National-
ity.18 With no paid staff, offices or decision-making power, this body 
was granted some advisory capacity until about 1974, when it be-
came merely a piece of window-dressing. Its members initially were 
prominent members of the Romanian Hungarian intelligentsia, but 
by the mid-1980s they had been wholly replaced by loyal party func-
tionaries of Hungarian ethnic origin. As a consequence, the Council 
of Workers of Hungarian Nationality could be used by Ceauşescu as 
a propaganda instrument, for instance in public quarrels with Hun-
gary.19 The process of cultural homogenization peaked in the 1980s, 
when the public thinking and expression of identity of the Hungarian 
minority were curbed in a number of ways. Any book that promoted 
Hungarian self-awareness was placed on the forbidden list at the 
Kriterion publishing house. Internal measures banned publication 
of apparently innocent works dealing with ethnography, art history, 
linguistic or literary criticism. Similar moves were made at the Cluj-
based Dacia publishing company as well. Hungarian-language TV 
broadcasting ceased in January 1985, and a single order by telephone 
was enough to silence the Hungarian regional radio studios in Târgu 
Mureş and Cluj-Napoca. Central Hungarian-language broadcasts on 
Bucharest Radio were reduced from 60 to 30 minutes a day.
The performing arts were constrained heavily in the 1980s, 
as the Communist Party kept a tight hold on repertoire. Most 
ethnic Hungarian playwrights and even contemporary writers 
from Hungary were banned. Most new ethnic Hungarian 
graduates found it hard to get jobs in Transylvania. In 1988, 689 
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of 951 fresh Hungarian graduates were forced to work outside 
Transylvania, while thousands of Romanian colleagues had been 
assigned to Hungarian-inhabited counties.20 Yet Hungarian-taught 
higher education (and implicitly secondary education as well) was 
threatened by staff cuts. The state in the 1980s ceased to advertise 
posts vacated by retirement and the examinations needed for 
academic advancement were no longer held, preventing ethnic 
Hungarians from gaining access to academic life and the most 
prestigious professions.
czechoslovakia (Árpád Popély)
There were radical changes in 1948 for Czechoslovakia and for its 
Hungarian minority, deprived of its rights since 1945. As in other 
Soviet-bloc countries, the communists under Klement Gottwald 
squeezed out the bourgeois parties and set about building a Stalinist 
single-party dictatorship.
The communist takeover brought no immediate benefits to 
the Hungarian minority, as the communists had been the main 
exponents of anti-Hungarian policy. The new Soviet-inspired 
constitution of May 1948 did not provide for any minority rights, 
and the indigenous Germans and Hungarians were still unable 
to vote in the general elections at the end of the month. In 1948, 
710 Hungarian-inhabited communities were given newly created 
Slovak names. (Tornalja became Šafárikovo, Párkány became 
Štúrovo, Bős became Gabčíkovo, Diószeg became Sládkovičovo, 
and Nagymegyer became Čalovo, for instance.)
However, the Soviet Union wanted orderly relations among the 
countries in its sphere, and Czechoslovakia had to mend its relations 
with Hungary, for which the main condition was the restoration of 
the rights of Czechoslovakia’s Hungarians, which began on October 
25, 1948, with the return of their citizenship.21 Then came an end 
to expropriation of their land up to a ceiling of 50 hectares, the 
foundation of a weekly (later daily) paper, Új Szó, in Bratislava on 
December 15, 1948, the establishment of the Cultural Association 
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of Hungarian Workers of Czechoslovakia – CSEMADOK – headed 
by the ethnic Hungarian painter Gyula Lőrincz on March 5, 1949, 
and the opening in the autumn of 1948 of Hungarian-taught classes 
in Slovak elementary schools, followed in 1950 by the revival of 
Hungarian-taught education in separate elementary and middle 
schools. The population exchange and re-Slovakization programs 
were halted at the end of 1948, and in the early months of 1949 it 
became possible for those deported to the Czech lands to return to 
their homes. The preparation of decisions affecting the Hungarian 
community and implementation of them were entrusted not just to 
the Slovak Communist Party leaders but to a Hungarian Committee, 
on which such party workers from the pre-war Czechoslovak 
communist movement as István Major, Gyula Lőrincz and István 
Fábry were included.22
It was against that background that in Budapest on April 16, 
1949, Czechoslovakia and Hungary signed a symbolic treaty of 
friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance. It was followed in July 
by the Štrbské pleso Agreement, which settled the financial disputes 
between the two countries. Hungary, for instance, dropped its claims 
for compensation for the property left behind by Hungarians arriving 
from Czechoslovakia. Finally, a Czechoslovakian–Hungarian 
Cultural Agreement was signed in Prague on November 13, 1951, 
but the clauses on minority rights and mutual support for minorities 
fell victim to Czechoslovakia’s opposition.
There were attempts in the late 1940s and early 1950s to 
settle the political, economic and social situation and reintegration 
of the Hungarian minority, in the form of party resolutions. It 
again became possible for Hungarians to join the Communist 
Party – several, including Lőrincz and Fábry, entered the central 
committees of the Czechoslovak and Slovak parties – and the 
various mass organizations. Hungarians were added to several 
national committees. In 1954 it was possible for Hungarians to vote 
and stand in the general elections, and several Hungarians were 
elected to the Prague and Bratislava assemblies.23 In principle it 
became possible to use Hungarian for official contacts in Hungarian-
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inhabited districts and institutions, and the names of Hungarian-
inhabited communities were to be posted in both languages. But in 
practice these resolutions were never published and the observance 
of them was never checked within the restrictions of a party state.24
There were no organized reactions to the 1956 Hungarian 
Revolution among the Hungarians of Czechoslovakia. Memories of 
post-war deportations were fresh and no one dared speak out in favor 
of revolution. There were only isolated manifestations of sympathy 
(in hymn-singing in church, wearing mourning ribbons, and laying 
wreaths on military graves). Even so, the fear of how the Hungarian 
inhabitants would behave was so strong in the authorities that the 
Hungarian (and the Polish) reserves were left out of the mobilization 
order to the Czechoslovakian army early in November 1956.25
Importantly, the constitution of 1960, which changed the 
country’s name to the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic,26 expressed 
the equality of citizens and declared minorities’ right to education 
and culture, but practical policy towards the Hungarians remained 
equivocal. The biggest blow was the 1960 reform of public 
administration, for mergers of small local government districts 
often involved combining a mainly Hungarian district with a 
mainly Slovak one to its north, so that the number of districts with 
a Hungarian minority decreased by two (Dunajská Streda and 
Komárno).
After CSEMADOK had been set up, the cultural needs of the 
Hungarian minority were served by the Hungarian Territorial Theater 
in Komárno founded in 1952, then by the short-lived Czechoslova-
kian Hungarian Book Publishers and the Czechoslovakian Hungar-
ian Folk Art Ensemble (1953), the Young Hearts Hungarian Folk Art 
Ensemble (1957) and the literary periodical Irodalmi Szemle (1958). 
Új Szó was joined by new weekly papers: Szabad Földműves for 
farming (1950), Új Ifjúság for youth (1952), Dolgozó Nő for women 
(1952) and the CSEMADOK cultural paper A Hét (1956).27
CSEMADOK’s activity was ambivalent. It had been founded 
mainly to popularize communist ideas and enforce party resolutions. 
Yet its work was vital in the years after the period of the deprival of 
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rights, in reorganizing the minority’s cultural activity, collaborating 
to reopen Hungarian schools, and setting up almost all the Hungarian 
institutions. From time to time it also attempted to take up the cause 
of the Hungarians, especially in the freer atmosphere of the 1960s.
The reform policy of the Prague Spring, associated mainly with 
Alexander Dubček, who was elected as head of the Czechoslovak 
Communist Party in January 1968, covered democratization, 
economic reform, reorganization of the law of the state, and a 
promise to settle the national minority question. It had the support 
of CSEMADOK, which put forward proposals on March 12, 
1968, covering, for instance, minority self-government, legislation 
on minority rights, proportional representation on state bodies, 
foundation of a Ministry of National Communities, rectification of 
the 1960 changes in public administration, expansion of the minority 
school system, and reappraisal of the anti-Hungarian laws passed 
after 1945. The new, reformist leaders of CSEMADOK (László 
Dobos as president and Rezső Szabó as general secretary) took part 
in discussing the proposals for a constitutional act on the minorities, 
although they were soon deadlocked.
When the Prague Spring was crushed on August 21, 1968, by 
the military intervention of the Soviet Union and four other Warsaw 
Pact countries (including Kádár’s Hungary), so was any chance of 
a reassuring settlement to the minority question. The constitutional 
act passed on October 27, 1968, granted the minorities the right to 
education in their native language, to association for minority social 
and cultural purposes, to a native-language press and information, 
and to use of their language in official contacts, but the clauses on 
self-determination were removed.28
The Hungarian minority, incidentally, was as opposed as the 
Czechs and Slovaks to the Soviet-led intervention. They were 
inimical to the arriving Hungarian troops, seeing them as occupiers, 
not liberators. CSEMADOK and the Czechoslovakian Hungarian 
writers, communists and young people all issued condemnatory 
statements. Hungary’s troops withdrew on October 20–31, but the 
Soviets remained until 1990.
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On January 1, 1969, Czechoslovakia became a federation of 
Czech and Slovak socialist republics. Dobos joined the Slovak 
government as minister of minority affairs and chair of the 
government’s National Minority Council. Rezső Szabó became one 
of the vice-chairman of the National Minority Committee of the 
Slovak legislature. In April 1969, Dubček was replaced as head of 
the federal party by Gustáv Husák. Despite the new constitutional 
act, the so-called normalization system abolished minority 
organizations or left them as formalities. Among those replaced by 
pro-Soviet officials were the reformist heads of CSEMADOK.
The political restoration also obstructed the assertion of the 
minority’s constitutional rights. The language rights and the schools 
of the Hungarian minority were frequently attacked in the 1970s 
and 1980s. For example, it became illegal for the Hungarian press to 
refer to Slovak-inhabited settlements by their Hungarian names. The 
Hungarian teacher training in Nitra was scaled down. The Slovak 
education portfolio from 1978 onwards advanced several plans for 
turning Hungarian-taught schools into bilingual ones or steadily 
introducing Slovak as the language of instruction.
News of the plans to end Hungarian schooling aroused strong 
opposition from the minority Hungarian intelligentsia and even 
from CSEMADOK, which directly promoted the formation of 
a Committee fot the Protection of the Rights of the Hungarian 
Minority in Czechoslovakia.29 Formed in 1978 and directed by Miklós 
Duray, this was the one rights-defense body to continue operating 
illegally until the fall of the communist system, although its staff 
were harassed by the secret police (Duray was imprisoned twice). It 
managed to orchestrate a wave of protest that helped to dissuade the 
authorities from pursuing their plans for bilingual education.30
The other outstanding figure in the Hungarian opposition apart 
from Duray was Kálmán Janics, who was deported and published 
important studies in Hungarian émigré journals in the West. These 
and a monograph entitled Years of Statelessness did much to 
advertise how the Hungarian minority was being deprived of its 
rights.31
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Yugoslavia (Árpád Hornyák)
Three of the member socialist republics of the post-war federal 
Yugoslavia had a Hungarian minority: Serbia (in the Autonomous 
Province of Vojvodina), Croatia and Slovenia.
The Hungarian community in Vojvodina shrank considerably 
after the war in absolute and proportional terms. About 80,000 
emigrated, mainly to Hungary, and post-war reprisals took a toll 
in tens of thousands. The relative significance of the Hungarian 
community was reduced by the massacre or expulsion of most Jews 
and many Gypsies during the wartime Hungarian occupation and 
by almost total removal of the German community, whose members 
were branded as collective war criminals after the war. The vacancies 
created were filled by several hundred thousand South Slavs, 
mainly Serbs from backward regions, under a conscious policy of 
building up the Serb presence. The first post-war census, taken in 
1948, recorded 496,492 Hungarians in Yugoslavia (3.2 percent of 
the population), of whom 428,750 lived in Vojvodina (26 percent), 
in contiguous settlements along the right bank of the River Tisa 
and in large numbers in northern Bačka. The 50,000 Hungarians of 
Croatia lived mainly in the Drava district and the 10,000 in Slovenia 
in the Mura district.
But as passions cooled, Tito’s Yugoslavia announced a new 
“national” policy. Over 18,000 landless Hungarian households 
gained by redistribution under the land reform. Furthermore, the 
minorities were disproportionately strong in the ruling Communist 
Party, and sizeable numbers of Hungarians gained political 
positions. However, there was no scope allowed for collective 
political organization of the Hungarian minority or representation 
of its interests, due to the centralist nature of the communist system, 
and to the implementation of the principle of ‘fraternity and unity’.
Another weakening factor was the fact that the whole Hungarian 
elite vanished after World War II. There were no more minority 
institutions: the Communist Party of Yugoslavia held a monopoly 
of political power and activity.32 The Hungarians and the other 
Case Studies (1948–1989) 409
minority communities could not put forward plans or aspirations, 
elect leaders, or control their lives institutionally. They seem to 
have been affected by the sweeping social and economic changes 
to a greater extent than the majority. The collectivization also lost 
the Hungarians their Church property, and paradoxically their 
communal property as well, making it impossible for them to keep 
up their social activities.33 Yugoslav policy on industrial production, 
especially heavy industrial production, meant initially that many 
small-town factories in the Southern Region were dismantled 
and their plants moved to new centers in more backward parts of 
the country, but new industry began to arrive in the 1950s. The 
transformation of the country and the economic structure in the 
Hungarian-inhabited areas brought about a drastic change in the 
social structure of the Hungarian community. Before the war, two 
thirds of the Hungarians lived in the countryside, 11 percent worked 
in industry, and another 11 percent were artisans and traders. The 
proportion working in agriculture fell rapidly after the war, and 
so did agriculture’s share of production. By the 1970s, the share 
of agriculture in Vojvodina’s social production was down from 59 
percent to 31 percent.34 The change was more conspicuous still in 
the Drava district, where 39 percent were working in industry, and 
in the Mura district, where industry was providing three quarters of 
the jobs in the social (state and cooperative) sector.35
Tito’s policy on the minorities was for show. Although he broke 
with the earlier efforts at forcible assimilation, he emphasized tacit 
assimilation instead. He recognized the rights of minority individuals 
but obstructed any communal organization by the more substantial 
minorities. Yugoslav minority policy was tolerant mainly in the 
fields of political representation, education, culture and language 
use. In political representation particularly there were great efforts 
to attain equality or equality of rights.
The Yugoslav leaders allowed the minorities freedom to use 
their native language and provided them with their own institutions, 
but from the outset the aim was to make these as characterless as 
possible in national terms. Political, academic and civil careers were 
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assured to the Yugoslavian Hungarian intelligentsia, but efforts were 
made to divorce them from their environment and native language.36 
For the most prestigious Hungarian institutions were based in Novi 
Sad, which isolated Hungarians who worked in them from the main 
bloc of Hungarian settlement far to the north.
Hungarian-taught education in Yugoslavia was in a better 
position than in the other successor states. There emerged in the 
1950s a network of gymnasia, specialist secondary schools and 
specialist training schools teaching in Hungarian that covered the 
province quite well, although not perfectly. The acute shortage of 
teachers was eased when the new University of Novi Sad included in 
1959 a Hungarian faculty offering qualifications for middle schools’ 
Hungarian teachers, and founded an Institute of Hungarian Studies 
in 1969. But this was the last Hungarian-language higher education 
institute established, and its intake was cut by the provincial 
authorities, which contributed to a situation where recruitment to 
teaching fell below replacement level. (In 1984, Hungarians made 
up almost 20 percent of Vojvodina’s population, but accounted for 
only 10.3 percent of those in higher education.)37 The number of 
elementary and secondary pupils taught in Hungarian fell drastically 
in the 1960s, due to disguised assimilation, a rise in mixed marriages, 
and large numbers of Hungarians working abroad.
Several Hungarian-language periodicals were founded in the 
1944–1948 period. The daily Magyar Szó appeared in the autumn of 
1945, and so did papers for children and young people. The aggregate 
membership of Hungarian cultural associations rose, and was much 
higher than before the war. There were 62 in operation in 1948, 
but over 100 took part four years later in the Hungarian Festival 
Games held at Palić, near Subotica.38 The umbrella organization 
for all areas of culture was the Hungarian Cultural Association of 
Vojvodina9 formed in Subotica in the summer of 1945. However, this 
“voluntarily” merged in 1948 with the Vojvodina Public Education 
Association. This meant that it became only a department, and the 
change involved a move from Subotica to Novi Sad that divorced it 
from its mass base. Hungarian drama followed a similar course.
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Hungarian-taught schools began to reopen in 1945 for the 
Hungarian minority in Croatia, who numbered about 50,000, but 
as in Vojvodina, the biggest problem was a shortage of teaching 
staff. A Croatian Hungarian Association40 was set up in Osijek in 
November 1949, with a weekly paper, Magyar Néplap. After a year’s 
gap this was replaced in 1951 by the pictorial Képes Újság, with a 
print run of 2,500–3,800 in that period. The Association played a 
seminal part in organizing cultural activity through local societies 
founded in almost every Hungarian-inhabited village. There were 
83 in the early 1950s, 62 of them cultural, 12 devoted to game 
hunting, and 9 devoted to sports and physical education. Croatia’s 
Hungarian community underwent the fastest decline and numbered 
only 22,355 in the 1991 census.41
The Hungarian community in the Mura district was in a 
similar position to those of Vojvodina and Croatia, undergoing the 
same processes: inward migration, and the foundation and later 
dissolution of cultural associations. A weekly paper, Népújság, was 
printed in some 2,000 copies. Changes came with the 1959 party 
resolution and the 1963 constitution, which gradually expanded 
the scope for the Mura Hungarians. The constitution assigned the 
minority question to the constituent republics. Slovenia decided 
on exemplary treatment, with an eye to easing the position of the 
Slovene minorities in Italy and Hungary.
After the 1948 split between Tito and Stalin, Yugoslavia gained 
greater scope for diplomatic, economic and political maneuver than 
the other state-socialist countries. Its policy on national communities 
and minorities proved more flexible as well. Yugoslavia had to 
ward off constant attacks from COMINFORM and the socialist 
countries in the years after 1948. One defense was to reinterpret 
Marxist principles and introduce in 1950 what came to be known as 
worker self-management. This partial devolution of executive power 
embraced benign gestures and a more tolerant policy towards the 
minorities. The 1952 Palić Games were held at a time when relations 
between Yugoslavia and Hungary were at their coldest. However, 
the threat from the north and east perpetuated the party state’s fear 
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of minority self-organization, as shown by the disbanding of the 
Vojvodina Hungarian Cultural Association.
The Yugoslav leadership and its tightly controlled legislature 
paid little heed to the minority question in the post-war years. Not 
until March 24, 1959, did the League of Communists of Yugoslavia’s 
Central Committee Executive pass a resolution on the subject. The 
dual-affiliation formula employed meant that the minorities were 
part not only of their nation of origin, but also of the country of 
domicile, and the greater their equality of rights the smoother 
their development would be. The party resolution declaring them 
to be integral parts of the socialist Yugoslavian community took 
care to avoid the injustice of ignoring minority members when 
filling important party state posts. It called for closer attention 
to bilingualism, and welcomed the operation of local minority 
cultural organizations, as binding forces at commune and district 
level, but did not see a need to combine them in an organizational 
sense. The 1963 constitution preferred to call the minorities national 
minorities.42 That of 1974 allowed vertical republic-wide national 
minority organizations in Croatia and Slovenia, but not in Serbia, 
where 90 percent of the Hungarian community lived. (The main 
reason was fear of giving rights to the large Albanian population in 
Kosovo, Serbia’s other autonomous province.)
The relative benefits of Yugoslavia’s economic and political 
reforms were necessarily extended to the intellectual activity in 
Vojvodina and among the country’s Hungarians. The economic, 
political and cultural situation of the Hungarians and other minorities 
became far better than in neighboring countries. They were able to 
enjoy the relatively positive changes of the period as citizens of equal 
rank. The literary and cultural journal Új Symposion was founded 
in January 1965, acting as a channel between world literature and 
that of the Vojvodina Hungarians. Its foundation coincided with 
initial efforts by the Yugoslav leadership to develop a supranational 
“Yugoslav nation” that went beyond the traditional notions of 
a nation. There was willingness among most of the Vojvodina 
Hungarian intellectual elite to sacrifice the traditional Hungarian 
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concept of nation to such Yugoslavism. Several of its members held 
high posts in the province’s political and institutional leadership.43 In 
this way they managed for a time to win the sympathy and support 
of the Yugoslav reform communists. But when they began, in line 
with literary tradition, to criticize the negative aspects of society, 
the authorities clamped down and the initiatives were banned, along 
with the existing institutions.44
The roots of Vojvodina’s autonomy reached back to the 1690s, 
when various privileges were granted to the Serb settlers by Emperor 
Leopold I, during and after the great northward migration of the 
Serbs. A territorially separate Crown Land known as the Serbian 
Vojvodeship and the Banat of Temes45 was established by the 
Habsburg government in 1849, but abolished again after ten years, 
when the territory was subsumed into the Hungarian county system. 
There was no separate administrative entity under Yugoslavia either, 
until Vojvodina was organized as an autonomous province of Serbia 
in 1945. However, that had no practical effect before the 1960s, or 
real significance until the 1974 constitution granted the province a 
status equivalent to that of a republic.
The 1953 constitution of Yugoslavia extended the system of 
self-management to the fields of culture and society, initiating a 
process of decentralization that peaked with the 1974 constitution, 
which effectively also broke the Communist Party up into separate 
territorial parties. Power in Vojvodina was taken by a group that 
kept an eye on local interests and included some Hungarians who 
identified wholly with Yugoslavism. This leadership was ousted 
in the autumn of 1988 by the “yoghurt revolution” of Slobodan 
Milošević’s Federation of Serbian Communists and by the virtual 
abolition of Vojvodina’s autonomy six months later.
the Soviet union (Csilla Fedinec)
The 1945–1991 period in which Transcarpathia (official name in 
the Soviet era: Zakarpatskaja oblast’ [Transcarpathian Territory]) 
belonged to the Soviet Union is divisible from the Hungarian point 
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of view by the following turning points: the 1945 Soviet–Hungarian 
agreement on sovereignty over Transcarpathia; the Twentieth 
Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1956, 
where cautious post-Stalinist reforms were announced, resulting 
in some concessions also on Hungarian affairs in Transcarpathia; 
the foundation of the Forrás [Source] Youth Studio in 1967, which 
formulated some political submissions on behalf of the Hungarian 
majority; finally, the foundation in 1989 of the Transcarpathian 
Hungarian Cultural Association as the first local body for the 
protection of the local Hungarian community’s interests.46
There was consternation among the inhabitants of Transcarpathia 
at the changes brought about by Soviet rule, which were radical and 
violent even by comparison with the sufferings undergone during 
World War II. They were intimidated by the persecution of kulaks 
and political show trials. Nationalization affected every branch of 
the economy. The peasants were herded into collective farms, and 
shorn of their land, tools and livestock. Each household was left 
with only a small plot of land for its own use, but some communities 
had remarkable success with some garden crops. Velyka Dobron’, 
for instance, became famous for its potatoes and peppers.47 
Petrovo became something of a model community as the center 
of a collective farm (kolkhoz), and its chairman, Andor Bíró, was 
the one Hungarian representative in the Supreme Soviet.48 There 
was substantial inward migration from other parts of the Soviet 
Union. It was the practice throughout the country for graduates to 
be posted for two or three years far away from their native area. 
Those drafted into the army served in units beyond Ukraine. Many 
Transcarpathians took seasonal work in “Russia” or became security 
guards accompanying trains carrying produce. This earned several 
times their normal wages for two or three summer months.
There had never been appreciable industry in the area, and only 
smaller component factories were relocated there from other republics 
during the Soviet period. This meant that the break-up of the Soviet 
Union caused a further economic trauma. One big economic factor 
was the railway system. Rail links between Czechoslovakia and 
Romania, and between Hungary and Poland, had been important 
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geopolitical factors since 1919. Chop and Bat’ovo (along with Brest 
further north, now in Belarus) formed a main western gateway for 
Soviet goods before the break-up of COMECON, playing a vital 
part in passenger and freight traffic.
The official atheist ideology of the Soviet Union confined religion 
in Transcarpathia within the walls of the churches. No Communist 
Party member, teacher or state office holder could attend church, not 
even weddings or baptisms. Church property was also nationalized, 
and many churches were closed or used as atheist museums or 
stores. In 1949, the Uniate or Greek Catholic Church in communion 
with Rome was forcibly merged into the Orthodox Church. Priests 
who refused to make the move were deported to labor camps. Some 
three quarters of the Transcarpathian Hungarians belonged to the 
Reformed Church, while the remainder were Greek Catholic or 
Roman Catholic. There were difficulties with training priests, as 
the only Catholic seminary was in Riga, Latvia. The clergy of the 
Reformed Church were trained at courses in Beregovo. After 1989 
it became possible for Catholic or Reformed clergy to be brought 
from Hungary, and somewhat later for Transcarpathians to pursue 
theological studies abroad.49
Hardly any great artists of old (such men as Gyula Virágh, 
Gyula Ijjász, Andor Novák, Sámuel Beregi or Károly Izai) survived 
into the Soviet period, but the first generation of the Transcarpathian 
school remained: Béla Erdélyi, József Boksay and Emil Grabovszky. 
Erdélyi failed after the war to start an artists’ association, although 
he was made chairman of the local branch of the Ukrainian 
republican association. From this official position he tried to start 
an art college in Uzhgorod, but it closed after a few months in favor 
of a secondary school for industrial design. Among the early pupils 
of both were István Szőke, László Habda, Gyula Sztaskó, Pál Balla, 
Erzsébet Kremninczky, Miklós Medveczky, Edit Luták Medveczky, 
János Sütő, and others including the highly original Anna Horváth 
and the painter József Garanyi, both from Beregovo. Erdélyi was 
soon sidelined, although he had registered as a Ukrainian, despite 
not speaking the language. As he remarked, “I’m a Ukrainian of 
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French culture and German native language [both parents were 
Swabians], who speaks Hungarian best.”50
The local press was communist-run: the daily Kárpáti Igaz Szó, 
Kárpátontúli Ifjúság for the young, translated word for word from 
a Ukrainian original, Vörös Zászló in Beregovo, Kommunizmus 
Zászlaja in Vinogradovo, and Kommunizmus Fényei in Uzhgorod. 
The first three especially had literature columns, but the state 
publisher issued only one or two Hungarian books a year. The other 
chance of publication was in the literary supplement of the popular 
annual Kárpáti Kalendárium, which appeared for forty years from 
1957. Almost the whole of all these papers except Kárpáti Igaz Szó 
was translated, but their literary sections printed original Hungarian 
work. Chances of publication abroad were very rare.
Books in Hungarian appeared from the Hungarian department 
at the textbook publisher and from the publishing house Karpaty. 
Schools in Ukraine followed the pre-war Soviet curriculum until 
1947, with slight adjustments to party resolutions that appeared. The 
ban on “foreign-language” textbooks at the end of 1944 covered 
not only Hungarian ones, but also those issued earlier for the Slav 
population by the Prosvita society, the Subcarpathian Scientific 
Society, and other associations closed after the war. All local history 
content was withdrawn, with the result that a whole generation grew 
up unaware of its own history. Another purge came in 1956, when 
all language and literature textbooks, including the Hungarian ones, 
had to be cleansed of references to Stalin and praise of him. The 
textbooks for schools teaching in Moldavian could be imported from 
the Moldavian SSR, but those used in Hungarian-taught schools had 
to be translated from Russian, except those for Hungarian language 
and literature. The very first Hungarian literature textbook for 
Transcarpathia, which appeared in 1950, was written by Antal 
Hidas, who lived in Moscow, but the rest were written by locals 
(Dezső Csengeri, Gizella Drávai, László Balla, Erzsébet Gortvay, 
and others).51
The local state publishing house Karpaty was not specifically 
for the Hungarian minority, but it had a Hungarian department and 
it began in 1959 also to publish jointly with firms in Hungary. By 
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1970 it had issued 1,800 titles in a total of 20 million copies, some of 
them sold in Hungary. Only one or two single-author works of prose 
or poetry per year appeared in Transcarpathia, but the almanacs and 
anthologies provided authors with broader publishing possibilities. 
From 1945 to 1983, the only scope for Hungarian writers anywhere 
between Tyachevo (Ukrainian: Tyachiv) and Uzhgorod was the 
literature studio attached to the Beregovo paper Vörös Zászló. In 1971, 
László Balla, editor-in-chief of the Kárpáti Igaz Szó, published an 
article (anonymously) accusing the Forrás [Source] Literary Studio 
in Uzhgorod of spreading bourgeois ideas and of being apolitical 
and anti-Soviet. At that time, the Beregovo studio provided the only 
refuge. Later the daily Kárpáti Igaz Szó, still with Balla at the helm, 
also gave chances for writers to see their work in print on a page 
labeled “Momentum.” In 1988, this gave way for a year and a half 
to a separate cultural magazine supplement called “New Shoot.”52 
Another substitute for book publication in 1979–1986 took the form 
of 14 verse booklets published as part of the paper (which had its 
print run of 40,000), along with an anthology of one verse each from 
15 poets. A traditional Transcarpathian almanac or “calendar” was 
published by Karpaty throughout the period under various titles.53
The promise of the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party 
of the Soviet Union in 1956 was belied by arrests in response to a wave 
of sympathy for the Hungarian Revolution, but in 1957 it became 
possible to buy books and subscribe to periodicals from Hungary. 
Hungarian radio and television programs could be picked up in 
most of the Hungarian-inhabited areas of Transcarpathia. The short 
programs in Hungarian made at the Uzhgorod studios of the Soviet 
state channel RTV were popular mainly in the Upper Tisa district, 
where Hungarian stations could not be picked up until the advent 
of satellite broadcasting in the 1990s. Although the international 
border sealed Transcarpathia off from Hungary – foreign travel was 
allowed only after lengthy procedures, once every two years, for 
the purpose of visiting close relatives – the broadcasts, books and 
periodicals kept the Hungarians of Transcarpathia relatively well 
informed.
418 Minority Hungarian Communities in the 20th Century
Foremost among the many folksong and dance ensembles was 
the Hungarian Melodies Chamber Ensemble, the Tisza Song and 
Dance Ensemble, and the People’s Theater in Beregovo (headed by 
Ottó Schober), which opened in 1952 and operated for 40 years. 
Prominent among the musicians were Dezső Zádor, who had been 
a pupil of Bartók’s in the 1930s, István Márton, and the critic Tibor 
Boniszlavszky.54
The Hungarians had no separate political or civil organization 
at that time, and the vacuum was filled by literary societies. Most 
of the writers, poets and journalists had graduated in Hungarian 
from the Uzhgorod State University. There worked Sándor Fodó, 
seen as the leading intellectual, who would become founding 
president of the Transcarpathian Hungarian Cultural Association 
in 1989. But the university department and its role were equivocal, 
as its teaching and research did not receive sufficient recognition, 
although it sufficed to provide common ground and encourage 
common thinking among young Hungarian intellectuals.
The literary society that wrote history, so to speak, in that 
period was the Forrás Youth Studio, formed in 1967 by Hungarian 
majors at Uzhgorod State University, having previously issued 
a typewritten samizdat entitled Együtt [Together] in the autumn 
of 1966. The leading light was the poet Vilmos Kovács. After 
this was banned, they found a chance to publish in the periodical 
Kárpátontúli Ifjúság, under whose auspices the studio came into 
being. Its members – József Zselicki, Gyula Balla, András S. 
Benedek, László Györke, and others, with some help from Kovács 
and Fodó – went beyond literary activity to draw up two petitions 
(in the autumn of 1971 and the spring of 1972) for collective rights 
for the Hungarians, addressed to the district party committee and to 
the top party and state leadership in Moscow. That precipitated an 
official campaign against “manifestations of Hungarian bourgeois 
nationalism” and military conscription of some students from the 
university, although they were able to complete their studies later. 
Forrás was replaced in 1971 on ideological grounds by the Attila 
József Literary Studio, to act as a spokesman for Soviet literary 
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ideas. This group gathered around the newspaper Kárpáti Igaz Szó, 
whose editor-in-chief László Balla cooperated actively in quelling 
the dissidents, with the result that the former Forrás activists were 
left with nowhere to publish. Those years gave rise to a dominant 
sense of grievance in the Transcarpathian Hungarian writers. In 1975 
Balla used Kárpáti Igaz Szó to publish a series of articles entitled 
“Soviet Hungarians,” the name that he coined for an ostensible “new 
category of men” on the ethnic map of Europe. It became official 
policy to treat the Moscow émigré writers – Máté Zalka, Béla Illés, 
Antal Hidas, Sándor Gergely, and so on – as the literary classics, 
rather than seeking tradition in Hungarian literature as a whole or 
in local Hungarian writing.
The Attila József Literary Studio was steadily sidelined. 
When it was revived in 1988, it was as the Attila József Creative 
Community, for all creative Transcarpathian Hungarians, not just 
writers and poets, with Károly D. Balla, György Dupka and Sándor 
Horváth as its co-chairmen. However, it dwindled in the 1990s 
without officially dissolving.
As for the one series of literary pamphlets bound up with the 
Kárpáti Igaz Szó, archived in its Uzhgorod offices, it was pulped in 
the 1990s, ostensibly by accident. This fittingly symbolized the end 
of the Soviet period.
Austria (Gerhard Baumgartner)
The Hungarian Revolution in the autumn of 1956 posed a huge 
challenge to Austria, as the Soviet military intervention sent a flood 
of refugees into the country. About 180,000 Hungarian refugees 
arrived in Burgenland in the next three months, including the whole 
teaching staff of Sopron’s College of Mining and Forestry, which 
moved on as a group to Canada in 1957, where the government 
founded for them a new college at Powell River, near Vancouver. 
Austria set up several large transit camps, from which the Hungarians 
were sent to Vienna and onward to a number of Western countries. 
Also set up in 1956 was the great refugee camp at Traiskirchen. On 
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December 19, the refugee camp at Eisenstadt received a visit from 
the US vice-president, Richard Nixon. Most of the refugees later left 
Austria for other countries: only 18,000 remained by the beginning 
of 1959. In Vienna, the United Nations built new apartment blocks 
to house them.55 The 1956 refugees brought a considerable change in 
the structure of the Hungarian-speaking community in Vienna. For 
several decades there were two groups divided by their attitude to the 
Hungarian state. The 1956-ers would have nothing to do with it, but 
the established Hungarian cultural associations in Vienna kept up 
relations with the Kádár regime. The Austrian state set up a separate 
secondary education system for Hungarian refugees, under which 
746 Hungarian students studied in five separate, Hungarian-taught 
gymnasia. The last school-leaving exams for 1956-er Hungarian 
students was held in 1963, after which the gymnasia were closed.56
The economic and social structure of the Burgenland villages 
changed fundamentally in the 1960s. Land ownership patterns several 
centuries old had ensured that dwarf holdings and smallholdings 
existed side by side with the great estates, but these smallholders 
became obliged in the 1960s to commute as workers to earn their 
living, to the industrial areas of Vienna, Lower Austria and Styria.57 
A good example was Andau: this was Austria’s biggest cattle-
breeding community in 1959, with over 2,000 head, but the last cow 
was sold in 1969. The people of Andau began commuting the 100 
kilometers to Vienna in special trains. Meanwhile, mechanization 
reduced the demand for farm labor on the manorial farm centers. 
The laborers moved first to nearby villages and then to the cities.58 
The farm centers with purely Hungarian inhabitants became totally 
depopulated, and the former laborers were rapidly assimilated, as 
Hungarian had only been a “servants’ language” in their eyes. The 
want of a complete Hungarian education system in Burgenland 
meant that there had been no Hungarian minority elite. This function 
was assumed in the 1960s by 1956-ers or other immigrant members 
of the intelligentsia from Hungary. In the Upper Wart at the end of 
the 1960s, the Catholic congregation in Unterwart, the Reformed 
congregation in Oberwart, and the Evangelical congregation in Siget 
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in der Wart all had clergy born in Hungary. The Austrian government 
of Bruno Kreisky, having signed with Italy an agreement on the 
status of South Tyrol (Alto Adige/Südtirol), sought also to settle the 
position of Austria’s minorities. The first step was a secret native-
language census, in which all inhabitants were invited to state their 
native language anonymously. More important was the 1976 act on 
ethnic groups,59 which granted five indigenous minorities certain 
language rights, official Chancellery representation, and state 
financial support. However, the rights of the Carinthian Slovenes, 
the Burgenland Croats and the Vienna Czechoslovaks had been 
guaranteed by interstate treaty, and so they refused to recognize the 
new act or delegate representatives to the new Ethnic Group Councils. 
The Burgenland Hungarians were the only community to form, 
in 1959, such an Ethnic Group Council, whose inaugural meeting 
Kreisky also attended. However, the act recognized as indigenous 
only the Burgenland Hungarians, not the migrant groups in Vienna 
and other cities.60 In 1980, the Burgenland Hungarian Cultural 
Association submitted a memorandum to the Austrian government 
calling for the development of Hungarian secondary and higher 
education institutions, the erection of bilingual place-name signs, 
and recognition of Hungarian as an official language.61 It became 
apparent within a few years that the Ethnic Group Council was not 
capable of pursuing the Hungarian minority’s aspirations, and so 
the Cultural Association declared in 1983 that it was demanding the 
same minority rights for Hungarians as the Croats and Slovenes had 
received under the State Treaty in 1955.62
The first boost in cross-border links came in 1974: the Iron 
Curtain opened at least from one direction and it became possible for 
Austrians to visit Hungary without a visa. The value of Hungarian 
for communication in Austria increased only in 1988, when 
Hungary waived most passport restrictions for its citizens and tens 
of thousands of shoppers flooded into Burgenland and Vienna. Then 
Otto von Habsburg, deputy speaker of the European Parliament and 
son of Hungary’s last king, joined Imre Pozsgay, a leading reform 
communist and state minister, in making a symbolic first cut in the 
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barbed wire across the frontier at Sopron on August 19, 1989, and a 
mass of waiting East German tourists seized the chance to flee to the 
West.63 This Pan-European Picnic marked an important breach in the 
division of Europe. By Christmas the Eastern European communist 
dictatorships were falling successively and the change of system 
had begun. The rest of the barbed wire dividing the Hungarians of 
Burgenland from Hungary was removed in the summer of 1990, 
after 45 years.
The villages of southern Burgenland had been closed 
communities until the mid-1960s. Not until then did people start 
commuting from them to neighboring towns and to cities such as 
Vienna and Graz. Hitherto every aspect of daily village had been 
tied to the home village, in a form of village life that provided a 
basis and framework for various distinct dialects to flourish as the 
natural means of communication. Hitherto it had been expected that 
those marrying into a Hungarian-speaking village would learn the 
dialect, and most of them did. Every Burgenland village contained 
some people who had mastered the local language alongside their 
own, and that new language would be the local dialect, not literary 
Hungarian.
The survival of the village dialects was assisted by strong ties 
to local cultural traditions. Each dialect was linked with verses for 
Luca64 or for the best man at weddings, with beating out winter, with 
Carnival, with traditional village frolics, and with traditional songs 
sung on such occasions, so that the dialects acted as a cultural and 
social bond, producing in Burgenland a kind of village ethnicity.65
By the mid-1970s, social modernization was breaking this 
traditional world up. The commuting workers left the village each 
morning and returned at night, or returned only at weekends. 
Also breaking up was the extended family structure, for several 
generations were decreasingly likely to live under one roof. While 
households still included three generations, the commuting did not 
affect language use greatly, as the grandparents stood in for the 
parents and taught the children the local speech. But if a young couple 
lived separately or moved to another village, there was no way to 
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transmit the minority dialect. It may not have been coincidental that 
this was when the first Burgenland Hungarian cultural association 
was formed, as if in response to these developments. The trends 
were noted by the rural clergy, who prompted the formation of 
institutions whose forms and demands were intended to offset the 
damage to the old village framework. This was successful to some 
extent through the financial and political support received after the 
1976 minority act came into force and the Burgenland Hungarians 
received official recognition.
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VI. FroM tHE cHAnGE oF rEGIME






The question of minority rights protection was sidelined in 
international domain after World War II. The horrors of the war 
had inclined the United Nations, founded in 1945, to concentrate 
on furthering world peace, stability, and the universal protection of 
human rights. The accepted wisdom in that period was that minority 
rights could be ensured by protecting human rights as a whole 
and prohibiting discrimination, especially on a racial, national or 
ethnic basis, and thus any reference to minority rights was omitted 
from the 1948 UN Declaration of Human Rights.1 It was rare for 
international human rights instruments to mention minorities at 
all, the most prominent exception being the 1966 International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,2 long the sole international 
human rights treaty to allude to the right of persons belonging to 
minorities to their culture and identity.3
Not until 1989–1990 did the minority issue come to the forefront 
of international politics again, as the authoritarian rule of the Com-
munist Parties of Central and Eastern Europe fell apart. Democratic 
transition was often accompanied by grave ethnic conflicts in the 
region. This applied especially to the break-up of the Soviet Union 
and of Yugoslavia, as national and ethnic communities in the former 
socialist federations started to claim not only political freedom but 
also the right to self-determination. The secessions of the Soviet 
republics were replete with such conflicts (one example being that of 
the Russian minority in the Transnistria region of Moldova), and so 
was the gaining of independence by the Yugoslav successor states 
(Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia and Slovenia).4
The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the wars in the ex-
Yugoslav region in 1991–1999 provoked serious international public 
attention on the situation of national minorities. These concerns 
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were reflected in the European context within the framework of 
international co-operations both in security and human rights issues. 
The Copenhagen Document on the Human Dimension, adopted on 
June 5–29, 1990, by the Conference on Security and Cooperation 
in Europe (CSCE; from 1994 the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe, OSCE), was the first significant step in 
setting the standards on the human rights of minorities in Europe, 
listing various cultural, linguistic, educational and political rights 
belonging to members of national minorities.5 This was followed 
by the adoption of the Helsinki Document of the CSCE in 1992, 
which established the office of the High Commissioner on National 
Minorities, whose tasks, through the diplomatic channels of the 
CSCE participants, were to provide “‘early warning’ and, as 
appropriate, ‘early action’ at the earliest possible stage in regard to 
tensions involving national minority issues that have the potential 
to develop into a conflict within the CSCE area, affecting peace, 
stability, or relations between participating States.”6 In the event, the 
High Commissioner in the last decade has gone beyond diplomatic 
activity to prepare comprehensive reports and proposals for the 
states on developing their minority rights legislations (for example, 
on the situation of Roma in Europe, on minority education, on 
language rights, and on the political participation of minorities).7 
The fact that minority rights protection is not just a European 
concern was reflected in the 1992 UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic 
Minorities.8
However, these were only political statements, not backed by 
legal commitments from the CSCE participant states – they did not 
qualify as full recognition of minority rights under international law. 
Such a move could not be expected from a mainly security-focused 
international organization, such as the CSCE/OSCE. The Council 
of Europe seemed to be a much more suitable organization for these 
endeavors. Several attempts were made in the early 1990s to have 
the Council of Europe prepare such a treaty. The first outcome was 
the 1992 European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, 
which defines the scopes for minority language use, from education 
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to state administration, allowing any subscribing state to choose the 
degree to which it accords these legal commitments on providing 
rights to its minorities. Moreover, even though the Language Charter 
clearly has effects on the situation of minorities, its declared goal 
is limited to the protection of regional or minority languages. The 
first international treaty to deal expressly and comprehensively with 
the rights of national minorities was the Framework Convention for 
the Protection of National Minorities, agreed within the Council 
of Europe in 1995. This enunciated the main principles in treaty 
obligations under international law, precluding, for instance, for 
instance, discrimination based on membership of a national minority, 
and stipulating that state parties should encourage and promote the 
protection of minority identity, language and culture.9 The Framework 
Convention acknowledged that protection of minority rights “is part 
of the international protection of human rights and as such falls within 
the scope of international cooperation.”
But neither the Framework Convention nor the Language Charter 
states plainly what states have to do, or what rights states must grant 
their minorities if their minorities’ identities are to be preserved. 
Furthermore, implementation of these agreements is monitored only 
by committees of experts and the political body of the Committee 
of Ministers – there is no recourse to an international court if a 
signatory state infringes rights agreed under these treaties.
The international documents merely formulate goals that each 
state may attain by incorporating them into its policies and legislation. 
For instance, there is no international document to define what size 
of minority would warrant a separate state university teaching in 
the minority language. The international standards are confined to 
stating that minorities have a right to appropriate education in their 
own language, but largely leave it to each state to decide how to 
meet this requirement.10
Thus the international protection of minority rights raises 
some complex issues. There is serious debate between states about 
whether there exist so-called collective rights applicable not to 
individuals but to minority communities, such as the right to self-
government or autonomy. These questions are left open in the 
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international documents that states have endorsed by consensus. 
The formulation of coherent, detailed international legal obligations 
proceeds in a cumbersome fashion, not only because states in 
Europe differ subjectively in their views on the consistency of 
minority rights, but also because of objective difficulties: the wide 
variety of demographic and sociological situations and degrees of 
organization found among the minorities themselves.
However, increasing emphasis has been placed in international 
politics on how states treat their minorities. It was seen that states 
and international organizations were encouraged to increase the 
protection of minorities in the 1990s by the perceived threats of 
war and violent conflict. It was recognized that the more successful 
is the accommodation of minority rights according to the needs 
of minority communities, the smaller the likelihood of majority/
minority conflict developing in a state. So minority protection was 
conceived in the context of the protection of human rights as an 
important international commitment for states to make.
A new development came when the European Union, the 
paramount political and economic entity of institutionalized 
international co-operation in Europe, joined the OSCE and the 
Council of Europe in paying serious heed to the minorities of 
Central and Eastern Europe. The 1993 summit of the EU, which set 
the Copenhagen Criteria for the accession of Central and Eastern 
European states, placed great stress on political criteria, including the 
protection of minorities. This was a big change for an organization 
that historically had seen European integration mainly in terms of 
economic integration and creating a single market.
The EU accession process for the early Central and Eastern 
European candidates, including Hungary, began in the spring of 1998. 
The European Commission issued every year a regular report (“the 
EU government” so to speak) on how far the Copenhagen Criteria 
had been met by candidate states, including developments in the 
position of the minorities. The extreme political importance of EU 
membership meant that the candidate countries strove to meet the 
political requirements, even though they were not legally binding.11
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This could be seen mainly in the strengthening of social 
integration measures for the Roma. In 2002–2004 a new Treaty 
Establishing a Constitution for Europe was prepared, in which, on 
Hungary’s proposal, it was stated for the first time that the Union 
had recognized in Community law the rights of those belonging to 
minorities. When the ratification process was terminated at the end 
of 2007 after rejection of the European Constitution by French and 
Dutch voters in referenda, it gave way to the Reform Treaty, which 
eventually took the form of the Treaty of Lisbon, which retained the 
reference to minority rights unchanged.12
All in all, the 1990s marked a big advance, as the question of 
minority protection and the situation of minorities came to the fore 
in international politics. The international community has now taken 
responsibility for their situation, the protection of their human rights, 
and the preservation of their identity – and not simply for fear of 
ethnic conflict. A further important development in the last 15 years, 
apart from the international documents adopted, is that any dispute 
over the minorities is no longer seen simply as an internal affair. The 
importance of international cooperation is universally recognized. 
This has been seen in the 2000s in international debates on the 
relation between kin-state and cross-border kin-minorities,13 the 
implementation of specific minority rights, the right of minorities 
to self-government or autonomy.14 Although since the late 1990s 
minority issues seem to be less important for the international 
community, the international documents adopted in the past decades 
are determining for handling internal and international debates on 
minority rights.
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2. HunGArIAn MInorItIES
And tHE cHAnGE oF SYStEM, 1989–1991
László Szarka
The system changes in East-Central Europe in 1989–1991 brought 
changes that were revolutionary in many ways. Monopoly 
communist power, after a brief transition, yielded to a democratic, 
parliamentary, multi-party system, and a Soviet-style command 
economy to a market-led one of privatization and free enterprise 
dominated by multinationals. But the gap left by the previously 
proclaimed communist notion of equality and the social, political 
and economic polarization that ensued brought symptoms of crisis 
to all societies in the region. The gap between the newly rich and 
the newly unemployed became a gulf, while both changes were 
often undeserved. Middle-class impoverishment and mounting 
destitution in the rest of society led to doubts about whether the 
newly proclaimed equality of opportunity meant anything at all.
On a great-power level, the changes of system came from 
Gorbachev’s reforms and rapprochement with the United States. 
The transforming force was trade unionist in Poland, constitutional 
in Hungary, “velvet” in Czechoslovakia, violent in Romania, and 
generated in East and West Germany by the fall of the Berlin Wall 
and the rise of reunification. The Soviet Union collapsed in 1991 
and Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia gave way to new states as 
well. The end of the Soviet bloc meant the end of its military and 
economic manifestations, the Warsaw Pact and COMECON. One of 
the early intimations of irreversibility was a spate of admissions to 
the Council of Europe.1
Opposition forums were developed meanwhile by all the main 
minority ethnic groups in the region. As democratic programs were 
written, a free press appeared, and parties and movements were 
founded, minorities naturally joined in the process of creating the 
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institutional system of political pluralism. They were simultaneously 
quick to institutionalize their relations with parent countries that 
were likewise reformulating their obligations to their minorities 
abroad. This renewed “parental” role was codified as follows in 
Paragraph 6.3 of Hungary’s revised constitution, promulgated on 
October 23, 1989: “The Republic of Hungary shall bear a sense of 
responsibility for the fate of Hungarians living outside her borders 
and shall promote the fostering of their links with Hungary.”2
Minority Hungarian communities in the Carpathian Basin could 
rely on initiatives from the reformers and dissidents in the state 
Communist Parties, on student movements, literary and cultural 
groups and clubs, voluntary and Church organizations, and on 
democratic initiatives among independent, opposition intellectuals. 
This steadily gained support meant that legal protection for minorities 
featured large within the illegal organizations of the 1980s. So the 
minority Hungarian movements and parties that emerged during 
the change of system had various antecedents.3
The changes that began in the Soviet Union in 1985 were mainly 
diplomatic. Tensions between the two superpowers began to ease. But 
Mikhail Gorbachev, unusually young for a Communist Party general 
secretary, sought domestic political changes as well, labeled glasnost 
(openness) and perestroika (transformation). The early period was 
marred by secretiveness about the disastrous accident at the Chernobyl 
nuclear power station, which undermined the credibility of glasnost 
for the world. By 1988, it was clear that the Soviet Union could not be 
modernized by reforms alone, and a process began that culminated 
in August 1991, when Gorbachev announced that the Soviet member 
republics would conclude a new treaty of association. This sparked an 
attempted coup by the army and secret service, forestalled by Boris 
Yeltsin, president of the Russian Federation, and forces loyal to him, 
but Gorbachev returned to power only symbolically. The Creation 
Agreement of the Commonwealth of Independent States, signed on 
December 8, 1991, at Belovezhskaya Pushcha, meant in effect that 
the Soviet republics had won their independence. The superpower 
had been replaced by new states, one of which was Ukraine, which 
included Transcarpathia.4
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Intellectuals, writers and artists were instrumental in 
Transcarpathia when the Transcarpathian Hungarian Cultural 
Association was formed at Uzhgorod (soon to become known as 
Uzhhorod) on February 26, 1989, with Sándor Fodó as its first 
president.5 It announced in its program that it would further the 
cultural and political interests of the community, and was soon 
expressing a need for provincial and national self-government. In 
the autumn of 1991, the council of Berehove (the former Beregovo) 
District proposed that the territory of Transcarpathia be declared 
an autonomous region and that the territory of Berehove District 
become a Hungarian Autonomous District. A referendum on 
the two types of autonomy was held in December 1991: in this, a 
clear majority of voters expressed support for autonomy for the 
Transcarpathian oblast and the creation of a Hungarian autonomous 
district of Berehove. However, this had no consequences.6 One 
big move in inter-state relations came on March 1, 1989, with the 
opening of a minor frontier crossing at Astely (Astej)/Beregsurány, 
which enabled Transcarpathians to visit Hungary with simplified 
border procedures.
In the final years of the Husák era (1969–1989) in Czechoslovakia, 
the work of the Czechoslovakian Hungarian Minority Protection 
Committee7 founded in 1978 proved decisive, with help from the 
samizdat and the official press in Hungary. The writer and geologist 
Miklós Duray was put on trial in January 1983, but the case was 
dropped. The Slovakian Hungarian public was mobilized by curbs on 
their language and education rights and by the increasing difficulties 
being faced by Hungarians in Transylvania. Ever more students and 
members of the intelligentsia joined in the defense of minority rights. 
The clergy who had been sidelined for their activity in 1968 became 
active, and so did activists of the Cultural Association of Hungarian 
Workers of Czechoslovakia (CSEMADOK´)8 and several other 
groups. There were protests over Czechoslovak infringements of civil 
and human rights and the general lack of legality, from Charta ’77, 
secret Slovakian Catholic organizations, and the rights movements 
among the Hungarian minority, all of which showed exemplary civil 
courage.9
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Resistance to the negative political initiatives of the Husák 
regime received ever-wider support. The Slovakian Hungarian 
writers’ group became active. CSEMADOK under the chairmanship 
of Zoltán Sidó was the one legal cultural organization to make its 
view heard on the party state’s system, the state-owned publisher 
Madách Kiadó played an increasingly frequent opposition role, and 
rising numbers of Hungarian university students joined in the work 
of minority legal protection, connection-building and information.
Slovakian Hungarians were among the first to join the “velvet 
revolution” that broke out with a mass student protest in Prague on 
November 17, 1989. A group of ethnic Hungarian intelligentsia in 
Šaľa anticipated all other Czechoslovakian groups by founding the 
Independent Hungarian Initiative on November 18.10 Cooperating 
closely with newly founded national movements, the Czech Civil 
Forum and the Public against Violence in Slovakia,11 it appealed 
on November 20 to Slovakian Hungarians to join a national strike 
aimed at ousting the communists. Two days later the Initiative, 
headed by Lajos Grendel, László Szigeti, László A. Nagy and Károly 
Tóth, joined the Public against Violence Coordinating Committee. 
Emphasis in its statements was placed on securing collective 
rights for national minorities through legislation, and on full self-
administration in the cultural and educational fields.12
An Initiative nominee, Sándor Varga, gained a vice-premiership 
in the new multi-party government of Milan Čič, formed on 
December 12, 1989, while László A. Nagy became deputy speaker 
in the legislature in 1990. The Initiative nominee in the government 
that formed after the 1990 general elections was Gábor Zászlós, 
likewise as a deputy prime minister.
Two other Hungarian political movements arose in January 
1990. Groups of Hungarian Catholic intelligentsia initiated the 
Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement,13 which focused in its 
program on securing the rights of Slovakia’s national minorities. It 
also espoused the cause of minority autonomy, but it emphasized 
from the outset the question of representation of the minority cause 
in the government structure.
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Also founded at this time as a classic minority umbrella party 
was the Coexistence Political Movement (for Democracy and the 
Rights of National Minorities), by Miklós Duray, who had returned 
at the end of November 1989 from an 18-month study trip to the 
United States.14 It entered into an electoral alliance with the Christian 
Democrats and proved efficient at mobilizing the Hungarian 
community. The demand for autonomy featured in its program from 
the outset, alongside settlement of the legal and political status of the 
minority and improvement in its cultural economic position.15
The minorities in Romania were under mounting pressure 
over plans by the Ceauşescu regime for village resettlement and 
homogenization. Romanian–Hungarian relations became highly 
strained towards the end of the 1980s, due to the mass flight and 
emigration of Transylvanian Hungarians to Hungary and the public 
demonstrations in Hungary against the regime and its resettlement 
plans.16 A local conflict arose over the removal of the militant Reverend 
László Tőkés from the Timişoara Reformed Church in September 
1989. Official Hungarian protests were joined on December 16 by a 
demonstration by his parishioners and Romanians in solidarity with 
them. This precipitated the December 1989 Romanian revolution, 
for after a couple of days the civil disobedience spread across the 
city and then the whole country, as a national movement against 
Ceauşescu. Attempts by the security police and the army to crush 
the protests caused many casualties, but the demonstrations swelled 
and much of the army came over to the demonstrators’ side. The 
events on December 21–25, 1989, toppled the regime. The dictator 
and his wife were sentenced to death by a summary military court 
and executed immediately. Serious armed clashes continued in 
Timişoara, Bucharest and other big cities between security forces 
loyal to the old regime and demonstrators and the military units on 
their side.17
The leading factor behind the December 1989 revolution became 
the National Salvation Front, as a new organ of state power.18 Among 
those who joined its presiding committee were Géza Domokos, who 
had done much for Hungarian culture as manager of the state-owned 
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Kriterion publishing company, and László Tőkés, a symbolic hero 
of the revolution. The Front duly included in its first proclamation 
on December 22 a pledge of equality before the law for the national 
minorities. Once the legal frames of political pluralism were in 
place, a group of Romanian Hungarians, mainly from Bucharest, 
issued a proclamation on December 25, calling on the Transylvanian 
Hungarians to form local branches of a new Democratic Alliance of 
Hungarians in Romania. This was registered on January 26, 1990, as 
a political body of “national public and interest representation.”19
The individual and collective rights of the minorities were 
duly recognized on January 5, 1990, by the National Salvation 
Front, which committed itself to drawing the minorities into the 
institutions of state, in line with the Gyulafehérvár (Alba Iulia) 
resolution of December 1, 1918.20 The Alliance initially placed great 
emphasis on cooperation with the Front, in line with the December 
25 proclamation, but it soon made clear its demands for communal 
rights for the Romanian Hungarians, to be codified in new national 
minority legislation, and minority participation in the legislature, 
executive and judiciary. The Alliance’s interim leaders – Géza 
Domokos, László Tőkés and Károly Király – called for minority 
language-use and education rights to be granted immediately. Within 
the Alliance, the initiators in Bucharest began to be relegated, and 
its center of gravity moved to the Székely Land, Târgu Mureş and 
Cluj-Napoca in Transylvania.
The process of building up the Alliance and rapprochement 
between Hungarians and Romanians was severely affected by 
the anti-Hungarian riots in Satu Mare and Târgu Mureş in March 
1990. The situation in Târgu Mureş became tense after a march 
of 100,000 Hungarians with books and candles on February 10, 
calling for language and education rights. The appearance of a sign 
in Hungarian at one of the city’s pharmacies was enough to start 
local Romanians organizing a counter-demonstration for March 
19. Rumors of Hungarianization measures were spread by the local 
Romanian press. Károly Király, as a vice-premier in the interim 
government, could not prevent an escalation into open conflict, 
Hungarian Minorities and the Change of System 447
which suited some national and local Romanian politicians. The 
Romanian parties and local interests forced Előd Kincses, Mureş 
County chairman of the Alliance, to resign. Romanian villagers 
moving on the city on March 19, armed with axes, attacked the city 
offices of the Alliance. Only the intervention of the army could save 
the writer András Sütő, who had been seriously beaten, and several 
local Alliance figures. Six lives were lost in the mass violence in 
the main square, and the television pictures shocked opinion in 
Transylvania and around the world. The dramatic nature of the events 
was emphasized by a wave of Transylvanian Hungarian emigration 
numbering several thousand. One important side-effect: the violence 
in Târgu Mureş provided a pretext on March 26 for resurrecting the 
secret police, which had been disbanded on December 30, 1989.21
Faced with indecision by the Bucharest government and 
nationalist efforts within it, the Alliance broke with the Front. At the 
same time, there broke out in the Alliance internal disputes among 
various groupings and political forces, leading to a weakening of 
the reform communist and moderate wing (with the relegation 
of Károly Király) and an advance by the young, radical trends 
(with the appointment of the poet Géza Szőcs, former editor-in-
chief of Ellenpontok, as general secretary) and to some temporary 
compromises in the party. Domokos remained as president and 
Tőkés as honorary president. All trends received seats on its national 
board.
A total of 18 parties including the Alliance won seats in the 
general elections, held at the same time as presidential elections. 
Transylvanian Hungarians won 12 seats in the Senate and 29 in the 
Chamber of Deputies, making them the second-largest force after 
the Front, which gained a two-thirds majority. The Alliance was 
now on the defensive against nationalism fomented by the Front and 
the chauvinist Vatra Românească (“Romanian Hearth”), formed 
on February 7, 1990, in Târgu Mureş, in a parliamentary system 
that left little leeway for opposition. The Alliance, after the Târgu 
Mureş events, found it hard to light on a political style to match its 
importance. A solution was found in the Democratic Convention22 
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formed on August 6, 1990, with other opposition groups, which 
became a vehicle for joint action with Romanian parties and 
renewal of the methods used in minority political activity. A radical, 
autonomist group within the Alliance, pressing for assistance from 
Hungary and the international community, managed for a while to 
increase its support at the expense of the moderates who sought 
cooperation with Romanian parties and factions of government.23
Yugoslavia was unique, as its transformation timetable was 
dictated by the process of state disintegration. Eight years after 
Tito’s death, the Federation of Yugoslav Communists as state party 
could not and would not curb the threat of Serbian nationalism any 
longer, for national conflicts of interest appeared inside the party as 
well. The first casualty was the status of the autonomous provinces: 
Vojvodina, and Kosovo and Metohija.24 Behind the Serbian 
nationalist notions lay the conviction that only a unified Serbia freed 
of provincial autonomy could impose Belgrade’s centralism on the 
other republics and hold the Federation together.
The crisis in post-Tito Yugoslavia began with this program 
of Serbian renewal. The implicit intention of enhancing Serbian 
domination, the efforts to shift internal ethnic borders, and the 
reinterpretation of the federal system to suit Serbia pushed the 
Yugoslav state into open crisis. Effort went at first into curbing 
the administrative autonomy and sovereignty of the republics 
of Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro and Bosnia–
Herzegovina. Then in October 1988 came the “anti-bureaucratic 
revolution” and attendant nationalism that lost Vojvodina its 
autonomous status.25
The Serbian efforts to centralize and restrict minority rights led 
to serious disturbances among the majority Albanians in Kosovo 
in January 1989, reinforced in February by a miners’ strike. The 
Albanian demands received support from other republics, heightened 
by the sharp responses of the Serbian state and party leaders. On 
June 28, 1989, Serbian President Slobodan Milošević chose the site, 
Gazimestan, and the 600th anniversary of the baneful Battle of 
Kosovo on St. Vitus’ Day 1389 to announce to a mass rally that he 
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was “restoring Serbian unity,” thus provoking the first declaration 
of independence by the Kosovo Albanians on July 2.26
The federal legislature, meeting in Belgrade on August 8, 
1990, amended the constitution to allow multi-party government 
throughout Yugoslavia. However, this version of the constitution did 
not recognize the minorities as communities, which left Vojvodina 
and Kosovo with only nominal status. Incitement to xenophobic 
antagonism towards minorities and neighboring countries increased, 
which enhanced the risk of armed conflict.
Faced with these conditions, a group of Hungarian intellectuals 
initiated by András Ágoston launched a petition for minority 
education rights on December 13, 1989. It was signed by almost 
18,000 Yugoslavian Hungarians. Five days later, Ágoston called 
together a committee of intellectuals (István Beszédes, János 
Boldizsár, Károly Dudás, Sándor Hódi, Tamás Korhecz, Frigyes 
Kovács, Zoltán Siflis, László Szekeres, János Tóth and János Vékás) 
to submit the founding document of the Democratic Fellowship 
of Vojvodina Hungarians.27 The initiators, acknowledging the 
consequences of the national and republican lines that had emerged, 
made their call for the collective rights to Serbia. The Fellowship, 
officially inaugurated in 1990, laid its main emphasis on “minority 
self-government on the personal principle” as the most appropriate 
legal form for asserting the collective interests of the Vojvodina 
Hungarians.28
Slovenia and Croatia seceded from Yugoslavia in June 1991 
after a short conflict. Their independence was recognized by the 
European Community countries on January 15, 1992. On April 27, 
1992, the rump of Yugoslavia adopted the fourth constitution in 
Yugoslavia’s history. This rump consisted of a federal community of 
states between Serbia and Montenegro. That was the situation when 
the congress of the Fellowship, meeting in Kanjiža on April 25, 
finalized its “Memorandum on the self-government of Hungarians 
living in the Serbian Republic.” The document, presented as a 
proposed constitutional amendment, was the most comprehensive 
expression hitherto of a system of Hungarian self-government 
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on the triple basis of personal rights and regional and local self-
government organizations.29
Hungary, along with Poland, was the regional pioneer in 
dismantling the party state and eliminating communist dictatorship 
during the years of transition. Cooperation between the opposition 
groups and the reformers within the state party (by no means free 
of conflict) appeared also in handling the issue of the Hungarian 
minorities. This was a constant topic in the émigré papers and the 
samizdat publications in Hungary, notably the periodical Beszélő. 
Apart from the numerous documents and news items that appeared, 
there were reinterpretations of the basic issues of Hungarian 
national and minority policy from such hands as Gyula Illyés, 
Sándor Csoóri, Miklós Duray, Gáspár Miklós Tamás, Géza Szőcs 
and Mihály Hamburger. Important thematic definitions came from 
writers, artists and scholars who had recently settled in Hungary, 
such as Attila Ara-Kovács, Iván Bába, András S. Benedek, Géza 
Páskándi, Pál Bodor, Miklós Hornyik, Károly Lábadi, László Tóth 
and others.30
Important changes were made in the official policy of the 
Hungarian party and government. Imre Szokai and Csaba Tabajdi, 
writing in the daily Magyar Nemzet on February 13, 1988, called 
the relation between the government and the Hungarians minorities 
ripe for rethinking “at this stage in the renewal of Hungarian 
socialism.” They argued plainly in favor of the unity of the cultural 
nation and called the defense of the minority Hungarians a task of 
Hungarian foreign policy.31
The half-hearted initiatives of 1968 had been blocked, but 
official foreign policy took wing again in the early 1980s, when the 
initiative of Imre Pozsgay’s reform supporters in the Hungarian 
Communist Party and of the national line represented by Mátyás 
Szűrös led in 1985–1986 to a declared intention of changing minority 
policy. The new emphases under the Németh government derived 
mainly from Minister of Foreign Affairs Gyula Horn and Minister 
of Education Ferenc Glatz. Yet the opposition at home and among 
the Hungarian minorities rightly called one of the big failings of 
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Kádárite foreign policy the meager activity that Budapest showed as 
the situation for Hungarians in Transylvania and Slovakia worsened.
The consensus for changing domestic and foreign policy during 
the change of system covered not only multi-party democracy 
and restoration of the sovereignty of the Hungarian state, but also 
responsibility for the Hungarian minorities in neighboring countries 
and institutionalized acceptance of that. The need for such support 
was writ large in the government and party programs of 1989–1990.32 
It entailed building up responsible relations with the Hungarian 
communities concerned. The Antall government expressly declared 
that they formed an integral part of the Hungarian nation, that the 
Hungarian state bore responsibility for their survival and destiny, 
and that support would be given for the programs devised by the 
minorities.33 What came to be known as the Antall doctrine placed 
the task of decision-making in the hands of the elected political 
representatives of each minority community concerned. Antall 
underlined the point that his government saw the political movements 
and parties, and the development of forms of personal, local and 
regional autonomy, as stabilizing factors integral to the processes 
occurring in Europe and capable of benefiting neighborly relations. 
In support of the policy of concluding basic treaties with neighboring 
countries, he stated that Hungary opposed any change in external 
or internal state boundaries, but it expected minority rights to be 
observed consistently. It was to the credit of the Antall government 
that it brought to the notice of neighboring countries and the outside 
world (although on occasions in an overly spectacular and emotive 
way) the fact that the cause of the Hungarian minorities abroad was 
a central and priority task of Hungarian foreign policy.34
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3. tHE PoLIcY oF BudAPESt GoVErnMEntS
toWArdS HunGArIAn coMMunItIES ABroAd
Nándor Bárdi
What is known colloquially in Hungary as nation policy – policy 
on minority Hungarian communities – is used since the 1990s 
to cover state policy towards the Hungarians abroad. The stance 
of the state towards the Hungarian nation, cultural heritage and 
envisaged future, and towards the basic values of the European 
Union, has the nature of an identity policy. But the state’s position 
on the ethnic and national minorities of Hungary (sectorial policies 
on minorities and the Roma) and on European national minority 
and ethnic issues can be expressed in ethno-political concepts. 
Beyond these framework concepts there can be distinguished as a 
sectorial field the policy towards the Hungarian community. This 
specific field of nation policy covers the relation system pertaining 
between Hungary and the Hungarians beyond its borders: 
international and bilateral minority protection, institutional 
operation of Hungarian–Hungarian relations (that is, relations 
between the kin-state and the minorities outside), and support for 
minority Hungarian communities. This sectorial policy can also 
be divided into integration, language and institutional policies 
between the government and the Hungarian minority concerned 
in the other Central European countries1
The Antall and Boross governments (May 1990–July 1994) 
had three concurrent goals in international relations: European 
integration, good neighborly relations, and addressing the problems 
of Hungarians abroad. They undertook in foreign policy to protect 
the Hungarian minorities through international forums, based on 
norms of human and minority rights, and to secure collective rights 
for them. At home the intention behind the 1993 Minority Act was 
to provide, instead of individual and language rights for national 
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and ethnic minorities, a self-government design that could act as 
a model for Central Europe. The third tenet was to recognize the 
sovereignty of Hungarian parties outside the country as bodies 
representing community interests, and to heed their views on issues 
affecting them.2
The practice of the Németh government (November 1988–May 
1990) was followed initially in using as the institutional framework 
for policy on the Hungarian community the College and Secretariat 
of National and Ethnic Minorities headed by Géza Entz (appointed 
in May 1990).3 In June 1992, the handling was placed on a higher 
administrative level, with a new Government Office for Hungarian 
Minorities Abroad,4 a parallel Illyés Public Foundation to channel 
governmental and budgetary support to the Hungarians abroad, 
and a special department in the Ministry of Education to deal with 
professional issues. The biggest new institution to be set up was 
Duna TV in 1992, as a television channel specifically broadcasting 
for the Hungarian communities abroad.5
The international policy of the Horn government (July 1994–
July 1998) was marked by debate on the basic treaties required by 
the Western powers as a condition for Euro-Atlantic integration. 
The series began with the Hungarian–Ukrainian basic treaty of 
December 1991, but this was not ratified by Parliament until May 
1993. Similar pacts followed with Croatia and Slovenia in 1992. 
To all three were attached separate commitments by the parties 
to ensure minority rights. One requirement was settled relations 
with the three newly established countries, while international 
recognition of their state sovereignty was contingent on a declaration 
in favor of the European norms of human and minority rights.6 But 
there was conflict over efforts at autonomy and minority protection 
by Coexistence, the Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement 
and the Hungarian Citizens’ Party in Slovakia in the former, and 
with the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania in the 
latter,7 and the debate on these two treaties came to dominate the 
Horn government’s policy towards neighboring countries. For 
the government after 1994 had to present such a policy, capable 
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of handling conflicts, before the culmination of Euro-Atlantic 
integration: the 1997 accession to NATO. It was vital for political 
activity concerning Hungarians abroad not to pose or even seem 
to pose a threat to the region’s stability. The issue became one of 
foreign policy and was subordinate to the priorities of integration. 
So the main European norms of minority rights were incorporated 
into the Hungarian–Slovak basic treaty, despite strong debate on 
the matter. However, these were just individual human rights, not 
the collective minority rights that local Hungarian politicians were 
calling for, and were to be monitored only by a committee with 
advisory powers set up in March 1995. A year and a half later, a 
Hungarian–Romanian basic treaty was concluded in September 
1996, despite Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania 
opposition. To this, relevant documents on minority protection were 
appended too, but, contrarily to the Slovak case, it was laid down 
in a separate footnote that Recommendation 1201 of the Council 
of Europe was not taken to refer to territorial autonomy on an 
ethnic basis. Little was achieved by either of the mixed committees 
designed to provide minority protection guarantees under the 
treaties. Nor was more heard of the promised separate agreements 
with Romania on the return of Church property, restitution for the 
goods expropriated from the Hungarian community, and settlement 
of the issues of native-language use and minority education.8
Meanwhile, there were big changes in Hungarian–Hungarian 
relations and subsidization policy. Basically the government 
regarded the Hungarians abroad as deprived groups, for which 
it bore a constitutional responsibility. But the rhetoric changed: 
future autonomy gave way to prosperity in the country of domicile 
as the envisioned way of handling the problems. The heads of the 
Government Office for Hungarian Minorities Abroad – Csaba 
Tabajdi, László Lábody and Erika Törzsök – stressed the need 
for economic back-up, the importance of political activity in 
local and regional government, and stronger initiatives towards 
modernization and social development. Efforts to further these were 
made by including local representatives into the New Handshake 
Foundation9 and the Illyés Public Foundation, specifically concerned 
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with economic development. On the political side of Hungarian–
Hungarian relations, the government sought contact with elite groups 
still in a position to negotiate with the majority political force on a 
national and local level: the Community of Hungarian Intellectuals 
in Transcarpathia as against the Transcarpathian Hungarian Cultural 
Association, the Vojvodina Hungarian Association opposing the 
Democratic Community of Vojvodina Hungarians, of the Slovakian 
Hungarian parties, the Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement 
and the so-called moderate wing of the Democratic Alliance of 
Hungarians in Romania.10
The foreign policy scope for the Orbán government (July 1998–
May 2002) increased along with the country’s geopolitical weight, 
after Hungary had gained NATO membership before its neighbors. 
This, combined with the support that Hungarian minority parties 
gave to Euro-Atlantic political forces in their own countries and 
their role as coalition partners, meant that the Hungarian minority 
question could no longer be represented as an internationally 
destabilizing element. Moreover, Hungary’s economic growth had 
resumed, which meant that more could be spent on subsidization.11
The focus shifted from crisis management and support for 
developing local institutions onto the financing of programs. The 
Apáczai Public Foundation was set up in December 1998 expressly for 
supporting education and training. Separate Hungarian institutions 
of higher education were established (the Sapientia Hungarian 
University of Transylvania in Cluj-Napoca, Târgu Mureş and 
Miercurea-Ciuc, and the Selye János University in Komárno, both 
in 2001) and existing ones were assured of regular budget support 
(the Berehove teacher training college and the Partium University in 
Oradea). The allocation to the Illyés Public Foundation was raised 
significantly and the media for Hungarians abroad (the news service 
and Duna TV) were further developed.
Institutionally speaking, the Government Office for Hungarian 
Minorities Abroad passed from the Prime Minister’s Office to the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and was overseen by the portfolio’s 
political state secretary, Zsolt Németh.
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The Schengen Agreement brought a danger that Hungary’s 
contacts with Hungarians in Transcarpathia, Vojvodina and 
Croatia, outside the Schengen area, would be impeded. By then it 
was clear that the efforts of Hungarians abroad towards gaining 
autonomy had failed and they could not be approached legally as 
regional communities. Discussion of such problems and formation 
of a supra-party consensus had lain behind the convening under 
the Horn government of the first official Hungarian–Hungarian 
summit in July 1996. Then came a second meeting at Pápa before 
the signing of the Hungarian–Romanian basic treaty, but without 
governmental participation. A conference was held in February 
1999 in Budapest, with the government and the political parties of 
Hungary and Hungarians abroad represented, where it was agreed to 
form a Hungarian Standing Conference as a liaison.12 This political 
consultative body met at least annually under the auspices of the 
Hungarian prime minister of the time and operated by agreement, 
not according to legal provisions. Its main contribution was to 
promote expert forums meeting several times a year under state-
secretary chairmanship. These became the main channels by which 
the administration addressed the problems of the Hungarians abroad. 
At the second meeting of the Hungarian Standing Conference in 
December 1999, the Hungarian parties outside Hungary called for 
legislation on the legal standing within Hungary of the Hungarians 
abroad. The Act on Hungarians Living in Neighboring Countries, 
enacted in June 2001,13 covered native Hungarians in all neighboring 
countries except Austria, granting them rights to stated concessions 
in culture, science, employment, medical care and travel, through a 
Hungarian Certificate issued on application by Hungary’s authorities, 
based on recommendations from specific institutions authorized to 
do so. This was passed with support from all political parties except 
the liberal Alliance of Free Democrats, and cognizance of it was 
taken by all neighboring countries except Romania and Slovakia. The 
former appealed on the grounds of infringement of state sovereignty 
and ethnic discrimination to the Venice Commission of the Council 
of Europe, which ruled in October 2001 that a kin-state had a right 
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to dispense cultural support to non-citizen members of its nation, 
but in doing so it should work to obtain consent from the host state 
and to avoid discrimination. For national identity, the Commission 
required not just personal choice but also the formulation of objective 
criteria. These were provided in a government order: the diplomatic 
mission would confirm that applicants for a Hungarian Certificate 
spoke Hungarian, or were somewhere registered officially as 
Hungarians, or were members of a Hungarian organization, or 
appeared as Hungarians in a church register. In December 2001, the 
Romanian side issued a separate statement of agreement with the 
Hungarian government, the main point in which extended the three-
month concessionary work permit to all Romanian citizens. On the 
act’s application to Slovakia, the Orbán government failed to reach 
agreement with the Commissioner for Enlargement of the EU and 
the OSCE high commissioner on national minorites.14
The Medgyessy government (May 2002–September 2004) 
placed the question of Hungarians abroad within its declared policy 
for national consensus. Its main purpose was to gain acceptance of 
the Status Law from neighboring countries. It accordingly amended 
the act in June 2003, with Fidesz and the Hungarian Democratic 
Forum voting against the change. The reference to a single Hungarian 
nation was removed from the preamble, and concessions on social 
insurance, medical care and employment were removed. However, 
the financial support for education in the mother tongue provided by 
the kin-state became available also for families with a single child, 
and irrespective of ethnic affiliation, the sole requirement being to 
attend a school teaching in Hungarian. The Slovak government would 
consent to the distribution of such support only if it was received by 
the education institutions (not the parents) through the mediation of a 
foundation (December 2003).
After the government change, the Government Office for 
Hungarian Minorities Abroad returned to the Prime Minister’s 
Office, under the secretary responsible for international relations. 
But the influence of László Kovács, minister of foreign affairs and 
Socialist Party president, and the diplomatic moves associated with 
the Status Law meant that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
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the party leaders of the Hungarians abroad had an increasing say. 
This was due to the stance of the Hungarian government that the 
decisions concerning support for Hungarians abroad should be left 
to the representatives of the latter. Thanks to the favorable domestic 
political position of the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in 
Romania, the Statue of Liberty in Arad was re-erected in a public 
square (in April 2004) and the Romanian government decided to 
build the Northern Transylvanian motorway in 2003–2004), although 
the Hungarian government helped indirectly in both cases.
The Hungarian–Hungarian policy of the first Gyurcsány 
government (September 2004–April 2006) was marked by debate 
on dual citizenship. The question of citizenship for Hungarians 
abroad not resettling in Hungary had come up in the summer of 
2003. For Hungary as an EU member was expected to require visas 
for visitors from two countries – Ukraine and Serbia–Montenegro – with 
large native Hungarian communities. One solution was to award 
them Hungarian citizenship without the requirement of residence 
(passports). Dual citizenship was forbidden by Ukrainian law, but the 
Serbian government stated several times that there was no obstacle. 
In the autumn of 2003, Hungarian organizations in Vojvodina 
collected 50,000 signatures in support and submitted them to 
Budapest. This provided the Budapest-based World Federation of 
Hungarians15 with a basis for initiating a referendum in Hungary. 
Held on December 5, 2004, it called on Parliament to introduce 
legislation on preferential naturalization procedures, by individual 
application, for non-Hungarian citizens domiciled outside Hungary 
who declared themselves members of the Hungarian nation.
All parliamentary parties in Hungary agreed that it was 
unfortunate to hold a referendum on this, but when it was announced, 
in September 2004, the two sides gave voters different advice and 
dual citizenship became a very divisive issue. Prime Minister 
Gyurcsány rejected it outright on the grounds of its purported social 
consequences: a potential influx of settlers, international rejection, 
and disruption to the political balance of the Hungarian electorate. 
Fidesz had warned before the campaign against increased migration 
and weakening of efforts to gain autonomy for Hungarians abroad, 
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but in the campaign it endorsed the clear support for dual citizenship 
given by legitimate organizations of Hungarians abroad. The 
opposition presented the issue of passports as one of strengthening 
relations and national reunification, saying that the drawbacks 
could be guarded against when Parliament legislated. It questioned 
the credibility of the government’s arguments and accused it of 
betraying the national interest. The prime minister’s response was 
to extend the concept of nation policy from relations between the 
Hungarian state and Hungarians abroad to social modernization 
of Hungary and all Hungarians. (This effectively placed the legal 
emancipation in Hungary of Hungarians abroad in the same policy 
bracket as pension, welfare and employment problems.) The 
prime minister intended to advance a sober, long-term, national 
(democratic, patriotic) vision of the future, as against the right-wing 
demand for dual citizenship, with ostensibly unforeseeable results.
The referendum was invalid;16 this strengthened Gyurcsány’s 
political position at home, but in Hungarian–Hungarian relations 
it alienated the Hungarian parties abroad from the Socialist–Free 
Democrat coalition government in Hungary. In January 2005, the 
prime minister announced a Program of National Responsibility, 
including a Homeland Program package. Meanwhile, the leaders 
of the Hungarian communities abroad established a Forum of 
Hungarian Organizations Abroad.17
Three policy strategies for the Hungarian community emerged 
in the decade and a half after the change of system, none of 
which could be exclusively associated with the right or the left. 
Apart from citing international norms and patterns, the minority 
protection approach starts from the premise that good relations with 
neighboring countries are needed before the problems of Hungarian 
minorities can be handled. This lay behind the policy of concluding 
basic treaties, with mixed committees on minority issues to handle 
the problems. Emphasis was given to each minority community 
finding ways of handling its problems within its own country, 
especially where the Hungarian party was a partner in government. 
Hungary could assist primarily by diplomatic means. The same 
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approach appears in the rhetoric about strengthening Hungarian 
minority societies economically and socially. These considerations 
were basic to Hungarian community policy under the left-wing 
governments, along with anti-nationalist discourse (condemning 
symbolic politicizing and national rhetoric).18
The ideology of national unification envisages unity extending 
across nation-state borders that could be institutionalized by breaking 
such borders down (through EU integration). Viewed in this light, 
the minority societies are severed limbs of the Hungarian nation 
dwelling in other countries. The political unity of the Hungarian 
ethno-cultural community was symbolized by the Hungarian 
Standing Conference and by the Hungarian Certificate as the link 
with the Hungarian state on an individual level.19 Beside the pan-
national outlook, the concept of a “contractual nation” was put 
forward to institutionalize the development separate from Hungary 
of the Hungarian regional communities in the seven other countries, 
as well as the assertion of their specific interests. The premise was 
that the Hungarian administration had to formulate its relations 
with each regional community separately and vice versa.20 The idea 
of unifying the nation without altering frontiers, along with rhetoric 
emphasizing symbolic, nation-building gestures, appears mainly 
among Hungary’s right wing. The third approach – starting from 
EU integration – emphasizes regionalization, trusting common 
regional interests to prevail over ethnic antagonisms.21 Sectorial 
policy-makers regard developing border areas and regionalizing the 
individual countries as means with great potential for the integration 
of minority Hungarian communities and the system of Hungarian 
cultural institutions, as well as for their own country. They seek to 
achieve this by establishing development regions and cross-border 
regions to meet local requirements (involving historical and ethnic 
characteristics). Some envisage these regions giving rise to regional 
autonomous institutions, which might be needed to shield national 
identity from nation-state interference.
The political consensus that has emerged among political 
parties in Hungary is to treat minority Hungarian communities 
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as separate entities and assist the reproduction and development 
of their national identity, both politically and by supporting their 
institutions. However, achievement of this has been thwarted by 
party rivalries and Hungary’s deteriorating economy. This and the 
abortive referendum – seen by Hungarians abroad as rejection of 
their desire for emancipation – have devalued it for Hungarians 
abroad and caused nation-policy issues to be sidelined in Hungary 
itself.22
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4. dEMoGrAPHIc ProcESSES
In MInorItY HunGArIAn coMMunItIES*
László Gyurgyík
The Hungarian communities in neighboring countries generally 
have a “distorted” social and demographic structure, in the sense 
that their individual social, settlement and demographic attributes 
are less favorable, or more backward, than those of the population 
as a whole. For the main basis for comparison is the population of 
their political domicile – the country whose majority community 
has defined for them the political, economic and demographic scope 
in which the reproduction of their community has occurred, in the 
decades since the role of a minority was thrust upon them.
The changes are shown here mainly through the last two census 
returns and the demographic data. (Figures for Hungarians in this 
section therefore record self-identification, within the constraints of 
the census forms and other returns.) The censuses at the turn of the 
1980s and 1990s, the start of the period, took place at various times. 
The earliest came in 1989 in the Transcarpathian region of Ukraine, 
then still part of the Soviet Union. Most neighboring countries held 
theirs in 1991, but Romania’s was a year later. The censuses of a 
decade later fell in 2001 in Slovakia, Croatia, Ukraine and Austria, 
and in 2002 elsewhere. Ukraine’s was unusual in being completed 
only at the third attempt.1
The figures for Hungarians living in the neighboring countries 
can be examined in two respects. As a first approach, the tendency 
can be compared with that of the population as a whole in their 
political domicile, although the examination in most countries has 
been confined to a narrower historical or geographical area long 
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The number of Hungarians living in most neighboring 
countries hardly differs from the number in the areas of each 
country historically inhabited by Hungarians. It is noticeable that 
the number of Hungarians has fallen in all neighboring countries 
except Austria. There the number of Burgenland Hungarians makes 
up only a fraction of the Hungarian population in Austria as a whole, 
which has risen greatly through migration.2
The demographic processes among Hungarians in most 
neighboring countries can be seen more clearly if the survey is 
restricted to the territory of longstanding Hungarian settlement 
(Table 2). This has been done for Ukraine (Transcarpathia), Romania 
(Transylvania), Serbia (Vojvodina), Slovenia (Prekmurje) and 
Austria (Burgenland).3 With Slovakia and Croatia, the demographic 
processes are examined over the whole country.4
Table 2: The change of number and rate of Hungarians
in the cross-border areas









Around 1990 Around 2000
Slovakia   5,274,335    567,296 10.8   5,379,455    520,528   9.7
trans-
carpathia   1,252,288    155,711 12.4   1,254,614    151,516 12.1
transylvania   7,723,313 1,603,923 20.8   7,221,733 1,415,718 19.6
Vojvodina   2,013,889    339,491 16.9   2,031,992    290,207 14.3
croatia   4,784,265      22,355   0.5   4,437,460      16,595   0.4
Prekmurje        14,291        7,243 50.7        12,698        5,212 41.0
Burgenland      270,880        6,763   2.5      277,569        6,641   2.4
total 21,333,261 2,702,782 12.7 20,615,521 2,406,417 11.7
The data in the two tables show strong differences of population 
between the regions examined and the countries as a whole. (The 
aggregate population of the seven countries in the 2000s was 97 
million and that of the regions examined fewer than 21 million.) But 
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the number of Hungarians recorded in each country in 2001–2002 
scarcely differs from the number in the regions examined: 2.466 
million and 2.406 million respectively. Most of the 60,000 come 
from the difference between the number of Burgenland Hungarians 
and the total in Austria. Let us look at the changes in each case.
The number of Hungarians in Slovakia in 1991–2001 fell by 
8.2 percent, from 567,296 to 520,528 – from 10.8 to 9.7 percent 
of the total population, that is, below 10 percent for the first time. 
The demographic tendency differed in the country as a whole: the 
population in 1991–2001 rose by 2 percent (105,120), from 5,274,335 
to 5,379,455, mostly by natural increase, but with not inconsiderable 
net migration as well.5
The number of Hungarians in Transcarpathia in 1989–2001 
fell by 2.7 percent, from 155,711 to 151,516, so that the proportion 
of Hungarians in the oblast decreased from 12.5 to 12.1 percent. 
Meanwhile, Transcarpathia’s population scarcely changed: a rise of 
0.2 percent (2,326) from 1,252,288 to 1,254,614. Births exceeded 
deaths up to the end of the 1990s, but a natural decrease set in around 
the turn of the millennium. The population has been falling since 
1995 due to net emigration being higher than the natural increase.6
The number of Hungarians in Transylvania in 1992–2002 fell 
from 1,603,923 to 1,415,718 – a decline of 188,205 or 11.7 percent, 
causing the proportion of Hungarians to fall from 20.8 to 19.6 
percent. Transylvania’s population in the same period fell by 6.5 
percent, from 7,723,313 to 7,221,733, mainly due to sizeable net 
emigration and changes in census counting techniques.7
The number of Hungarians in Vojvodina in 1991–2002 fell from 
339,491 to 290,207 – a fall of 49,284 or 14.5 percent, bringing the 
share of Hungarians down from 16.9 to 14.3 percent. The population 
rose by 0.9 per cent (18,103), from 2,013,889 to 2,031,992, due to 
Yugoslav war-related immigration. (The indicators of migration in 
Serbia in the 1990s were very unfavorable. The population growth 
in Vojvodina has been negative since 1989, and in 2000 the number 
of births was 10,000 higher than that of deaths.)8
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The three smaller communities of Hungarians abroad also fell 
in number and proportion – those of Croatia from 22,355 to 16,595 
(down 5,760 or 25.8 percent), those of Slovenia from 7,243 to 5,212 
(down 2,031 or 28 percent), and those of Burgenland from 6,763 to 
6,641 (down 1.8 percent). 
Three main factors lie behind the way in which the Hungarian 
communities have dwindled: natural increase or decrease, 
demographic processes, and assimilation processes. The examination 
here is confined to the four areas with sizeable numbers of Hungarian 
inhabitants: Slovakia, Transcarpathia, Transylvania and Vojvodina.
The easiest of the three factors to estimate is natural increase or 
decrease. Breakdowns of migration data by national group are not 
always available, but the trends in the birth and death figures for the 
Hungarian community can be estimated quite easily by examining 
the demographic data by country and administrative unit.
A big loss was caused by acceleration of the natural decrease in 
the Hungarian population, to which several factors contributed. (The 
number of births was declining steadily in most neighboring coun-
tries and was coupled with a steady rise in the average age of the in-
habitants.) The most important was an uncertain social and economic 
situation, but alternative lifestyle changes were reducing the number 
of marriages and raising the age of marriage, which meant a decrease 
in fertility. It can also be seen that the biological reproduction of Hun-
garian women (number of offspring produced) is higher than their 
ethnic reproduction (number of offspring registered as ethnic Hungar-
ians). The official migration statistics by ethnic group largely include 
only the latter and reflect latently an inter-generation plane of assimi-
lation. In general, the bigger the difference between biological and 
ethnic reproduction, the higher the proportion of mixed marriages in 
the group concerned. For most children born to mixed marriages are 
registered as members of the majority nation and only a small propor-
tion as members of the minority. (In Slovakia 20 percent of the off-
spring of mixed marriages are registered as Hungarian,9 in Transyl-
vania one third,10 and in Vojvodina 20–30 percent. There are no such 
figures available for Transcarpathia.) The Hungarian communities in 
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all neighboring countries have seen their natural increase turn into a 
decrease. There are annual national demographic statistics available 
for the natural increase/decrease of the Hungarians in Slovakia and 
Transylvania, but the figures for the other areas are estimates.
The annual number of Hungarian births in Slovakia fell by a 
third in 1991–2000 (from 6,707 to 4,498) but the death figure fell by 
11 percent (from 6,270 to 5,554). This means that the natural increase 
in the Hungarian population of Slovakia turned into a decrease in 
1994. The number of Hungarian births in 1990 was over 800 higher 
than the number of deaths in 1990, but in 2000 it was over 1,000 
lower. Between the last two censuses (1991–2001), the aggregate 
natural decrease can be put at around 2,000; its rate changed from 
+1.5 to –1.9 per thousand.11
Population trends for the Transcarpathian Hungarians can 
only be estimated. The natural increase in the oblast became a 
natural decrease around 2000, but the switch was earlier for the 
Hungarians, probably before 1990. Deaths outnumbered births 
among the Hungarians throughout the period between the censuses. 
The estimated annual average natural decrease of around 3 per 
thousand led to a decrease of about 5,000.12
The birth rate for Hungarians in Transylvania declined from 
14,616 in 1992 to 10,615 in 2002, a fall of 27 percent, and the death 
rate from 23,906 to 20,944 (–12.3 percent). This produced to a natural 
decrease of 8,000–11,500 over the 1992–2002 period, with 107,437 
more deaths than births.13
The available data for Vojvodina are incomplete, due to warfare. 
An estimate can be made by comparing annual national demographic 
data with Hungarian demographic figures available for certain years. 
The province had the highest rate of natural decrease of all the four 
Hungarian-inhabited areas examined – around 10–11 percent over 
the period between the censuses, leading to a probable decrease of 
around 30,000.14
Examining the migration processes is more complicated still. 
The demographic figures for each country include a component for 
“registered” international migration, but “hidden,” unregistered 
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migration may be a multiple of it. Another factor to consider when 
estimating the magnitude of the migration processes is the fact 
that the criteria for counting the Hungarian population may change 
between censuses. Available data show that the net migration 
of Hungarians varies widely from territory to territory, as do the 
factors behind it.
The migration loss among the Hungarians of Slovakia in 1991–
2001 may have been around 2,000. This relatively low number is 
corroborated by the relatively low number of Slovakian citizens 
recorded in Hungary’s migration statistics. The relatively low loss 
is explained by the fact that Hungarian employees from Slovakia 
mainly commute daily to work in Hungary or Austria. Relatively 
few choose to settle in Hungary. The economic incentive to work 
abroad is the lowest in any of the four areas examined, and the 
settlement pattern of Hungarians in Slovakia makes daily or weekly 
commuting to Hungary feasible.15
There is a wide band between the upper and lower estimates for 
Hungarian emigration from Transcarpathia. Some estimates put the 
number who settled in Hungary in the 1990s at 5,000, while others 
suggest 25,000–30,000. The latter is more likely to be the combined 
number of those working with (or without) work permits or studying 
in Hungary.16
The Romanian Statistics Office recorded a population decrease 
of more than half a million in the 2002 census. This was largely 
because all those residing abroad were counted in the 1992 census, 
but only those who had been abroad for less than one year were 
counted in 2002. The methodological difference also affected the 
fall in the number of Transylvanian Hungarians counted. About 
100,000 Hungarians left Transylvania between 1992 and 2002 to live 
abroad permanently, of whom 80,000 are now living in Hungary.17
Warfare was the main determining factor of migration among 
the Vojvodina Hungarians. Some 60,000 Vojvodina Hungarians fled 
abroad in the 1990s, of whom 20,000 settled abroad, although it is 
not known how many have returned since. The census also recorded 
no small number of Hungarians who were also living abroad and 
were unlikely to return.
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The third deciding factor behind the fall in the number of 
Hungarians in some regions is assimilation. This cannot be measured 
directly from census or demographic data, or only with difficulty. 
A figure has been put on it by subtracting natural increase and net 
immigration from change in population.
Two aspects of the processes of change in national affiliation 
among the Hungarians in Slovakia can be distinguished – not just 
the move towards identifying with the Slovak nation, but a noticeable 
shift in the direction of the Roma. With the relative strength of the 
factors behind the assimilation processes working on the Hungarians 
of Slovakia, the strongest is origin, and the weakest the national 
affiliation of the spouse. Between the two lie language of schooling 
and depth of knowledge of the Hungarian language. All are affected, 
of course, by the proportion of Hungarians in the place of residence 
and by sex and age. Here are some data to illustrate the assimilation 
processes: 95 percent of those of purely Hungarian origin identified 
themselves as such, but only 20 percent of those of mixed origin 
did so. Adding in the other factors, it was found that 99 percent 
of those of purely Hungarian origin who had attended elementary 
school in Hungarian, spoke Hungarian to a high standard, and were 
married to a Hungarian identified themselves as Hungarian. Of the 
pure Hungarians who had attended elementary school that taught in 
Slovak, 33 percent identified themselves as Slovak.18
The census data for Transcarpathia show dissimilation in the 
direction of the Hungarians, less because of change in the Ukrainian/
Hungarian ratio than because of legislative changes in favor of the 
minority, prompting some who had recorded themselves as Gypsy, 
Ukrainian or Slovak to write “Hungarian” in 2001. The question is 
whether a more or less formal allegiance (a “statistical” switch of 
nation) will continue to swell the Hungarian community, or whether it 
was simply prompted by an administrative change. Meanwhile, it can 
be assumed that the progeny of mixed marriages between Hungarians 
and Ukrainians/Rusyns will tend to benefit the majority nation.19
Assimilation appears to be the weakest factor in the decline 
in Transylvania’s Hungarian community. Only 18–19 percent of 
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Hungarians marrying in the 1990s contracted a mixed marriage, 
while the proportion of mixed marriages by the Hungarians of 
Slovakia was 25–28 percent. Only 2 percent of Transylvanians of 
purely Hungarian origin recorded themselves as Romanian. The 
loss due to assimilation and change of national allegiance can be put 
at about 30,000.20
A different kind of dissimilation appears among the Hungarians 
of Vojvodina, where it was common in multi-ethnic areas for 
partners in mixed marriages to record themselves as “Yugoslav” 
in their national allegiance. Some of these have altered or reverted 
to “Hungarian” since the dissolution of Yugoslavia. But this formal 
ethnic reversion does not change the inter-ethnic relations between 
Hungarians and Serbs, and a high proportion of mixed marriages still 
produces a marked rate of decline in the Hungarian numbers. The 
fact that some “Yugoslavs” declared themselves to be Hungarians 
in 2002 and may have belonged to the minority community ten 
years earlier only means that the number of Hungarians in 1991 
was underestimated and the decline in the 1990s was higher than 
recorded (Table 3).21
Table 3: Informative data
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The decisive factors behind the fall in the minority population 
differ in their weights in the four regions. Even where their rankings 
were the same, the events behind them were quite different. If 
the data for each region are aggregated, the loss displayed proves 
in some cases greater and in others smaller than the sum for the 
three groups of factors. This is partly because the groups of factors 
cannot be distinguished mechanically, and can be identified only 
with difficulty, if at all, so that the same causal relation may be 
classed under different factors in different cases. Furthermore, the 
difference between the sum of the three factor groups and the total 
recorded may be affected by methodological differences between 
the two censuses – as a kind of measurement error.
All in all, caution is needed when evaluating the trends and 
factors behind population estimates for minority Hungarian 
communities, as their relative weights vary widely between regions. 
The decline in Slovakia is due mainly to assimilation processes. 
Transcarpathia is the one area with a direction of change in formal 
ethnic allegiance that favors the Hungarians. In Transylvania, a high 
loss due to migration and low fertility goes together at present with a 
low rate of loss from changes in ethnic affiliation. In Vojvodina, the 
sharp decline in Hungarian numbers is due to migration, a marked 
natural decrease, and assimilation.
Table 4: The estimated magnitude of the determining factors of the 
Hungarian population in four cross-border areas in the 1990s
territory decrease natural Increase/decrease
Migration 
difference Assimilation
Slovakia   47,000    – 2,000    – 2,000 – 38,000
transcarpathia     4,000    – 5,000    – 5,000   + 5,000
transylvania 193,000 – 100,000 – 100,000 – 30,000
Vojvodina   50,000   – 30,000    – 40,000 – 20,000
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5. tHE EducAtIon ISSuE
Attila Papp Z.
Provision of native-language education for Hungarians abroad is 
a major recurrent issue in minority communities, whose political 
efforts on its behalf picked up after the changes of system in East-
Central Europe. For the development of native-language education 
there had previously run up against political barriers, erected on 
internationalist or national grounds. So arguments in favor of 
teaching in Hungarian contributed to the grievance-driven political 
activity that imbued the minority elites in the 1990s, in some cases 
overshadowing discussion of the concepts that underlay the education. 
The effects of this can be felt to this day. The prime function that 
minority schools have, according to nation-related concepts, is to 
protect the minority and nurture its identity, but rival interpretations 
of education as a service look beyond native-language cultivation 
and protection towards a main aim of strengthening pupils’ eventual 
labor market position.1
In terms of education policy, Hungary’s neighbors can be placed 
in two groups. Croatia, Slovenia and Austria have relatively small 
numbers of Hungarians, but there is largely adequate provision of 
Hungarian or bilingual instruction in basic and higher education. 
Maribor University in Slovenia, for example, offers courses for 
teachers of Hungarian language and literature at elementary 
and secondary levels, to supply the bilingual institutions in the 
Prekmurje district. In Croatia, Osijek’s Josip Juraj Strossmayer 
University has a Hungarian Language Department. Notable among 
the educational institutes in Hungarian-inhabited communities is the 
same city’s Croatian Education and Cultural Center. The University 
of Vienna offers Hungarian Studies. Native-language teaching in 
Hungarian-inhabited communities in Burgenland has ceased, but it 
has been replaced by teaching of Hungarian as a school subject and 
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by a bilingual gymnasium (academically orientated high school) 
founded in Oberwart in 1992.
The other group of neighboring countries – Romania, Slovakia, 
Serbia and Ukraine – inherited a Soviet type of education system 
marked by strong centralization, a predominance of technical 
subjects in secondary and higher education, and compulsory 
secondary education coupled with a shortage of higher education 
and early, largely irreversible, specialization. Apart from Romania, 
these were all new countries in a new political situation, where 
education policy was intended to further the requirements of the 
nation state, by fostering identification and loyalty among their 
citizens. Education in the East-Central European countries not only 
was affected by systemic change but also contributed to it.2 The 
changes in higher education were spectacular, but the extent and 
centralization of the school system slowed its reactions to the new 
political and economic requirements.
Each of these countries can be said, in the 1990s, to have devised 
its educational programs to meet nation-state demands, which partly 
obscured the collapse of the old political and economic system. The 
construal given to the education system – that it was a basic national 
institution – made the leaders of Hungarian communities abroad 
all the more concerned to have secondary and higher educational 
institutions that taught in Hungarian. Education became a key 
symbolic element in political activity. The nation-building logic of 
majority and minority collided over the question of the language 
of instruction and the national character of educational institutions, 
leading to some physical clashes – for instance in Târgu Mureş, and 
over alternative education in Slovakia.
The clashes of elites appear mainly in their ideas for transforming 
higher education. The symbolic and specialized debates on 
developing Hungarian-taught higher education took place on two 
planes: in majority–minority relations (majority opposition to or 
scrutiny of efforts to found or expand minority institutions), and 
as an internal matter (concerning the question of which part of the 
minority elite had the right to carry out the development, and who 
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could best obtain funds for this from the state concerned or from 
Hungary). These accompanied an intensive process of founding 
institutions. By the beginning of the twenty-first century, all major 
regions of Hungarian habitation had separate state or private 
institutions of native-language higher education.
The new institutions teaching in Hungarian appeared on what 
was becoming a mass, expanded market for higher education, which 
meant that the state system had to respond. The opening of the 
Sapientia Hungarian University of Transylvania – founded in 2001 
with campuses in Cluj-Napoca, Miercurea-Ciuc and Târgu Mureş, 
on the initiative of the Hungarian Churches in Transylvania,3 but 
funded almost exclusively by the Hungarian state – prompted Cluj’s 
state-run Babeş–Bolyai University to expand its range of Hungarian-
taught courses. Likewise, the opening of the mainly Slovak state-
financed Selye János University in Komárno in October 2003, 
teaching in Hungarian, speeded up the establishment of a Faculty 
of Central European Studies at the Konstantin University in Nitra, 
already an important factor in Hungarian-language teachers’ training. 
The internal Hungarian minority conflicts over higher education 
development normally became politicized. Examples can be found 
in each region. In Ukraine, the Ferenc Rákóczi II Transcarpathian 
Hungarian Institute in Berehove was controlled by the Transcarpathian 
Hungarian Cultural Association, but Uzhhorod National University 
by the rival Hungarian Democratic Federation in Ukraine. The 
Sapientia project in Romania led the Cluj academic elite to question 
repeatedly the Churches’ role in founding, although not funding, the 
university, in a period when the Reformed Church bishop László 
Tőkés (founder, by the way, of the Partium Christian University 
in Oradea) was at political loggerheads with the largest minority 
political force, the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania.4 
Academics associated with the Bratislava and Nitra institutions in 
Slovakia saw the foundation of Selye János University as a victory 
for the Hungarian Coalition Party, not as an educational advance. 
Such internecine conflicts have been exacerbated by the funding 
received from Hungary, which thereby becomes a factor in domestic 
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rivalries and affects the course followed by Hungarian educational 
development abroad.
The participants in minority education have not been active 
in national education policy-making, despite their parliamentary 
representation and even role in government. The strong dichotomy 
seen in the legislative background to education policy in each country 
produced a curious mixture of structures in minority education, 
some inherited from the previous period and some adapted to EU 
expectations. The present legislation in Romania is EU-compatible, 
but the process of implementing it was repeatedly delayed for want 
of political backing, with the result that the Romanians had to fall 
back on temporary government orders. Slovakia had yet to pass a 
new public education act by the end of 2007 and preparations for 
doing so had hardly begun. The 1984 act inherited from the socialist 
period was amended from time to time. The European Structural 
Funds were available, but the minority teaching community was 
unable to avail itself of them. In Ukraine, the uncertainty factors 
were the legacy of the Soviet system, challenges from Ukrainian 
national renewal, and new conflicts to do with commitments to 
observe EU norms. The national educational development doctrine 
adopted in 2002 named education as the key development issue 
for the Ukrainian state, nation, society and individuals, and for the 
country’s competitiveness. But the declared aims of education policy 
will call for serious effort from a strongly centralized, underfunded 
education system. A new act on public education was passed in Serbia 
in 2004. The country took part, in the early years of the twenty-
first century, in several international programs designed to implant 
the requirements and principles for educational reforms. However, 
that openness was offset by memories of the Yugoslav wars of the 
1990s and occasional nationalist overtones, accompanied by apathy 
among teachers and emigration by young people.
The conditions and scope for these education systems in the 
early twenty-first century are affected not only by the political and 
legal frames, but also by aspects of demography. The number of 
children in the Hungarian minorities of all these countries was 
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falling. In Transylvania, for instance, the number of Hungarians of 
elementary school age fell by 42 percent between 1990 and 2008, 
and that reduction would reach secondary and higher education 
over the next ten years. The fall in the Hungarian elementary school 
population in Slovakia was 20 percent between 2001 and 2006. It 
was being forecast that the number of secondary school students 
would fall by more than 30 percent by 2011 and of those in higher 
education (the 20–24 cohort) by half by 2020. Similar reductions are 
forecast for Vojvodina: the number of ethnic Hungarians in higher 
grades of elementary school (the 10–14 cohort) would fall by about 
25 percent by 2012 and the higher education roll by almost 40 per 
cent by 2022. There are no detailed figures available for the mainly 
rural Hungarians of Transcarpathia, but this group too suffered a 
demographic decline of 20 percent in 1989–2001 as the Hungarian 
community aged.
The figures for educational attainment were also negative in many 
respects. The proportion of Hungarians in Romania with a higher 
education was lower than the national average.5 The proportion of 
Slovakian Hungarians with only elementary schooling was far 
higher than the national average and the proportion with higher 
education only 5 percent, against a national figure of around 10 
percent.6 The Hungarians of Transcarpathia showed a relatively 
high number of secondary school graduates but a very low number 
of graduates of higher education.7 The Vojvodina Hungarians also 
showed a relatively high proportion with only elementary schooling 
and lower than average proportions for secondary school and higher 
education graduates.8 Thus in all four countries, the proportion of 
Hungarians relative to the average falls as educational attainment 
rises.
In view of those demographic and educational attainment 
figures, education policy among the minority Hungarians sought 
to reduce such differences between native Hungarian-speakers and 
the majority. Professional and political opinion among the minority 
Hungarians dwelt on the underrepresentation of Hungarians in 
higher education and the narrow range of available courses taught 
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in Hungarian. This concern led directly to the initiation of higher 
education development projects in Transcarpathia, Transylvania, 
Slovakia and Vojvodina, designed to compensate for “ethnic” 
disadvantage and create educational equality of opportunity.
In Transylvania in the 2007–2008 academic year, 61 courses 
were taught in Hungarian at the Babeş–Bolyai University in Cluj-
Napoca,9 and 12 at the Partium Christian University in Oradea 
(which grew out of the earlier István Sulyok College).10 Sapientia 
University in Cluj-Napoca, Miercurea-Ciuc and Târgu Mureş 
offered 19 courses in the fields of economics, social science, arts and 
engineering.11 There was other state higher education available in 
Hungarian in Târgu Mureş (University of Medicine and Pharmacy, 
Szentgyörgyi István University of Dramatic Art) and Bucharest 
(Hungarian studies). Denominational higher education in Hungarian 
occurred at the Protestant Theological Institute in Cluj-Napoca and 
the Theological Institute of Alba Iulia.
Hungarian-taught higher education was offered in Slovakia 
in 2006–2007 at the Konstantin University in Nitra – whose long-
established Hungarian-taught courses of teachers’ training were 
hived off from the Faculty of Central European studies in 2004 – and 
at Selye János University in Komárno, which had courses in theology, 
economics and teachers’ training. Hungarian language and literature 
could be studied at the Comenius University in Bratislava, where 
the department was set up in 1951, and since 1996 in the Philology 
Faculty of Bél Mátyás University in Banská Bystrica.12
In Transcarpathia, Hungarian minority higher education was 
set up at the foundation-run Ferenc Rákóczi II Transcarpathian 
Hungarian Institute in Berehove, with Hungarian funding. This was 
offering courses in teachers’ training, horticultural engineering, 
economics and IT, and Hungarian, English and Ukrainian language 
courses, leading to degrees accredited in Ukraine, and recognized 
also in Hungary as university degrees under a bilateral treaty. 
Such courses were being taught in five departments and the Adult 
Education Center in 2007–2008. Other Hungarian-taught courses 
were available at the state Uzhhorod National University, where a 
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Hungarian-language section, the Faculty of History of Hungary and 
European Integration operates at the Historical Department opened 
in 2008, and by the Hungarian-language section of Teachers’ 
Training College of Mukacheve State University.13
In Vojvodina, teaching in Hungarian within the state higher 
education system was available at the Technical College and 
Teachers’ Training Institute in Subotica, and the Department of 
Hungarian Studies, University of Novi Sad. Some courses were 
also taught in Hungarian in the Economics and Civil Engineering 
faculties in Subotica, University of Novi Sad and at the Academy of 
Arts in Novi Sad. A Hungarian-taught Teachers’ Training Faculty 
opened at Subotica University in October 2006.14
Hungarian-taught higher education in neighboring countries 
was also being offered by extra-mural branches of Hungary-based 
institutions: in Transylvania by Szent István University (based in 
Gödöllő), the University of West Hungary (Sopron), Károli Gáspár 
University of the Hungarian Reformed Church (Budapest), the 
College for Modern Business Studies (Tatabánya), Dennis Gabor 
College (Budapest), the University of Debrecen and Sámuel 
Tessedik College (Békéscsaba); in Slovakia by Corvinus University 
(Budapest), Budapest University of Technical and Economic 
Studies, Komárom City University, the University of West Hungary, 
the Horticultural Faculty of Kecskemét College, the University of 
Miskolc, the College of Modern Business Studies and Dennis Gabor 
College; in Transcarpathia in the 1990s by Nyíregyháza College, the 
Horticultural Faculty of Szent István University and Dennis Gabor 
College; Szent István University and Dennis Gabor College offered 
courses in Vojvodina, too.15 The motive behind these initiatives was 
partly to fill gaps in availability, but there were financial spurs as 
well. The parent institutions could claim capitation grants from the 
Hungarian Ministry of Education even for students in neighboring 
countries, or, where the course did not qualify, fees could be charged. 
Some extra-mural branches remain, but others were superseded by 
the local higher education initiatives.
It makes educational and economic sense to bring the 
developments in higher education, with the regional strategies 
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and those of certain institutions, into line with the demographic 
and labor market trends. The declining numbers of the students 
will soon place the institutions and their supply in a new situation, 
especially where there are duplications. These days the Hungarian 
higher education system abroad cannot be divorced from market 
forces: market logic applies among the institutions teaching in the 
minority and in the majority language, and among those teaching 
in Hungarian as well. Further challenges derive from the change 
to the Bologna system and the EU accession of Hungary, Slovakia 
and Romania. In wider terms, higher education institutions abroad 
that teach in Hungarian (and the research facilities associated with 
them) face problems of future staffing, the expansion of higher 
education, the social imbedding of higher education, the recognition 
of Hungarian-taught courses no longer being an end in themselves, 
the absence of regional research strategies, the expansion of 
network cooperation, and the financing of courses and researches. 
Accreditation of courses may also be hit by local legislative changes 
and by conflicts between majority and minority political elites.16
Transylvania has the biggest system of elementary and high 
schools teaching in Hungarian, although demographics have reduced 
the number of schools or sections by a third in recent years. In 2006 
there were around 1,400 Hungarian-language kindergartens and 
schools with 180,000 pupils. Slovakia had almost 49,000 pupils in 
377 elementary and high schools conducted in Hungarian. An extra 
task for minority education in Transcarpathia was to switch from 
teaching Russian as a subject to teaching Ukrainian, in line with the 
official language of state. The Hungarian-taught system consisted 
of 106 schools: 11 primary schools, 52 elementary schools, 34 high 
schools, 2 gymnasia and 7 lycea, with almost 20,000 pupils. Three 
quarters were teaching exclusively in Hungarian, while others had 
sections teaching in Ukrainian or Russian attached. In Vojvodina 
Hungarian was the language of instruction in 2004–2005 in 78 
elementary schools in 26 communities with some 18,000 pupils, 
and in 12 administrative districts in 34 high schools (10 gymnasia 
and 23 specialist middle and trade schools) with some 6,700 pupils.
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The other main area of change in minority Hungarian education 
is secondary education. An important part has been played by local 
associations of Hungarian teachers. Minority secondary education 
in the countries examined is largely theoretical in nature, with the 
added impetus going into the humanities, education studies and the 
social sciences, where an attempt can be discerned to compensate for 
decades of state neglect. For the Hungarian minority in particular, 
the artificially inflated scale of teaching of scientific and technical 
subjects was not complemented after the change of system by 
sufficient attention to vocational training.
In Romania, specialist, trade-related subjects could only be 
taken in Romanian in the 1990s, but the possibility of teaching them 
in the minority language opened up with legislation in 1999, with 
the requirement that the technical vocabulary be taught in Romanian 
as well. The restrictive rules governing the minority education 
system meant that most of Romania’s Hungarian-taught high school 
population went to schools teaching theoretical, not vocational, 
subjects. In 2002–2003, for instance, these accounted for 63 percent 
of enrollment, while the remaining 37 percent could choose between 
arts, sports, education and technical specializations, of which 
the last accounted for over 30 percentage points. The situation in 
minority vocational schooling was hampered not only by the low 
intake proportion, but also by a poor range of trades offered and 
by regional differences in availability, compounded by inadequate 
infrastructure, indifference from businesses, a dearth of qualified 
Hungarian instructors, lack of provision for extension training, and 
a shortage of manuals and textbooks in Hungarian.17
Data for Slovakia show a similar shift from vocational towards 
gymnasium schooling, with the former stabilizing at 28–30 percent. 
Another factor contributing to the low prestige of vocational schools 
was the fact that most of those completing them failed to find jobs 
in their trade. The schools had become divorced from reality in 
many respects. Their courses were unrelated to actual labor market 
demands and imparted practical or theoretical knowledge, not skills. 
Such schools also had low prestige and low intakes in Transcarpathia. 
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There were two vocational lycea involved, one teaching entirely in 
Hungarian in Yanoshi (Makkosjánosi) and one with Ukrainian and 
Hungarian sections in Berehove, where a Hungarian class is started 
if more than 25 students apply for it.
Similar compensatory logic accompanied the spread of 
high schools maintained by Churches and civil organizations 
(foundations). Erasing the aftermath of centralization is a long task, 
in which non-state schools teaching in Hungarian make a breach in 
the state monopoly, but in some regions come to teach the elite or 
students selected by ability.18 In Transcarpathia in 2006–2007, for 
instance, there were seven selective Church-run gymnasia teaching 
in Hungarian: the Reformed Lyceum in Pyjterfolvo, the Sándor 
Sztojka Lyceum in Karachin, the St. Stephen Lyceum in Mukacheve, 
the Reformed Lyceum in Velyki Berehy and the Reformed Lyceum 
in Velyka Dobron’.19 Church schooling is far more widespread in 
Transylvania: there were 20 Church high schools accounting for 12 
percent of the places in Hungarian-taught education in 2006–2007. 
In the same year, 989 pupils in Slovakia were attending Church-
maintained elementary schools that teach in Hungarian and almost 
700 such gymnasia. Selective high schooling in Hungarian began 
at two gymnasia in Vojvodina in September 2003: the Philological 
Grammar School “Dezső Kosztolányi” in Subotica and the Science 
and Mathematics Secondary Grammar School for Gifted Students in 
Senta.20 Also Church-maintained is the Diocese Classic Gymnasium 
and Diocese Seminary “Paulinum” in Subotica,21 where teaching is 
in Croatian and Hungarian and the leaving examination is accepted 
by all Serbian institutes of higher education.
The difficulties faced in elementary and secondary education 
taught in Hungarian differ from region to region, but some can 
be considered general: reorganization of schools in response to 
demographic changes, teaching the state language, attracting trained 
teachers to rural areas and retaining them there, the feminization 
of the teaching profession, the need to develop extension training 
for those teaching in Hungarian, the justification and efficiency of 
education programs in areas of scattered Hungarian habitation, and 
the need to integrate the schools of Hungarian-speaking Gypsies.22
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In addition, it is important to mention the expansion of adult 
education.23 In Romania and Slovakia there seems to be the requisite 
legislation and market demand for the system to expand on a market 
basis, but in Transcarpathia and Vojvodina it covers mainly IT and 
foreign-language learning, through non-profit foundations.
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6. tHE PoSItIon oF tHE HunGArIAn LAnGuAGE
Orsolya Nádor
In language policy terms, Hungarian appears in three main 
contexts: as a majority language, a minority language, and a foreign 
language. These contexts may each bridge several categories, some 
educational (for example, Hungarian as a less widely known, a 
language of origin, or a secondary language) and others related to 
situation and political position (as the native language of a scattered 
group, a lost language, or a regional official language).1
The concept of Hungarian as a minority native language arose 
after the treaties that followed World War I, which left over three 
million native speakers as “Hungarians abroad.” Since then more 
than eighty years have not passed without leaving their linguistic 
mark. Territorial variants of the language have arisen, minority 
Hungarians have gradually become bilingual, and Hungarian has 
been increasingly affected by the majority language in various 
registers, notably in the vocabulary of technical terms, but also in 
grammatical structure, where traces of Slovak, Romanian, Serbian, 
Croatian, Slovene, German and Ukrainian have appeared.2
The concept can be approached from several directions, mainly in 
the field of applied linguistics: those of sociolinguistics, dialectology, 
psycholinguistics, neurolinguistics, language policy and language 
planning. Each field has applied universal scientific findings to 
Hungarian relations. This has given rise to research into Hungarian-
pairing linguistics, the question of multi-centrism, sociolinguistic 
study of minority territorial variants of Hungarian, study of language 
switching and the process of language loss, interpretation of 
endangered status, language inequality and discrimination through 
political decisions affecting and curtailing minority language use, 
and examination of linguicism in relation to certain groups of 
Hungarian-speakers. Linguistics lagged far behind historical and 
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political developments in only beginning to concern itself in the 
last third of the twentieth century with the social and psychological 
attributes of linguistic communities. Before that, issues concerning 
minority languages had appeared in other scholarly contexts, in 
works of history, law (the legal history of Hungarian as a state 
language) or ethnography (dialects, phraseologies). The minorities 
appeared in the linguistics of Hungarian mainly in philological 
activity to do with research into language history, etymology 
and historical topics, and with contacts between the majority and 
minority languages. However, linguistic surveys were affected by 
the change of system and by the alteration in European attitudes 
towards minorities. Today, Hungarian scholarship is falling into line 
with universal linguistics as the political borders are dismantled. 
Research cooperation in this field was almost impossible before the 
changes of system. Now the Hungarian Academy of Sciences is 
cooperating with language institutions in neighboring countries (the 
Hodinka Antal Institute, the Gramma Language Institute, the Attila 
T. Szabó Language Institute, the Samu Imre Language Institute, 
the Scientific Society for Research into the Hungarian Community, 
and the Hungarian Language Corpus in Vojvodina) to formulate 
new dictionary entries and in language policy and education policy 
researches in all fields. Among the fruits has been the TERMINI 
website, where lists of “cross-border” words and publications on the 
subject are available.3
The main criteria of Hungarian as a minority language are 
these:
- Use of the language is restricted; it plays a subordinate role to 
the majority language.
- Defects of linguistic competence appear, especially in official 
and specialist parlance.
- The intra-communal prestige and extra-communal assessment 
of the language differ from place to place.
- Members of minority language groups steadily become 
bilingual, and Hungarian is not the dominant language in all 
cases.
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- Depending on minority size and political status and on 
settlement conditions, bilingualism may take the form of 
substitution or augmentation.
Restriction of language use and competence in using it are 
closely linked. One cardinal point of majority policy in successor 
states is their stance towards the minorities in their midst. László 
Szarka distinguishes four kinds of legal position over language in 
East-Central Europe: 1. The concept of the official (state) language 
is laid down in the Constitution and applies solely to the language of 
the majority nation (in Slovakia and Romania, and in the Yugoslavia 
of Milošević in the 1980s and 1990s). 2. The concept of the official 
(state) language is laid down in the Constitution, but along with 
the country’s minority languages, as regional official languages 
(in Slovenia and Croatia, and in part in Austria, Ukraine and post-
2002 Serbia). 3. The state or official language is laid down not in 
the Constitution but in other legislation (in Poland). 4. The concept 
of an official (state) language is not stated in the Constitution or in 
other legislation (in the Czech Republic and Hungary).4
With Hungarian in neighboring countries, the typical case has 
been of attempts to encourage the advance of the majority language 
at the expense of the minority one through stigmatization or by 
narrowing the field where it can be used, openly or on the grounds 
of ostensible practicality. As a first step, the minority language is 
relegated in settling official matters, orally or in writing. Then the 
shortcomings of native-language education lead to gaps in specialist 
vocabulary. These days, minority Hungarian children usually receive 
the bases of education in their native language, but find that they 
are hampered in secondary and higher education, the route to full 
linguistic competence, because they are taught in the state language. 
It is hard to maintain the prestige of the minority native language 
if the route to self-improvement lies through the majority language. 
The minority community has accorded for decades a high intrinsic 
value to its native language, irrespective of the language-policy 
environment, resting on appreciation of the local linguistic variation 
and archaic forms, in relation not only to the local majority language 
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but also to the standard language of Hungary. This appreciation 
helped to ensure until recently that the type of bilingualism found 
in the Hungarian community was an augmenting one in which the 
native language retained dominance. More recently, linguistics 
scholars have warned of a retreat by the native language from its 
decisive role, due to various social processes (such as enhanced 
mobility, break-up of rural communities, and commoner mixed 
marriages) so that a substitutive type of bilingualism has become 
more frequent, which may lead to a switch from Hungarian or its 
loss as a native language.
There have been big changes in language laws over the decades 
since the Hungarians became a minority. Between the wars, much of 
the minority saw the situation as temporary, and competence in the 
language was fully maintained. The second, socialist period brought 
a gradual decline in competence. After the changes of system, 
there was a clear deterioration in the face of impatient, restrictive 
measures by new nation states. The present division of the minority 
Hungarians between those within the EU and those outside it or 
aspiring to membership makes it harder to take advantage of the 
developments in international language-related legislation.
The position of Hungarian as a minority language, in terms of 
language policy, can be defined historically in the first, interwar 
period in Romania, Czechoslovakia, the Serb-Croat-Slovene 
Kingdom, and Austria. The early measures by successor states 
made quite clear to the Hungarians the difference in rights and 
extent between a majority and a minority native language. All states 
concerned signed the minority protection treaty in Saint-Germain-
en-Laye in 1919, which included specific clauses on freedom of 
language use: the minorities, irrespective of race, language or faith, 
would have equal rights in employment, worship and all areas of 
public life. But these commitments were not seen as binding by the 
new states, which cited historical grievances in their constitutions 
and language laws as grounds for curbing the minorities’ natural 
rights and native-language use.
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The process by which national languages formed in the 
nineteenth century was mainly internal: assembly from a host of 
variants of a common standard for orthography and usage. This 
joined with moves to end the use of outside languages, as curbs on 
the role and prestige of the national language.
The national languages became vehicles of national identity. 
Their weight increased appreciably when inequalities among 
languages and ethnic groups became enshrined in legislation. As 
Szarka states,
The symbolic, political function of the majority nation’s 
language was laid down in the constitutions of the 
region’s countries, and… in Slovakia, Ukraine, Serbia, 
Slovenia, Poland, and since 2001 Hungary, in separate 
language laws. In these the national language is seen as 
the means of expression of the nation state, the means 
of clear communication within state activity and public 
administration, the vehicle of national cultural values, 
a basic element of national identity, a national cultural 
treasure, the means of common communication among all 
citizens, protected and developed by specific institutions…. 
Majority national languages without exception enjoy official 
status as a state language, as opposed to minority national 
languages, which… according to legislation in the region 
have won official regional status in Slovenia, Croatia, 
Ukraine… and Serbia in minority-inhabited areas. In the 
other countries, the language rights of the minorities are 
not recognized as official languages, but were enhanced in 
the last decade of the twentieth century by some limited 
concessions on language use.5
The measures of successor states clearly overlap. The constitution 
or legislation based on it typically includes riders that contradict 
the country’s treaty commitments. For instance, general freedom 
of use of native language is curbed by a threshold qualification, 
usually stipulating that the minority comprise 20 percent of a given 
population. Education laws may specify that non-denominational 
schools teach in the state language, thus forcing Hungarian middle 
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schools and colleges to close or change their language of instruction. 
Frequent use is made of name analysis, as notoriously circumstantial 
evidence of an earlier “Hungarianization,” not in any case admissible 
under the treaty commitments, and so is official registration of 
Hungarian names in forms found in the majority language. Curbs 
on minority communities introduced in judicial and administrative 
practice may contravene not only treaty commitments, but also the 
constitution or superior legislation. It is interesting that all successor 
states have resorted to gerrymandering to prevent a minority 
language from attaining the necessary figures of speakers in the 
local population to qualify for language-use rights. Official place 
names are changed to mirror translations in the majority language 
or altered to existing majority usages.
Taking the new Yugoslav state as an example, such discrimination 
occurred in Hungarian-inhabited areas with a Serb/Croat/Slovene 
majority. An extra tax of 10–50 percent was levied on commercial 
signs in Hungarian, or they had to be vetted by the police. Customers 
entering catering establishments, workshops or retail outlets had to 
be greeted in the new state language. The minority language could 
not be used in post offices or on railways even for information. 
Hungarian schools were nationalized, had their financing reduced, or 
were closed. The premises of middle schools were expropriated and 
their teaching aids were removed. Hungarian schools were confined 
to taking pupils who had escaped the attentions of official name 
analysis up to 1927. New place names were devised and introduced 
in 1922, whereby only 42 of Hungarian-inhabited 335 settlements 
kept their original name, others being translated or adorned with a 
Slav prefix or suffix. The scope for Hungarian speakers to use their 
native language worsened further in 1929, when the language was 
banned in all public offices and the remaining Hungarian officials 
were dismissed.
After brief extension of Hungarian rule over much of the 
Hungarian-inhabited territory in 1938–1944, the assimilation 
resumed after World War II under a different political cloak. There 
was still no legal recourse against language discrimination. Up 
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until the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, minority affairs were treated 
as internal matters or were susceptible only to external influence 
through Moscow. The second period began almost everywhere 
with physical and intellectual reprisals. Only gradually did some 
communist front organizations of the Hungarian community appear, 
based on a new basis of class discrimination imposed by communist 
ideology. In still ostensibly democratic Czechoslovakia in 1945–
1948, it was forbidden to use Hungarian in public, Hungarian schools 
were closed, Church services could not be held in Hungarian, and 
no periodicals or books in Hungarian could appear. The extreme 
Stalinist totalitarianism that followed the communist takeover of 
Czechoslovakia in 1948 meant that years passed before a system of 
state-controlled minority cultural institutions emerged. Conditions 
were similar elsewhere, although Czechoslovakia’s several-year 
outright language ban was unique. Some positive moves were 
made in Tito’s Yugoslavia in the last third of the twentieth century: 
Hungarian began to be taught as a “neighboring” language in 
Vojvodina’s Serbian schools, Hungarian press and book publishing 
revived, and an institute of Hungarian studies was founded at Novi 
Sad University. But Romania in the last years of the Ceauşescu 
regime took openly discriminatory measures, declaring a program 
of “national homogenization.” Hungarians were referred to as 
ethnic Hungarian or Hungarian-speaking Romanians. Unrealistic 
population proportions were imposed as a requirement for native-
language schooling and pressure was put on Churches to introduce 
Romanian-language services.
The territorial reorganizations of 1989–1990 failed to bring 
peace and quiet to the region’s minorities. Nationalism was typically 
strengthened in the new states, along with mounting grievance-
based antagonism to minorities. Emphasis was laid on the primacy 
of the state and national language and successive new curbs were 
placed on minority language use: Slovakia’s language laws of 
1991 and 1995, Romania’s 1994 law on public administration, and 
Serbia’s 1991 law on language use and 1992 and 1998 education 
laws. Each restricted public appearance of minority languages as 
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incompatible with the concept of a nation state, especially in the 
fields of public administration, exercise of civil rights, schools and 
public education. Exceptions in relation to Hungarian were Ukraine 
and Croatia, which respected the linguistic and cultural rights of 
their proportionally smaller Hungarian communities while engaged 
in bitter struggles against far larger Russian and Serbian minorities 
respectively.
The concept of a state language is often confused or identified 
with that of an official language. Szarka cites Jenő Kiss’s definition 
of a state language as one with a historically privileged position 
within a nation state, enjoying unlimited usage, as opposed to 
disadvantaged minority languages without such status. György 
Szépe in his definition of “the language of citizens” brings to the 
fore the communal and state administrative functions of national 
and official languages, along with their historical, political and 
symbolic function. He is quoted by Szarka as saying that “the 
national languages symbolizing the state and native land – think 
of national anthems, the national literary composition known to all, 
the community-forming force of historical slogans – for a long time 
represented the state only symbolically, but with the codification 
of language rights in the twentieth century they have become state 
languages in a legal and administrative sense, while retaining earlier 
symbolic, even sacred functions now adjusted to the needs of each 
state.” According to Szépe, “This symbolic function of the official 
language – especially if it is the language of the native land – lends 
positive additional meanings and a strong emotional tinge.”6
Change in the language rights of the Hungarian minorities in 
the Carpathian Basin and some diminution of the discrimination 
against them followed at the end of the 1990s, reaching a stage in 
the 2000s where the right to use the native language was granted 
de jure. Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia and Ukraine accepted Hungarian 
as a regional minority language. Romania, Slovakia and Austria 
also introduced measures that allowed minority languages to be 
used more widely. At present, Slovakia appears to adhere most 
consistently to a state-language concept emphasizing the primacy of 
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Slovak, backed by a persistent official perception of the minorities 
as factors that still threaten the national interest and the country’s 
sovereignty and territorial integrity, as they once did in the 1930s 
and 1940s, irrespective of subsequent commitments such as the 
EU membership of Hungary and Slovakia and their ratification of 
the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages.7 The 
laws on public administration and education in Romania remain 
inconsistent, failing to rule on the language rights of minorities. 
The fragile multilingual tradition of Yugoslavia was a casualty of 
the ethnic Yugoslav wars of the 1990s, before which Vojvodina 
had been in an enviable position for several decades. Only after the 
Yugoslav successor states had stabilized politically could ethnic 
and linguistic order return. The constitution of Slovenia proclaims 
the concept of regional minority languages to exist and defines 
their scope for official use. Croatia acknowledges the existence of 
indigenous minorities. Serbia guaranteed regional use of minority 
languages in summer 2002. Surprisingly, Austria did not give 
Hungarian similar treatment in the Burgenland communities of 
Unterwart, Oberwart, Oberpullendorf and Rotenturm an der Pinka 
until May 2000.
These changes are positive, but decades of linguistic inequality 
have left their mark, so that the de facto Hungarian-speaking 
community outside Hungary cannot fully exploit the language 
rights belatedly gained. Surveys show that the proportion giving 
the majority language preference is increasing. The minority 
language has only a limited area of influence, extending over 
fewer registers than the version spoken in Hungary itself. It shows 
increasing signs of its contacts with the majority language and 
its prestige is falling. These are sure indications of a linguistic 
assimilation that can only be slowed by a considered minority and 
language policy based on international agreement.
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7. cuLturAL And ScIEntIFIc ActIVItY
AMonG HunGArIAn MInorItY coMMunItIES
Nándor Bárdi, Csilla Fedinec and Attila Papp Z.
The institutional position of Hungarian minority culture altered 
radically with the systemic changes in Central Europe. State cultural 
policies directed from a Communist Party center gave way mainly 
to grassroots organization of minority communities. The arrival of 
the rule of law and private property relations brought great scope for 
institutionalization. However, state subsidies shrank considerably, 
except in Austria and Slovenia. An attempt was made to compensate 
for this with a system of subsidies from Hungary, directed at 
institutionalizing and developing intensive relations with a Hungarian 
ethno-cultural community extending beyond Hungary itself. This 
changed entirely the institutions and the content of minority Hungarian 
cultural life. Efforts hitherto, literature-centered and concerned chiefly 
with encouraging language use and conserving cultural heritage, 
were joined by aims of disseminating knowledge about the minority 
community in each locality or region and meeting its cultural needs. 
This meant presenting and developing the Hungarian cultural heritage 
(intellectual and material), and reinforcing national self-awareness 
and distinctiveness. The minority communities became a presence 
in public life not just as representatives of a distinct culture, but as 
institutionalized social groups. Literature lost its central importance 
to patterns of cultural consumption found in Hungary, fostered by 
intensive relations and common mass media.1
A survey by the Institute for Ethnic and National Minority 
Studies of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences found almost 3,000 
Hungarian minority cultural institutions and organizations at the turn 
of the millennium. These were most widespread in Romania (1,700), 
then Slovakia (560), followed by Serbia (400), Ukraine (160) and 
Slovenia (33). This meant an average of about 900 Hungarians per 
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institution, except in Slovenia, where the number was about a third of 
that. Most were multi-functional cultural centers and organizations, 
three quarters of which defined themselves in almost all regions as 
Hungarian institutions. The exceptions were Croatia and Slovenia, 
where the proportion was about 60 percent. The most widespread forms 
were music and dance groups (about 500), followed by knowledge-
disseminating youth clubs (250), drama groups (about 100), and 
various artists’ workshops (70). Decisive among collections and in 
the community cultural sphere were libraries (about 400), followed 
by museums (80) and other collections. The press was dominant 
in cultural dissemination (300), followed by book publishing (80), 
then television, radio and Internet portals (60). Two thirds of these 
institutions had been founded after 1989, although 60 percent of the 
public collections dated from before then. An important tendency in 
the previous decade had been the steady increase in importance of 
institutions independent of the state, although state and increasingly 
local government-run cultural institutions (such as cultural centers) 
were still playing a vital role in areas where Hungarians were in a 
majority. Book publishing and the media were the most marketized, 
while two thirds of the public collections were still publicly funded.2
After the change of system, there were attempts by existing 
Hungarian institutions (CSEMADOK in Czechoslovakia, the KMKSZ 
in the Ukraine, EMKE in Romania, and the Yugoslavian Hungarian 
Cultural Society)3 to offer a centralized frame for the new minority 
institutions. It soon became clear that only institutions capable of 
responding directly to local cultural demands were viable, and 
organization from above largely gave way to a type of institution 
that stressed further education and provision of methodological 
assistance. Model examples were the Hungarian Cultural Institute 
in Lendava (Magyar Nemzetiségi Művelődési Intézet), the Hungarian 
Institute of the Burgenland-Hungarian Cultural Club (Burgenlandi 
Magyar Kultúregyesület) and the Central Hungarian Library, both 
in Unterwart. In 1996, the Forum Minority Research Institute in 
Šamorin began to act as a library center, documentation center and 
scientific and public institution for its region, and as an integrator 
of minority research in Slovakia. Since 2004, the CSEMADOK 
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Cultural Institute in Dunajská Streda has acted as a methodological 
center. In Senta, the Institute for Hungarian Culture in Vojvodina 
founded in 2005 coordinates the scientific and documentation work 
in the region as the one institute dealing with the methodology of 
community culture and librarianship.4
Literature adjusted itself to a new canon. It is now possible to talk 
of a universal Hungarian literature, not a division between Hungary’s 
literature and those of neighboring minority communities. Literature 
can be structured in terms of aesthetic values, not geographical 
boundaries. The idea behind literature that reflects the communal 
problems of minority Hungarian society is being relegated to the 
background by increasingly professional social scientific research. 
The Bratislava journal Kalligram is also influential in universal 
Hungarian literature. A decisive role among post-1989 Slovakian 
Hungarian writers and literary historians is played by the oeuvre 
and intermediary role of Lajos Grendel. The decade after the change 
of system has brought fulfillment in the work of László Vári Fábián 
and Károly D. Balla – the latter runs the most intensive Hungarian 
literary portal.5 In Romania, major summarizing works by writers 
who began their careers in the 1950s (András Sütő, Sándor Kányádi, 
János Székely and István Szilágyi) appeared in the 1990s, while poets 
Géza Szőcs and András Ferenc Kovács, active since the 1970s and 
1980s, reached fulfillment and became known also in Hungary. The 
best-known Transylvanian writers of the generation who began their 
careers just before or after the change of system are András Visky, 
Zsolt Láng, János Dénes Orbán and László Lövétei Lázár. Vojvodina 
had the most modern regional Hungarian literature in the 1970s and 
1980s: the Új Symposion generation. This continued not only with 
those who settled in Hungary, but also in the work of Ottó Tolnai, the 
poetry of István Beszédes, and the prose of Ildikó Lovas and György 
Szerbhorváth.6
Marketization of book publishing meant, incidentally, that 
publishers in Hungary could freely export to neighboring countries 
after 1989. The biggest change, though, was that the number of books 
bought fell to a fifth of what it had been in the 1980s. The pre-1989 
state-owned, monopoly publishers in Hungarian, who had played a 
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role in minority intellectual and public life (Madách in Bratislava, 
Kriterion in Bucharest and Cluj-Napoca, and Fórum in Novi Sad) 
lost their dominance after privatization. What developed was an 
undercapitalized book publishing sector of several firms that relied 
mainly on competitive applications for funding, publishing some 
400–450 titles a year between them. The better-known publishers 
that have emerged since the change of system include Mentor, 
Komp-Press, Polis, Pallas-Akadémia, Pro-Print and Koinonia in 
Romania, and Kalligram, Mery Ratio and Lilium Aurum in Slovakia. 
The Hungarian publisher with the most titles in Transcarpathia is 
Intermix of Uzhhorod.7
Theater, like reading and book-buying, lost its importance in post-
1989 Hungarian minority culture, but it gained in professionalism 
and integrated more closely with Hungary. This is represented most 
clearly at the Festival of Hungarian Theaters beyond the Borders, 
which began to be held annually in Kisvárda, Hungary, in 1989. The 
full-time companies have been joined by the Gyula Illyés Hungarian 
National Theater in Berehove, the Csík Playhouse in Miercurea- 
Ciuc, Theater Figura Studio in Gheorgheni, and the Sándor Tomcsa 
Theater in Odorheiu-Secuiesc. The greatest attention has been 
accorded to the productions of Gábor Tompa in Cluj-Napoca and 
Attila Vidnyánszky in Berehove.8
The fine arts, not being dependent on language, have shown 
the strongest transnational influences and connections. Overall 
Hungarian arts associations have formed, but more intensive work 
is done in the growing number of training establishments, project 
groups and artists’ colonies. As important as the structural changes 
have been the expansion of the training and scholarship systems 
and the addition of complex visual culture and art actions to the 
traditional branches of art. Private Hungarian universities in Cluj-
Napoca and Oradea in Romania have multiplied their intakes by 
offering photography, film, media and visual culture courses. 
Hungarian cinema in Transylvania has produced almost 300 
motion pictures since 1989, most of them documentaries, with the 
periodical Filmtett playing a central role. The action base set up 
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at Sfântu Gheorghe by Imre Baász holds regular festivals of live 
art, through which the consciously Transylvanian performances of 
Gusztáv Ütő have become internationally known. One of the most 
effective performance artists today is Ilona Németh of Dunajská 
Streda, who raises issues of universal importance reinterpreted in a 
minority context. The Contemporary Collection at Dunajská Streda 
makes conscious collection efforts in all Hungarian-inhabited 
regions. Another decisive influence is the mediation work of Bálint 
Szombathy of Vojvodina. Gábor Hushegyi of Bratislava stands out 
among the art critics.9
The press was probably the medium that reacted most sensitively 
to the changes, from the early 1990s onward, and often contributed 
to them directly. The changes took place on three planes: in the 
press, on the audiovisual plane, and on the Internet. New papers 
were founded and existing ones underwent a renewal of content. 
The launches were often designed to strengthen some locality, 
while the existing papers served to manifest renewal among old 
and new elites, introducing the vocabulary by which the changes 
became comprehensible to readers. To put it another way, the press 
created anew the day-to-day ideology required for preserving and 
maintaining the identities related to minority existence. Thus it 
became a constant field of conflict among minority elites, and the 
reorganizations of ownership often took on a political tinge.10
Yet the structure of the press did not alter radically. There 
remained in every region central papers (from the Hungarian 
minority’s point of view) that had appeared for decades: the county 
papers in Transylvania (Hargita Népe, Háromszék, Szabadság, 
Népújság, Bihari Napló, Szatmári Friss Újság), Új Szó (established 
1949) in Slovakia, Magyar Szó (established 1944) in Vojvodina, and 
the Uzhhorod Kárpáti Igaz Szó (established 1920) in Transcarpathia. 
Not that there were no major new papers, of course – the minority 
elite made continual efforts to acquire press mouthpieces by direct 
or indirect influence. That endeavor after 1989 lay behind the 
Transylvanian Krónika and Romániai Magyar Szó (the post-1989 
successor to Előre), and Kárpátalja, published in Berehove.
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Although the structural renewal of the written press served 
as the yardstick, there were important changes also in radio and 
television. In each region, the surviving state-financed, state-
controlled Hungarian-language radio and television stations were 
joined by new local stations, and satellite dishes meant that Hungary’s 
television channels could be picked up as well. The Hungary-based 
Duna TV could be received in all the minority regions from 1993, 
and these days the Hungarian commercial stations can be picked 
up to a large extent as well. Meanwhile, the neighboring countries’ 
commercial TV stations have also developed enormously into strong 
competition for the Hungarian stations.11
The third field of renewal in the media beyond Hungary’s 
borders has been the emergence of Internet news portals. These 
represent strong competition to the press in all countries, as 
they often lend a new tone to coverage of public affairs. There is 
already competition among them, and allegiances have developed 
to specific political forces. The other media also run websites, to 
take local, regional, pan-Hungarian and international information 
to a wider public and circumvent shortcomings of newspaper 
distribution. Transylvania’s best known site is www.transindex.
ro, whose operators define it less as a portal than as a “project,” 
with forums, blog facilities and columns accompanied by relatively 
little news as such. Other portals of note are www.hirek.ro and 
www.erdely.ma. Notable sites elsewhere are www.karpatinfo.
net for Transcarpathia, www.vajdasagma.info for Vojvodina, and 
Slovakia’s www.felvidek.ma, www.bumm.sk, www.parameter.
sk. In addition there are institutional sites for scholarship, science 
and culture, and most numerous of all, local portals with news and 
forums designed to boost a sense of community. There are major 
thematic, cultural, literary and other specialized portals, notably 
www.zetna.org in Vojvodina, www.bdk.blog.hu in Transcarpathia, 
www.katedra.sk in Slovakia, and www.langos.at in Burgenland. 
Notable here are databanks (bibliographies, statistics, link 
collections, digital libraries and document collections, registers and 
dictionaries) such as www.foruminst.sk, www.adatbank.ro, http://
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adattar.vmmi.org and www.mtaki.hu.12 A new arrival in March 
2006 was www.emagyar.net, to connect so-called eMagyar points 
in various regions with financial support from Hungary. However, a 
problem for all Hungarian minority portals has been traffic at a low 
level that precludes self-financing. Many supply their pages from 
servers in Hungary.13
The media changes helped to transform the scholarly activity 
that furthered Hungarian self-awareness beyond Hungary’s 
borders. The arts and social sciences were tied closely to Hungary 
by connections, funding and their language orientation, while the 
pure and applied sciences built up stronger international links 
and embedded themselves more deeply in the system of scientific 
institutions of their country. The emphasis on literature in the period 
before the change of system meant that this was the field in which 
the first serious research projects and schools emerged, thanks 
particularly to Mihály Czine, Mihály Ilia and András Görömbei.
There are almost 1,000 postgraduates in neighboring countries 
who publish in Hungarian, many with doctorates awarded since 
1989 (some in Hungary) and positions in higher education. Some are 
integrated into their own country’s academic institutions. Others 
work at Hungarian research stations funded by foundations,14 
usually attached to universities or independent professional bodies. 
Such integration and management in Slovakia was performed in the 
1990s by the Mercurius Group, and since then by the Forum Institute 
and Gramma Language Office. The biggest groups of Hungarian 
researchers are in the Central European Studies Faculty of Konstantin 
University in Nitra and at János Selye University in Komárno. The 
role is played in Transcarpathia by the Hungarian Studies Center at 
the state Uzhhorod State University, and increasingly since the mid-
1990s by the Limes (now named after Tivadar Lehoczky) Institute of 
Social Research, attached to the Ferenc Rákóczi II Transcarpathian 
Hungarian Institute, and by the Hodinka Antal Institute. The broadest 
promoter in Romania is the Transylvanian Museum Society with 
six specialized departments. Several fields are served by separate 
associations and foundations, mainly based in Cluj-Napoca: the 
510 Minority Hungarian Communities in the 20th Century
János Kriza Ethnographical Society, the Attila T. Szabó Linguistics 
Institute, the Max Weber Society, the István Apáthy Society, the 
Entz Géza Foundation for Cultural History and the WAC-Center for 
Regional and Anthropological Research in Miercurea-Ciuc. These 
are run mainly by university staff, but research and publications are 
covered by the Sapientia Foundation Institute for Research Programs, 
funded by the Hungarian state, while the Hungarian departments 
at Babeş-Bolyai University have a separate research coordinator: 
the Hungarian University Federation from Cluj-Napoca. Similar 
processes occurred in Serbia to those in Transcarpathia: alongside 
the University of Novi Sad, Faculty of Philosophy, Department of 
Hungarian Studies arose new workshops of social science that have 
assumed the task of molding self-awareness in centers of Hungarian 
habitation. The broadest research management and publishing role 
is played by the Scientific Association  for Hungarology Researches 
in Subotica. In 2006, the Identity Minority Research Institute was 
founded specifically for sociological research, under the aegis of 
the Vojvodina Hungarian Cultural Institute. Hungarian scientific 
activity in Croatia is coordinated by the Society for Hungarian 
Science and Art in Croatia in Zagreb, with over 60 members, the 
most important work being associated with Károly Lábodi. There 
is scientific coordination also done in Lendava (Slovenia) and 
Unterwart (Austria). The main journals are Fórum in Šamorin, 
Erdélyi Társadalom, Korunk, Magyar Kisebbség and Web in Cluj-
Napoca, Híd and Létünk in Novi Sad, Aracs and Bácsország in 
Subotica, Muratáj in Lendava, and Kisebbségkutatás, Pro Minoritate 
and Regio in Budapest.15
The subject matter of research has changed. The descriptive 
works presenting the cultural and social heritage (national identity) 
typical before 1989 have lost ground to examinations of the operation 
of minority and regional communities, institutional sub-systems, and 
specific social processes. Simultaneously, specialization is occurring, 
although this cannot run as deeply in a narrower, numerically 
smaller minority Hungarian environment as it does in Hungary or 
among majority researchers in neighboring countries. The most 
widespread research projects best known internationally have to do 
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with bilingualism, variants of living language, and language policy. 
Miklós Kontra initiated research that has been going on for decades 
into the progressive multi-centeredness of Hungarian. Questions 
of language design have been tackled by István Csernicskó, Lajos 
Göncz, István Lanstyák, János Péntek, Gizella Szabómihály and 
Sándor N. Szilágyi.16 Of most importance to the self-awareness of 
minority communities have been the census analyses, enquiring 
into the processes of demography and social structure, notably by 
László Gyurgyík, István Horváth, Tamás Kiss, Károly Mirnics, 
József Molnár, Árpád E. Varga and Valér Veres.17
The main methodological innovation in the social sciences was 
the mass survey. Several regions and majority/minority relations 
have been covered by major surveys. The Ferenc Balázs Institute has 
repeatedly used questionnaires on the subject of change in values. 
György Csepeli and Antal Örkény ran an examination of inter-ethnic 
relations in the Carpathian Basin in 1997. Ferenc Gereben carried out 
surveys of national awareness through reading habits. Changes in 
religious observance were mapped sociologically by Miklós Tomka. 
Kálmán Gábor looked at youth culture in terms of adaptation. The 
Institute for Ethnic and National Minority Studies of the Hungarian 
Academy of Sciences cooperated with groups beyond the borders 
on the Carpathian Panel of 2007, to examine the relationships of 
social and employment positions with value systems.18
Surveys of ethnography and cultural anthropology play an 
important role in revealing the features of minority everyday life. 
Important names here are József Liszka of Slovakia, and the Cluj-
Napoca and Miercurea-Ciuc schools of ethnographers: Vilmos 
Keszeg, Ferenc Pozsony and Vilmos Tánczos, and Zoltán A. Biró, 
József Gagyi and Sándor Oláh.19 At the opposite pole is political 
philosophy, where important changes have been made in the 
interpretation of the concept of a minority and ethno-political and 
legal relations by adapting modern political multiculturalism and 
collective rights to situations that vary from country to country. 
The Hungarian-language literature on this has been dominated by 
László Öllős of Slovakia, Alpár Losoncz of Vojvodina, and Miklós 
Bakk and Levente Salat of Transylvania.20 
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Looking at studies of history that go beyond local history 
and general knowledge, there are well-known cultural and social 
historians in Transylvania, such as Ákos Egyed, Gusztáv Hermann, 
Zsigmond Jakó, András Kiss, András Kovács, Sándor Pál-Antal and 
Judit Pál. Minority and regional history has become increasingly a 
subject of Hungarian historiography, in Hungary and in neighboring 
countries alike. These research projects are reflected also in this 
book.
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Magyar Köztársaság alkotmánya és a határon túli magyarok [Conflict 
of Agreement. Hungary’s Constitution and the Hungarians beyond 
the Borders] (Somorja, 2008); Alpár Losoncz, Európa-dimenziók 
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8. cASE StudIES
Austria (Gerhard Baumgartner)
One feature of today’s Austrian minority policy is the absence of 
considered strategy: its direction is set by factors of foreign or, 
more rarely, domestic policy.1 Foreign policy pressure resulted, 
for instance, in recognition of the Vienna Hungarians in 1992, 
division of the Czechoslovak national group in the same year, 
and recognition of the Romanians in 1993. The rights assured 
to minorities by Austrian law do not seem deficient at first sight, 
but not all the stipulations apply in practice. For example, several 
demands and 45 years went by before multilingual place name signs 
required under the 1955 Act of State were erected in Burgenland, 
giving German/Hungarian place name signs to the communities of 
Oberwart/Felsőőr, Unterwart/Alsóőr, Siget in der Wart/Őrisziget, 
and Oberpullendorf/Felsőpulya.2
Domestic political pressure has applied only in education 
policy.3 Bilingual education became possible all over Burgenland 
in the 1990s only because school rolls had fallen by 50 percent in 
the 1980s while the number of teachers had grown by 150 percent. 
The teachers were public employees, which put the provincial 
government in a difficult situation. They could only be found 
employment by increasing the number of school classes, which 
was possible if classes became bilingual, for which a relatively low 
minimum number of pupils was required. The remaining places 
were taken up by pupils from Hungary and Slovakia who commuted 
across the borders each day. In 1992–1993 there were 35 children 
in Burgenland infants’ schools receiving instruction in Hungarian, 
while the two Hungarian-language elementary schools had 50 pupils 
and the one Hungarian civil school 55. In the same academic year, 
220 pupils in 11 Burgenland elementary schools chose Hungarian 
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as an optional subject, as did 229 pupils in civil schools. There were 
229 students being taught in Hungarian at the secondary and higher 
levels. Such teaching in Burgenland is still regulated by legislation on 
minority schooling from 1937, as amended in 1994. This guarantees 
minority-language teaching in all communities where the minority 
accounts for at least 50 percent of the inhabitants. However, the 1994 
amendment also allows for optional minority-language teaching in 
all schools where seven or more pupils opt for it. In 1992, a bilingual 
federal gymnasium opened in Oberwart, with Croatian/German and 
Hungarian/German sections and all subjects taught in both minority 
languages. The school currently has about 200 students. There has 
also been a People’s College of Burgenland Hungarians operating in 
Oberwart since 1989.4
Burgenland has two quarterly publications published in 
Hungarian: the Őrvidéki Hírek and Őri Füzetek. The Bécsi Napló 
is a newspaper published in Vienna by the Central Federation of 
Austrian Hungarian Associations that appears six times a year. 
The Burgenland provincial studios of ORF, Austrian national 
broadcasting service, began to air a 25-minute Hungarian television 
program four times a year in 1990, rising to six times since 2000. 
There is also a weekly 45-minute radio program and a daily 5-minute 
news bulletin. From 1998 to 2004, there was a private radio station, 
Antenna 4, broadcasting in four languages from Pinkafeld, but it 
ceased when funding from the Federal Chancellery was withdrawn.5 
Vienna’s only Hungarian-language radio station – the privately 
owned Vienna Hungarian Radio – started up in 2006 and is run by 
various groups of young people of Hungarian origin.
Figures on the size of the Hungarian community in Burgenland 
vary. In the 1991 census, 6,763 Burgenlanders stated that they 
used the Hungarian language in everyday life. Interestingly, this 
figure has been stable for decades, while the other minorities have 
been steadily decreasing in size. According to a survey by the 
Roman Catholic Church in Burgenland, taken in 1987, some 7,000 
different Burgenlanders went to a Hungarian mass or requested 
spiritual guidance or other services for churchgoers during the 
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year. According to the results of a mini-census taken in 1994 by the 
Austrian state and the Burgenland Provincial Statistics Office, there 
were 14,000 Burgenlanders who could speak Hungarian to various 
degrees.6 This put the proportion of those knowing Hungarian 
fairly high, and also showed people recording themselves as either 
German-speaking or Hungarian-speaking, depending on the social 
and political climate at the time of the census.
Table 1. The Hungarian population of Austria
based on language spoken, 1971–20017
1971 1981 1991 2001 1991–2001
1991–
2001, %
Burgenland   5,673   4,147   6,763   6,641 -  122 -1.80
Vienna   8,413   8,073 13,519 15,436 +1,916 14.17
Lower 
Austria   2,088   1,159   5,440   8,083 +2,643 48.51
Styria   1,028      543   1,863   3,115 +1,252 57.20
upper 
Austria      915      953   3,218   3,849 +  631 19.61
carinthia      234      197      490      738 +  248 50.61
Salzburg      215      301      793   1,095 +  302 38.08
tirol      223        15      671      956 +  285 42.47
Total for 
Austria 19,117 15,875 33,459 40,583 +7124 21.29
A comparison of the 1991 and 2001 census data shows that the 
Hungarian-speakers became the most numerous group in Austria 
among the speakers of recognized minority languages, with a 
sharp rise in numbers in all provinces except Burgenland.8 This 
is explained in eastern Austria by migration to seasonal and black 
economy work, while in western Austria the number working in the 
travel industry has grown, partly because of a rise in the number of 
Hungarian tourists.
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One milestone in the history of the Hungarian minority in 
Vienna was recognition as an indigenous ethnic group, awarded 
in 1992. This gave them a representative on the Council of Ethnic 
Groups and entitled them to state support – rights that the Hungarian 
associations in Graz, Linz and Salzburg have yet to receive. 
Contributions to the increase in the Vienna Hungarian community 
were made by the Yugoslav wars and by the mounting popularity of 
the University of Vienna with students from Hungary and Slovakia. 
The traditional dividing line between the pre-1945 and post-1956 
arrivals has faded.9
The position of the Hungarian-language group in Burgenland 
differs strongly from those of the Croats and the Roma. The lat-
ter have partly become assimilated and partly become wholly mar-
ginalized, while the Croats are politically divided into large Social 
Democratic and People’s Party camps. The Hungarians are divided 
in quite different ways: on one side there are the old Hungarian vil-
lages consisting of communities with distinct historical identities, 
and on the other there are the post-World War II settlers. The latter 
arrived either as refugees after 1956 or for economic reasons after 
1989,10 and now hold the leading positions in the language group. 
This has caused a marked dividing line between the minority elite 
and the indigenous Hungarians. The group identity lies close to the 
Hungarian identity of the twentieth century and has little to do with 
earlier forms of identity.
It can be said of the Hungarian ethnic group of Burgenland that 
they are divided in a social sense, but the divisions speak different 
languages hardly intelligible to one another. The recently arrived 
magyaró are at home in local and standard German and in the 
Hungarian literary language, but unfamiliar with “pidginized” 
Hungarian or even with local Hungarian dialect. The families 
who arrived after 1956 or 1989 themselves speak standard Austro-
German and standard Hungarian. In addition, the long-established 
Northern Burgenland Hungarians descended from families of hired 
agricultural labor speak both standard and dialect German and a 
quite distinct western dialect of Hungarian, and cannot follow the 
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archaic dialect spoken by the indigenous Hungarians of the Upper 
Wart region.
The Hungarian villages of Burgenland are in a paradoxical 
situation. Just as the Hungarian education was being reintroduced at 
all levels (infants’, primary, civil and gymnasium), children whose 
mother tongue was Hungarian were all but extinct. Their parents are 
no longer able to pass on their knowledge of the language and must 
rely on the education system to teach it. The preservation of the 
village language has become associated since 1986 with a “romantic” 
desire, while knowledge of Hungarian has had a practical side since 
the opening of the border. For one thing, knowledge of the language 
is necessary to tap a mass purchasing power from Hungary. For 
another, the open border has given Burgenland Hungarians a 
comparative advantage in tasks relating to the burgeoning Austro-
Hungarian relations. Thirdly, social contacts with Hungarians 
beyond the local community have suddenly become stronger. The 
children who learn their Hungarian in school speak a quite different 
Hungarian from that of their parents or grandparents.
The structure of the Burgenland Hungarian minority has altered 
considerably in the last decade.11 Earlier it consisted of a network 
of minority groups speaking different dialects. Now the minority 
has become scattered across the whole province as individuals,12 
tending to use the standard Hungarian language. It remains to be 
seen whether this newly implanted standard Hungarian language 
can gain a real minority social basis in Burgenland. One require-
ment for that is for the minority to rise above its traditional internal 
rivalries.
croatia (János Vékás)
The last Yugoslav census in 1991 recorded 22,355 self-described 
Hungarians in Croatia, whereas 121,000 people of Hungarian 
ethnicity had dwelt there in 191013 – a demographic loss greater 
than that of any other Hungarian minority beyond Hungary’s post-
Trianon borders. Their position was worsened by the bloody process 
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whereby an independent Croatia emerged from the fragmentation 
of Yugoslavia, as bloody as the one in neighboring Bosnia-
Herzegovina.
Croatia’s declaration of independence on June 25, 1991, was fol-
lowed by the secession of mainly Serbian-inhabited districts cover-
ing a third of the republic’s territory, with active assistance from the 
Serbian-led Yugoslav army. The ambition of the self-styled Republic 
of Serbian Krajina was to detach these districts from Croatia and 
attach them to Serbia. They included the Drava district of south 
Baranja and east Slavonia, where four fifths of the indigenous 
Hungarians lived, as a majority in several communities.14
The Hungarians came out in favor of independent Croatia, many 
of them taking up arms, but they had to flee before the advancing 
Yugoslav army, which wrought devastation in their villages. Over 
1,000 Hungarians were killed and about 8,000 fled. Churches, 
public buildings and dwellings were looted and destroyed, and 
about 50,000 Serb colonists were brought in from other parts of 
Bosnia and Croatia.15
Croatia reoccupied the quasi-state in 1995, but the return of 
refugees of Hungarian ethnicity commenced only in 1997, in the 
face of many difficulties. The Hungarian state contributed a 200 
million-forint reconstruction fund in 1999, which was used to 
rebuild the Reformed church of Kopačevo and the arts center of 
Zmajevac. These ceremonially reopened on November 13, 1999, in 
the presence of the Croatian and Hungarian prime ministers. The 
Hungarian prime minister was also present on January 26, 2002, at 
the rededication of the rebuilt Reformed church of Korog.
But the economy and the job market had collapsed, and hardly 
three quarters of the refugees returned. The Croatian census of 2001 
found 16,595 people of Hungarian ethnicity, 9,784 of them in north 
Baranja County.16
The legal situation of the Hungarians in Croatia can be 
described as stable. 17 Croatia was keen to meet expectations for 
minority protection in its quest for international recognition of 
its independence and eventually for EU membership. The first 
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constitution, of 1990, already stated that indigenous national 
minorities had a right to free expression of their national identity, 
free use of their writing system, and cultural autonomy.18 Dedicated 
laws were passed in 2000 allowing for native-language education 
and regulating its use in detail. The 2000 amendment to the 
constitution introduced the requirement of a qualified two-thirds 
majority for amendment of legislation to do with minorities and 
provides for their representation in Parliament.19 The 1999 electoral 
act reserved five seats in Parliament for minorities, including one for 
the Hungarians. The act on parliamentary constituencies has created 
a separate constituency covering the whole country for this purpose. 
The act on electoral rolls assigned the task of preparing such rolls 
for minorities to the state administration. In 2002 came an act on the 
minorities with constitutional force, one paragraph of which defines 
their political representation in Parliament and local government, 
and permits the formation of minority local government bodies in 
local or county governments where the minority accounts for 1.5 
percent of the population, or exceeds 200 (500 for counties).20 In the 
event, the 2007 elections led to the formation of Hungarian minority 
local governments in five counties, seven cities and ten villages.21
Vertical organization of minorities had been permitted under the 
party state in Croatia. The successor to the supreme Hungarian body 
founded in 1949, the Federation of Croatian Hungarians, remained 
after the change of system.22 However, several of its leaders left for 
Hungary during the war. The Hungarian People’s Party of Croatia23 
that they founded at Zmajevac on March 23, 1990, was unsuccessful 
in the elections. The leaders remaining in Croatia set up a Provisional 
Presidency of the Federation of Croatian Hungarians in 1990, and 
on April 6, 1993, in Zagreb a Democratic Union of Hungarians 
of Croatia, headed by Sándor Jakab.24 This performs the tasks of 
representing the Croatian Hungarians in Parliament and scores 
consistently well in local elections. It also does significant work in 
publishing and educational organization.
The Democratic Alliance’s HUNCRO Newspaper and 
Book Publishing Co., founded in Osijek in 1996, dominates the 
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dissemination of information, with a weekly Új Magyar Képes 
Újság, a monthly Horvátországi Magyarság, and a children’s paper 
Barkóca. Programs are broadcast in Hungarian on the Osijek and 
Croatian Baranja radio stations and on Slavonian Television.
The educational associations to split from the Democratic 
Community are grouped under a Federation of Hungarian 
Associations.25 This includes the Croatian Hungarian Teachers’ 
Association, formed in 1996.26 In the same year a Society for 
Hungarian Sciences and Arts in Croatia was founded in Zagreb by 
65 scientists and scholars with postgraduate degrees.27
Education is among the Croatian Hungarians’ biggest problems. 
In the 1989–1990 school year there had been 41 Hungarian 
educational institutions with over 2,500 students, but by the turn 
of the millennium both figures had halved. In 2006–2007, only 148 
children attended a Hungarian infants’ school and 256 attended 
one of the five elementary schools teaching in Hungarian. (Another 
15 schools taught 729 children Hungarian as a native language, 
and there was a bilingual section in Zagreb with 14 pupils.) The 
only secondary school teaching in Hungarian was attached to the 
Educational and Cultural Center of Hungarians in Croatia, with 
67 students. Most of the surviving institutions worked under poor 
conditions, with substantial subsidies and help with teachers’ 
training from Hungary.
The other grave problem is unemployment. Modernization has 
not begun in Hungarian-inhabited villages to the same extent as 
it has in equivalent Croat-inhabited ones. Returning Hungarian 
refugees were not given their jobs back in state-owned firms, and 
the proportion employed in the state administration is smaller than 
their proportion of the population.
Hungary and Croatia signed a treaty in Osijek on April 5, 1995, 
protecting the rights of Hungary’s Croatian and Croatia’s Hungarian 
minority and set up a mixed minority committee to implement it.28 
The two governments held a joint meeting in Budapest on January 
26, 2006. The problems of the Hungarian community in Croatia 
mentioned could be solved by cooperation between them.
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romania (Nándor Bárdi)
The Hungarian elite in Romania is determined by Romania’s 
Hungarian national minority, by creating and operating a system 
of institutions that covers the ethno-cultural community as far as 
possible. This system can be divided into sub-systems: representation 
of political interests, local government posts, religious affairs, 
education, publicity, culture and public education, and voluntary 
institutions.29 The country’s policy towards the Hungarians and the 
minority community’s legal and economic situation are decided by 
the institutional frameworks within Romania itself.
Of key importance is the protection of interests, undertaken 
largely by the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania 
(DAHR). The history of the system of interest representation since 
1989 can be divided into five phases.30
1. The first lasted until the Braşov conference of 1993. There 
had been simultaneous initiatives by the intelligentsia in Timişoara, 
Cluj-Napoca and Bucharest in December 1989 to assert the separate 
interests of the Hungarians. The joint DAHR started its life with a 
statement on December 25 and was headed by Géza Domokos, then 
manager of the Kriterion publishing company. The interim executive 
formed at the end of February 1990 stated that the DAHR intended to 
act as an umbrella organization for all Hungarian interest-protecting, 
cultural and religious bodies. The development of local and county 
bodies owed much to Domokos’s contacts in literature, journalism 
and the arts. Even at the first congress in Oradea in April 1990, 
there was opposition to the strategy of working through the reform 
communist National Salvation Front31 and there were calls for a line 
based on basic democratic principles of human and international 
rights. This line was represented by Géza Szőcs, a returned political 
émigré, backed by the Union of Hungarian Youth Organizations.32 
An attempt was made to handle the clash between the two strategies 
by electing Domokos as president and Szőcs as secretary-general, 
with offices in Bucharest and Cluj-Napoca respectively.33 After the 
parliamentary elections of May 20, 1990, had made the DAHR the 
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second-largest political party in the country, the anti-Hungarian 
measures taken by the new government shifted the DAHR towards 
the right-wing forces of the party system, concerned with basic 
democratic values. The Democratic Convention was formed with 
other opposition organizations.34 After the September 1992 elections, 
the post-communist Democratic Front for National Salvation35 was 
capable of ruling as a minority government only with support from 
the communist and nationalist parties, and the DAHR sought allies 
on the center-right. This also applied in the foreign relations of the 
Alliance, as the DAHR became the country’s first party to join the 
European Democratic Union (of European Christian Democratic 
parties) in May 1993. The DAHR managed to broaden its scope 
at the time that Romania was admitted to the Council of Europe, 
through an American visit by László Tőkés and through efforts by 
György Frunda in the Council of Europe. The internal strains over 
strategy became specific and reached a climax at the 2nd Congress 
in Târgu Mureş in May 1991.36
The political means of striking bargains in Bucharest was 
opposed increasingly by those trusting in pressure from abroad 
on the grounds of minority and democratic rights. This amounted 
to a call for partner-nation status: treating Romania’s Hungarians 
not as a set of minority individuals, but as a national community 
with power-sharing rights, as a distinct political entity. It went on 
to develop concepts of autonomy and minority law, and successive 
political declarations, memoranda and petitions expressing a demand 
for political emancipation. Meanwhile the elite was changing. 
The local and national elections replaced increasing numbers 
of DAHR politicians who had belonged to the pre-1989 cultural 
elite with younger people, many with technical qualifications, and 
representatives of local and regional interests. The multiplicity of 
strategic interests and values led in 1992 to various ideological 
platforms forming within the DAHR. Out of the Union of Hungarian 
Youth Organizations arose the Reform Bloc headed by Tibor T. 
Toró, from the Székely Land Political Group arose the Transylvanian 
Hungarian Initiative headed by Ádám Katona, and from the group 
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of liberal experts arose the Liberal Circle chaired by Péter Eckstein-
Kovács, then in 1993 the Social Democratic–New Left Bloc.37 
Internal democracy and pluralism were to be ensured not only by the 
platforms but also by legally constituted political associations – the 
Romanian Hungarian Christian Democratic Party and Association 
of Romanian Hungarian Employees – and by trade, professional and 
social associations: the Transylvanian Museum Society, Hungarian 
Cultural Society of Transylvania, Romanian Hungarian Farmers’ 
Association, Hungarian Teacher’s Association of Romania, and 
so on.38 The third pillar of internal pluralism was the DAHR’s 21 
county and district organizations. All these changes were instituted 
at the 3rd Congress, held in Braşov in January 1993, along with a 
structural reform that followed the principles of the “state model.” 
The chief decision-making body (“legislature”) is now the Council 
of Association Representatives, and the executive (“government”) 
is the Executive Presidency, with divisions for its various programs. 
The intention was to complete this self-governing model with the 
election of party office holders through secret and direct general 
internal elections among the Hungarians of Romania. The two 
rival leaders resigned at the Congress, after which Béla Markó was 
elected as president and Csaba Takács as executive president.39
2. The second period of DAHR history, in 1993–1996, was one 
of many conflicts. Some concerned criticism of Romania’s Euro-
Atlantic integration and the DAHR’s minority position on the 
Hungarian–Romanian basic treaty. Others derived from government 
policy: operation of prefectures in the Székely counties, the act on 
the national anthem, debate on the education act, problems of the 
Romanian community in the Székely Land, and so on. The third 
group of conflicts arose between László Tőkés and DAHR members 
of the legislature Attila Verestóy, György Tokay and György Frunda.40 
Beyond the relations with the Romanian administration, this conflict 
was about the desirable legal status and autonomy of the Hungarian 
community of Romania, more generally about the tension between 
adherence to a political vision for the future and the day-to-day 
assertion of minority political interests through a bargaining process 
within the system of political institutions.
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Béla Markó and the parliamentary leaders gained strength from 
the increasingly professional process of party politics. The fourth 
congress, in Cluj-Napoca in May 1995, amended the statutes so as 
to benefit the territorial branches and party-like activity, not the 
platforms. The internal elections to clarify power relations within 
the DAHR were not held. The Operative Council and the president 
gained a bigger say in decision-making. The “people’s party” 
character (ideological openness, strong party and electoral apparatus) 
was strengthened at the expense of the autonomy model.41
3. The third phase, in 1996–2000, was marked by participation 
in the country’s right-wing government coalition. November 
1996 elections gave the Democratic Convention and the Social 
Democratic Union a 53 percent majority.42 There were three reasons 
for DAHR participation in the government: the stabilizing effect of 
its 7 percent support in Parliament, the fact that Hungarian votes 
had been decisive in Emil Constantinescu beating Ion Iliescu in the 
presidential election, and the international credit that the DAHR 
gave to the government through its known strong commitment to 
Euro-Atlantic integration. The importance of the latter became clear 
when the DAHR’s ability to further its language use and educational 
demands lasted only until July 1997, the NATO summit in Madrid, 
for once Romania was admitted to the second circle of candidates 
for accession, it became less vulnerable over its minority and human 
rights record. Apart from some emergency government orders and 
legislative amendments, the DAHR’s chief victory was the foundation 
of the Minority Protection Bureau with a broad mandate and regional 
offices. Also important was the addition of state-secretaryships for 
minority matters to the Ministry of Education and Culture. The 
debates within the DAHR mainly concerned its coalition role and 
the institutional prospects for voluntary organization. Here a key 
element was the question of a separate Hungarian-language state 
university, which was not included in the government programs 
of Victor Ciorbea or Radu Vasile. The party program at the 6th 
Congress of the DAHR put stronger emphasis on regional interests 
focused on Transylvania.43
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4. In the fourth phase, the parliamentary elections in the 
autumn of 2000 were won by the Social Democratic Party 
(successor to the National Salvation Front and the 1992–1996 Party 
of Social Democracy).44 The new government was not joined by the 
DAHR, but in exchange for annually renewed national and county 
agreements in 2000–2004, it agreed to support the governing party, 
which was in a minority in Parliament. This yielded an amendment 
to the law on public administration in favor of minority-language 
usage, a significant increase in state-sponsored higher education 
in Hungarian, an operating permit for the Sapientia Transylvanian 
Hungarian University of Sciences funded by the Hungarian state, 
and the foundation of separate Hungarian secondary schools. The 
land act was also amended in line with the interests of the Hungarian 
community – communal property was recognized as a form of 
ownership, meaning that such cooperatives could be refounded and 
regain their holdings. One step of great regional importance was 
the start made on building the A3 Expressway through Northern 
Transylvania. There was great symbolic significance in the re-
erection of the Statue of Liberty in Arad in 2004.45 The local 
influence of DAHR branches was greatly increased by agreements 
reached at county level.46 There were attempts to form an internal 
opposition to the Operative Council (consisting of Markó, Verestóy, 
László Borbély, Frunda and Csaba Takács), but these did not 
succeed. Tőkés’s post of honorary president was abolished at the 7th 
Congress, held in Satu Mare in January and February 2003, and it 
was agreed that those standing against the DAHR in elections would 
lose their membership automatically. This substantially weakened the 
positions of Tőkés and the groups opposed to Markó. Meanwhile 
Tőkés began to organize an autonomy movement at grassroots level. 
As a result the Hungarian National Council of Transylvania was 
formed under Tőkés’s leadership, and in October 2003 the Székely 
National Council was formed with József Csapó as president.47 
The autonomy program of these two unregistered organizations 
was rejected in the legislature in 2004 by all parties except the 
DAHR group.48
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5. The fifth phase began with the parliamentary elections of 
November 2004. Independent candidates of the still unregistered 
Hungarian Civic Party headed by Jenő Szász, mayor of Odorheiu-
Secuiesc, ran on Romanian party lists gaining 1 percent of the vote, 
and the DAHR campaigning for autonomy goals obtained 6 percent. 
The liberal-democratic grouping formed a coalition government 
with the DAHR and the Humanist Party. It included a DAHR vice-
premier, three ministers (territorial planning, information systems 
and commerce), nine state secretaries, four prefects and eight 
sub-prefects. The program included a minority act, decentralized 
administration and finance, foundation of development regions 
important to the Hungarians, and construction of a Transylvania 
Expressway. Romania’s accession to the European Union on January 
1, 2007, attained a major foreign policy objective pursued by the 
DAHR for 15 years.
Table 2. Election results
of the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania
date representatives Senators Votes (thousands)
Polls 
(%)
1992 27 12 811/831 7.4/7.5
1996 25 11 813/838 6.6/6.8
2000 27 12 737/751 6.8/6.9
2004 22 10 628/637 6.1/6.2
Romania’s post-1989 policy towards the Hungarians, the way 
in which the government approached the Hungarians was strongly 
influenced by the party struggles in Romania (post-communists 
against the right) and by international relations (the demands of 
Euro-Atlantic integration).49
The first National Salvation Front statement, on December 24, 
1989, promised Romania’s minorities full equality of rights. There 
followed a special statement on January 5 that held out the prospect 
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of ensuring individual and collective rights. But by the end of 
January 1990, conflict between national communities had broken 
out after the Hungarian state secretaries in the Front, along with 
the DAHR, had declared a short-term goal of founding separate 
Hungarian middle schools. The Front was attacked as unpatriotic, 
in the period leading up to the promulgation of the constitution in 
June 1991, by the anti-communist parties, for making institutional 
concessions, while fears aroused of the Hungarians and of Hungary 
were being used to justify a range of anti-democratic measures. The 
two factors coincided in the events in Târgu Mureş in March 1990: 
a demonstration by the city’s Hungarians for a separate Hungarian 
Bolyai Gymnasium and native-language education, and mobilization 
of the Romanian masses, filled with fear of ostensible Hungarian 
separatist endeavors. The street clashes seemed to justify the leaders 
of the National Salvation Front in founding successor organizations 
for the political secret police (Securitate), which was supposed to 
disband at just that time.50
The constitution and the basic treaty with Hungary denied the 
principle of collective rights and institutional protection of minority 
rights, thus hindering the institutional development of a separate 
Hungarian cultural and political community. The 1991 constitution 
offered no legal guarantees of rights for minorities, and discriminated 
against them by declaring Romanian to be the sole official language 
(§13). At the Neptun Meeting in June 1993, the government made 
concessions specifically to some moderate DAHR politicians in 
separate bargaining. This lent cachet to the politicians concerned 
and provided useful international publicity.51
Negotiation of the basic treaty with Hungary in 1995–1996 
was the main test of strength in this period. The Hungarian side 
strove to include the main international norms of minority rights, 
but the Romanian side opposed any codification of international 
agreements. The talks were broken off in 1993, but resumed under 
international pressure by a new Hungarian government in 1995. 
The biggest dispute was over Council of Europe Recommendation 
1201/1993, defining the concept of a national minority, opposing 
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change in demographic relations in minority-inhabited areas, 
asserting rights of minority self-organization and official use of the 
native language, and proclaiming the right to establish autonomous 
administrative bodies with special status in areas where a minority 
formed a majority of the inhabitants. In the end the basic treaty 
cited three international documents, including Recommendation 
1201, to which a footnote was attached, stating that it was not being 
interpreted as ensuring collective rights. The DAHR refused to 
endorse the treaty.52
Policy towards the Hungarian community up to 1996 was 
personified in President Ion Iliescu. It continued to be an issue at 
government coalition level in the subsequent period as well. After 
the Democratic Convention and its ally the DAHR took power in 
1996, the government sought to found the Minority Protection 
Bureau (a constitutional requirement) and ensure language rights 
and other reform measures through emergency government orders. 
However, these were not ratified by the legislature, or they were 
ratified only after compromises had been made. The obstacle in this 
period was less the government than the resistance of both coalition 
and opposition (socialist and nationalist) parties, impeding the 
foundation of the Bolyai University, seen as the key to a separate 
Hungarian system of institutions in education.53
When the Social Democrats came to power in 2000, the DAHR 
gave extra-governmental support under agreements reached annu-
ally between the two parties. The Hungarian Status Law (more 
precisely the issue of setting up a network of offices in Romania 
to implement the law, and that of the financial support for educa-
tion in the mother tongue provided by the kin-state), as well as 
the legal and political integration of the Transylvanian Hungarian 
University of Sciences were two issues on which advances were 
made, thanks to good DAHR bargaining positions. Also important 
was the 2003 constitutional amendment.54 Once again part of the 
government after the 2004 elections, the DAHR sought to advance 
positive discrimination through the minority act.55 However, it 
failed to get the concept of cultural autonomy past its coalition part-
ners (as a non-local government-based institution hitherto alien to 
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Romanian public administration). Romania’s minority policy today 
rests on ensuring equal individual rights, with separate institutions 
envisaged through language usage and voluntary social organiza-
tion. Here the political weight of the DAHR is decisive (by stabi-
lizing the government majority and through high performance by 
some of its politicians). Its bargaining position becomes effective 
from a position of integration into government policy. The “Roma-
nian model,” also bandied abroad through the government partici-
pation of the minority party, has become widespread practice in the 
region. Integration of the minority political elite has brought with it 
the official view that the minority elite is competent to judge in the 
affairs of its own community, although it also means that Hungarian 
efforts are confined within the prevailing political system. Efforts to 
alter the political frames (for instance by constitutional amendment, 
proposing minority legislation, or altering the divisions of public 
administration) have elicited immediate conflicts and government 
questioning of the legitimacy of those representing the minority. 
Also within the province of the minority political elites is the fi-
nancing of minority institutions out of public funds.56
The legal status of Romania’s Hungarians – and implementation 
of policy on the Hungarians – is set by the 1991 constitution 
as amended in 2003. Romania is a nation state whose official 
language is Romanian. The constitution defines several minority 
rights: to ethnic identity, native-language education, parliamentary 
representation, and use of the native language in court proceedings. 
But these were phrased generally, in terms of future legislation that 
has yet to be passed, with the result that the basic principles lack 
legal guarantees. Moreover, a series of acts passed up to 1996 put 
constraints on the minorities’ equality before the law and equality of 
opportunity. The state security act (June 1991) declared “separatism 
of a segregatory nature” inimical to the state. Under the public 
administration act (November 1991) local government measures 
could be suspended at any time by the state-appointed prefect, and 
the language of local government meetings and administration was 
to be Romanian exclusively. The severest restrictions came in the 
June 1995 education act: classes taught in Romanian were to be 
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available in every locality; Romanian was to be the language of 
official school documents; minority groups could not be organized 
at the expense of Romanian-taught education; Romanian history and 
geography were to be taught in Romanian; “specialist education” 
was to be in Romanian too.57
Major changes came after the 1996 change of government 
brought the Hungarians into the coalition. The Ciorbea government 
amended the language-use terms of the public administration act in 
an emergency government order (22/1997). For instance, minority 
members could use their native language for administrative 
business in communities where the minority made up 20 percent of 
the inhabitants. There information in public institutions and place 
name signs had to feature the minority language as well. This was 
passed also by Parliament in 2001 under a 2002 agreement between 
the Social Democrats and the DAHR. With the education act, a 
similar ameliorating government order was followed by legislation 
in 1999, guaranteeing the right to study in the native language 
from kindergarten to university. However, this did not allow for the 
foundation of a separate state-sponsored Hungarian university.
Further advance in minority law came with anti-discriminatory 
legislation tabled in 2000 by the minister of minority affairs, Péter 
Eckstein-Kovács, and passed in 2002. This gave general access to 
an anti-discrimination council.
The 2003 constitutional amendment guaranteed private proper-
ty, denominational education, and abolition of compulsory military 
service, and ensured native-language use in public administration, 
public offices, and the judiciary. The concept of a unified nation 
state remained in the constitution but no proposal was adopted that 
was detrimental to the Hungarians. After 80 years, the question of 
minority-language use had been settled. A similar advance was the 
primacy given to EU law over national law.
The economic situation of the Romanian Hungarians was 
affected strongly by restitution legislation. The act on returning 
farmland and forest holdings was amended in a way favorable to 
them in 2001. Another 2001 act returned estate illegally confiscated 
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between 1945 and 1989. The terms applied to all confiscated real 
estate and provided for compensation where it could not be returned. 
In 2002 came an act on returning Church property. Implementation 
began the following year. There had been 1,957 applications by the 
end of 2005 and 387 positive decisions had been reached. A 2004 
act on communal real estate allowed associations, foundations and 
their legal successors to receive compensation too.
The DAHR had pushed for a minority act since 1991 and 
tabled a bill in 1993, but to no avail. Romania promised such an act 
when acceding to the Council of Europe and the European Union. 
It featured in the program of the post-2004 right-wing coalition 
government, but the draft submitted foundered on disagreements 
within the coalition.
The economic position of the Romanian Hungarians differed 
little from the national tendencies. The deciding factor has been 
the economic and geographical position of Hungarian-inhabited 
communities. Privatization and reorganization of the financial system 
was slow until the incoming Ciorbea government’s reforms began 
in 1996. Loss-making firms were wound up; domestic consumption 
and subsidies fell; privatization accelerated; small and medium-
sized firms were supported; forest and farmland was returned to 
its owners; regional development programs started. Behind a fall 
in GDP (+4.1 percent in 1996, -7.3 in 1998, and +2.1 in 2000) lay 
capital shortage, disorderly ownership relations, and a 40 percent 
black economy, but inflation, budget deficit and unemployment 
eased steadily.
By 2005 there were 5,600 partly or wholly owned firms from 
Hungary registered in Romania – 5 percent of all those in which 
there was foreign investment. Hungary’s aggregate stake of €360 
million put it 13th as a source (2.7 percent of the total). This went 
mainly into small firms in Hungarian-inhabited areas.
The economic positions of Romanian Hungarians are affected 
by business expertise gained from contacts in Hungary, but this 
advantage goes together with emigration by many in marketable 
professions. Transylvania and the Partium were at a medium level 
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of development, but Hungarian-inhabited communities have fallen 
behind in applying for EU development funds. Much unemployment 
is hidden, with many farming tiny, hardly mechanized holdings by 
hand or taking temporary jobs abroad. Collective ownership of 
land and forest is an institution in Transylvania, with each village 
holding common property restored since the new millennium. 
This form was confirmed by an DAHR-initiated government order. 
But peasants are still suspicious of communal cultivation, and the 
Hungarian rural population is ageing rapidly.58
Publicity and education are treated in other chapters, but 
two more sub-systems remain. The three largest religious 
denominations (Reformed, Catholic and Unitarian) cover 93 
percent of Romanian Hungarians. The Reformed Church has two 
districts (centered at Oradea and Cluj-Napoca) and the Unitarian 
Church one (Cluj-Napoca). The Roman Catholics have four 
dioceses in Transylvania (Satu Mare, Oradea, Timişoara and Alba 
Iulia) and the dioceses of Moldova (Iaşi) and Bucharest. Over 
half the Hungarian Catholics in Romania belong to the diocese 
of Alba Iulia, which Pope John Paul II raised to an archbishopric. 
The other dioceses come under Bucharest’s authority. Hungarians 
form a diminishing proportion of Romania’s Roman Catholics: 60 
percent in 2002. One problem is the question of native-language 
worship for the Csángó Hungarians of Moldova, where there has 
been slow movement in local congregations under pressure from the 
Vatican. The main advance in Church policy has been the passage of 
the Church affairs act in December 2006. This stresses the Romanian 
Orthodox Church’s role in national history, but without declaring it 
the state religion. The main innovation is a separate budget fund to 
support the Churches.59
By 1996 there was a system of several hundred institutions 
covering science, scholarship, education, music, and the fine, 
applied and performing arts, integral to Romanian Hungarian civil 
society.60 National bodies were the Hungarian Cultural Society 
of Transylvania with its Hungarian houses, and in scholarship 
and science the Institute of Research Programs of the Sapientia 
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Hungarian University of Transylvania, the Hungarian Technical 
Scientific Society of Transylvania, and the Hungarian University 
Federation from Cluj-Napoca.61 (Affiliates of the last include the 
János Kriza Ethnographical Society, the Max Weber Society for 
sociologists, and the Géza Entz Foundation for art historians.)62 
Foremost among the public collections are the city libraries of 
the Székely Land, especially their museums.63 Other important 
repositories of Hungarian cultural heritage in Romania are the 
Archbishopric of Alba Iulia and the archives of the Transylvanian 
Reformed Church District, the museums of Sfântu Gheorghe 
and Miercurea-Ciuc, the Teleki Téka library in Târgu Mureş, the 
Elemér Jakabffy Foundation’s documentary center in Cluj-Napoca, 
the Internet portal of the Transylvanian Hungarian Databank, and 
for scheduled historic buildings, the Transylvania Trust. There 
are Hungarian theaters in nine Transylvanian cities, a separate 
Hungarian opera house in Cluj-Napoca, and two professional 
folkdance ensembles in the Székely Land. These are complemented 
by several hundred amateur clubs and groups concerned with 
heritage, folk dancing and folk music, and folk arts. The Hungarian 
book publishers of Transylvania (Mentor, Kriterion, Pallas-
Akadémia, Polis, Pro-Print, and others) issued almost 300 titles a 
year in the early years of the millennium.64
This system of institutions had emerged by the turn of the 
millennium. Thereafter the emphasis was on financing it and 
operating it as efficiently as possible. But it emerged that the services 
necessary to preserve Hungarian self-awareness in communities 
with a non-Hungarian majority (adult education, library, heritage 
preservation, and so on) could not be provided by voluntary 
Hungarian associations alone, whereas in Hungarian-majority 
communities this could be done. So the focus in the former group 
has shifted to making the state and local government institutions 
multilingual.
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Serbia (János Vékás)
Of all the minority Hungarians in neighboring countries, those of 
Yugoslavia suffered most, although the degree varied from republic 
to republic. The situations there had differed in earlier decades, 
but their ways parted irrevocably after the break-up of the federal 
state.
The last Yugoslav census in 1991 recorded 378,000 persons 
of Hungarian ethnicity, of whom 90 percent (340,000) lived in 
Vojvodina.65 By this time the federal state hardly existed in more than 
name,66 but the republics had no chance of parting in peace, faced 
with Serbia’s view that the right of self-determination belonged not to 
them, but to the individual nations of Yugoslavia.67 Of the 8.5 million 
Serbs (36 percent of the population), 1.4 million dwelt in Bosnia-
Herzegovina and 600,000 in Croatia. The Hungarians were innocent 
victims of the merciless Yugoslav wars. Those who fared worst were 
the Hungarians of Baranja and the parts of Slavonia overrun by 
Serbia. Next came those of Vojvodina, many of whom fled abroad 
before threats of conscription, economic collapse and psychological 
warfare. Least affected were those of Slovenia, who soon joined the 
Hungarians in Hungary and Slovakia (and later Romania) in the 
European Union.
Slovenia, Croatia and Macedonia voted for independence 
after the Yugoslav break-up, in referenda in 1991, and recognized 
Bosnia-Herzegovina as independent in 1992. In that year Serbia and 
Montenegro federated as the Yugoslav Federal Republic. The name 
changed to the State Alliance of Serbia and Montenegro in 2003, 
before they became separate states in 2006.
The Vojvodina Hungarians were in a very unfavorable position 
during the great socio-political upheavals of the time. Their numbers 
had halved since the annexation of 1920 and had begun to fall even 
faster in the 1970s. The census of 1991 found only 340,000 people 
in Vojvodina who declared themselves Hungarian – hardly more 
than three quarters of the 1961 figure of 440,000. This was partly 
due to assimilation, partly due to emigration, and still more due to 
the low birth rate typical of the region.
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Another problem for the Hungarians of Vojvodina was a scattered 
settlement pattern. Far fewer dwelt in areas with a Hungarian majority 
than was the case in Romania or Slovakia. There had been large-
scale colonization after both world wars,68 and a steady process of 
urbanization, favorable socially and economically, but leaving them 
open to assimilation.
The Hungarians had lower than average schooling and training, 
and were underrepresented in highly paid fields such as financial 
services and social and political organizations.69 But they showed 
up well in small-scale industry and in farm equipment levels. Even 
under socialism many were self-employed.
Serbia’s two provinces, Kosovo and Vojvodina, had enjoyed a 
measure of self-determination within Serbia since World War II. 
The 1974 constitution had given them a status hardly different from 
that of the six republics. In Kosovo’s case, this assisted the Albanians 
(85 percent of the population) to assert their national interests, but 
this did not apply in Vojvodina, where the Hungarians made up only 
15 percent.70
One drawback during the transformation was a ban on nation-
ally based vertical organization and public debate on minority rela-
tions. There could be no sociological or demographic research. As 
the crisis worsened, pressures to depart were put on the opposition 
intelligentsia, which might have taken the lead during the change of 
system.71 Much of the Vojvodina Hungarian community kept aloof 
from politics. Although forbidden to discuss it during 50 years of 
socialism, they remembered the fate of many innocent Hungarians 
at the hands of the partisans in 1944–1945 and the peasants who 
were chased off their land.72
Earlier policy was to promote awareness of a “Yugoslav 
Hungarian nation,”73 especially after Tito fell out with Stalin in 
1948, while Hungary was under tight Soviet control. The partial 
success was partly due to higher standards of living in Yugoslavia 
than in Hungary in the 1960s and 1970s.
As the country broke up, Serbia encouraged Serb communities 
in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina to declare separate “republics” 
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in areas where they formed a majority, with the intention of an-
nexing them later. This called for homogenization of the Serbs and 
incitement to nationalism, which created a mood in which system 
change in Serbia itself could be postponed. Serbia had cited “na-
tional unification” when dismissing the dogmatic political leader-
ship of Vojvodina74 and ending its autonomy. So the first opposition 
movements there voiced general demands for democratization, not 
just national ones. When it became clear that the national question 
had to be at the focus if any advance was to be made, the Hungarian 
participants in these movements founded the Democratic Fellow-
ship of Vojvodina Hungarians.75
During the Cold War Tito developed the Yugoslav People’s 
Army into one of the best equipped in Europe. The 1974 Yugoslav 
constitution gave the republics a large part in running the armed 
forces. The chiefs of staff tried to centralize it after Tito’s death in 
1980, but this was resisted, especially by Slovenia. When the federal 
organizations became paralyzed, almost all army officers made for 
their home republic and reported for duty there.
When Slovenia declared its independence, the republic’s 
defense units were swept aside in days by the Yugoslav army there, 
although that was not its prime intention. It set about furthering 
Serbia’s interests by helping substantially to arm the local Serbs 
in Croatia. It then retreated into Bosnia, and when Serbia recalled 
all its citizens, most of the military equipment was handed to the 
Bosnian Serbs.
It became increasingly hard to fill the army ranks, and 
mobilization took ever more violent forms. In October 1991, huge 
numbers of reservists were called in from Hungarian-inhabited parts 
of Vojvodina, and when word went round that they would be sent to 
the front, there were mass demonstrations throughout the province. 
After calls for peace from crowds of several thousand in Senta and 
Ada, local government assemblies called for a referendum on whether 
local citizens supported the war. The Presidency of the Democratic 
Fellowship of Vojvodina Hungarians appealed to the state presidency 
and chiefs of staff to demobilize Hungarian conscripts until the 
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army “returned to activity defined by constitutional frames.”76 As 
news of battlefield casualties spread, a flow of refugees began. By 
May, some 25,000 Hungarian conscripts had left for Hungary, while 
those who stayed and resisted conscription at home lost their jobs.77
The UN Security Council imposed a range of sanctions on 
Serbia in 1991–1996, deeming that its leaders could be blamed for 
the worsening ethnic conflicts in former Yugoslavia. This caused a 
dire economic crisis: production halted, half the workforce was sent 
on compulsory leave, the army cost vast sums of public money, and 
the cost of looking after the refugees pouring into Serbia soared. 
This further fed the emigration by the Hungarians, and by other 
communities. Meanwhile ground was gained in the economy by 
mafia activity in connivance with the political leadership.
The Democratic Fellowship played a dual role, encouraging 
activity within the community, and representing the community 
politically at home and abroad. In the latter it had success in federal, 
Serbian and provincial elections, receiving votes proportional to 
75–80 percent of the Hungarian inhabitants on the electoral roll and 
winning eight or nine seats in the province. But it failed to gain a 
seat in the 250-member Serbian legislature, which in 1991 passed 
a language law banning official use of Hungarian forms of place 
names. In 1992, the schools act allowed only state-owned elementary 
schools. Hungarian-language arts and information facilities could 
operate only with heavy support from Hungary. Local government 
had almost no independent powers. The number of Hungarians 
employed in courts and state administration dwindled. A 1995 
inheritance act ruled out inheritance by anyone who had fled abroad 
from conscription.78
From the outset the Democratic Fellowship saw parliamentary 
representation as inadequate for securing minority rights. The vital 
element in maintaining proportionality and minority self-identity 
in important areas of civil equality was separate institutions run by 
the Hungarians as a form of minority autonomy. The Democratic 
Fellowship has made three autonomy proposals during its 
existence:
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1. A 1990 move for autonomy on a personal basis would have 
made Vojvodina Hungarians competent to decide matters affecting 
them regardless of their place of residence or proportion of the 
inhabitants.79
2. The “triple autonomy” concept of 1992 envisaged territorial 
autonomy for the majority Hungarian communities of north Bačka, 
special legal status for Hungarian-majority communities outside that 
territory, and personal autonomy for all Vojvodina Hungarians.80 
Serbian President Slobodan Milošević received a Democratic 
Fellowship delegation and promised to set up an expert group to 
negotiate on how to implement the autonomy. Nothing came of 
that. Pressure on the Democratic Fellowship was stepped up: its 
leaders were beaten up, shots were fired at their houses, grenades 
were thrown into their yards, they lost their jobs, and army call-up 
papers were sent to them, to encourage them to flee abroad.81 After 
the 1993 elections, Milošević offered a coalition to the Democratic 
Fellowship, which had won five seats in Parliament. This was 
rejected.
3. The “modernized” autonomy concept of 1995 returned to 
personal, rather than territorial, autonomy.82 This did not prove 
acceptable either. It seemed realistic because the international 
community, through the heads of the Yugoslavia Conference held 
at that time, recommended the broadest possible autonomy for the 
Croatian and Bosnian Serbs, but such proposals were still rejected 
out of hand by the Serbian government, which sought annexation, 
not secure minority rights in neighboring republics.
Meanwhile, a militarily strengthened Croatia was obliterating 
the “Republic of Serbian Krajina” established on its territory, while 
the war and genocide in Bosnia-Herzegovina had prompted NATO 
intervention and international control. Serbia seemed to be moving 
towards peace at last, and neither the international community nor 
the government of Hungary wanted to push hard for Vojvodina 
Hungarian autonomy at that time.
Both the Serbian and the Hungarian government saw the 
autonomy demands of the Democratic Fellowship leaders as 
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disturbing factors.83 This prompted efforts to fragment it by 
withholding subsidies and denying the administrative conditions 
for it to function.84 Of the six successor parties, the Alliance of 
Vojvodina Hungarians formed in 1994 had the best electoral success, 
holding one of the posts of deputy speaker in the Serbian legislature 
in 1997–1999.85 The concept of autonomy on a personal basis was 
taken further by the Democratic Party of Vojvodina Hungarians 
registered in 1997 by the former Democratic Fellowship president 
András Ágoston.86
But peace was still a long way off. The Kosovo Albanians also 
thought that the time had come to secede. The Serbian military 
efforts to break them did not stop short of mass murder, which 
could only be forestalled by bombing the country’s main military 
and industrial installations. After the defeat of 1999, when Kosovo 
came under the control of UN peacekeeping forces, a new surge 
of refugees arrived in Serbia, and a high proportion were settled 
in Vojvodina, still an economically more developed province.87 
This brought change not only in ethnic proportions, but also in 
mentality.88 Only the restraint shown by the Hungarians prevented 
matters degenerating into nationally based clashes, especially in 
west Bačka.89
Milošević was unable to live down his defeat in Kosovo. His 
position wavered, as a result of the Dayton Agreement signed in 
December 1995 and his “betrayal” of the Bosnian Serbs, and he was 
able to hold on to power only through serious election rigging. In 
September 2000 he lost the federal presidential election to Vojislav 
Koštunica, a joint opposition candidate. In December, the opposition 
won the Serbian parliamentary elections as well, and a government 
was formed by Zoran Đinđić, president of the Democratic Party. The 
Alliance of Vojvodina Hungarians took six parliamentary seats and 
joined the coalition, with its leader, József Kasza, as a deputy prime 
minister.
On March 12, 2003, soon after Milošević was arrested and 
extradited to the Hague to face charges of war crimes by the 
international court, Prime Minister Zoran Đinđić was murdered 
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by former special-unit members of the Serbian police. A state of 
emergency was declared, and by the time that it ended, the political 
scene had become so fragmented that general elections had to be held 
on December 23, 2003. The most votes went to the extreme nationalist 
Serbian Radical Party, but it was unable to form a government even 
with its ally the Socialist Party of Serbia.90 But none of the Hungarian 
parties gained a seat, as they failed to reach the threshold of 5 percent 
of the poll. Only in 2007 did the Alliance manage to gain three seats, 
after a 2004 amendment to electoral law waived the threshold for 
minority parties.
The international community gave exceptional support to the 
new Serbian leadership in launching the process of democratization. 
In exchange Serbia was expected to hand over war criminals and 
guarantee human and minority rights. The first happened hardly at 
all and the second very slowly.
The House of Representatives in February 2002 passed an act on 
the powers of autonomous provinces that restored to the Vojvodina 
government some of the powers that it had held before 1989, but 
left the financing of the administration in the hands of the Serbian 
legislature.
Also in 2002, the House of Representatives of the Yugoslav 
Federation passed a minorities act that became part of Serbia’s 
legal system after the Serb-Montenegrin community of state was 
dissolved.91 This authorized the foundation of national councils of 
the minorities as expressions of their collective communal interests, 
but they were elected not by the members of the minorities but by 
a college of electors operating under strong state influence, and the 
powers given to the councils were very limited.92 The Hungarian 
National Council formed in that year took over the founders’ rights 
of the daily Magyar Szó and weekly Hét Nap from the Vojvodina 
House of Representatives.93 However, its meager resources were 
inadequate, under market economic conditions, to run the Vojvodina 
Hungarian institutions hitherto heavily subsidized by the state. Most 
of the capital of the Forum Publishing Company had been used up, 
and it had relied on support from the Hungarian state during the 
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war years. The Hungarian sections of Novi Sad Radio and Novi 
Sad Television were cut back, along with their range of reception 
and broadcasting time. Hardly any new institutions appeared. 
Furthermore, there had been a sharp demographic deterioration. 
Some 340,000 persons in Vojvodina had declared themselves 
Hungarian in 1991, but only 290,000 did so in the 2002 census.94 
Conscription and penury had sent mainly the younger and better 
qualified Hungarians abroad.
All the minority Hungarian communities of the Carpathian 
Basin had looked proudly to Hungary at the beginning of the 1990s, 
as a leader in the change of system, democratization, and socio-
economic catching up of Eastern Europe, while its neighboring 
countries still struggled with internal crises. That admiration gave 
great impetus to the idea of national cohesion. It was a huge change 
especially for the Vojvodina Hungarians, who faced mounting Serb 
nationalism after the collapse of the Yugoslav ideal and the end of 
Yugoslavia’s economic advantage over Hungary. By mid-decade it 
was clear that “redemption” would not come from Hungary either, 
as it had many barriers to dismantle before it could become an equal 
member of the European Union. On December 5, 2004, Hungary 
held a referendum on whether to grant citizenship to the Hungarians 
beyond its borders.95 The result made it clear to the Vojvodina 
Hungarians, among others, that the idea of cohesion alone would 
not ensure prosperity for the supranational Hungarian community.
Slovakia (Judit Hamberger)
Czechoslovakia’s political, economic and social transformation, 
which started with the Velvet Revolution of November 17, 1989, 
produced a multi-party, democratic political and legal system 
that allowed the half-million-strong Hungarian community to 
enter the local (self-governmental) and national (parliamentary) 
politics. They won some 10–12 percent of the seats in the first free 
and democratic general and local elections. But Czechoslovakia’s 
dissolution on December 31, 1992, put them instead in the nation 
state of Slovakia.96
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Liberal, Christian Democratic and national/ethnic political 
organizations arose among the Hungarians in 1989/1990, along with 
some other minor ones. The first (on November 18, 1989) was the 
liberal Independent Hungarian Initiative (FMK) led by Károly Tóth, 
then László A. Nagy. In the spring of 1990 came the Hungarian 
Christian Democratic Movement (MKDM) led by Kálmán Janics 
and later Béla Bugár, and the Coexistence Political Movement 
initiated by Miklós Duray.97 The last two ran together in the first 
free elections in 1990. From the summer of 1990 to the summer 
of 1992 the FMK joined in the democratization process as part of 
Slovakia’s democratic governing coalition and was a devotee of 
the joint governance with the majority nation’s democratic forces. 
The other two joined the parliamentary opposition. In the 1992 
elections, the FMK gained only 2 percent of the poll and failed to 
gain representation in Parliament. It became the Hungarian Civic 
Party (MPP) in January 1992.98
Outside political and legal pressures (notably the amendment to 
the electoral law on February 1998) persuaded the three minority 
Hungarian parties to form first an electoral alliance (Hungarian 
Coalition) and then the combined Hungarian Coalition Party 
(MKP),99 of which Bugár became president. The Christian Democrats 
played a conciliatory role, trying to settle debates among the factions 
over collective and individual minority rights, and rival concepts of 
cultural, educational and territorial autonomy. Various programs and 
strategies were prepared, but to no avail. The main aim in 1990–1996 
was to win a legal status of territorial local government. The local 
government rally in Komárno on January 8, 1994, can be seen as an 
attempt to emphasize this aim.100
In 1995, the Hungarian government sought to stabilize the 
legal and political position of Slovakia’s Hungarians by signing and 
ratifying the Slovak–Hungarian Basic Treaty. The ratification process 
in Slovakia took a whole year, as the treaty included the Council of 
Europe Recommendation 1201/1993, which permitted territorial local 
government alliances that in principle might be taken as territorial 
autonomy.101
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The third Mečiar government of 1994–1998 brought for the 
Slovakian Hungarians severe curbs on their minority-language rights. 
One coalition member was the extreme right-wing, anti-Hungarian 
Slovak National Party, which advocated restrictive language and 
education policies, a resistant stance in relations between Slovakia 
and Hungary, and attempts to restrict minority Hungarian culture 
and limit the role of Hungarian functionaries even in areas where 
the Hungarians formed a majority. These anti-minority measures by 
ministers belonging to the National Party were supported also by 
Prime Minister Mečiar. The minister of culture, from the National 
Party, sought to introduce “alternative education” in schools teaching 
in Hungarian, whereby it would become compulsory to teach certain 
subjects in Slovak. Slovakian Hungarian protests against this in 1995–
1996 were successful, partly thanks to support from the Organization 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).102 (In retaliation, the 
minister later sacked several Hungarian school principals who had 
opposed his assimilatory plans, one of which was to make Slovak the 
language of administration in schools, meaning that even students’ 
educational certificates would have ceased to be bilingual.) The 
Hungarian parties also called on EU and NATO member countries for 
help against new discriminatory measures in language use, cultural 
financing and local government.103
The third Mečiar government in 1995 replaced the Nationality 
Council with a Minority Council alongside the government, in which 
the minority delegates had only advisory powers. The Council’s 
internal balance of power effectively blocked decision-making on 
minority matters.
The second act on the state language, which was passed at 
the end of 1995 and came into force on January 1, 1997, declared 
Slovak to be the exclusive language in public administration and 
public life, with penalties for breaching that. This, at EU behest, 
should have been offset by an act on minority-language use, but this 
did not materialize until July 1999, when the Hungarian Coalition 
Party joined a new governing coalition. Before that, the third 
Mečiar government had forbidden Hungarian members by law from 
addressing the legislature in Hungarian.
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In July 1996, the legislature passed an act gerrymandering 
local government boundaries to prevent any territory emerging as 
an ethnic Hungarian unit. The Hungarian Coalition had pressed for 
three counties where Hungarians would have been in a majority 
(centered on Komárno, Rimavská Sobota and Kráľovský Chlmec), 
but the new act precluded any such arrangement. The aim of the 
agreed law was to deliberately fragment the Hungarian-majority 
areas, and thus obstruct the Hungarian territorial self-governing 
ambitions.104
The so-called Blue Coalition of Slovak democratic parties 
reached an electoral agreement on December 3, 1997, with the 
coalition of the three Hungarian parties, laying down principles 
for future cooperation in government. The Slovak parties declared 
Slovakia to be the state of all its citizens, not just of the Slovak nation. 
After the general elections of September 1998, the Blue Coalition 
and the Hungarian Coalition Party formed their first coalition 
government under Mikuláš Dzurinda in November, following a 
coalition agreement of October 28 obliging the Hungarian Coalition 
Party to abandon for the duration of the government its demands 
for ethnically based autonomy, foundation of a separate Hungarian 
university, and reappraisal of Czechoslovakia’s Beneš Decrees of 
1945–1946 imposing collective guilt and sanctions on indigenous 
Hungarians and Germans.105 It also stated that the government 
would accept the verdict of the Hague International Court over the 
Gabčíkovo–Nagymaros dispute with Hungary,106 and refrain from 
initiating changes in the language of instruction in schools teaching 
in Hungarian.107
The Hungarian Coalition Party pressed during the first 
Dzurinda government of 1998–2002 for extended minority 
rights, an end to the illegalities committed against minorities in 
1945–1948, and a regionalized administrative system. It sought 
to strengthen democratic institutions of minority politics and 
culture, render the budget support for minority cultures systematic, 
and relieve the economic, social and environmental problems of 
Hungarian-inhabited southern Slovakia. As agreed, the Hungarian 
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Coalition Party took the portfolios of minority affairs and regional 
development (Pál Csáky as deputy prime minister), environmental 
affairs (László Miklós) and building construction (István Harna). 
Bugár, the Hungarian Coalition Party president, was elected as a 
deputy speaker of the legislature. It was not granted a separate post 
of state secretary for minority affairs in the Ministry of Education 
and Culture.108
There was only partial success for the Hungarian Coalition 
Party over land expropriated (mainly from Hungarians) in 1945–
1948, ownership of the disputed class of farmland known as the 
untitled lands, drafting of a bill on minority-language use rights, and 
expansion of the scope for native-language education. Only under 
the second Dzurinda government (2002–2006) would Minister of 
Agriculture Zsolt Simon achieve the transfer of the untitled lands to 
local government ownership and overhaul the land registry system.
Some coalition parties refused to back a government reform of 
local government based on twelve kraj (regions), preferring a solution 
less favorable to the Hungarians, which divided the country into 
eight kraj running north and south, in all of which the Hungarians 
in the southern Slovakian belt would have been in a minority. None 
of the other coalition parties supported a Hungarian Coalition 
Party counter-proposal for turning the main bloc of Hungarian 
settlement into a thirteenth kraj based on Komárno. In the event, the 
Hungarian Coalition Party in the legislature overruled its own branch 
organizations and remained in the government, despite this serious 
political defeat.
However, the Hungarian Coalition Party had some successes 
in government. A prime ministerial bureau for human and 
minority rights was founded at the end of 1998, as was a division 
of the government and a parliamentary committee with the same 
mandate. On April 14, 1999, a Minority Council chaired by Pál 
Csáky was formed. The minority representatives, the chairman, and 
the vice-chairman were the only voting members. A government 
commissioner was appointed to coordinate Roma affairs and several 
Roma-related government programs began.109
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The first Dzurinda government used accelerated procedures 
to amend the state language act provision on bilingual certificates 
in school. The powers of local and district school councils were 
increased pending later legislation. The government saved the 
Hungarian Thália Theater in Košice from financial collapse and 
gave a grant towards renovation of the building. On June 16, 1999, 
the government voted to grant 1.9 million koruna from the cultural 
budget to the Slovakian Hungarian Social and Educational Association 
(CSEMADOK). Smaller minority cultural institutions that had been 
merged in the Mečiar period became independent again.
The government introduced a bill on the use of minority lan-
guages in communities with at least 20 percent of minority inhabit-
ants. This was passed by the legislature in July 1999 in a truncated 
form not supported by the Hungarian Coalition Party. Nonetheless, 
the use of Hungarian for official purposes began to increase again 
under the two Dzurinda governments. District offices under Hun-
garian control soon had bilingual forms, signs and leaflets. Both 
languages appeared on signs in most official buildings. Dzurinda 
himself ushered through the legislature Slovakia’s ratification of the 
Council of Europe’s Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, 
which was signed in Bratislava in 2002.
The Hungarian Coalition Party was able to halt the decline in 
the number of schools teaching in Hungarian. Some new Hungarian-
taught middle and elementary schools were founded. Hungarians 
were appointed to head education departments in several districts. 
Independent school inspection centers were set up. The Ministry of 
Education recognized the Szkabela–Bóna Slovak language teaching 
methodology, devised by two Slovakian Hungarian teachers, as 
an official method, and supported it. In the early spring of 2000, 
Hungary and Slovakia signed an equivalence agreement recognizing 
each other’s university qualifications, and extension courses began 
at Konstantin University in Nitra for graduates of teachers’ training 
colleges in Hungary.110
Tensions within the coalition eased during the second Dzurinda 
government of 2002–2006 as the Party of the Democratic Left failed 
to gain seats in the legislature. The old problem of Hungarian-language 
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university training for teachers was resolved. In 2001, the senate of 
Nitra University rejected the plan for a separate Hungarian faculty 
despite the government decision. However, in 2002 the Hungarian 
Coalition Party pressed for a separate Hungarian university in 
Slovakia, which was included in the second Dzurinda government’s 
program. The government approved on March 13, 2003, a statement of 
intent and schedule of foundation for the new Selye János University 
in Komárno, with faculties of education, economics and Reformed 
Church theology teaching in Hungarian.111 This was endorsed by 
the legislature on October 23, 2003, and inaugurated on January 
17, 2004, in the presence of the Slovak and Hungarian ministers of 
education, Martin Fronc and Bálint Magyar. The first rector was 
Sándor Albert. Meanwhile the Faculty of Central European Studies 
opened at Nitra University, with around 800 students being taught 
in Hungarian by 50 teachers.
The same government also provisionally settled the statutes of 
the Danube-side Museum112 in Komárno, a central museum of the 
Hungarian community, along with the reopened Historical Museum 
of Hungarian Culture,113 part of the Slovak National Museum in 
Bratislava.
Slovak public opinion looked favorably on all the Hungarian 
contributors to the two governments of 1998–2006: Pál Csáky, 
deputy prime minister, and the portfolio ministers István Harna 
(construction), László Miklós (environmental protection), Zsolt 
Simon (agriculture), László Gyurovszky (regional development) 
and briefly László Szigeti (education). Despite compromises, semi-
successes and failures, the party’s government work fostered the 
growth of a common (con-social) model of Hungarian–Slovak 
government, but implementation of it suffered from the lack of a 
strategic inter-party partnership to place the minority question on 
new foundations. Want of support from partners in government 
prevented the Hungarian Coalition Party from presenting a minority 
bill that could provide a lasting solution. After 2006, control of 
minority policy reverted to the governing parties, without reference 
to minority aspirations.114
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In Hungarian–Hungarian relations (that is, relations between 
the parent country and the minorities outside), preoccupation with 
government work lost the Hungarian Coalition Party some of its 
earlier initiating role. This was clear when application of Hungary’s 
status law to Slovakia was blocked for a time by the Slovak 
government: the Hungarian Coalition Party failed to persuade its 
own coalition parties of the law’s positive sides.
Despite domestic and foreign policy successes, the economic 
consolidation under the Dzurinda governments had grave social 
costs. The general election of 2006 replaced the coalition with one 
consisting of the strongly populist SMER (Direction, the social 
democratic party of Robert Fico), Vladimír Mečiar’s Movement 
for a Democratic Slovakia, and Ján Slota’s nationalist Slovak 
National Party.115
Slovenia (János Vékás)
Slovenia’s secession was the least troubled aspect of the break-up 
of Yugoslavia, for three reasons. Firstly, the republic’s frontiers 
largely followed the ethnic boundaries. Secondly, modernization 
and Europeanization were advanced, which helped to draw 
international support. Thirdly, Slovenians had long been preparing 
for self-determination. They did not see Yugoslavia as the frame for 
their own national development.116
Slovenia was the first Yugoslav republic to set about amending 
its constitution to enable political pluralism and equal treatment 
for all forms of ownership. This was done in conjunction with the 
opposition. The federal constitutional court ruled the amendments 
unconstitutional, but it emerged that the federal authorities no longer 
had the means of imposing its rulings.
The first free parliamentary and presidential elections were held 
on April 8, 1990. There was no antagonistic difference between 
the old regime and the opposition over the need for national 
independence. Thus DEMOS, the combined opposition party, won 
55 percent of the seats in the legislature, but Milan Kučan, former 
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member of the Central Committee of the Federation of Yugoslav 
Communists, was elected president. On June 2, 1990, the legislature 
issued a declaration of the sovereignty of the Slovenian state, which 
was put to a referendum on December 23, in which 88.5 percent of 
the votes were in favor of sovereignty and independence.117
The legislature announced on January 31, 1991, that the process 
of secession from Yugoslavia would begin. The constitution was 
amended accordingly on February 20, and Slovenia’s independence 
was announced on June 25 (as was Croatia’s).118
On the following day the Yugoslav federal government 
pronounced that the declarations by Slovenia and Croatia were 
unlawful and empowered the army to regain control of the 
international frontier posts that Slovenia’s border guards had taken 
over. The subsequent ten-day war between the territorial guards 
of the federation and those of Slovenia ended when the former 
retreated.
Slovenia’s formal declaration of independence followed on 
October 8, 1991. A tribunal set up by the International Yugoslavia 
Conference concluded on January 11, 1992, that Slovenia met all 
criteria for recognition as an independent state. It was recognized 
on the following day by Austria, Belgium, the UK and the Vatican, 
and by the other European Communities members within a few 
days. On March 22, 1992, Slovenia became a full member of the 
OSCE, and on May 1, 2004, the first Yugoslav successor state to 
accede to the European Union.
The Hungarians and Italians of Slovenia enjoy a special 
position. The constitution declares them indigenous, autochthonous 
minorities (there were 2,258 Italians at the time of the 2002 census), 
grants them broad collective rights, and recognizes them as national 
minorities under international law.119 The constitution also mentions 
the Gypsies (numbering 3,246 in 2002) and orders that their position 
be defined in separate legislation.120 Much more populous, however, 
are the “new minorities” (numbering 230,000 or 11.5 percent of the 
population): mainly Serbs, Croats and Bosnians from other Yugoslav 
republics. They do not have collective rights in Slovenia, merely 
554 Minority Hungarian Communities in the 20th Century
protection from discrimination, albeit with exceptions. Legislation 
that followed the declaration of independence gave those of Slovenian 
descent automatic citizenship, while those originating from other 
republics had to apply.121 More than 18,000 residents who failed to 
do so by the deadline simply had their domiciles removed from the 
records in 1992. The constitutional court of Slovenia then declared 
this to be unconstitutional,122 but when a referendum was held in 
2004, 95 percent voted against restoring those rights of domicile.
It emerged after the change of system and independence that the 
number of Germans in Slovenia was far greater than earlier censuses 
had suggested. This became clear when they began to organize. 
Slovenia still refuses to recognize them as an indigenous minority, 
not least because the new German associations have lodged claims for 
compensation for collective injustices suffered after World War II.
In all censuses held in Yugoslavia, over 95 percent of the ethnic 
Hungarians in Slovenia were found in the Prekmurje district detached 
from Hungary after World War I, almost all in a largely continuous 
band along the border. But numbers have steadily declined, between 
1953 and 2002, from 11,019 to 6,243 in Slovenia and from 10,581 
to 5,429 in Prekmurje.123 Emigration is a factor, as Prekmurje is the 
country’s least developed region. Furthermore, its total population 
has declined. The Slovenian government is attempting to right this 
by offering annual competitive funding for economic development 
of the Italian and Hungarian indigenous minorities. In 2007, €2.1 
million was awarded, of which Hungarian businesses in underde-
veloped, ethnically mixed communities received preferential loans 
totaling €1.26 million and grants totaling €200,000.124
Also significant is the assimilation of the Hungarian 
community. This is clear from the rising proportion since 1981 of 
native Hungarian-speakers who declare themselves Slovenian by 
national affiliation. Yet the position of the Hungarian minority is 
unrivalled in the Carpathian Basin in legal status and per capita 
institutional provision. The 1991 constitution guarantees the right 
to preservation and development of self-identity, education in 
the native language, establishment of associations, and ties with 
Hungary, as well as representation in local government and the 
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national legislature.125 What is more, Paragraph 64 gives minority 
representatives a right of veto over legislation that expressly affects 
the interests of the minority concerned. Parliamentary and local 
assembly representatives of each indigenous minority are elected 
from separate electoral rolls.126 Paragraph 80 states that “the Italian 
and Hungarian communities will each elect one representative to 
the National Assembly.” (The Hungarian representative was Mária 
Pozsonec, who was succeeded by László Göncz in 2008.)
The rules define most minority rights territorially and specify 
“mixed communities”: in the Hungarians’ case Lendava, Moravske 
Toplice, Šalovci, Hodoš and Dobronak. These elect Hungarian local 
government bodies, which in turn elect a National Hungarian Self-
Governing Body, which has existed in Slovenia since 1975. The 
act on self-governing national communities came into force on 
December 4, 1994, allowing minority self-government at community 
level. The local elections in Lendava, Hodoš-Šalovci and Moravske 
Toplice were followed by elections to the Community National 
Council, which chose from its numbers an 18-member Prekmurje 
Hungarian National Council. In the 1998 local elections, Hodoš 
and Dobronak also elected representatives and formed a minority 
self-governing council. In January 1999, the Prekmurje Hungarian 
National Self-Governing Community elected a 21-member council, 
changing its name to the Prekmurje Hungarian Self-Governing 
National Community on July 12.127
There was parallel development in the system of arts institu-
tions. The Institute for the Information Activity of the Hungarian 
National Community founded on May 21, 1993, took over the week-
ly paper Népújság and the Prekmurje Hungarian Radio, which had 
been going since 1958. Early in 1994 the Institution for Hungarian 
Nationality and Culture began with László Göncz as director, and 
since 1995 Hungary and Slovenia have jointly financed a Lendava 
arts center. The Association of Hungarian Writers in Slovenia was 
founded in the spring of 1997 and the Association of Hungarian 
Scientists of the Prekmurje Region in October 2002. The Reformed 
Church of Slovenia was constituted on May 23, 1993, with about 
500 members.128
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There has been steady erosion in education. Official figures 
show that the five bilingual elementary schools in Prekmurje had 
844 pupils in 2006–2007, while the one bilingual middle school, 
in Lendava, had a roll of 340, and 263 children attended bilingual 
kindergarten.129
Hungarian has been taught at Maribor University since 1966; 
there has been a Faculty of Hungarian Language and Literature 
there since 1980.
The Hungarian–Slovenian Minority Protection Agreement was 
signed in Ljubljana on November 6, 1992.130 A Hungarian–Slovenian 
Minority Mixed Committee was set up on April 4, 1995, in Ljubljana 
to monitor its implementation. The two countries also signed a basic 
treaty in 1992.131
Major improvements in communications between this small 
Hungarian community and Hungary have occurred. A railway link 
opened between Murska Sobota and Zalalövő on May 16, 2001, and 
a new road frontier crossing opened at Čepinci–Kétvölgy on March 
28, 2002. The two governments agreed in 2004 that all Slovenian–
Hungarian frontier crossings would open to third-country traffic 
from the date of the two countries’ EU accession (May 1, 2004). 
Border controls were lifted on December 21, 2007, under the 
Schengen Agreement.
ukraine (Csilla Fedinec)
Separatist action gained many countries independence in the 
twentieth century. The “right to secede” was also enshrined in 
successive Soviet constitutions (1924, 1936 and 1977), but it only 
became possible in the post-Soviet sphere in the 1990s. Europe, 
the birthplace of the nation state and nationalism at the end of the 
eighteenth century, seemed likely to be its graveyard towards the 
end of the twentieth. The strongest signs of its return were the 
Soviet, Yugoslav and Czechoslovak break-ups into successor states 
organized on a nation-state basis,132 hastened by Gorbachev’s calls 
in the mid-1980s for glasnost and perestroika. Hungary was among 
the first countries to recognize Ukraine’s independence in 1991.133
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Three main documents determined the legal status of the 
minorities in the new country: the statement of minority rights (1991), 
the act on national minorities (1992) and the constitution (1996). 
They stated, among other things, that resident minorities form part 
of the Ukrainian people. Minority affiliation can be chosen freely, 
and there are possibilities for monolingual and bilingual signs in 
the minority language. Numerous places in Transcarpathia have 
regained their original names and many Hungarian-related statues 
and memorial tablets and signs have been erected. The Hungarians 
make up 0.3 percent of the population, almost all of them living 
in Transcarpathia. They had no political organization before 1989. 
The intellectual and ultimately political sphere made only a cultural 
appearance, mainly in literature and art. Change could only be 
sensed in the second half of the 1980s.134
The earliest organization to form (and still the largest) was the 
Transcarpathian Hungarian Cultural Association, in 1989.135 A rapid 
change of generation took place in it with the election of Miklós 
Kovács as president. This brought a sharp change of outlook that 
permanently polarized the Transcarpathian elite. Earlier Cultural 
Association supporters and several newer bodies combined in 1994 
as the Forum of Transcarpathian Hungarian Organizations.136 This 
takes the view that the cause of the Hungarians in Ukraine can be 
pursued effectively by cooperating with Ukrainian political forces. 
In doing so it cannot ignore the city of Uzhhorod, the capital of the 
oblast, with its main institutions and university with Hungarian 
faculties, from which the Hungarian elite was recruited, although the 
city’s role in the community has declined since 1989. The Cultural 
Association is based in the Tisa-side districts, where it presses for 
Hungarian autonomy and a Hungarian educational area.
The position of the Forum was steadily taken over by the 
Hungarian Democratic Federation in Ukraine, founded with Sándor 
Fodó as president in October 1991 by the Transcarpathian Hungarian 
Cultural Association, Cultural Federation of Hungarians in Lviv, 
and the Association of Hungarians in Kiev.137 However, at the June 
1995 general assembly of the Democratic Federation in Uzhhorod, 
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its general secretary, Tibor Vass, said that there was nothing to report 
on its activity, as it had not operated. In March 1996 a new president 
was elected, Mihály Tóth, a member of the Ukrainian legislature. In 
1997 the Transcarpathian Hungarian Cultural Association suspended 
its membership of the Democratic Federation, so making the split 
into two camps permanent.
In the intervening general elections, each organization has seen 
a seat in the legislature as reinforcement of its legitimacy, and this 
has several times resulted in rivalry between Hungarian candidates. 
In 1990, Fodó, then president of the Cultural Association, stood, but 
then suddenly stepped down and urged his supporters to vote in the 
Cultural Association’s name for a Ukrainian candidate, Vasyl Shepa, 
which they did. In 1994, the organizations that had seceded from the 
Cultural Association chose Mihály Tóth, who managed to beat Fodó, 
not least because the latter’s campaign relied strongly on discrediting 
his opponent. Four years later Tóth lost to the new Cultural Association 
president, Miklós Kovács. Fodó, running on the list of the Social 
Democratic Party of Ukraine (United),138 was far behind. This move 
brought him before the ethics committee of the Cultural Association, 
but with no consequences. The Social Democratic Party of Ukraine 
(United) did not withdraw from Hungarian public life; in the 2002 
elections it launched the party’s Berehove chairman, István Gajdos, 
against Miklós Kovács, supported by the Cultural Association. The 
Democratic Federation lined up behind Gajdos. Kovács’s chances 
were lessened also by the candidacy of an unknown namesake, who 
took some of his votes. The seat was won eventually by Gajdos, 
by order of the Supreme Court, after several recounts, appeals and 
complaints.
In the wake of the election scandals, the then governor of the 
oblast, Hennadiy Moskal, chided Hungary for giving Kovács open 
support, saying that it was not the first time that disputes among 
Ukrainian Hungarian associations had been soured by such direct 
intervention. The general meeting of the Cultural Association said 
in a statement that Gajdos’s election was due to crude abuses and 
destruction of voting papers, with the result that the result did not 
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reflect the will of the voters. Kovács had received a clear majority 
in the communities where Hungarians were a clear majority of the 
population, meaning that the Cultural Association’s legitimacy was 
unquestionable. Kovács’s complaint was taken up by the European 
Court of Human Rights.
Legitimacy was at the heart of the debate. The Cultural 
Association’s main charge against the Democratic Federation was 
that it did not take part and its chosen member of the legislature 
represented a Ukrainian party that was in power. Taking the voting 
papers at face value, Kovács was “self-nominated” and Gajdos was 
the candidate of the Ukrainian Social Democratic Party (United), as 
civil associations could not stand. Gajdos did his political reputation 
further harm in 2004 by crossing the floor to the Socialist Party 
of Ukraine faction, after the balance of power was changed by the 
presidential elections.
The situation changed radically in the 2006 general elections, 
with the formation of the first Hungarian parties: the Transcarpathian 
Hungarian Cultural Association–Hungarian Party in Ukraine chaired 
by Kovács and the Hungarian Democratic Party in Ukraine chaired 
by Gajdos.139 Neither had a realistic chance of reaching the 3 percent 
threshold for seats in the legislature. The real stake was local 
government representation. During the elections, the Hungarian 
parties attracted attention from Ukrainian political forces, which 
meant that they could put up joint lists. The appearance of the 
Hungarian parties gave a boost to support for other minorities to 
form parties. In the early 2007 elections, the candidate of each 
Hungarian party found a place on a large party’s list, but neither 
gained a seat in the legislature.
The autonomy question arose in a context specific to Trans-
carpathia, for the Rusyns, not recognized by the authorities as a 
minority, also made autonomy claims in the early 1990s, with 
some practical steps being taken between the declaration of 
Ukraine’s independence on August 24, 1991, and the formation 
of the Commonwealth of Independent States on December 8. The 
autonomy demand by the Society of Subcarpathian Rusyns was 
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supported by the Berehove branch of the Transcarpathian Hungarian 
Cultural Association, which soon afterward proposed a referendum 
on setting up a Hungarian autonomous area. This was supported 
by the local authorities and a referendum announced for December 
1. While 90 percent of the country’s voters came out in favor of 
independence for the republic, 78 percent of votes in Transcarpathia 
were cast in favor of special status for the region, and 81.4 percent 
in the Berehove raion supported founding a Hungarian autonomous 
area. However, the referendum had no legal consequences. Signs of 
a split in the Cultural Association were apparent in 1992, with the 
handling of this being one of the points at issue. The Hungarian–
Ukrainian basic treaty of 1992 made no mention of the matter. The 
council of the Transcarpathian oblast almost immediately rejected 
the local Hungarian draft for establishing the Berehove Hungarian 
Autonomous Area. Hungarian cultural autonomy remained on the 
agenda of the Ukrainian–Hungarian Mixed Committee and was 
raised at the April 1993 meeting in Uzhhorod of President 
Leonid Kravchuk and Prime Minister József Antall. In May the 
Mukacheve conference of the Society of Subcarpathian Rusyns 
formed a shadow government of Podkarpatska Rus (the official 
name of Transcarpathia in the Czechoslovak period), announcing 
the move in Bratislava and causing tensions between Ukraine and 
Slovakia. These scandals marked the end of Rusyn organization. 
Kuchma, seeking re-election in 1999, campaigned in Transcarpathia, 
assuring the Hungarians that he would support their autonomy 
if elected. After the presidential election, legislation was passed 
establishing a free economic zone in Transcarpathia, but there was 
silence over cultural autonomy, and creation of a separate Hungarian 
school network came to seem a more realistic goal.
An important role in the civil sphere was played by the 1993 
Transcarpathian Community of Hungarian Intellectuals, chaired by 
György Dupka, one merit of which was to begin a series of events 
in 1996 called the Transcarpathian Hungarian Local Government 
Forum. In 2001, the Local Government Association of Border 
Communities was founded.140 Various professions now have 
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associations (Hungarian teachers, librarians, artists, physicians, 
peasants, business people, and so on). 
There have been essential changes in culture and education.141 
In the early 1990s, Hungarian infants’ schools opened and scope 
for Hungarian-taught education improved. Denominational schools 
appeared alongside the state institutions, and several secondary 
schools started Hungarian groups. The state-accredited Ferenc 
Rákóczi II Transcarpathian Hungarian Institute opened, mainly 
with funds from Hungary. In 2005, Uzhhorod National University 
opened a Hungarian History and European Integration Faculty. 
Scientific workshops appeared: the Tivadar Lehoczky and Antal 
Hodinka institutes in Berehove, and the Center for Hungarian Studies 
in Uzhhorod. Since 1994, there has been a Gyula Illyés Hungarian 
National Theater, and since 1990 the Imre Révész Society of 
Transcarpathian Hungarian Painters and Applied Artists. The press 
proliferated (Kárpáti Igaz Szó, Kárpátaljai Szemle, Ukrajnai Magyar 
Krónika, and so on), but it was still not possible to buy or subscribe to 
papers from Hungary, largely for economic reasons, and state book 
publishing in Hungarian ceased for want of funds. Instead, private 
publishers have been winning competitive funding from Hungary to 
produce Transcarpathian works. The main book publishers include 
Galéria in Uzhhorod (Károly D. Balla) and Mandátum in Berehove 
(János Penckófer). Intermix Kiadó of Uzhhorod and Budapest, the 
largest book publisher by number of titles, was founded in 1992 with 
György Dupka as manager. Its Transcarpathian Hungarian Books 
series includes poetry, prose, sociology, local history, ethnography, 
documentary publications, and so on. Institutions have also taken to 
publishing books, and local Internet portals have appeared.142
The Churches play important charitable, educational and cultural 
roles. They are present increasingly in welfare services. They were the 
first to open Sunday schools for those in areas of scattered Hungarian 
habitation. The biggest problem in Transcarpathia and throughout 
Ukraine has been the critical economic situation.143 The large-scale 
structure of farming practically disappeared in the 1990s and almost 
all industrial production ceased, with the result that unemployment 
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rose to around 20 percent. Personal savings accumulated in the Soviet 
period were frozen indefinitely. The region was devastated in 1998 
and 2001 by flooding of the River Tisa. Many had little option but 
to make a living out of illegal cross-border trading or by working 
temporarily in Hungary or Slovakia. Only a small proportion of 
the joint ventures started have been in the production sectors. The 
situation changed at the beginning of the twenty-first century only 
insofar as local businesses found it harder to recruit labor. Those 
who have prospered out of illicit trading are unwilling to abandon 
it, although it has detrimental effects on society. The legislation on 
the Transcarpathian free trade area of more than 700 hectares and 
investment concessions covering the whole of Transcarpathia were 
intended by the government as measures to stimulate the economy.
Economically motivated emigration, a national problem, in-
creased vastly in the 1990s. The country’s population fell from 52.1 
million to under 49 million between 1989 and 2001, with migration 
accounting for no small proportion of the decrease. In 1991–1993, the 
migration balance was still positive and the population rose by almost 
half a million, but then the decline set in, with a net 620,000 inhabit-
ants lost to emigration in subsequent years, most of them qualified 
or skilled. The three main target countries are Israel, Germany and 
the United States. Mass emigration from Transcarpathia began in the 
1980s, with the targets being the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Israel, 
Germany and the United States, but with Hungary taking by far the 
most. Almost 85 percent of ethnic Hungarians migrating from Trans-
carpathia – 30,000 people – have chosen Hungary as their destina-
tion. They also apply for citizenship, although dual citizenship is not 
recognized by the Ukrainian constitution. Large numbers study at 
colleges and universities in Hungary, and many still at school do not 
return either. All this is changing the social structure of the Hun-
garian community. According to the 2001 census, 151,500 of Trans-
carpathia’s 1,254,600 inhabitants were ethnic Hungarians (12.1 per-
cent).144 The proportion of Hungarians classing Hungarian as their 
native language hardly changed between the 1989 and 2001 censuses, 
one reason being that a higher proportion of the Hungarian-speaking 
Gypsy community declared themselves ethnic Hungarians in 2001.
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In tHE cArPAtHIAn BASIn
Viktória Bányai
The Jews of Hungary gained individual civil rights in 1867 and 
religious rights in 1895. This meant that by law they had equality 
of rights as individuals and state recognition as a historical 
(longstanding) religious denomination alongside the main Christian 
denominations. The legislature thereafter treated the Jews collectively 
as a religious denomination and individually as Hungarian citizens 
adhering to the “Israelite” religion (Judaism) – until the passage of 
the racial theory-based second and third acts on the Jews in 1939 and 
1941. There were divisions of various kinds among 5 percent of the 
inhabitants of pre-Trianon Hungary (excluding Croatia) who were 
Jews by that definition (911,000 people in 1910). They had strong 
social, economic, cultural and ideological differences, and even 
the law provided a state-recognized framework for their religious 
differences. For when the Jews in the late nineteenth century came 
under pressure from the state to organize themselves into a national 
religious institution analogous to the main Christian churches, there 
emerged within Hungarian Judaism not one but three denominations, 
at ground level and nationally: Neolog, Orthodox and Status Quo 
Judaism.1 The last sought to preserve the situation before the 
Neolog/Orthodox split had occurred and implied that they were not 
adherents of either faction, but in time their communities became 
organized into a third denomination. In 1910, 43 percent adhered 
to Neolog Judaism, 52 percent to Orthodox, and 5 percent to Status 
Quo.2 Territorially, the Neolog were dominant in Budapest, most of 
Transdanubia, the Danube–Tisza region, and the Southern Region, 
the Orthodox in Upper Hungary and as far south as Győr-Moson and 
Sopron Counties, and in the northwest: there were very few Neolog 
communities northeast of a line from Kassa to Nagyvárad. The most 
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populous Status Quo communities were found along the borders 
between the areas dominated by the other two denominations, in 
Léva, Vác, Eger, Gyöngyös, Nyíregyháza and Marosvásárhely.3
The inter-denominational differences appeared in attitudes 
towards adjustment to the expectations and customs of majority 
society and modern life, or in their rejection of these. Most Neolog 
communities adopted the lifestyle and outward appearance of the 
majority society, while the Orthodox demanded full observance 
of the traditional religious prescriptions, even at the cost of a 
measure of isolation. However, there were differences of approach 
to language, schooling, dress, and so on, within the Orthodox 
denomination as well. More western Orthodox communities turned 
to the use of Hungarian, while among the ultra-orthodox and 
Hasidic communities of the northeast, especially in Transcarpathia 
and Northern Transylvania, Yiddish remained as the everyday 
language, although other languages were used to communicate with 
the outside world. Both in 1910 and in 1941, about 80 percent of Jews 
in the Carpathian Basin were exclusively or primarily Hungarian-
speaking. Up to the end of World War I, assimilation was in the 
forefront of the aims for the whole Jewish population of the region to 
such an extent that they themselves became Hungarianizing factors 
in some minority areas. It is important to add that assimilation of 
the Jews was not a one-way process. Hungarian Jewry, through their 
social contacts and mutual influences, contributed to introducing 
modern cultural traits and became in general the main vehicle of 
modernization.
Understandably, Trianon was a huge blow to Hungarian Jewry 
as well. Its numbers fell from 910,000 in 1910 to 473,000 in 1920. 
48 percent of Hungarian Jewry found themselves outside the new 
borders.4
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dilemmas
The change of sovereignty prompted the Jewish population in all 
successor states to decide or at least consider their situation.5 While 
in post-Trianon Hungary the main trend remained the continuation 
of assimilation, in the detached territories paths opened up to a 
community of interest with the Hungarians, to choosing various 
types of Jewish national identity, or to assimilating into the new 
majority nation. It is hard to gain a true picture of the proportions 
who chose each course and what changes in attitude occurred over 
time, for one unconcealed purpose behind the censuses taken in the 
successor states was to prove that the new ruling nations were in 
a majority, and the ethnic and language data in them tended to be 
political statements.
Identification with Hungarian national awareness – self-
definition as adherents of Judaism belonging to the Hungarian 
minority – remained throughout as one of the decisive individual and 
communal strategies adopted. Many Hungarian Jewish journalists, 
politicians and artists worked for Hungarian interests and cultural 
endeavors, with loyalty to the Hungarians as their political program. 
For example, there was Oradea’s militantly anti-Zionist Neolog 
chief rabbi, Dr. Lipót Kecskeméti (1865–1936). He and many of his 
flock joined the minority Hungarian Party formed in Transylvania.6 
Several memoirs relate how older people brought up under Dualism 
would don their kippot (prayer caps) and stand to attention if the 
Hungarian National Anthem was played, or greeted with joy the 
return of Hungarian rule in World War II, although they would be 
tragically disillusioned and betrayed by it.
However, there were several factors that were to weaken that 
pursuit of assimilation. One was the surge of anti-Semitism that 
appeared in post-war Hungary: the brutalities of the White Terror 
and the passage of the numerus clausus act in 1920, limiting 
Jewish access to university places. Jews initially sympathetic to the 
Hungarians were alienated to some extent by the news that they 
heard from the “mother country.” This stance was displayed, for 
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instance, in the 1921 book Jews Facing a Dilemma, by the well-
known literary historian Aladár Komlós (1892–1980), who came 
from an Upper Hungarian assimilated Jewish family. He pointed to 
the many Jewish lives lost in the pogrom at Orgovány, which had 
been carried out by detachments of officers.7
It has to be emphasized that the distancing from the Hungarians 
was political, not linguistic or cultural. There remained Hungarian-
speaking Jewish communities and centers of culture and journalism 
in Košice and Bratislava in Slovakia, Užhorod and Mukačevo in 
Transcarpathia, Arad, Cluj, Sighetu Marmaţiei and Târgu Mureş 
in Transylvania, and Subotica and Novi Sad in the Southern 
Region.8 There and elsewhere in the interwar period a wide range 
of Hungarian-language Jewish papers appeared, showing that the 
linguistic situation was unchanged. The best-known Jewish paper 
in Transylvania was the pro-Zionist Új Kelet, founded in Cluj in 
1918 under Ernő Marton, which was revived in Tel Aviv in 1948.9
The new state authorities in each case sought to dissociate the 
Jews from the Hungarian minority, to cut the size and proportion 
of the latter. One important weapon in Czechoslovakia, Romania 
and the Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom was to go against Austro-
Hungarian practice and treat the Jews as a separate ethnic group, 
irrespective of their native language.10 This also relieved the Jewish 
communities in detached regions from the pressure to assimilate 
again, for the policy of the political leaders of each new majority 
nation was not to assimilate Jews, but simply to have them distance 
themselves from the Hungarians by expressing their loyalty to the 
new state. It was enough if members of Hungarian-speaking Jewish 
communities identified themselves as members of the Jewish 
national minority. The new regimes therefore supported the new 
Jewish movements and parties with a national or Zionist basis. 
Zionism – the movement, spawned intellectually by the Budapest-
born Theodor Herzl, that sought a Jewish national state of Israel – was 
highly popular, especially among the younger generation. However, 
it was still scorned by groups that supported Hungarian assimilation 
and by ultra-Orthodox and Hasidic communities, the latter on the 
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religious grounds that it involved unauthorized people assuming the 
task of the Messiah.
Orthodox and Hasidic rabbis were also concerned that the 
burgeoning of Zionism coincided with mounting interest among 
younger Jews in the atheist and left-wing movements (social 
democratic and communist) that could flourish in the liberal political 
climate of Czechoslovakia. They saw the conservative Hungary of 
old as far preferable. But they too had to adapt to the new conditions. 
They saw ethnically based political activity as the best way forward 
for committed religious Jews practicing in a traditional way, and 
offered instead of the secular national movements the Orthodox 
religious alternative of a movement known as Agudat Yisrael.
Assimilation into the new majority nation was chosen only by 
a small number, and hardly at all before the 1930s. One reason was 
the brevity of the period: it took time to adopt the new language 
(usually through education taught in it) and the associated cultural 
traditions. This, along with left-wing ideology that supersedes or 
overrides the nationality question, would become a frequent choice 
in the period after the Holocaust.
Slovak nationalists were inimical to the Jews from the outset, 
as a community loyal to the old Hungarian regime. Nor did their 
leaders change their stance in the interwar period. But Masaryk’s 
Czechoslovakia as a whole was the one successor country to attempt 
a political system similar to the Western democracies and eschew 
discriminatory measures up to 1938. The Orthodox communities 
that predominated in the Upland were coordinated by an Orthodox 
Bureau in Bratislava. The political forum on a minority basis was the 
Jewish Party, founded in 1918, which had branches in all Slovakian 
cities with an appreciable Jewish community.
Transcarpathia, also annexed to Czechoslovakia, holds a specific 
place in the history of Hungarian Jewry. Many of the Jews there 
followed Hasidism, the mystical spiritual movement of Judaism. 
Their religious customs and folklore differed from those of the 
Jews in other parts of former Hungary. Furthermore, their everyday 
language was Yiddish. There was also an upsurge of Hasidism in 
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Transylvania, where whole communities had arrived in Hungary 
from Galicia during World War I, for instance that of Yisrael Hager, 
rebbe of Vyzhnytsia, in Oradea. Their rapid spread prompted Dezső 
Schön to write a novel.11
The proportion of Jews in Transcarpathia was an exceptionally 
high 14 percent, which included proportions of 27 percent in 
Užhorod and 43 percent in Mukačevo, where the Jews formed the 
largest community,12 representatives of the Jewish parties had a 
right to address the city assembly in Yiddish or Hebrew, and the 
public library had a Hebrew/Yiddish section. There were strong 
Jewish nationalist, Zionist presences in the Transcarpathian cities, 
and several (including Užhorod and Khust) started schools teaching 
in Hebrew, the best-known being the Hebrew Gymnasium of 
Mukačevo, founded in 1924.13
Romania in 1919 was the last country in Europe to legislate 
for equal rights for Jews. (The act was incorporated into the 1923 
constitution.) Religious recognition ensued under a 1928 act on 
religious affairs. So the Jews of the Regat had been tied up in 
different campaigns, and different cultural and linguistic traditions 
also delayed cooperation with the communities of Transylvania. 
The local associations – the Transylvanian Orthodox Central 
Bureau (1920) and the Association of Transylvanian–Banat Israelite 
Communities (1922) – were derived from counterparts in Hungary.14 
Meanwhile a Zionist association organized on an ethnic basis – the 
Transylvanian Jewish National Federation15 – was formed in 1918 
and proved to be a strong communal force for pursuing Jewish 
interests. The community began to make an impact in local and 
national politics with the foundation of the Transylvanian Jewish 
Party in 1930.16
There were communities of over 10,000 Jews in Cluj, 
Oradea, Timişoara, Satu Mare and Sighetu Marmaţiei, making 
the Transylvanian Jews the strongest community of any in the 
detached regions. Hungarian Jewish writers and journalists played 
a big role in minority Hungarian life.17 In the Dualist period, the 
trend especially in Neolog communities had been to send their 
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children to Hungarian state or parish schools (suspending their 
own), but the 1920s brought an upsurge of denominational schools 
to provide Hungarian-taught education, including some middle 
schools (in Oradea, Timişoara and Cluj), although the last could not 
continue after 1923, when the use of teaching in Romanian became 
compulsory.18
One special feature of Southern Transylvania was the 
survival of a Jewish community that was Sephardic, as opposed 
to Ashkenazi, like the vast majority of the Jews in the Carpathian 
Basin.19 Sephardic Jewish tradition derived from the Jewish 
community of Spain, which was expelled under the Alhambra 
Decree of 1492 and spread as a diaspora through the Maghreb and 
the Balkans, and in the wake of the Ottoman incursions as far as 
Hungary and Transylvania.20 Traditional Sephardic communities 
survived into the twentieth century in Alba Iulia and Timişoara.
Vojvodina Jewry also faced the dilemma outlined earlier. 
Responses can be divided into two groups. Some clung to their 
pre-1918 traditions of close ties with the Hungarians, and others 
wished to be loyal to the Yugoslav King Alexander II. The latter 
was typical of Novi Sad and its environs, and of younger Jews, who 
were responsible for building up active Zionism in the province. The 
Jews loyal to the new state were grouped in the Novi Sad Jewish 
Association, and received extra state subsidies in exchange.
The new Austrian province of Burgenland had once contained 
some significant Jewish communities. Those settled by the Ester-
házy princes (in Eisenstadt/Kismarton, Mattersdorf/Nagymarton, 
Kittsee/Köpcsény, and so on) and the Batthyány counts (in Rohonc/
Rechnitz) had enjoyed autonomy and exerted a decisive economic 
and cultural influence on Hungary’s Jews up to the early nineteenth 
century, but by the end of that century these had been lost and most 
had moved to Vienna. The remaining Orthodox communities of 
a few hundred people formed a Burgenland Orthodox Bureau in 
1920. By 1934 there were only 3,600 Jews in the province, and these 
would flee or be annihilated, deported, or moved to Vienna after the 
Anschluss of 1938.21 Their home towns were then declared Judenrein 
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(free of Jews) and their synagogues demolished. The communities 
did not revive after World War II, but they are remembered in the 
Austrian Jewish Museum in Eisenstadt.
the Holocaust
Once the gains by the Vienna Awards of 1938 and 1940 had been 
retaken, the restrictions in Hungary’s so-called Jewish acts applied 
to them, and conscription into the labor service began. The first 
stage in the tragedy came in the summer of 1941, when “stateless” 
Jews without Hungarian citizenship were rounded up, deported, 
and massacred near Kamenets-Podolsky.22 Yet despite the many 
thousands of lives lost and the deportations to neighboring countries 
in 1941–1942 – before the German occupation – most Jews in 
Hungary still felt that they were protected.
After the German occupation on April 16, 1944, the Jews (and 
those legally classed as such) were confined in ghettoes and deported. 
The task was carried out according to gendarmerie districts, from 
east to west, starting in Transcarpathia and Northern Transylvania. 
The deportee trains that left between May 15 and July 8 were bound 
for the death camps of Auschwitz. Some 445,000–450,000 people 
were sent off within weeks, mainly women, children and the elderly, 
as men of working age were in the labor service by then. Only the 
Budapest Jews herded into the ghettoes escaped deportation, but 
they suffered greatly at the hands of the Hungarian Arrow-Cross 
movement, legalized by the quisling prime minister, Döme Sztójay.
The Holocaust scholar Randolph L. Braham estimated that the 
war cost 266,000 Jewish lives in the reannexed territories.23 It is 
worth recalling that in Northern Transylvania (occupied by Hungary 
under the Second Vienna Award of August 30, 1940) almost three 
quarters of the Jews perished, while the number of Holocaust victims 
in Southern Transylvania was one or two thousand. Although in 1942 
Jews were also deported from there (from Timişoara and Arad) to 
Transdnistria, where tens of thousands of Jews from other parts of 
Romania were annihilated, Romania then stopped this and allowed 
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them to emigrate to Palestine.24 So in 1943 and 1944, Jews from 
Northern Transylvania, Hungary and other countries were trying 
to escape into Romania and thence via Bucharest and Constanţa to 
Palestine.25
Aftermath
After the war some thousands or tens of thousands of Jews returned 
to some regions to start a new life. The numbers of survivors are 
put at 35,000–40,000 from Northern Transylvania, 40,000 from 
Southern Transylvania, 20,000 from Transcarpathia, 10,000 from the 
southern, mainly Hungarian-speaking, strip of Slovakia (and 27,000 
from the whole of Slovakia), and 3,000–5,000 from Vojvodina.26 
However, many survivors did not return to their native regions, or, 
on discovering that all their kin and community were gone, and 
encountering a frequently hostile reception from non-Jews, they 
immediately departed again for Israel or for Western countries. 
Some 10,000 Transcarpathian survivors settled as Czechoslovak 
citizens in the Czech lands, especially Sudetenland, and so when the 
Soviet Union gained sovereignty over the province, in June 1945, 
there were hardly 4,000 Jews to be found there.27 All the survivors 
faced great difficulties, as communities that were devastated and 
robbed of their wealth, and were without their religious leaders. At 
least in the larger communities, the communities weathered out the 
difficulties and social and educational institutions were reorganized. 
The main aid came from the American Jewish Joint Distribution 
Committee (Joint).
The acts and decisions of the survivors of the Holocaust were 
aimed above all at freeing themselves of the burden of the “Jewish 
Question”. Both communism and Zionism appeared to offer rapid, 
radical solutions, and indeed for a while they worked hand in hand. 
Large numbers of Jews joined the Communist Party, seeing it as a 
haven from persecution. Many were then to be disillusioned by the 
anti-Zionist trials and the anti-Israel policies that the Communist 
Party came to proclaim. Others sought freedom to pursue their 
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Jewish identity in Western countries with long liberal traditions, 
or were simply unable to come to terms with a native land that had 
rejected them and massacred their families. Some Jews moved 
from the detached territories into Hungary. Others chose to remain, 
reacting by hiding their Jewishness, even from their own children, 
and seeking full integration into the majority society.
Emigration to Israel was most intensive in 1948, the year that it 
was founded, and in the following few years. The population flow 
was further increased by the communist takeovers in Romania and 
Czechoslovakia, for the new authorities seized control of the Jewish 
organizations and expelled the international Jewish organizations 
providing relief to the Jews there. Jewish community life was kept 
within narrow religious, denominational bounds.
The loss of ground by Jewish culture and community life in 
the communist period hastened emigration, which continued within 
the limits set by the policy of each state. The Yugoslavs differed 
from the other communist regimes in not impeding emigration or 
the activity of international Jewish organizations. Before leaving 
the country, emigrants had to renounce their citizenship, which 
meant that their real estate passed to the state.28 In Romania, after a 
period of isolationism in 1951–1958, another 106,000 Jews had left 
the country by 1966. Thereafter the Ceauşescu regime demanded 
and received from Israel a capitation fee averaging US $3,000 for 
each emigrant. By the end of the 1980s, only 6,000 out of the post-
Holocaust community of 80,000 Jews remained in Transylvania.29 
A new wave of emigration from Slovakia commenced in 1968.
The Jews of Transcarpathia were the community in the 
toughest position after World War II. The borders were closed in 
the autumn of 1945, and only from the mid-1970s would the Soviets 
allow substantial Jewish emigration, under pressure from abroad. 
Returnees from long periods in labor camps and immigrants from 
provinces further east actually increased the Jewish population to 
about 12,000 in 1959.30 Communities had to register before they 
could operate, and obtaining a permit proved impossible in many 
cases. According to a report in 1950, there were only four registered 
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communities: in Uzhgorod (later to become known as Uzhhorod), 
Mukachevo, Beregovo (later to become known as Berehove) 
and Khust. Places of worship belonged to the state under Soviet 
law, and the synagogues were seized even from the registered 
communities.31
In the provincial towns of all countries in the region there remain 
only cemeteries as a memorial to the old Jewish communities that 
vanished after the Holocaust and the depopulation of communist 
times. 
the Present day
Today the Jewish inhabitants of the detached territories live mainly 
in the big cities, in communities numbering only a couple of 
hundred, of whom no more than 30–40 attend the synagogue or 
Jewish institutions. The holding of services is often prevented due 
to a lack of the prescribed quorum (10 males).
In many places there is a generation gap between the dwindling 
elderly, drawing their tradition from childhood and home, and 
younger people, often from mixed marriages, who have discovered 
their Jewish identity in recent years and are still learning the 
traditions. The middle generation of those who grew up under 
communism is absent from the community. In Transylvania, since 
the last rabbi (Ernő Neumann of Timişoara) died, there has been no 
one to replace him.32 There is tension between the communities of the 
diaspora, intent on maintaining their own traditions, and the policy 
of assisting emigration to Israel. Particularly in Transcarpathia, 
even the remnants of the Hungarian Jewish families have moved to 
Israel since the change of system. Many Vojvodina Jews decided to 
do the same during the Yugoslav wars.
There is a dwindling community in the neighboring countries 
that senses a dual, Hungarian and Jewish, affiliation.33 Relations with 
communities in Hungary have been enlivened by annual meetings 
in Debrecen since 1999. These have become an important event in 
the community life of the Jews of the Carpathian Basin.
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Jews from Hungarian-speaking territories settled in numerous 
countries, but in many they simply integrated with an existing local 
Jewish community instead of building up their own framework, 
meaning that their subsequent history cannot be traced even if 
they appeared in the immigration statistics. This section concerns 
the development and institutions of Jewish communities that were 
Hungarian-speaking or tied to Hungarian tradition in some form, 
based on available data, which are often fragmentary or inaccurate. 
The main centers are Israel and North America (the United States 
and Canada), but Western Europe, South America and Australia 
also became important destinations, particularly after World War II 
and 1956.
The impetus behind Jewish emigration in the Dualist period, 
around the turn of the twentieth century, was mainly economic, 
especially from poorer counties in the northeast, but political 
motives also became important in the interwar period. Many 
young people barred from higher education by the 1920 numerus 
clausus legislation in Trianon Hungary set out for Western Europe 
and North America, some to become world-famous. The Zionist 
movement and consequent emigration to Palestine were strong in all 
the successor countries. In Hungary’s case this speeded up towards 
the end of the 1930s with the passage of the Jewish laws, and even 
then only a few thousand took that route, most preferring to make 
for the United States. The number who managed to leave during 
the war was tragically low – between five and ten thousand. The 
real flood of emigration began only after the Holocaust and peaked 
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in 1947–1949. In the countries in the Soviet sphere of influence, it 
preceded the communist takeover, when the borders would close, 
and it coincided with the formation of the state of Israel. This short 
period was the only one when the majority of the Jews leaving 
Trianon Hungary went to Israel.
Jewish emigration continued in the communist period as far as 
political conditions allowed. Some 20,000–25,000 Jews left Hungary 
after 1956 (a third for Israel, and two thirds for North America, 
Australia or Western Europe). The emigrants found new homes and 
a new country, but their departure was an irreparable loss to the 
inhabitants of the Carpathian Basin.1
Israel
It is not widely known that there existed in the second half of 
the nineteenth century a small Hungarian Jewish community in 
Palestine, which grew into one of the largest and most prosperous 
groups in the still-small Jewish community there. This Orthodox 
community was not Hungarian-speaking, but Hungary as its source 
country remained an important part of its self-identity. The Hungarian 
kollel (mutual educational and benefit society) founded in Jerusalem 
in 1858 was headed by Yosef Chaim Sonnenfeld (1849–1932), who 
was responsible in the 1880s for instituting a quarter of the Batei 
Ungarin (Hungarian houses) in the city. From this community 
arose also the first Jewish agricultural settlement in Palestine, Petah 
Tikva.2 The thinking of the leading intellect among them, Akiva 
Yosef Schlesinger (1837–1922), resembled in many ways the goals 
of the later Zionist movement (revival of the Hebrew language, 
cultivation of the land, self-defense and a new education system), 
the decisive difference being that Schlesinger and his associates 
based all this on the strictest observance of Orthodox principles, 
in farming and community life as well. This was the approach that 
Szombathely-born Yehoshua Stampfer (1852–1894) took as the first 
leader of Petah Tikva. His son Shlomo Itzhak became the first mayor 
of what by then was a city.3
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Such ultra-Orthodox groups from Hungary and Hasidic Jewish 
groups came to form the extremist movement that continues to reject 
on religious grounds the state of Israel, including Israeli citizenship, 
although they have lived in Israel for several generations. The 
Neturei Karta (Guardians of the City) movement arose in 1935 and 
disagreed with the Zionist efforts to found a state and political aims.4 
Its adherents, in the Mea Shearim quarter of Jerusalem and the city 
of Bnei Brak, receive strong backing from the Satmar Hasidim in 
the United States.
Quite differently structured and motivated emigrant groups 
arrived in Palestine from the Carpathian Basin in the interwar 
period. Most were young and had been prepared for their aliyah 
by a Zionist organization. Many were professionals (engineers and 
architects) intending to use their expertise to build the country.5 
They were helped in settling and integrating by the Hitachdut 
Olei Hungaria – Hungarian Immigrants’ Association – founded in 
1920, which had branches in several cities, and even a Hungarian 
lending library in Rehovot, and began to produce information 
materials in the 1940s. The organization still exists as a focal point 
for the older generation of Holocaust survivors, and it also aims 
to assist recent arrivals. Hungarian-speaking Jewish immigrants 
seeking a communal, agricultural life, mainly young Zionists from 
Transylvania, founded their own kibbutzim, for instance the Dalia 
kibbutz in 1939.
There are relatively reliable figures for numbers of immigrants 
into Palestine/Israel. Around 10,000 arrived from Hungary between 
1919 and the foundation of the state of Israel in May 1948, another 
10,000 in 1948–1949, and some 13,000 in 1950–1957.6 These 
relatively small numbers would seem to justify the proposal by Israeli 
Radio in 1961 to cease broadcasting in Hungarian, but it became 
clear to the Israeli public in the subsequent bitter debates that many 
of the Jews arriving from other countries in the Carpathian Basin 
also had Hungarian as their native language, so that the number 
of Hungarian-speaking Jews resident in Israel was put between 
125,000 and 200,000 or even more. It seems realistic to accept the 
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smaller of those numbers, but it is also worth considering that the 
biggest Hungarian paper, Új Kelet, was selling 20,000 copies a day 
in 1960, at a time when many other Hungarian publications were 
appearing: pamphlets from Zionist organizations, publications by 
the Israeli army and political parties, papers from origin-based 
communities, Orthodox religious papers, and literary, artistic and 
social periodicals. These and the books published in Hungarian 
feature in a bibliography by Zoltán Féder that emphasizes the 
importance of the Hungarian reading public in Israel.7 Centers 
of social life were the Hungarian speakers’ clubs that operated in 
places such as Nahariya, Kfar Saba and Petah Tikva.
After the Holocaust, many societies were started by people 
who had come from particular cities, such as Oradea, Dej, Sighetu 
Marmaţiei, Dunajská Streda, Eger, Mád, Baia Mare, Kisvárda 
and Karcag, to help survivors keep in touch, to immortalize once-
flourishing communities in books, and to arrange for cemeteries 
to be maintained. Another act of commemoration is the Memorial 
Museum of Hungarian-Speaking Jewry in Safed.8 It is rare for the 
children or grandchildren of Hungarian-speaking Israelis to retain 
the Hungarian language, due to the natural process of assimilation, 
often speeded up by a decision taken after the Holocaust not to teach 
their children the language of a society that rejected them.
united States
Historians of American Jewry make mention of immigrants from 
Hungary from the 1848–1849 War of Independence onwards, and 
some Jewish veterans of that conflict went on to take part in the 
American Civil War.9 Immigration on a large scale (65,000–70,000 
people) began in the 1880s and continued until World War I. Most 
of the immigrants came from impoverished Orthodox families, who 
earned their living in light industry and retail trading. The focuses 
were New York and Cleveland, but there were Hungarian Jewish 
organizations in other cities, such as the Herzl Society and the 
Máramaros Sickness Benefit Society in Chicago, offering benefits 
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and funeral rites, and organizing social events, rather as the Chevra 
Kadisha had done for the Diaspora in the Middle Ages. In New 
York, the immigrants from Hungary occupied a defined block of 
land in the Jewish quarter of the Lower East Side, and then, as they 
rose socially, they formed a Hungarian Jewish neighborhood in 
Yorkville at the turn of the century.10
Those arriving in the United States around the turn of the 
century had a double or triple identity (as American Hungarian Jews) 
that was altered substantially by events in Hungary in the 1920s. In 
religion, they integrated into the general Jewish community instead 
of founding institutions of their own, and socially and politically 
they distanced themselves increasingly from the general, which is to 
say predominantly Christian, Hungarian institutions, withdrawing 
from American Hungarian affairs. So they became Americanized 
in language and customs more quickly than the other Hungarians.
But this did not mean there was no Hungarian Jewish social life 
between the wars or after the Holocaust. For instance, there was a 
Hungarian Jewish weekly newspaper, Egyleti Élet. Based on the 
New York census returns of 1950, it has been estimated there were 
31,000 Jews born in Hungary. The city was also where the World 
Association of Hungarian Jews was formed in 1951,11 and a Bnai 
Zion Hungarian Club still operates there.
The paradox of Hungarian Jewish history is that the Satmar 
Hasidim, one of the Eastern Hungarian Hasidic groups most opposed 
to linguistic and cultural assimilation, became after World War II the 
mainstay of Hungarian Jewish tradition in America, and to a lesser 
extent Israel. Its head, Joel Teitelbaum (1887–1979), settled in New 
York in 1947, where he reestablished in Brooklyn (Willamsburg and 
Borough Park) a congregation that has become the world’s second-
most populous Hasidic group. They stick strictly to their traditions, 
foods and religious folklore, and to the Hungarian language, although 
not as their first language, of course.12
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canada
There are Hungarian Jewish communities in Montreal and Toronto. 
Since 1961, the Menora-Egyenlőség, describing itself as the 
newspaper for Hungarian-speaking Jews in North America, has 
been published in Toronto.
South America
Jews from Hungary arrived in the countries of South American 
between the world wars and after the Holocaust. Separate 
organizations were set up in the countries with the largest Hungarian 
populations – Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela and Uruguay – but 
these have dwindled or disappeared, due to the lack of further 
immigration. That has happened, for instance to the Argentinean 
Association of Hungarian-Speaking Jews in Buenos Aires, once 
the center for a number of pursuits (sports, drama and charitable 
events) and publisher of Hatikva, a paper that was once distributed 
throughout the continent, but whose membership is no longer of 
Hungarian origin.13 The loss of a Hungarian-language Jewish press 
leaves only networks of personal contacts. However, the Hungarian 
News Agency list of Hungarian organizations abroad includes 
two other organizations, the Community of Hungarian Israelites 
in Montevideo, and the Hungarian Mother Tongue Israelite 
Congregation, founded in São Paolo in 1931.14
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3. tHE cSánGóS oF MoLdAVIA
Zoltán Ilyés
The ethnic name Csángó, meaning migrant or wandering, is applied 
to several Hungarian-speaking or originally Hungarian-speaking 
groups in and outside the Carpathian Basin. The largest are the 
Roman Catholic Csángós of Moldavia, who dwell beyond the Eastern 
Carpathians. Along the Upper Trotuş River in the historical county 
of Ciuc are the Ghimeş Csángós, descendants of eighteenth-century 
settlers from the Székely Land and Romanians from Moldavia. 
Furthermore, there are several villages of Hungarians belonging to 
the Evangelical (Lutheran) faith in the Şapte Sate and Ţara Bârsei 
districts near Braşov, whom local Székelys call Csángós.
The Moldavian Csángós, “Hungarians beyond the borders” 
even before Trianon, came to form, together with the Hungarians of 
Transylvania, the largest Hungarian minority in any country. This 
might have encouraged them to pursue education in Hungarian 
language, religious life and culture and strengthened their Hungarian 
identity – integrating them into the nation, so to speak – but in the 
event it did not. First, the Romanian nation state pursued a rigid 
minority policy on the Moldavian Csángós, and such integration 
was also discouraged by the Moldavian Roman Catholic Church’s 
commitment to the Romanian nation. The Moldavian Csángós do not 
have a community of experience with the Hungarians of historical 
Hungary. They do not look back at the period of linguistic renewal 
and national awakening as being decisive to their national identity.
The Moldavian Csángós themselves are not uniform in their 
origin, dialect or culture. To this day many are inclined to consider 
themselves as descendants of the Hungarians of the Etelköz, who 
absorbed other nomadic groups, notably Cumans. However, the 
research of Gábor Lükő in 1932–1933 made it clear that some of 
the ancestors of the Moldavian Hungarians had settled in the 
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Middle Ages and were heirs to the Hungarian cultures of Szamos 
and the Tisza Valley, while others had arrived as part of the flight 
and resettlement of Székelys in the eighteenth century.1 Based on 
historical, literary and ethnographic research, Lükő drew the modern 
distinctions between the archaic culture of the northern Csángós 
in the Románvásár (Roman) district, that of the southern Csángós 
around Bacău, and that of the Székely Csángós around Siret, Tazlău 
and Târgu Trotuş in Neamţ and Bacău Counties.2
Pál Péter Domokos from Ciuc, who collected Moldavian folk 
poetry and folk songs in 1929–1933, helped to reawaken Székely 
and pan-Hungarian fellowship and to delineate a fifth dialect area of 
Hungarian folk music.3 A very thorough critique and account of the 
source materials was published by László Mikecs in 1941.4
The Csángós were subject to strong Romanian nationalist 
pressure in the interwar period, including the attentions of the Iron 
Guard, although linguistically they were largely assimilated by 
then. In 1941 Iosif Petru M. Pal, a Franciscan minister in Moldavia, 
devised a theory of the Romanian origin of the Moldavian Csángós. 
This still influences the Romanian concept of the group and 
contributes to legitimizing the self-image of the Roman Catholic 
Church elite in Moldavia.5 The Romanian state commissioned Dr 
Petre Râmneanţu of the Sibiu Institute of Hygiene (part of 
the University of Cluj) to investigate the Romanian origin of the 
Moldavian Csángós using blood tests and measurements of physical 
and anthropological parameters in the worst tradition of race 
biology.
During the repatriation of the Bukovina Székelys in 1941–1942, 
settlers also went to Bačka from some Moldavian Csángó villages, 
such as Cleja, Vladnic and Găiceana, and were resettled in 1945 in 
the homes of Swabians deported from villages in Tolna and Baranya 
Counties. A drought in 1946–1947 brought further moves to 
Hungary despite an equivocal stance by the Hungarian authorities, 
fearing a mass migration and the setting of a precedent for migrants 
from northern Transylvania, and by their Romanian counterparts, 
from whom came alternate encouragement and discouragement. 
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Many Csángós acquired emigration permits by bribing officials in 
Bucharest.6
After the war, the communist-inspired Hungarian People’s 
Association7 set up 35 schools teaching in the Csángós’ Land. 
These ran from 1948 to 1959, with intermissions, and are still 
remembered appreciatively, but they began to shrink and close after 
1953 due to opposition from Romanian education officials and the 
Roman Catholic Church and the dissolution of the Association.8 
Furthermore, the plethora of Romanian loan words in Csángó 
dialect meant that many pupils struggled with standard literary 
Hungarian. (One informant who attended junior school in Vladnic 
said that the pupils could not understand, for instance, the title of a 
piece in their reader: “Stripping and shelling the sweet corn.”)9 Some 
of the teachers imported from the Székely Land had no knowledge 
of Romanian and they were pedagogically unskilled to help them. 
In the absence of local Hungarian institutions the language was 
spoken only in the home, and the urge for parents to support the 
schools was weak. There was little support from cultural events 
laid on by the Hungarian People’s Association, which were replete 
with communist and atheist propaganda. Romanians in neighboring 
villages began to see the Csángós as ardent left-wingers, yet in fact 
they were strongly religious.
Intensive post-war collection of folk songs by János Jagamas, 
József Faragó and Zoltán Kallós continued for twenty years. 
Kallós and György Martin also researched the archaic Moldavian/
Carpathian dance culture of Romanian origin, while Károly 
Kós, Judit Szentimrei and Jenő Nagy completed a monograph 
on Moldavian Csángó folk art. Their work and that of a younger 
generation of ethnographers – Péter Halász, István Pávai, Ferenc 
Pozsony and others – turned the Moldavian Csángós into one of the 
most intensively studied ethnographic groups in Europe. There was 
interest beyond Hungary particularly in the hitherto unknown old-
style folk songs, ballads, laments and archaic prayers, as a valuable 
heritage of Hungarian culture. The Romanian state has sought to 
offset this wealth of ethnographic evidence with the publication 
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of works that sought to trace the Csángós back to Transylvanian 
Romanians and present their ethnographic materials as wholly 
Romanian. The most notorious of these works was a book on 
the origins of the Moldavian Csángós by Dumitru Mărtinaş that 
appeared in 1985, and in English translation in 1999.10
The pastoral work of the Transylvanian Franciscans among 
the Moldavian Csángós had practically ceased by the last third of 
the sixteenth century. Thereafter the work was done by a separate 
missionary district staffed mainly by Bulgarian, Polish and Italian 
priests. When the Roman Catholic Diocese of Iaşi was founded in 
1884, Romanian became the general preaching language, and the 
cantors who had kept alive the prayers and psalms of the Hungarian-
speaking congregations in liturgical practice had largely died out. 
Many stories are told of Roman Catholic priests with Romanian 
sympathies who knew no Romanian when they were children and 
still spoke Hungarian to their mothers, yet looked down on the archaic 
speech mixed with Romanian words of their congregations and 
forbade the “devil’s language” in church. This image of “janissary” 
priests apparent in Hungarian discussion and even in scholarly works 
reflects a failure to appreciate the pressure applied to the Moldavian 
Roman Catholic Church, from the mid-nineteenth century onwards, 
by the Romanian nation state, and other pressure experienced due 
to its position as a minority denomination in an overwhelmingly 
Orthodox society. The Romanian nation state, strengthening its 
administrative hold, would recognize only the Orthodox Church 
as the state religion, and used a number of techniques of coercion 
to persuade the Roman Catholic Church to abandon the using of 
another language, which was seen as reflecting an ambivalent 
loyalty to the nation and the Romanian-speaking community. Even 
in the 1930s and 1940s, its wholly Romanianized priesthood and 
congregations still suffered threats and discrimination from the state: 
their loyalty to Romania was questioned and they were threatened 
with deportation.11 In many cases it faced simple anti-Catholicism, 
which impelled it to define itself as Romanian. One response in 
Moldavia was to adopt a name that was at variance with Catholic 
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universalism, calling itself “Romanian Catholic” (român catholic), 
instead of “Roman Catholic” (romano-catolic). These pressures do 
not excuse the Roman Catholic priests who banned the Hungarian 
language and harassed its speakers, often against the pleas of their 
congregations, even calling for assistance from state agencies. In 
1938, for instance, the priest of Lespezi had the gendarmerie arrest 
the cantor of the village, who was rebelling in favor of celebrating 
mass in Hungarian, and conduct house-to-house searches for prayer 
books and hymnals in Hungarian.12
By 1989 there was no longer widespread support for initiatives 
to reintroduce the Hungarian-language liturgy into Moldavian 
Roman Catholic churches: the most committed proponents of this 
were a group in Pustiana. This may have been due to the categorical 
dismissal of the idea by the clergy, the way in which generations had 
grown up with the Romanian liturgy by then, the fact that Romanian 
was the first language for many of the young, and/or the undeniably 
active Church life in Moldavia. Nor was there any support from the 
Vatican, which saw in the proposal only a likelihood of superfluous 
conflict within the Moldavian clergy that would not make clerical 
life easier in predominantly Orthodox Romania. All such proposals 
were simply referred to the Diocese of Iaşi. This left only occasional 
Hungarian-language masses celebrated in secret by priests from 
Hungary or Transylvania, and a single, annual Hungarian mass 
permitted by the diocese, held at Cacica in Bukovina, the most 
important place of pilgrimage for Moldavian Catholics.
The twentieth-century demography of the Moldavian Csángós, 
with the degree of language change and assimilation, can be traced 
in official census returns, but these need to be augmented and 
contrasted with local linguistic, ethnographic and sociological 
findings. A historical demographic analysis by Vilmos Tánczos 
showed that the number of Roman Catholics in Moldavia had risen 
from 109,953 in 1930 to 240,038 in 1992. These did not include an 
estimated 50,000 Csángós who had moved to Transylvania or an 
estimated 15,000 in the rest of Romania. Behind this spectacular 
increase lie some clear processes of acculturation and assimilation 
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that had begun in the latter half of the nineteenth century. In 1930, 21.7 
percent of the Catholics recorded described themselves as Hungarian, 
but in 1992 this was down to 0.8 percent (1,826 people, of whom 
some 500 were living in Moldavian Csángó villages and the rest in 
cities, where they were mainly of Transylvanian origin. In terms of 
self-identification, therefore, the half-century of political effort by the 
Romanian nation state and the Diocese of Iaşi was successful. But 
the often loaded census returns, collected with the priests and local 
officials prompting the “right” answers, say little about the level 
of Hungarian-language knowledge or identification with Csángó 
Hungarian culture. Based on averaging Tánczos’s local findings, the 
number of Csángós who speak Hungarian and live in Moldavia can 
be put at about 62,000.13
Many Csángós who moved to Transylvania communicated in 
Romanian at work and in daily life, even in the Székely Land. Ferenc 
Pozsony showed that this was not only because of the material and 
symbolic advantages of identifying with the Romanians, but also 
due to threatening attitudes by those in authority: Csángós were 
forbidden to attend Hungarian-language masses and urged to call 
for Romanian masses. In daily life, the archaic Hungarian of the 
Csángós, spiced with loan words from Romanian, may have caused 
them comprehension problems in their contacts with the Székelys. So 
the assimilation processes that began in Moldavia were completed 
in a Hungarian environment.14
The figures for self-identification and native language cover 
identity patterns and degrees of assimilation that vary from village 
to village. Pozsony, surveying a sample from Ciuc in Bacău County, 
found that 41.8 percent ticked Hungarian, 23.8 percent Csángó, 
5.3 percent Hungarian Csángó, 5.9 percent Romanian Csángó, 13.4 
percent Catholic, and 9.8 percent Romanian.15 Attila Hegyeli in a 
similar survey in nearby Somuşca found 35.9 percent of respondents 
describing themselves as Csángó in language, 27.8 percent as 
Romanian and 22.8 percent as Hungarian, but for national affiliation 
the responses were 44.3 percent Romanian, 36.1 percent Csángó, 4.6 
percent Hungarian, and 3 percent Catholic.16 Despite the many options 
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offered in the questionnaires, it is clear that Roman Catholicism 
is the attribute that most respondents wish to emphasize. The 
findings of identity surveys may also vary according to the ethnic 
affiliation of the researcher or questioner. This suggests that the 
Csángós, caught between the opposing efforts of rival nation states 
and associated readings of history, may behave, understandably, like 
chameleons, adjusting to the current situation. The rival nation states 
of Central and Southeastern Europe expect straightforward identities 
and affiliations, and thus the Csángós, with their “pre-national” form 
of identity, find themselves unwittingly a subject of contention.
The identities and cultures of the Moldavian Csángós, after 
centuries of coexistence and Romanian schooling, cannot be judged 
by the same gauge of national affiliation or the same coordinates of the 
Carpathian Basin as can be applied in the case of the Transylvanian 
Hungarians, for example. The archaic culture, old-style Hungarian 
speech, and wealth of folklore that appeal to outsider Hungarians 
symbolize to the Moldavian Csángós themselves their backwardness 
and poverty, which young people especially would like to see the 
back of as soon as possible. In this situation, and with no system of 
Hungarian-language institutions, the language of modernization, 
advancement and self-fulfillment appears to many to be Romanian, 
or more recently Italian or Spanish.17
It would be a mistake to belittle the importance of those who have 
completed their higher education in Hungarian since 1989, although 
most never return to their home district, for want of appropriate 
jobs there. Moldavian Csángós did not take work in Hungary in large 
numbers, but those who did so likewise contributed to improving the 
prestige of the Hungarian language, standard of knowledge of it, and 
strength of identity with the Hungarians. In Vladnic, for instance, the 
competence of younger people in Hungarian was perceptibly better 
in 2001 than in 1990, although some were inclined to mix Budapest 
slang with their Székely-style Hungarian. As for the post-modern 
development of identity, the Moldavian Roman Catholic Church has 
to reckon with the secularization of young migrant Csángós. The 
Church will not regain its earlier reputation or comprehensive role in 
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influence on daily life. This means not only freer morals and a decline 
in traditional respect for its authority, but greater freedom to change 
or choose an identity.
The Moldavian Csángós were engaged originally in arable 
farming and stockbreeding. This occupation pattern began to 
change only with post-World War II industrialization. Most Csángó 
women took very low-paid work for the local collective farm, 
while the men commuted to nearby cities or to construction sites 
or factories elsewhere in the Regat or in Transylvania, where whole 
families would sometimes move from the 1970s onwards. The 
Moldavian Csángó villages were simpler and poorer than those 
of the Romanians, due to large families, isolation, qualification 
disadvantages, and low inter-generational employment mobility. 
After 1989 came the closure of many workplaces that had employed 
Csángó men. (From Vladnic alone, there were three busloads of 
commuters to Bacău, but by 2001 only two or three villagers were 
still doing it.) The urgent need to earn a livelihood led to migration 
of workers to Hungary, Israel, Italy and Spain on such a scale that 
the Roman Catholic Diocese of Iaşi sent priests to Italy to cater for 
the Csángós there.
The Association of Moldavian Csángó-Hungarians,18 founded in 
1990 to protect their interests and promote traditional culture based 
on their language, cited Romanian school legislation in petitioning 
for teaching of Hungarian language, literature and culture to children 
of parents requesting it. Despite repeated threats and verbal or 
occasional physical aggression, applications for tuition in Hungarian 
were made by the parents of 7 pupils in Lespezi, 29 in Pustiana, and 
25 in Cleja. The education office in Bacău gathered 598 signatures 
for a petition in Lespezi stating that the teaching of Hungarian was 
superfluous. The Association then started extra-curricular Hungarian 
tuition in village halls and private homes – in 2000 in Cleja, and in 
2001 in Somuşca, Pustiana, Galbeni, Fundu Răcăciuni and Gioseni. 
The county education office then tried to obstruct this through 
litigation against the organizations and foundations providing the 
instruction, and local teachers of Hungarian were harassed by the 
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local police. The situation normalized after the Council of Ministers 
of the Council of Europe adopted a resolution affording protection to 
Csángó culture in 2001, and the Romanian authorities permitted two 
weekly lessons of optional Hungarian between seven and eight a. m. 
in the local state schools. In the 2005–2006 school year there were 
1,187 pupils taking part in the scheme: 725 in state schools and 369 as 
an extra-curricular activity.19
There are several organizations and cultural associations that 
have formed since 1989 to assist in sending Moldavian Csángó 
students to Hungarian-taught schools in Transylvania and Hungary, 
find hostel accommodation, and award scholarships. Pupils in the 
first eight grades are sent regularly to camps conducted in Hungarian 
in Transylvania and Hungary. On the Romanian side, the idea of the 
Romanian origin and culture of the Csángós is propagated by the 
Dumitru Martinaş Association, founded in 2001.
The Csángó festival organized annually since 1990 in Jászberény 
and the Csángó ball held since 1997 in Budapest are the gatherings 
of Moldavian Csángó folklore, where the people of Hungary can 
become more familiar with Csángó instrumental folk music and 
dances, showing a fair amount of Romanian influence as well, and 
can listen to and learn the Moldavian folk songs.
The questions of language and minority rights for the Csángós 
have become topics in European discussions on minority rights 
and the protection of endangered minorities. On May 4, 2001, the 
Finnish rapporteur Tytti Isohookana-Asunmaa presented a report 
entitled “Csángó Minority Culture in Romania” to the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe, based on an extensive visit in 
1999, which led the Council of Europe to formulate a nine-point 
recommendation to Romania, calling among other things for 
native-language teaching, Church masses in the “Csángó language,” 
recognition and support for Csángó organizations, presentation of 
Csángó culture in Romania, and assistance for regional economic 
renewal.20
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* * *
Apart from the Moldavian Csángós, three other groups in Romania 
have been called Csángós colloquially.
The Ghimeş Csángós live in the villages of Lunca de Sus, Lunca 
de Jos, Ghimeş-Făget, Cădăresti and Coşnea in the Ghimeş Pass 
on the borders of Moldavia and Transylvania, where their ancestors 
migrated in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries from Ciuc 
Székely and Moldavian Hungarian and Romanian villages. They are 
engaged mainly in upland stockbreeding and forestry. Isolation has 
meant that their folk culture preserves an ancient layer of Székely 
peasant culture.21
The Ţara Bârsei or Seven-Village Csángós call themselves 
Hungarians but are called Csángós by others. They are the surviving 
descendants of eleventh-century Pecheneg border guards in villages 
in the southeast extremity of Ţara Bârsei, near Braşov: the four 
villages that make up today’s Săcele (Baciu, Turcheş, Cernatu and 
Satulung), as well as Tărlungeni, Zizin and Purcăreni. Several other 
Ţara Bârsei villages are also grouped with them: Apaţa, Crizbav, 
Satu Nou, Hălmeag and Jimbor. They adopted the Evangelical 
(Lutheran) faith of the Brassó Saxons. Many emigrated to Romania 
before World War I. They were prominent as drivers of hired 
carriages and taxi cabs in Bucharest in the 1930s.22
Also informally referred to in the past as Csángós were the 
Bukovina Székelys. Several thousand Székelys had migrated 
from Csík (Ciuc) and Háromszék (Trei Scaune) to Moldavia after 
the Siculicidium or Mádéfalva massacre of 1764, in the reign of 
Maria Theresa, but were resettled in the province of Bukovina 
(today Suceava County) by the Habsburg court in 1776–1786. The 
province, which had been ceded to Austria under the first partition 
of Poland in 1775, was relatively sparsely populated. The habit of 
referring to them as Csángós spread in the Hungarian press in the 
1880s, but was never adopted by the Bukovina Székelys themselves. 
Two of these settlements, Laudonfalva (Bălcăuţi) and Tomnátik 
(Tomnatek), were abandoned at the end of the nineteenth century, 
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but Fogadjisten (Iacobeşti), Istensegíts (Ţibeni), Hadikfalva 
(Dorneşti), Andrásfalva (Măneuţi) and Józseffalva (Vornicenii 
Mari) became severely overpopulated. A campaign to resettle the 
inhabitants in Hungary led to the foundation of the Lower Danube 
villages of Hertelendyfalva (Vojlovica), Sándoregyháza (Ivanovo), 
and Székelykeve (Skorenovac), but there were also moves to 
Gyorok (Ghioroc) in Arad County (1888–1892), Déva (Deva, 1910), 
Vajdahunyad (Hunedoara, 1892), Babsa (Babşa) in Temes County 
(1900), Vice (Viţa) in Kolozs County, Magyarnemegye (Nimigea 
de Jos) in Beszterce-Naszód County (1900), Marosludas (Luduş) 
in Maros County (1905), and Sztrigyszentgyörgy (Streisângeorgiu) 
and Csernakeresztúr (Cristur) in Hunyad County (1910). This 
affected 6,000–7,000 people in all. In 1930, under Romanian rule, 
there were 15,650 people in the Hungarian villages of Bukovina. 
The remainder were moved by the Hungarian state to the occupied 
region of Bačka in Serbia in 1941, but in the autumn of 1944 they 
had to flee into Transdanubia (in Hungary), where about 13,000 of 
them moved onto smallholdings in Tolna County vacated in 1946 
by deported Swabians. The descendants of the Bukovina Székelys 
today live along the Lower Danube (in the Pančevo district of 
Vojvodina) and in the villages around Déva and in Transdanubia, 
mainly in Bonyhád, Kakasd, Tevel and Egyházaskozár.23
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4. HunGArIAn-SPEAKInG GYPSIES
In tHE cArPAtHIAn BASIn
Péter Szuhay
The number of Gypsies in Hungary and in the neighboring countries 
is not known precisely. The numbers estimated by the researchers 
are about three times higher than the numbers of self-identified 
Roma recorded in the censuses. In 2001 fewer than 200,000 people 
declared themselves as Gypsy/Roma in Hungary, while the number 
of the persons considered or regarded as Gypsies by the majority 
society was about 600,000. The ethnic structure of the Gypsies 
in Romania (especially in Transylvania), Slovakia, Ukraine’s 
Transcarpathia and Serbia’s Vojvodina is more complex and less 
homogeneous than that of the Gypsies in Hungary.
Gypsies in the neighboring countries do not always speak a 
common language with Gypsies of Hungary, whether the latter 
are Vlach Gypsies (Roma), whose mother tongue is Romani, 
along with Hungarian, or the Boyash Gypsies (“trough-carving” 
Gypsies), whose mother tongue is a dialect of Romanian in addition 
to Hungarian. Hungarian in such cases serves as the intermediary 
language. The same role is not fulfilled by Romanian in 
Transylvania or by Slovak in Slovakia, because in the neighboring 
countries there are Gypsy groups who speak the language of the 
local or regional majority, but do not speak the dominant language 
of the whole country.
If we consider the Gypsies (Roma) living in the Carpathian 
Basin who declare themselves as such, two groups can be 
distinguished among them (in terms of a distinction adopted as a 
scientific convention): those who speak one of the Gypsy languages 
or dialects, and those who do not speak a Gypsy language. Most 
speakers of the Gypsy languages speak Romani, previously known 
in Hungary as the Vlach Gypsy language. This language has several 
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dialects. Dominant in eastern regions (including Transylvania) is 
Kalderash (Kelderás), and Lovari (Lovári) in Slovakia and Hungary, 
but there are groups who speak the Cerhári and Másári dialects of 
equal importance.
Other languages spoken by the Gypsies are the Carpathian 
Gypsy language, which is spoken by the earliest Gypsy groups who 
settled in the former Nógrád, Hont and Gömör Counties, and the 
language of the Sinti, strongly influenced by German, and spoken in 
the western part of the Carpathian Basin. Most researchers recognize 
as a Gypsy language the Boyash tongue, which largely preserves the 
Romanian language in its state before the language reforms that took 
place during the nineteenth and the twentieth century. This language 
developed in isolation from the Romanian-speaking environment on 
the territories of present-day Hungary, Slovakia and even Croatia, 
and it is spoken by the groups of the trough-carving Gypsies.
All speakers of a Gypsy language also speak another language 
as their native tongue. They rarely show uncertainty about their 
identity, considering and calling themselves Gypsies or Roma, but 
in mixed ethnic areas they may speak the locally dominant language 
to the same level as their mother tongue and another widely spoken 
local language as well.
Apart from the language differences, the main distinctions 
among Gypsies are those of lifestyle, which can be both chosen 
and inherited. They can be distinguished by whether they are 
settled or nomadic, and by the traditional occupations practiced. 
The terminology used in Hungary mostly differs from that which 
is used in Transylvania, where it is customary to talk of “tent-
dwelling” Gypsies and “house-dwelling” Gypsies. The latter are 
called “house-dwelling” Gypsies – by themselves, and also by the 
“tent-dwelling” Gypsies, or by the majority population – if they 
have been settled for a long time, and if they are firmly integrated 
into the local social division of labor, but have not merged (or been 
accepted) into the majority society. “Tent-dwelling” Gypsies settled 
only a few generations ago. Their migrations and migrant trades 
are remembered at least on a mythical level. They keep track of 
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tribal or clan ancestry, and typically they have a strong sense of 
Gypsy identity. “House-dwelling” Gypsies tend to be agricultural 
day-laborers or casual workers, doing tasks for peasants on the farm 
or around the house; they might also be musicians, adobe-makers, 
basket-makers or blacksmiths. Most “tent-dwelling” Gypsies used to 
be coppersmiths or tinkers. Ethnographers label them as Kalderash 
(Kelderás). Many call themselves “Gábor” Gypsies, even adding that 
they are “noble Székely Gypsies,” descendants of Áron Gábor (as has 
been described recently).
One third of all the Gypsies of the world live in the Carpathian 
Basin, as Károly Kocsis noted at the beginning of his account of the 
demographic situation of the Roma after 1990.1 The latest censuses 
counted 579,000 people (2 percent of the population) who identified 
themselves as members of the Gypsy nationality and whom 291,000 
(1 percent) stated that they have Gypsy language as their native 
language. The first figure includes 246,000 in Transylvania, 90,000 
in Slovakia, and 14,000 in Transcarpathia. Expert estimates from 
2001, however, put the number of those who are regarded as Gypsies 
in the Carpathian Basin to 2.6 million, of whom 1.4–1.5 million 
live in Transylvania, 600,000 live in Hungary, and 380,000 live in 
Slovakia. This means that some 9 percent of the total population 
are Gypsies, and they probably outnumber the Hungarians in 
Transylvania. “They are concentrated mainly in the northeast and 
east of the Carpathian Basin, not in the mountains, but in the hilly 
areas on the rim of the Great Plain: the Gömör, Spiš, Šariš, South 
Zemplén and Košice districts of Slovakia, Nógrád, Borsod-Abaúj-
Zemplén and Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg Counties and the mid-Tisza 
district in Hungary, and in Romania in the mainly flat edges of Satu 
Mare, Bihor, Arad and Timiş Counties, and the Transylvanian Basin. 
Elsewhere there are appreciable numbers in Hungary’s Baranya and 
Somogy Counties, in the Serbian parts of the Banat and Belgrade, and 
in Budapest and Bratislava. Despite east-to-west and village-to-city 
migration, the Gypsies today live mainly in the same places as they 
did when they were surveyed in 1893. Gypsies live mainly in less 
urbanized, traditional rural areas with a mixed ethnic and religious 
structure, where it used to be relatively easy for them to find a place 
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in the local social division of labor. […] The number of those with 
a declared Gypsy affiliation grew most between 1991 and 2001 in 
northern Hungary, the Budapest region (50–70 percent), the Partium 
(34–39 percent), the Hungarian-inhabited districts of southern 
Slovakia (51 percent), Bačka (57 percent) and Prekmurje (51 percent), 
due mainly to natural increase, economically motivated immigration 
and, not least, ethnic dissimilation. The last entails a mounting 
awareness of being Gypsies among people who had hitherto recorded 
themselves as Hungarians. More and more Hungarian-speaking 
Gypsies are declaring themselves Gypsies, especially in southern 
Slovakia, Eastern Hungary, and the Hungarian-inhabited districts of 
Satu Mare, Bihor, Sălaj and Arad Counties in Romania.”
In the period up to the end of World War II the main socio-
political development for the Gypsies, as well as for the Jews, was 
the Holocaust and its antecedents. We can reconstruct the events for 
each country using the book by Barna Purcsi.2
In Romania notions of “racial biology” began to spread in the 
1930s, along with concepts such as “ethnic purity,” “ethnic groups 
of a lower rank” and “ethnic promiscuity.” The “minorities of non-
European origin,” the “burdensome minorities,” in other words the 
“Gypsies, Jews and others” were perceived as “bio-ethnic peril” in 
Romania at that time. This was the beginning of the modern racial 
ideology proclaiming the “racial superiority of the Romanians.” 
The annexation of the northern part of Transylvania by Hungary, 
after the Second Vienna Award, spared the Hungarian-speaking 
Gypsies from some of the wartime suffering undergone by those 
in Romania, where first 11,441 nomadic Gypsies and then 13,176 
settled Gypsies were deported.
After Germany occupied Serbia, the military government 
ordered in 1941 the registration of the Gypsies, and they were forced 
to wear a yellow armband marked Zigeuner (Gypsy). Inscriptions 
prohibiting Jews and Gypsies sprang up on the streets, in stores, on 
buses and streetcars. Incidents provoked by the German military and 
executions of groups taken hostage had caused the deaths of 10,000–
15,000 people of Gypsy origin in Serbia by 1942.
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Registration of Gypsies in Croatia was ordered in July 1941 by 
Minister of the Interior Andrija Artuković. Inscriptions appeared in 
public places forbidding the entry of “Serbs, Jews, nomadic Gypsies, 
and dogs.” The racial policy of the Ustaša regime aimed the creation 
of a Croatia consisting of Catholic Croats and Muslim Bosnians and 
the elimination of such “alien elements” as the Orthodox Serbs, the 
Jews and the Gypsies. They stated the following “The basis of the 
Ustaša movement is religion. We have three million bullets for the 
minorities: the Serbs, the Jews and the Gypsies.” The Ministry of the 
Interior ordered in August 1941 that the so-called “white Gypsies” 
(the Muslims) should not be harmed and they should be treated as 
Aryan. This decree was widely flouted by the Ustaša authorities 
and death squads. In September 1941 the Ustaša began to round 
up the Bosnian Gypsies, the Serbs and the Jews for deportation to 
Jasenovac, Đjakovo, Stara Gradiška and Loborgrad. In 1942 the kiln 
of the Jasenovac Pottery was adapted to operate as a crematorium. 
In May they began cremating the dead bodies there but the weak and 
the ill were thrown into the brick kilns while they were still alive. 
Gypsies were also brought to Jasenovac from other camps, such as 
Stara Gradiška.
In Košice, Czechoslovakia, there was a trial in 1924–1929 in 
which 19 Gypsies from Moldavia were accused of cannibalism – the 
accusations proved to be unfounded but this episode helped to whip 
up anti-Gypsy feeling. In 1927 legislation was introduced against 
nomadic Gypsies, requiring them to register at the place where they 
would spend the night and ask for residence permits. The proclaimed 
purpose was to “civilize” the Gypsies, but the outcome was to 
deprive them of their civil rights. The authorities issued 39,000 
Gypsy identity documents in 1936. Southern Slovakia, with most of 
Czechoslovakia’s Hungarian-speaking Gypsies, was reannexed to 
Hungary under the First Vienna Award of 1938, and thereafter they 
shared the fate of the other Gypsies in Hungary. The Gypsies and 
Jews in Slovakia were conscripted into the labor service by an order 
issued on January 18, 1940. Gypsies were banned from entering 
parks, coffee houses or restaurants, and from using public transport. 
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“Forced-labor establishments” were set up in the vicinity of the 
factories where there was a labor shortage, and the Gypsies and 
other “anti-social elements” were interned there. In 1941 municipal 
authorities were required to expel Gypsies. The Gypsies of Slovakia 
actively supported the uprising against the Tiso government in the 
summer of 1944.
The Austrian gendarmerie counted the Gypsies in Burgenland 
on two occasions, arriving at figures of 5,480 in 1925 and 6,032 
in 1927. Other figures from the same period showed 5,188 and 
7,164, with another 1,600 living elsewhere in the country. Yet 
other estimates put the number of Gypsies outside Burgenland 
at around 3,000. The criminal police ordered the arrest of 3,000 
Gypsies from Burgenland – 2,000 men of working age and 1,000 
women – and their deportation to concentration camps. In 1939, 
440 Burgenland women were interned at a camp in Ravensbrück 
for trading or working without a license, or as “asocials” engaged 
in telling fortunes. All those were declared “asocial” who avoided 
police investigations and interrogations, those who married non-
Gypsies and fled to avoid sterilization, and even those who left their 
homes without a permit. By April 30, 1945, when the camp was 
liberated, it held an estimated 5,000 Gypsy women. On March 1, 
1943, began the deportation of Gypsies from Austria (they were 
overwhelmingly Hungarian-speaking Gypsies from Burgenland) 
to the “Gypsy family camp” in Auschwitz–Birkenau. Deportations 
were completed by the end of the month.
The post-war position of Hungary in the Soviet political sphere 
brought an end to open persecution of the Gypsies. The monograph 
by Zoltan Barany has been used as a source for the following 
country-by-country account of events related to Gypsies.3
Romania sought to settle the nomadic groups at first and later 
started to disperse the larger Gypsy settlements. Masses of unskilled 
Gypsies, similarly to the case of Hungary, were drawn into the post-
war agricultural collectivization and extensive industrialization, 
which lent their situation the appearance of assimilation. In fact, 
the question of awarding the Gypsies national minority status never 
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arose, and policy-makers hardly dealt with their situation after the 
mid-1970s.
The Roma in the countries of the former Yugoslavia were 
probably in the most favorable position in the region. Nobody 
sought to settle the nomadic groups. The solution to any potential 
problems came through economic conditions in which agricultural 
communities no longer required migrant artisans or traders, 
meaning that the nomads were “settled” naturally by a drastic fall in 
demand for their services. Furthermore, the Gypsies were assisted 
towards equality by the multicultural nature of Yugoslav society, 
with its range of ethnic, religious and, to a certain extent, linguistic 
allegiances. In 1981, they were granted the same communal status 
as the Albanians or the Hungarians. This gave rise to several dozen 
social and cultural associations and brought the Gypsies into public 
life. In some areas, the Romani language began to be taught in 
schools and Romani radio and television programs were broadcast. 
The name Roma was used for the first time here in order to replace 
the term Gypsy, which was considered pejorative.
Emphasis in Czechoslovakia was placed on two political 
goals: providing full employment for Gypsies capable of work, 
and dissolving Gypsy settlements (there were around 1,300). There 
were also campaigns against illiteracy and the “parasitic way of 
life.” About 221,000 people were registered as Gypsies at the end 
of the 1940s, most in the east of the country. The renewed plans 
for the dispersed resettlement meant regularly and methodically 
moving Gypsies from settlements in Slovakia to the western (in 
other words Czech) territories, where there were relatively few of 
them. By 1968 this program had clearly foundered on inadequate 
funding, widespread social protests, sabotage at the middle levels 
of power, and resistance from the Roma themselves. The Gypsies 
were then given national-minority treatment for a couple of years, 
and allowed, indeed encouraged, to set up their own agricultural 
cooperatives and social and cultural associations, but these were 
all disbanded in 1973 on the grounds that they had not performed 
their function of integration. The authorities returned to the earlier 
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approach of assimilation, as part of which hundreds of Gypsy 
women with several children were sterilized after 1980.
In Burgenland the conception of the state about the Roma 
remained unchanged after World War II. The Ministry of the Interior 
issued an order for resettling the Gypsies, as asocial elements and 
potential criminals, as late as 1948. In 1993, the Roma and the 
Sinti were recognized as ethnic groups; the schools act of 1994 
enabled mother-tongue education for Roma, and a People’s College 
of Burgenland Roma was founded. Romani can also be used in 
writing; the Graz University linguistics faculty has produced a 
Romani–German dictionary.
Among the citizens of the Soviet Union living in Transcarpathia 
(which is now part of the post-Soviet Ukraine) there are estimated 
to live some 20,000–30,000 Roma. They have lived in almost all 
parts of Transcarpathia for centuries, the largest communities being 
in Mukacheve, Uzhhorod, Berehove, Khust, Chop and Rativtsy. The 
majority of them speak Hungarian, but those living closer to the 
Carpathians have shifted their language to Ukrainian.
Writing about the contemporary economies of the Gypsies, 
Alain Reyniers noted the following: “Gypsy members of the 
intelligentsia, community representatives, and a stratum of 
proletarianized Gypsies working in industry and agriculture 
emerged over the four decades of communism. However, the Gypsies 
as an ethnic group have not developed harmoniously. Although their 
social stratification has become more complex, the marginalization 
of the majority has become more severe. This was accelerated by 
the disappearance of their traditional trades – pursued by only a 
small number of Gypsy craftsmen – coupled with the disintegration 
of the traditional social structures that had hitherto governed their 
relations with non-Gypsies, and the growing uncertainty of their 
position on the job market. The extensive industrialization of the 
1950s and 1960s called for large quantities of unskilled labor. Gypsies 
found work in industry on a mass scale, but they still received 
the less socially valued, badly paid jobs, for which qualifications 
were not required and which other members of society were not 
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prepared to do (street sweeping, cleaning, grave-digging). Their 
mass employment in jobs requiring few qualifications had negative 
effects. Regular earnings from such jobs did not encourage Gypsy 
families to direct their children towards the school system, of which 
they remained suspicious, while leaving them with only a toehold 
on the labor market.” 4
At the end of the 1980s, large numbers of Gypsies in Romania 
followed the earlier example of the Saxons in seeking refuge in 
Germany, while others moved into the Romanian villages that 
the Saxons had abandoned. According to a report by the German 
authorities in 1990, almost 18,000 Roma from Romania had requested 
asylum; two years later the number had reached 34,000. The years 
that followed the collapse of the Ceauşescu regime increased the 
potential migration in subsequent years, but it also heightened the 
ethnic tensions between the Hungarians or Romanians and the 
Gypsies. Probably the worst incident occurred in 1993 in Hădăreni, 
where a crowd of 750 Hungarians and Romanians murdered four 
Roma, chased out 130 others, and set 17 houses on fire.5
Following the dissolution of the two Czechoslovak republics, the 
Roma-related conflict increased between the successor states. The 
Czech Republic sought simply to repatriate to Slovakia the Roma who 
had originated from there. The Czech Republic is the country in the 
region that takes the hardest policy line against the Roma. There and 
in Slovakia attacks on the Roma occur most frequently. In July 1995, 
some 30 skinheads attacked local Roma residents in Hronský Beňadik 
and set one Roma youth on fire: he later died because of his burns. 
Significant Roma emigration began in the second half of the 1990s, 
initially to Britain and Ireland, and later to Scandinavia and Canada. 
This prompted several countries to reintroduce visa requirements for 
visitors from Slovakia, for longer or shorter periods. A cut in social 
benefits in the spring of 2004 led to severe riots and looting among 
the Gypsies of Trebišov and a drastic police response.6
The stance of rural Hungarians towards Gypsies is often one 
of contempt and rejection. Yet Hungarians collectively expect the 
Gypsies to “rally round” at census time, and by asserting their 
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secondary identity as Hungarian-speakers lend support to Hungarian 
minority efforts to assert educational, cultural and language rights. 
And the Roma seem increasingly unwilling to do this.
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5. tHE HunGArIAn dIASPorA
BEYond tHE cArPAtHIAn BASIn uP to 1989
Ilona Kovács
The Hungarian diaspora in the West began with a surge of economic 
emigration at the turn of the twentieth century, before the break-up 
of historical Hungary, and was directed mainly towards America, 
particularly the United States. Up until the outbreak of World War 
I, it caused an annual average of 100,000–120,000 people to leave 
the country. Even if the returnees and the numbers for minorities 
are deducted, it meant a total loss of some 460,000 native speakers 
of Hungarian. Those seeking a new home were mainly from the 
peasantry and the working and artisan classes, who were prompted by 
the unfavorable pattern of ownership and poor economic conditions. 
Some 90 percent of the emigrants sought passage to the United States.1 
There was also appreciable pre-1914 emigration to Canada, of an 
estimated 15,000.2 Post-war US immigration restrictions meant 
that only about 40,000 Hungarians arrived there between 1920 and 
1940; the remaining emigrants went to European countries, South 
America or Canada instead. The favored countries were Argentina, 
Brazil and Venezuela in South America and Germany, France, 
Belgium and the Netherlands in Europe. But by then the emigration 
was not confined to manual workers. It was joined after the defeat of 
the 1919 revolution by a stratum of left-wing intelligentsia, and in the 
second half of the period by many Jewish artists, writers, journalists, 
scientists and industrialists fleeing from the discriminatory laws. 
The centers of the left-wing émigrés were Vienna, Paris, Berlin and 
London, from where some went to fight in the Spanish Civil War.
After World War II the center of the left-wing and democratic 
Hungarian intelligentsia abroad became Paris. Only after World 
War II did large numbers of Hungarian emigrants make for Australia. 
The post-war Western diaspora was swollen by two main waves of 
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emigration. The ’45-ers included the “national emigration” of Tibor 
Eckhardt and his circle and the ’47-ers the “democratic emigration” 
of Ferenc Nagy, Béla Varga, Imre Kovács and their associates. At the 
end of the war in 1945, some 120,000 Hungarian refugees remained 
in Austria and Germany in prisoner-of-war and refugee camps. The 
smaller, but politically significant, wave after 1947 was made up of 
people who had acknowledged the 1945 constitution and contributed 
to the first stage of Hungary’s democratic transition, but left as the 
coalition government collapsed and the Communist Party took 
over. Most were politicians of the Smallholders’, Peasants’ or Social 
Democratic Parties and rightful owners of nationalized assets. The 
two waves together became known as the DPs (displaced persons): 
it took a new agency, the IRO, and several years to distribute them 
among Western countries, many not leaving the camps until 1950 
or 1951. The varying estimates allow only broad figures to be given 
of how many went where: 26,000 to the United States, 10,000 to 
Canada, 3,000 to Australia (but according to one source 14,000), 
8,000 to France, 5,000 to Belgium, 4,000 to Britain, 3,000 to 
Argentina (but according to another source 14,000), and 2,300 to 
Sweden. Israel placed no restrictions on immigration of Hungarian 
Jews, taking in some 100,000 over subsequent decades.3
The development and survival of the diaspora communities 
resulted not only from economic and political conditions at home, 
but also from labor demand and the attitude taken to aliens and 
minorities in the recipient countries. The earliest Hungarian 
communities in the West grew up in the United States and Canada 
before World War I. Immigrants worked in mines and factories and 
on railway construction. In Canada they were recruited to found 
new agricultural communities. The many millions of European 
immigrants into the United States placed a considerable burden on 
the original Anglo-Saxon society. In many cities 70 percent of the 
population changed. The newcomers brought with them foreign 
languages and customs, which met with resistance and debate among 
existing Americans, although immigrant labor was needed urgently 
as industry burgeoned. The newcomers were defenseless against 
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their employers, lived under tough conditions, and formed a despised 
section in society, but they earned more than they had at home and 
found democratic rights and freedoms that they had not had before. 
They were free to build their communities, use their languages, and 
operate their institutions. Although they were expected to integrate, 
fit in, and respect the recipient society, and received various forms of 
assistance and training for doing so, assimilation was not required 
until the second generation. The public stance changed in World 
War I, when society felt threatened, and although the feeling died 
down after the war, economic depression led later to strict rules of 
entry into Canada and immigration quotas in the United States.
After both world wars, most recipient countries sought manual 
laborers, most of whom started on the lowest rung of the social 
ladder, irrespective of their previous position or qualifications. 
Success for immigrants came in most cases from industry, attitude, 
talent and good fortune. Europe was able to absorb only a smaller 
quantity of refugees after World War II, while the United States 
would accept immigrants from Hungary, an enemy country during 
the war, only after political checks and guarantees of a livelihood. 
The South American countries, on the other hand, would take 
refugee labor and talent without restriction. Migrants and political 
émigrés after both world wars met with problems of livelihood, 
language and acceptance of their qualifications, but in no country of 
Europe or the Americas did they face a crude policy of assimilation, 
although stronger pressure was applied in Australia. However, a 
conscious policy of toleration and a multicultural concept of society 
did not appear in the legal and institutional system until the 1960s 
and 1970s.4
Early immigrants from all countries settled close to each other 
in blocs, so that veritable Hungarian quarters and settlements arose. 
Those with a sense of business set up Hungarian workers’ hostels 
(boarding houses), stores, bars, banks, printing presses and other 
service provisions. Hungarian was spoken within the community, 
with local schoolchildren often acting as interpreters for adults in 
the outside world. These Hungarian communities were replenished 
after World War I with new arrivals, but the post-World War II 
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refugees and the second generation, with their higher qualifications 
and better language skills, attained higher positions in society and 
soon moved out to better neighborhoods and became scattered. 
The old Hungarian streets and quarters emptied and took on a new 
demographic complexion. The process was hastened by changes of 
economic structure in mining and industrial areas.
Although there were internationalist socialists, liberals and 
communists among the emigrants to America and Europe, most 
had a national commitment, including the Jews. The principles were 
those of 1848 and Lajos Kossuth, and their big day of celebration 
was March 15.5 Among the arrivals after World War II were some 
extreme right-wingers and anti-Semites, but they met with strong 
resistance in the forums of the national conservative émigrés. The 
earlier immigrants had not been devoid of political differences, but 
the refugees and émigrés after World War II differed widely in their 
views. This often caused clashes and debates, especially between 
’45-ers and ’47-ers, and in some cases with the liberal democratic 
refugees of 1919 found in the circles around Oszkár Jászi and Mihály 
Károlyi, or with the extreme right wing. The frictions became 
apparent in their organizations and press as well.
The post-World War II Western diaspora members were united 
in their rejection of the Soviet-installed communist regime of 
Mátyás Rákosi. Organization of political activity and international 
protest began in the refugee camps. Of the many political bodies, 
one that played something of the role of an émigré parliament was 
the Hungarian National Committee,6 based in New York and headed 
by Béla Varga. Consisting of leading Hungarians who had emigrated 
before the war, having played some part under the Horthy regime, 
and of members of the post-1945 democratic forces, apart from the 
extreme left and extreme right, it was well placed to coordinate 
action among the old and new moderate, conservative forces. The 
refugees with an army or gendarmerie background were covered by 
the branches of the World Federation of Hungarian Veterans.7 The 
US administration, as part of its Cold War activity, established the 
Free Europe Committee and Radio Free Europe.8
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The Western diaspora set up in each country institutions for 
preserving and asserting their identities and traditions, and ensur-
ing national, religious and political cohesion and communications: 
churches, societies, newspapers, schools, drama clubs, community 
houses, radio stations and other services, to match the rate of im-
migration and features of each recipient country. Such organiza-
tions were ubiquitous, but differed in size and consistency. They 
were well frequented by the still-isolated Hungarian communities 
of the early period. Their cohesive function remained important in 
the ensuing age of generation change and geographical dispersion, 
but typically involved only 5–10 percent of the community.
The pillars of this system of institutions for immigrants and 
émigrés were the associations. Relief clubs began to form in the 
United States in the 1880s, and by 1910 there were more than a 
thousand of them. The first in Canada was founded in 1901, and by the 
1930s they covered all the cities where Hungarians lived. In Europe, 
economic immigration began relatively early in France, where 
similar bodies were in place by the 1920s. By 1921, the number of 
Hungarian–American institutions exceeded 2,000. Several hundred 
formed in other countries of settlement, including Church, lay and 
political bodies. A number were built up into national networks, 
such as those involving health plans (sickness benevolent societies, 
aid societies) and churches in the United States. Several bodies 
provided cohesion at a national level: the American Hungarian 
Federation, the Hungarian Reformed Federation of America, or the 
American Hungarian Catholic Society.9 Equivalents elsewhere – the 
Partnership of German Emigration, the South American Hungarians’ 
Federation and the Australian Hungarian Federation10 – played a 
part in coordinating and funding Hungarian community life. One 
worldwide body was the Hungarian Scout Association in Exteris, 
formed in 1946, which gained importance in the diaspora with new-
found methods for stimulating Hungarian awareness in the next 
generation.11
Also important to preserving awareness of Hungarian identity 
among adults were several local and other cultural associations and 
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scientific societies, such as the Széchenyi Society and the Rákóczi 
Foundation in Canada, the Hungarian Society and the American 
Hungarian Foundation in the United States, and the Mindszenty 
Hungarian Academy of Science and Culture, and the Péter Pázmány 
Free University in Argentina.12
Many political associations were founded before and 
during World War II, such as the Human Rights League of the 
Social Democratic Organization and the anti-fascist Hungarian 
Independence Movement in France, and the British Hungarian 
Council, formed with a similar purpose in the United Kingdom.
The press was prominent from the outset among the Western 
diaspora, as a means of communication and communal organization. 
There were political, Church, denominational, cultural, literary, 
social scientific, and youth papers, as well as comic papers, sports 
papers and magazines. They ranged from local newsletters to national 
dailies, and numbered in all perhaps a thousand titles. Many were 
short-lived, but others persisted for decades or longer. As time went 
by, dailies became weeklies, monthlies or quarterlies. Most were 
produced wholly for a Hungarian-speaking readership, except for 
a few designed to inform international opinion, but many became 
bilingual as time went by, to cater for the new generation. The first 
began to appear regularly at the turn of the twentieth century: the 
Cleveland Szabadság and the Amerikai Magyar Népszava, for 
example. Other papers, such as Katolikus Magyarok Vasárnapja 
and Kanadai Magyarság, appeared at the end of the 1920s, as did 
the South American Délamerikai Magyarság and Délamerikai 
Magyar Újság, or after 1945, such as the Vienna Bécsi Napló and the 
periodicals Hadak Útján, Hungária, Látóhatár and Új Magyar Út. 
The émigré Hungarian papers led to several Hungarian journalists’ 
associations, the first being the Association of Hungarian Journalists 
Abroad,13 chaired by József Nyírő and later by Albert Wass.
The outlets for Hungarian literary and scholarly self-expression 
were the printing presses and publishers. The post-1945 emigration 
brought the Western diaspora a generation of writers of outstanding 
value: László Cs. Szabó, Sándor Márai, Zoltán Szabó and others. 
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Larger papers had presses of their own, but neither they nor the 
independent publishers could develop into substantial, profitable 
businesses: the number of works published seldom exceeded a 
dozen. The most prolific after 1945 were Amerikai Magyar Kiadó 
in Munich, Kárpát Kiadó in Buenos Aires, Kossuth Kiadó in 
Cleveland, Ohio, and Occidental Press in Washington, DC. The 
only other intellectual outlets were the press and the Hungarian 
broadcasts by Radio Free Europe and the BBC.
The Churches soon began to organize and build, for instance 
in the final years of the nineteenth and early years of the twentieth 
century in North America, in the 1920s and 1930s in South 
America, and in the 1940s and 1950s in Australia. Hungarian clergy 
could work in Australia, but it was the end of the 1950s before they 
were allowed to form a Church on an ethnic basis. The Roman 
Catholic and Reformed Churches were prominent, but Greek 
Catholic, Evangelical (Lutheran), Baptist and Jewish congregations 
also appeared as specifically Hungarian congregations using the 
Hungarian language to converse and for services. There are known 
to be 42 Hungarian Roman Catholic and 102 Hungarian Reformed 
congregations in the United States, where all the denominations 
mentioned are represented. Elsewhere, the Roman Catholics were 
strongest in South America, but other denominations appeared. The 
Roman Catholic and Reformed Churches dominated in Europe. 
The Reformed Church, as a national Church, was crucial initially 
in preserving the Hungarian language and identity abroad. It ran 
hundreds of summer and weekend schools, obtaining textbooks and 
libraries from Hungary, and later producing and publishing its own. 
The close ties to the mother Church broke in World War I, after 
which efforts were made to train clergy by offering Hungarians 
born in the United States university-level tuition in the Hungarian 
language. The Roman Catholics also organized schools, including 
some full-time ones, but in that case the law prohibited the sole use 
of Hungarian as the language of instruction. The ties broke finally 
after World War II, but the Catholics were strengthened in Europe 
and overseas by the arrival of many monks, nuns and priests as 
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refugees. In 1950, the Pope appointed a Hungarian apostolic visitor 
to oversee the pastoral care of the Hungarian diaspora in the West. 
The Hungarian translation of the New Testament by Gellért Békés 
and Patrik Dalos was published in 300,000 copies by Actio Catholica. 
Important teaching institutions, movements and centers were set up, 
such as the Hungarian youth organization Pax Romana, American 
Hungarian Csíksomlyó (Youngstown, OH) and St. Gerard’s Abbey 
(São Paulo).14
The aging Western diaspora, who were gradually being 
assimilated into their host countries’ culture, received a temporary 
boost with a new wave of refugees in 1956, due to the 1956 Revolution. 
This injected new life into the scattered Hungarian communities, 
but also brought about big changes. Various estimates have been 
made of how many refugees there were, but broadly speaking, some 
200,000 people had left Hungary by the end of 1956: 10,000–11,000 
of them returned, while the rest settled in the West. Most crossed the 
border into Austria, where the superhuman task of receiving them 
was carried out in a praiseworthy way. About 20,000 of them crossed 
instead into Yugoslavia, where they were also welcomed. Following a 
UN appeal, Western governments extended assistance to Austria and 
received sizable numbers of refugees: 12,700 went to France, 15,500 
to Germany, 21,000 to Britain, 12,000 to Switzerland, and 10,000 
to Belgium, the Netherlands and Sweden between them. The United 
States took 40,000, Canada 26,500, Australia 11,000, and South 
Africa 1,300. Most of those in Yugoslavia reached these recipient 
countries via Italy.15
These refugees were received with a sympathy, amazement 
and respect not accorded to earlier immigrants, and given special 
treatment and concessions, both officially and from local people and 
established Hungarian communities. Later the previous Hungarian 
immigrants noted that the ’56-ers were able to integrate more easily 
because they did not have to climb each rung of the immigrant ladder, 
but were given immediate access to higher education and support in 
establishing their livelihood. Still, most Hungarian groups received 
them with pleasure and expectation.
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The ’56-ers were far from uniform. Many had fled persecution 
after taking up arms or otherwise assisting in the Revolution, 
including communist supporters of the government of Imre 
Nagy. Others had escaped discrimination on the grounds of class 
background or political views. Quite a number were looking for higher 
education and an academic career or success in their profession. 
Others were attracted by the freedom of thought and personal 
development. Many sought rapid integration in language and way 
of life, especially for their children. On the other hand, the stratum 
brought renewal in terms of identity and political consciousness 
to Hungarian organizations and social life. But differences of 
generation and of social and political experience and upbringing 
sometimes led to conflict, new objectives, and the founding of 
new associations and institutions. Above all there arose so-called 
freedom-fighter bodies among those who had served in the National 
Guard or as military or intellectual leaders: the Hungarian Freedom 
Fighters’ Association headed by Béla Király, the World Federation 
of Hungarian Freedom Fighters under Lajos Dálnoki Veress, and the 
World Federation of Hungarian Freedom Fighters (National Guards) 
under Gergely Pongrátz.16 One émigré organization of ’56-ers from 
the intelligentsia was the Petőfi Circle, which eventually settled in 
New York, still headed by Pál Jónás, as it had been in Budapest. The 
Union of Hungarian Writers Abroad, based in London, had a similar 
constituency, but included pre-1956 émigrés as well.17 Chairing it in 
succession were György Faludy, Pál Ignotus, and then Tibor Méray. 
The Imre Nagy Institute of Political and Social Studies was set up 
in Brussels with György Heltai, who had been state secretary at the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs under Nagy, as its director, while János 
Horváth was elected to preside over the Kossuth Foundation in New 
York.18 All these bodies had been formed right after the defeat of 
the Revolution, in Austria or elsewhere in Europe. Most of them 
received American financial support through the Commission for 
a Free Europe or other US agencies, under the Cold War program. 
There were additional institutional supporters of the communities 
of ’56-ers in other European countries too, such as Switzerland and 
West Germany.
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The most important organization was a political one: the 
Hungarian Committee, registered in March 1958 by post-World 
War II émigrés and ’56-ers, which settled in New York.19 This 
replaced a National Committee of the earlier émigrés. One ’56-
er organization that joined it was the Hungarian Revolutionary 
Council formed in Vienna in November 1956, mainly by exiled 
Smallholders’ Party and Social Democratic Party revolutionary 
leaders. Another organization that dissolved itself without joining 
the National Committee was the Government Representation, which 
sought to represent the Nagy government under the chairmanship 
of Anna Kéthly, the only member of that government to have ended 
up in the West. The Hungarian Committee elected as its president 
Béla Varga, who had held the same post in the dissolved National 
Committee. Its members were divided equally between the earlier 
émigrés and the ’56-ers, but it committed itself wholly to the cause 
of 1956, and like the other 1956 organizations, saw representation of 
Hungarian interests as its prime task: drawing attention to 1956 and 
Hungary, and drawing conclusions from 1956. This was especially 
important between November 4, 1957, and December 20, 1962, 
while the “Hungarian question” – that of the armed suppression of 
the Revolution by the Soviets and of the legitimacy of the Kádár 
government – remained on the agenda of the UN General Assembly. 
National Committee members sought to influence public opinion 
by argument, presenting witnesses, and holding debates on the UN 
report.
Most of the ’56-ers were young; some 8,000 of them were 
students. This posed the problem of student organizations for 
those studying at the Hungarian schools and the universities of 
various countries. There was a demand from young families for 
Hungarian-taught elementary education, reinforced by the weekend 
or occasionally full-time tuition in Hungarian-taught or partly 
Hungarian-taught schools run by the Churches or the Scouts (in 
Cleveland, New York, New Brunswick, Passaic, Toronto, Buenos 
Aires, São Paulo, and so on). At the secondary level, the Hungarian 
Gymnasium that operated at Burg-Kastl in Germany from 1984 to 
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2006 was particularly important. Multicultural concepts were put 
forward in several countries in the 1970s, in relation to schools and 
to identity-reinforcing cultural activities, and moral and financial 
support was received from minority programs.
Even in the early period of exile, Hungarian university students 
established a successor organization to the 1956 Federation of 
Hungarian University and College Students’ Associations.20 This 
was joined by large numbers of Hungarian students in European 
universities, and had active branches, for instance in West 
Germany. It operated until 1966. A North American association 
of Hungarian students also sprang up, and in parallel with that, 
Hungarian branches arose in the social democratic and Catholic 
youth movements. These organizations provided a good school 
and intellectual environment for future Hungarian graduates, who 
went on to establish throughout Europe the most fertile forums of 
the émigré Hungarian intelligentsia, holding regular conferences 
and meetings. The most important of these were based in the 
Netherlands, Vienna, London, Bern, Lugano and Geneva.21 Similar 
bodies appeared in the United States.22
Around each appeared various press and book publications. 
Although many were short-lived, they were often replaced quickly, 
and many of those that survived until the 1990s were repatriated to 
Hungary, although some outlived their purpose, at home or abroad, 
and closed.23
The events in Hungary and abroad after 1956 had a marked 
effect on the political and the cultural organizations and the entire 
Hungarian diaspora in the West. The 1963 amnesty that ended the 
years of reprisals and the subsequent milder policies in Hungary 
caused debates and divisions among the Hungarians abroad. There 
were clashes over the question of continuing the isolation and 
rejection of the de facto regime or opening up official contacts with 
it. For the Hungarian authorities sought contacts with the diaspora 
of various kinds, with some modest successes, such as the series of 
Mother Tongue Conferences that began in 1970. The other major 
effect of subsequent East–West détente was to reduce the financial 
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support that the West gave to the émigré opposition. As the money 
dwindled, so did the importance of the émigré organizations and 
press, and the influence of Radio Free Europe. The 1975 Helsinki 
Conference gave backing to the efforts to improve the legal political 
position of the Hungarian community in the Carpathian Basin. 
The Hungarian Human Rights Foundation was established under 
the chairmanship of László Hámos.24 The radical turning point for 
the Hungarians in the West came with the changes in Hungary in 
1990.
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6. SoME SocIAL And dEMoGrAPHIc FEAturES 
oF tHE HunGArIAn dIASPorA
In tHE WESt And ItS InStItutIonS
Attila Papp Z.
Scattered communities of Hungarians have existed in the West 
since the second half of the nineteenth century. This section looks 
at the migration processes that helped to establish them, and notes 
what demographic and social information can be gathered about 
them. The main source for their origin and maintenance was a 
surge of mass emigration from Hungary that peaked in the years 
before World War I. To this can be added the natural increase in 
the ethnic population and recruitment of later refugees or migrants. 
The concept of “Hungarian refugee or migrant” is defined broadly 
as including others besides those leaving from the area that was 
within the territory of Hungary at the time of departure. Those of 
Hungarian ethnic affiliation arriving from various other regions 
tended to join those from Hungary, but there were also efforts to 
maintain a regional identity discernible in the names and aims of 
the organizations established.1
It is important to explore the demographic features and the 
institutions of the Hungarian diaspora in the West, as research-
based literature on the subject is sparse. It has taken second 
place to studies of the minority Hungarian communities in the 
Carpathian Basin, on which detailed social, economic, political and 
demographic information is available, while the information on the 
Hungarian diaspora in the West is less reliable and gathered in a less 
disciplined way. Motives of ethnic mission and activism, current 
also in the Carpathian Basin before the change of system in 1989, 
dominate over the dispassionate methods that are designed to dispel 
these in a scientific way.
642
Some Social and Demographic Features 643
Table 1. Numbers of Hungarian citizens








1871–1879        5,597        7,682 -
1880–1889    115,252    164,119 -
1890–1899    235,895    261,444 -
1900–1909 1,094,116 1,171,758    854,584
1910–1913    410,480    433,230    315,498
Total
1871– 1913 1,861,340 2,038,233 -
Total
1900–1913 1,504,596 1,604,988 1,170,082
Almost two million Hungarians migrated abroad in 1871–1913, 
mainly for economic and livelihood-related reasons. The numbers 
peaked in the first decade of the twentieth century, when almost a 
million migrations were recorded in various sources. Almost half 
a million more left Hungary in the years up to 1914. During this 
period of mass migration, almost three quarters of the emigrants 
were men, of whom three quarters were in their best working years 
of 20–49, while only 3 percent were over 50. Hardly more than a 
quarter of those leaving the country were Hungarians (26.3 percent) 
and a similar proportion were Slovaks, but there were sizable 
numbers of Croats (16.6 percent) and Germans (15 percent) as well.
By the end of World War I, the conditions for international 
migration had altered. The United States, hitherto the top destination, 
tightened its policies, introducing an origin-based quota system. 
As a result, interwar migration from Hungary to the United States 
was under 50,000. However, that temporarily increased the number 
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going to Canada (25,000–30,000 in 1924–1930), most of them 
from the countryside. To a smaller extent there was also migration 
by Hungarian citizens to South America, especially Brazil and 
Argentina, likewise mainly to agricultural jobs.
Nor were the changes in the direction of migration confined to 
overseas. Within Europe, the main destinations in the 1920s were 
France and Belgium, but in the 1930s it became Germany, although 
in these cases temporary migration was commoner than it was among 
immigrants to the United States, from which about a quarter of the 
arrivals from Hungary in 1899–1913 returned. All in all, the scale 
of emigration decreased between the wars, but the proliferation of 
destinations meant that the communities of the Hungarian diaspora 
were more scattered. That was still more true of the post-World 
War II and post-1956 migrations.
More than eleven million people in Europe were left in foreign 
countries at the end of World War II, of whom about eight million 
had been repatriated by the summer of 1947. However, about a 
million and a half did not want to return. The International Refugee 
Organization (IRO), a UN agency, managed between July 1947 and 
the end of 1951 to coordinate the settlement of a million displaced 
persons (DPs) in refugee camps in Germany and Austria, and where 
possible in overseas countries. According to IRO figures, some 
17,000 people of Hungarian origin were sent to the United States, 
and rather more than 3,500 to France. Canada took 16,500 such 
Hungarian citizens between 1946 and 1955, and Australia had taken 
11,500 by 1954. Other estimates suggest that some 10,000 Hungarian 
DPs went to South America and 5,000 to the Scandinavian countries. 
Economic and political criteria were applied by the recipient 
countries. The United States, for instance, set tight political controls 
designed to exclude immigrants compromised by an Arrow-Cross or 
fascist past. Other countries were interested primarily in the aspects 
of appeal to the labor market. Some 20 percent of the DPs were of 
Jewish origin, most of whom went to Palestine (after 1948, Israel).
There was a more or less complete cessation of migration in 
1949–1956, due to the restrictions applied by the communist regime: 
hardly more than 2,500 people emigrated from Hungary legally. 
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Then came an exodus of about 200,000 after the defeat of the 1956 
Revolution, which caused serious demographic losses at home,3 
although it helped to restock diaspora communities. Earlier waves 
of migrants had founded the associations, Churches, Scout troops 
and other organizations of the Hungarians abroad, but their longer-
term survival was ensured by subsequent waves. Furthermore, the 
’56-ers formed organizations of their own.
The emigration did not stop there. Annual numbers of emigrants 
up to the change of system, legal or illegal, ranged between 3,000 
and 6,000: altogether some 130,000 Hungarian citizens left between 
1960 and 1989. Official Hungarian data show that legal and illegal 
emigration were about equal in the 1960s and 1970s, but illegal 
emigration was much higher in the last decade of state socialism 
(Table 2).
Table 2. Legal, illegal and total emigration between 1947 and 19894
Legal Illegal total
1947–1955   2,553 n. d.     2,553
1956–1962 20,703 193,835 214,538
1963–1979 36,713   40,725   77,438
1980–1989 14,931   30,266   45,197
Total 74,900 264,826 339,726
There was some reduction in migration to the West after the 
change of system in 1989, but it resumed, and Hungary also became 
a transit country, from which many foreign citizens (including those 
of Hungarian ethnicity) emigrated further. The exodus westward 
increased after Hungary’s accession to the EU in 2004. The real 
scale of this can only be estimated from records in the recipient 
countries, not from official Hungarian statistics. In 2008, for 
instance, the latter record 359 migrations but aggregated European 
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immigration figures show the arrival of 26,661 Hungarian citizens, 
of whom 70 percent went to Germany.
The departures from Hungary are well documented, often 
from a variety of sources, but estimating the number of Hungarians 
resident in foreign countries runs up against various obstacles in 
all but a couple of countries. The first question is who to consider a 
Hungarian. Most people who emigrated from Hungary after World 
War II are likely to be Hungarian, unless there has been a personal, 
voluntary decision to hasten assimilation.5 But information from 
recipient countries is inadequate here, as ethnic Hungarians will 
also have migrated there from countries other than Hungary and that 
fact may not have been recorded. Native language is an important 
criterion of national affiliation, but there are several ways to define 
native language, and some national censuses do not gather data on 
native language at all.6
Table 3. Hungarians and persons of Hungarian ancestry












2006 1,563,081 n. d.
canada
2001    267,255   23,685
2006    315,510   21,905
Australia
2001      62,507   24,485
2006      67,625   21,565
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Despite these uncertainties, it is possible to obtain some kind 
of picture of the Western diaspora and its magnitude (Tables 
3–5). There are some ostensibly expert, although insufficiently 
documented, estimates, and there are detailed official figures 
available in some recipient countries. This applies to the three most 
prominent destinations – the United States, Canada and Australia 
(Table 3) – and to some South American and European countries 
that record country of ancestry and/or year of immigration, or 
where the number of Hungarians can be estimated from figures for 
religious affiliation.
The United States has about a million and a half residents of 
Hungarian ancestry, which does not imply a native Hungarian-
speaking population of this size. Census questionnaires after 1980 
asked, alongside “ancestry,” not about native language but about 
language spoken at home. This criterion is matched by only 8–10 
percent of those of Hungarian ancestry in 1980–2000. Data on 
native language were last gathered in 1970, when respondents were 
asked about the language that they had spoken in childhood, not 
about their ethnic ancestry. This produced a figure of 447,000 native 
Hungarian-speakers in 1970. Research using similar methodology 
done in 1979 gave a figure of 421,000, in other words a reduction 
of only 6 percent.9 Thus around 1980 about a quarter (23.6 percent) 
of those of Hungarian origin were native Hungarian-speakers. 
Projecting this onto the 2000 census data gives a maximum of 
330,000 (not taking assimilation into account) native Hungarian-
speakers. Canada enquires after language use as well as ethnic origin, 
among other things about native language and language spoken at 
home. Of the 315,510 people of Hungarian origin in 2006, both 
parents were Hungarian in only 88,685 cases (28 percent). Of these, 
75,595 (24 percent) gave Hungarian as their native language and only 
21,905 (7 percent) spoke Hungarian in the home. The proportions 
in 2001 were 28.8 and 8.8 percent respectively. Australia likewise 
asks about origin, and the respondents may refer to two forebears. 
Combining these produces a figure of 62,507 people with Hungarian 
ancestry in 2001 and 67,625 in 2006. The language question, as in 
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the USA, refers to the language spoken in the home, not the native 
language. It can be deduced from the figures that 39 percent of those 
of Hungarian ancestry in 2001 (24,485 people) spoke Hungarian at 
home in 2001 and 32 percent (21,565 people) in 2006.
An important observation about these three countries is that the 
proportions of those of Hungarian origin who are native speakers 
and who speak Hungarian in the home are similar. The proportion 
speaking Hungarian in the home is much higher in Australia, however. 
This points to a higher proportion of ethnically homogeneous 
marriages there and a smaller degree of assimilation.
Comparing South American and European data from various 
sources, they appear to differ by orders of magnitude in some 
countries (above all where census data do not detail ethnic or 
national affiliation sufficiently). Argentina and Brazil, the two 
South American countries with the largest Hungarian colonies, 
show wide discrepancies (Table 4). Germany’s, France’s, Belgium’s 
and Sweden’s estimates appear to be the most reliable in Western 
Europe (Table 5). It is fairly simple to arrive at estimates from 
census data in the Latin American countries, by assuming that 
Hungarians living in each are of four kinds: those born in Hungary, 
those originating from countries neighboring Hungary, and the 
children of either of these two groups. The responses to questions 
about country of birth and information about live births make it 
easy to count those originating from Hungary and their offspring. 
Those originating from Romania, Yugoslavia/Serbia and the former 
Soviet Union/Ukraine can be estimated from the responses to the 
question on religious affiliation: Roman Catholics and Protestants 
can be assumed to be Hungarian. With those from Slovakia/the 
former Czechoslovakia there is no such religious divide, but half 
the immigrants have been counted as Hungarian (a deliberate 
overestimate) and the same fertility rate is assumed. There was 
no enquiry into religion in the most recent census in Argentina, 
and so the proportions found in Brazil have been superimposed 
on Argentina as well. This method of estimation obviously has its 
limitations, for it is questionable whether children born to Hungarian 
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mothers will remain Hungarian. Nor do the calculations consider 
third- and fourth-generation Hungarians, who may have retained 
their identity in some form.
Table 4. Estimates for Hungarians living in Latin American countries
199610 200011 200612 IPuMS13
Mexico      100      300 n. d. n. d.
costa rica n. d.   1,100 n. d. n. d.
Venezuela   5,000   4,500 4,000–5,000   2,600
Brazil 60,000 70,000 5,000–10,000 14,000
Peru      150   2,000 n. d. n. d.
chile 2,000–3,000   2,000 n. d.   1,115
uruguay   5,000   3,500 4,000–5,000 n. d.
Argentina 40,000 40,000 20,000–30,000 12,000
Paraguay      150 n. d. n. d. n. d.
colombia      150 n. d. n. d. n. d.
All 112,450–113,450 123,400 33,000–50,000 29,715
Using this procedure on the most recent census data in 
Argentina and Brazil, it was found that some 12,000 first- and 
second-generation Hungarians may be living in the former and some 
14,500 in the latter. Proportionate results were obtained for Chile 
and Venezuela, although they are lower than previous estimates. 
It is worth noting that the Argentinean estimate seems realistic, as 
similar results have been obtained by other methods.14 With Brazil, 
our estimate is closest to HTMH.
According to the 1999 census returns in France, the number of 
citizens or holders of residence permits born in Hungary is about 
10,000.15 To this need to be added the numbers of live births and 
of Hungarians arriving from other Carpathian Basin countries, 
along with their descendants, making a total of about 20,000. The 
figures for Germany suggest a dynamic increase since 1996 that 
may be plausible: it has been mentioned that according to 2008 data, 
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Germany was home to 70 percent of the Hungarian citizens registered 
in Western Europe (about 19,000 people). Adding the 1996 figure, 
the number of children born to these, and the number of arrivals 
from other countries in the Carpathian Basin gives a minimum total 
of 100,000, which is not far from the 120,000 estimate made by the 
National Association of Hungarians in Germany (BUOD).
For Belgium there are two reliable starting points: the known 
figure of some 3,500 Hungarians who arrived after 1956, and an 
official figure of some 2,000 Hungarian citizens living there in 
2006. Thus the number of Hungarians can be put at 7,000–8,000. 
The estimates for Sweden, based on official figures,16 come to 
25,000–35,000. In 2002, for instance, there were 13,935 people 
who had been born in Hungary, and about the same number born 
in Sweden but with Hungarian antecedents, giving a total of almost 
28,000 people with ties to Hungary. To these can be added ethnic 
Hungarians from other parts of the Carpathian Basin, notably 
Transylvanians, recorded as being from Romania. Of the 12,172 
Romanian-born immigrants, 6,808 arrived in the 1980s and 
may well be Transylvanian Hungarians. It is not possible to say 
accurately what proportion of the 12,000 immigrants from Romania, 
2,000 from Ukraine, or 75,000 from the former Yugoslavia are of 
Hungarian origin, but aggregating the lowest estimates produces a 
total of 35,000.
It is important to add that Hungarians and people of Hungarian 
origin dwell in other parts of the world. Sources already quoted 
suggest that there are 200,000–250,000 Hungarian-speakers in Israel, 
from Hungary and other parts of the Carpathian Basin. There are 
also some 10,000 in Africa and 30,000 in Asia. However, in Israel’s 
case even the lower figure is probably an overestimate. The IPUMS 
database found 51,000 people who had been born in Hungary in the 
1972 census returns, and only 23,000 in the 1983 census returns.17 
These two censuses asked those over 15 about the language that 
they used in daily life,18 which produced figures of 21,000 in 1972 
and 15,000 in 1983. However, Israel is a special case, as many of 
those arriving there saw it as a homecoming, not emigration, and 
the younger generations would rather speak Hebrew.
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Table 5. Estimates for Hungarians living in European countries 
outside the Carpathian Basin
199619 200020 200621
Austria 60,000 40,000–45,000 40,000
Belgium 10,000–15,000 14,000–15,000 5,000–6,000
cyprus n. d. n. d. 2,000–3,000
czech republic n. d.   20,000 19,000–20,000
denmark   2,000     4,000 2,000–4,000
Estonia n. d. n. d.      150
France 50,000 40,000–45,000 15,000–19,000
Finland n. d. n. d.   1,000
Greece n. d. n. d. n. d.
netherlands 10,000 11,000–12,000 8,000–10,000
Latvia n. d. n. d.      300
Lithuania n. d. n. d.      120
Poland n. d. n. d.      500
Luxembourg n. d. n. d. 2,000–3,000
Britain 25,000 25,000–30,000 25,000–30,000
Germany 62,000 120,000 120,000–160,000
norway   3,000     4,000   3,000
Italy 10,000 9,000–10,000 n. d.
Portugal n. d.     2,000 n. d.
Spain      200 n. d. n. d.
Switzerland 20,000 18,000–20,000 20,000–25,000
Sweden 25,000 25,000–27,000 30,000–35,000
All 277,000–282,000 332,000–354,000 289,470–354,670
So far an attempt has been made to measure emigration to 
countries and estimate “potentially” the number of Hungarians 
dwelling there. Whether those Hungarians or people of Hungarian 
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origin actually belong to the Hungarian diaspora as a community 
is a matter for further research. Research in the United States and 
Argentina suggests that some 5–10 percent of those of Hungarian 
origin take part in some organized Hungarian-style activity. This 
kind of activity may involve 10-15 percent elsewhere.22 The least 
information is available for the “working-class” diaspora and for 
less successful migrants, who may end up on the periphery of a 
Hungarian community or even of society as a whole, and have a 
lower potential for asserting their interests or organizing themselves 
institutionally.
The forms of organization are varied and susceptible to 
categorization in several ways, not least because each larger group 
formed its own organization. The fraternal organizations in the 
United States were founded in the 1880s. Those whom they insured 
were mainly workers (against accident and sickness). There were 
newspapers associated with them, and they also held balls and other 
community-building events. However, the Western organizations took 
a kind of post-emigration turn after the change of system in Hungary 
in 1989, whereby their functions shifted towards maintaining ethnic 
Hungarian culture and mediation between cultures.
The decisive role in preserving ethnic identity in the Western 
diaspora today is played by the Churches and the Scout movement, 
and the weekend Hungarian schools that they run. That is not to say 
that other organizations do not contribute23 or have not importance 
(in cultural, intellectual, higher educational, political, lobbying, 
press and internet community fields).24
Organization of Hungarian-language religious congregations 
began towards the end of the nineteenth century. Today the 
Hungarian Reformed Church has the most congregations in the 
United States: 64.25 The Hungarian Reformed Church in America 
has 32 and the US Calvin Synod Conference of the United Church 
of Christ 27. Four belong to the American Presbyterian Church, and 
one is independent (the Akron, Ohio, Free Hungarian Reformed 
Church). There are Hungarian-language congregations in 12 places 
in Canada and 8 in Australia. Argentina and Brazil, and such 
Western European countries as Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, 
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Switzerland, the UK and France each have at least one Protestant 
congregation.
It was harder to build up Roman Catholic institutions using 
Hungarian as a working language, not least because the Church is 
universal and more hierarchical. By the beginning of the twentieth 
century the USA had almost 100 such Catholic congregations, but 
the number has fallen since to 16 Roman Catholic and six Greek 
Catholic congregations, not all of which use Hungarian in the 
liturgy.26 There were Roman Catholic congregations elsewhere as 
well: 18 in Canada, six in Australia, and several congregations, 
missions and monastic communities in South America.
Also important is the progress made among Hungarians by the 
Baptist Church. These are grouped in North America under the 
Hungarian Baptist Convention of North America, whose member 
congregations are summoned at least three times a year. There 
are ten congregations that officially belong to it. There is also a 
Hungarian Baptist congregation in Melbourne, Australia.27
The Churches play an important role in maintaining ethnic or 
national awareness in the Hungarian diaspora. So, understandably, 
the challenges of assimilation are felt most strongly in their 
community life. There are often problems not only with replacing 
clergy (especially for the Catholics), but with retaining the 
congregation when the number of Hungarians is declining. There is 
sometimes debate within the diaspora Churches about the relative 
emphasis to be placed on keeping up the faith or on sustaining the 
Hungarian community.
Organization of the Hungarian Scout movement in the West 
began in 1945, when the Hungarian Scouts Association formed 
in 1912 was revived in the refugee camps. Troops were formed in 
the camps, assisted by the Teleki Pál Scout Association formed in 
1946, and spread among those who emigrated to the United States, 
Canada, South America, Australia and Western Europe. Meanwhile 
the Scout movement in Hungary was merged in 1948 into the 
communist Pioneer movement, after which the Association took the 
name Hungarian Scouts Association, then for a while the Hungarian 
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Scout Federation in Exile, and after the movement became legal 
again in Hungary in 1989, the Hungarian Scout Federation in 
Exteris. The spread of the Scout movement in the United States 
began with Gábor Bodnár and his troop, and the Federation moved 
to headquarters in Garfield, NJ. It continued to strengthen over 
subsequent decades and today involves 4,000 Scouts in 70 troops, 
having peaked in the 1980s with 6,200 Scouts in 84 troops.28 One 
of the big challenges is the rule that only those conversant with the 
Hungarian language may take part, with the result that the declining 
numbers of Hungarians and the pressures of assimilation make 
recruitment increasingly difficult.29
The Churches and Scouts support most of the weekend Hungarian 
schools serving the Hungarian diaspora in the West, although other 
voluntary bodies are also involved. There are 26 known schools in the 
United States, 15 in Germany, and 14 in Sweden, but they cover other 
countries too. A few of them are daily (for instance at the ‘Toronto 
Magyar Gimnázium” or Helicon School in Toronto) and one or two 
schools or classes are state-run (such as the Hungarian-language 
high-school class in Bankstown in Australia).30 Nor it is unusual for 
weekend schools to include a creche or a kindergarten as well.31
One big challenge for most Church or voluntary schools is to 
recruit suitably qualified teaching staff. Another is to have suitable 
teaching materials, where Hungary can provide only a measure of 
support. There is still aversion in some places to textbooks from 
Hungary or even to adaptation of them to local needs.32 Since the 
1970s, materials for weekly tuition prepared jointly by educationalists 
in Hungary and from Western communities have been published 
by the International Society for Hungarian Language and Culture 
(Mother-Tongue Conference) and used successfully in several 
places. Another important question is whether weekend courses can 
contribute in a broader sense to social integration and complement 
the lives of young people in schools not taught in Hungarian. 
There have been positive developments in some countries, where 
Hungarian can gain official recognition. Germany has “accredited 
Hungarian tuition” and some US states (such as California) award 
high-school credits for knowledge of the Hungarian language.
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One question central for schools and all Hungarian organizations 
in the West was whether they could cooperate and how far they took 
note of one another. The operating logic of some includes keeping 
up a common umbrella organization (the Churches or the Scouts), 
while others have started to form networks recently, for instance 
schools – the Association of  Hungarian Teachers in North America 
(MITE) – and bodies representing special interests. The Western 
European Association of Country Organizations of Hungarians33 
formed in 2001, and a similar body in Latin America in the summer 
of 2004.34
Other political and professional umbrella organizations that 
formed earlier in the United States include the American Hungarian 
Educators’ Association, the American Hungarian Foundation, 
the American Hungarian Association, the Hungarian American 
Coalition, the Hungarian Human Rights Foundation, the Hungarian 
Studies Association and the Hungarian Communion of Friends. The 
primary purpose of the umbrella organizations and their members 
is to preserve and encourage use of the Hungarian language and 
culture, since the Western diaspora faces its greatest challenge 
from assimilation. This is clear from the demographic figures given 
earlier, and it is apparent on an individual level in the daily lives 
of people of Hungarian origin living in the West, for a great many 
factors work against their ties to the parent country and retention 
of the Hungarian language and culture in a linguistic environment 
far removed from that of their native language. Yet the organized 
frameworks of Hungarian life have been retained for decades, if 
in random and equivocal ways, meaning that an intermediary role 
can still be played. The Hungarian Alumni Association/György 
Bessenyei Circle in the United States, for instance, has for over fifty 
years provided lecturing or exhibition opportunities for over 300 
prominent Hungarian writers, scientists, experts and artists from 
Hungary, its neighboring countries and the West, mainly at Rutgers 
University in New Jersey.
The task of mediating between cultures is inconceivable 
among the Hungarians in the West without a sense of mission. 
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The US sociologist Károly Nagy sees this as “implant[ing] a sense 
of mission in and among ourselves, to convey the realities of the 
Hungarian community to Western countries. This… also provided 
a reason why our children, young people, and fellow citizens should 
retain their Hungarian language and culture in Western countries… 
to become spokesmen for the interests and problems of the parts of 
the Hungarian nation.”35
Finally, there is the question of what supra-ethnic values the 
institutional framework can project and in what relation they 
stand to the cultural, political and economic changes in Hungary 
in recent decades. Lack of scholarly study means that these often 
stop short of anything more than simplistic activism not backed by 
actual knowledge of conditions in Hungary and the neighboring 
countries. On the other hand, the solidarity and voluntary activity 
of the Western diaspora Hungarians over the decades present an 
exemplary alternative of civil organization that contrasts sharply 
with the étatist approach among the Hungarians of the Carpathian 
Basin.
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Nagy paid tribute to Erika Dedinszky for her work on poetry by 
János Pilinszky in the Netherlands and Vince Sulyok for his work 
on Sándor Csoóri and Sándor Kányádi in Norway, Lóránt Czigány 
for a history of Hungarian literature in English, Ádám Makkai for 
two volumes of Hungarian verse translated into English in the US, 
and others for English-language studies of key events and people in 
Hungarian history. Nagy translated for a US university publisher 
important studies by István Bibó. He lists a further twenty ethnic 
Hungarian literary translators in Europe and America and their 
“outstanding achievements of recent years.”
7. tHE contAct dIALEctS oF HunGArIAn
Miklós Kontra
Any regular contact with speakers of another language or dialect 
can have an effect on the way we speak. When about 3 million 
native speakers of Hungarian became citizens of Czechoslovakia, 
Romania, Yugoslavia and Austria, they came into increasing contact 
with speakers of Slovak, Ruthenian, Ukrainian, Romanian, Serbian, 
Croatian, German and other languages. The new international 
borders drawn after World War I disregarded the ethno-linguistic 
boundaries in the Carpathian Basin and turned formerly majority 
Hungarians into minority Hungarians overnight, in a similar fashion 
to “members of the Spanish culture” who “woke up one morning 
to find themselves citizens of the United States”1 when the USA 
annexed New Mexico following the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo 
in 1848. This had two kinds of linguistic effects: 1) Hungarian 
regional dialects in the circum-Hungary countries began diverging 
from the regional dialects in post-World War I Hungary,2 and 2) the 
increasing contact with speakers of Slovak, Romanian, Serbian, and 
so on, gave rise to contact dialects of Hungarian, that is, varieties 
of Hungarian that show the effects of language contact and are 
unknown and unused by Hungarian-speakers in Hungary.
The effects of the post-World War I border changes on the 
indigenous Hungarians in what are today Slovakia, Ukraine, 
Romania and Serbia are shown in Table 1.
According to Pál Péter Tóth, the number of Hungarians in the 
neighboring countries decreased from 3 million in 1920 to 2.4 
million in 2000.3 However, the percentage of Hungarians vis-à-vis 
the majority nations’ populations decreased even more (Table 1).
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Table 1. The effects of post-World War I international border 
changes on indigenous Hungarians in Hungary’s four neighboring 
countries: total numbers (N) and Hungarians as a percentage of the 
total population of Slovakia, Transcarpathia (Ukraine), Romania 
and Vojvodina (Serbia)
Slovakia ukraine romania Serbia
n % n % n % n %
1921 650,597 21.68 111,052 18.1 1,423,459 9.964 371,006 24.2
2001 520,528 9.675 166,700 13.46 1,431,807 6.60 290,207 14.37
At the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century, 
indigenous Hungarians belong to one cultural nation and eight 
political nations. According to the theory of political or civic nation, 
national identity is defined on the basis of citizenship. According to 
the theory of cultural nation, it is defined on the basis of language 
and culture. Since the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, 
Hungarians have defined themselves as a cultural nation. By contrast, 
says Gal, “Majority politicians in the circum-Hungary states have 
most often taken the ‘civic’ stance. This was the Hungarian position 
before 1918, and is currently legitimated in the post-socialist region 
by pointing to its espousal by prestigious Western states.”8
Throughout the twentieth century, state borders changed 
frequently, and, as a result, many people have held five different 
citizenships without ever leaving their hometown. Deportations, 
population exchanges, ethnic cleansing and other similar acts have 
been used to create homogeneous nation states. The language 
rights situation of Hungarian minorities has varied from country to 
country and from time to time since 1920, but most of Hungary’s 
neighboring states have exercised linguicist policies towards their 
Hungarian minorities. (Linguicism is social discrimination between 
groups of people defined on the basis of language.9) The Hungarians 
in Slovakia, Ukraine, Romania and Serbia are overrepresented in 
blue-collar trades and underrepresented in higher education. Gal 
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observes that in those states “where there are large Hungarian 
minorities (Romania, Slovakia, Ukraine, Serbia), the language 
issue has remained the focus of political dispute for the twenty 
years since the end of communism.”10 Control over the reproduction 
of the national languages influences jurisdiction over schools and 
can result in bilingual programs that “turn out to be submersion or 
transition programs that take Hungarian-speaking youngsters into 
Serbian.”11
Hungarian linguists did not recognize, let alone contemplate, 
the linguistic consequences of World War I for many decades. 
Then, in 1995, Lanstyák proposed that Hungarian be viewed as a 
pluricentric language, that is, a language that has more than one 
standard variety (similar to, for instance, German, which has a 
standard variety in Germany, another one in Switzerland and a third 
one in Austria). Thus the standard variety of Hungarian spoken by 
Hungarians in Slovakia, or that spoken in Romania, is recognized as 
somewhat different from the standard Hungarian in Hungary. These 
standards show the effects of bilingualism and must not be viewed 
as “impure, corrupt, degenerate” varieties.12  In a lecture delivered at 
the Hungarian Academy of Sciences in 2002, Szilágyi made a well-
argued proposal to revise the periodization of Hungarian linguistics. 
He suggested that the modern Hungarian period (which is held to 
begin in 1772 and to continue to the present day) should end in 1918, 
and that the period following World War I should be regarded as the 
latest period (legújabb kor in Hungarian), because it is since the end 
of World War I that Hungarian has been spoken as a native language 
not only in Hungary but in several other states as well.13
Domains of language use – One important consequence of the 
language hierarchies in Slovakia, Ukraine, Romania and Serbia 
is seen in what domains and to what extent Hungarian is used in 
those countries. Data gathered for the Sociolinguistics of Hungarian 
outside Hungary project14 reveal that in 1996 most Hungarians in 
Slovakia, Ukraine, Romania and Serbia used their mother tongue 
overwhelmingly with family members and neighbors, and in church, 
but in more official domains such as a doctor’s office, bank, local 
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government office or police station those who used Hungarian alone 
or Hungarian and the majority language together fell well below 50 
percent of our respondents. See Figure 1.15
As Figure 1 demonstrates, use of the Hungarian national 
minorities’ mother tongue tends to be restricted to the family; it 
may be used at work in some cases, but its use in official contacts 
is very limited.
Attitudes to varieties of Hungarian – Reviewing the studies 
conducted in the mid-1990s16 Susan Gal notes that the Hungarian 
minorities operate with a dual evaluative scheme: “With the 
economic lens, minority Hungarian speakers see the state languages 
as ‘better’ than Hungarian, since their chances of upward social 
mobility are better with higher education in the state language” 
but “With the aesthetic and cultural lens, Hungarian is valued very 
highly by its speakers in all countries.”17
Minority Hungarians also rank the regionally distinct forms 
of Hungarian, including their own variety. The Hungarian used in 
Transylvania is valued most highly in all the countries. Hungarians 
in Transcarpathia also evaluate their own variety as beautiful, in 
contrast to Hungarians in Slovakia, who devalue their own distinctive 
forms of Hungarian, as do those in Serbia and the countries in 
the southwest (Croatia, Slovenia and Austria). Gal is correct in 
stating the following: “Hungarian speakers in Hungary make no 
allowances for the linguistic effects of bilingualism. This, and the 
somewhat divergent local forms used by minority speakers are 
heard by metropolitan Hungarians as provincial and chronotopically 
‘backward’ or unsophisticated.”18 In a recent study, Menyhárt shows 
that over half of the Hungarian primary school children in a village 
in southern Slovakia report that their speech patterns are identified 
by Hungarians in Hungary as different from those heard in Hungary 
(Figure 2), and the most telling feature is their use of borrowed words 
from Slovak, such as párki ‘hot dog’ (which is virsli in Hungary) or 
horcsica ‘mustard’ (mustár in Hungary). See Figure 3.19
Hungarians in Hungary are strong supporters of standard 
language ideology: that is, they believe in the existence of a “correct 























































































































































































































































































































































































































668 Minority Hungarian Communities in the 20th Century
Hungarian” and expect everybody to use it in nearly all speech 
situations. Linguistic stigmatization of, and social discrimination 
against, those speakers who use “incorrect” Hungarian are both 
extremely widespread, and “in the pan-European regime of 
monolingualism and standard language”22 borrowing words from the 
majority language, code-switching (the alternate use of Hungarian 
and another language) and other language contact phenomena “lead 
to stigma and to self-deprecation. Judgmental encounters with purist 
linguists and teachers also create problems of self-confidence.”23
Vocabulary differences – Some regionalisms date from before 
1918: for instance, the present-day Transylvanian word laska ‘ribbon 
noodles’ is tészta in standard Hungarian in Hungary. Use of this 
regional word can create temporary misunderstanding between a 
Transylvanian and a metropolitan Hungarian-speaker. International 
words that were used by Hungarians before 1918, for instance 
internátus ‘boarding school’, katedra ‘(university) chair’ or penzió 
‘pension’ have become old-fashioned in metropolitan Hungarian 
but continue to be used as colloquial words by Hungarians in the 
neighboring countries.24
Lexical changes induced by contact with the majority languages 
can be of several kinds. First, a Hungarian word can obtain a new 
meaning due to contact with another language (semantic borrowing), 
as is the case with szemafor, which means ‘(railway) semaphore’ in 
Hungary but ‘traffic light’ in Romania, Slovakia, Serbia, Ukraine, 
Croatia and Slovenia. Second, calques (word-for-word translations 
into Hungarian) are often used: for example, feljátszik ‘record 
something on tape or video’ in Slovakia equals felvesz in Hungary, 
előadótanár ‘associate professor’ in Romania equals egyetemi 
docens in Hungary, előlát ‘plan something’ in Serbia is tervez in 
Hungary.25 Third, the most conspicuous effect is the use of direct 
borrowings from the majority languages, for example abonament 
‘bus pass’ in Romania (which in metropolitan Hungarian is 
buszbérlet), avansz ‘advance payment’ in Ukraine (metropolitan 
Hungarian előleg), delikvencia ‘delinquency’ in Serbia and Slovakia 
(metropolitan Hungarian bűnözés). Under the influence of a contact 
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language, minority Hungarians may use a different form of the same 
international word from that used by metropolitan Hungarians: for 
example, all Hungarians in Hungary use infarktus ‘heart attack’ but 
the Hungarians in all the seven neighboring countries use infarkt.26
Our study conducted in 1996 in seven countries27 has revealed 
statistically significant differences in the use of universal contact 
variables, that is, variables that vary both in Hungary and in the 
neighboring countries, and one of whose variants has an analogous 
variant in the contact languages. In metropolitan Hungarian, 
compound profession nouns with the component -nő ‘woman’ are 
only used when it is important to stress the referent’s gender. Such 
nouns were used by significantly more Hungarians in the neighboring 
countries than in Hungary. Figure 4 shows the respondents in seven 
countries on the written sentence completion task Anyám egy 
középiskolában tanít, ő tehát… (tanár ‘teacher’ or tanárnő ‘teacher 
+ woman’) ‘My mother teaches in a high school so she is a…’.
Grammatical differences – The use of place name suffixes by 
Hungarians 75 years after the Treaty of Trianon shows some of 
the grammatical effects of the borders drawn after World War I. 
First, a review of the rule for Hungarian place name suffixation 
is in order. The majority of Hungarian city and village names 
take the surface cases or on cases (for example Budapest-en ‘in 
Budapest’) whereas some names denoting Hungarian settlements 
and all names of foreign cities take the interior cases or in cases 
(for example Tihany-ban ‘in Tihany, Hungary’ and Boston-ban ‘in 
Boston, USA’). The role of the semantic feature ‘foreign’ in suffix 
choice can be illustrated by such a pair as Velencé-n ‘in Velence, a 
village in Hungary’ and Velencé-ben ‘in Velence [= Venice], a city in 
Italy’. The Hungarian vs. foreign distinction is often interpreted as 
“belonging to historical (pre-1920) Hungary” vs. “outside historical 
Hungary.” In our study we hypothesized that Hungarians in Hungary 
and those across the borders will differ in their use of place name 
suffixes: the latter will use the surface (on) suffixes for place names 
outside historical Hungary but within the state in which they live 
(for example, Hungarians in Yugoslavia will favor Koszovó-n), 
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whereas Hungarians in Hungary will use the interior (in) cases for 
these places (for example Koszovó-ban). Two such place names were 
chosen to gather the data: Craiova (a city in Oltenia, Romania) and 
Koszovó (in 1996 an autonomous region in southeast Serbia). Both 
have always been outside historical Hungary.
In one task, informants were required to choose one of two 
words (Craiován or Craiovában) that best fit the sentence Az egyik 
ismerősöm fia … volt katona ‘The son of an acquaintance of mine 
was a soldier in…’. In the other task, respondents had to choose 
the more natural sentence of these two: 1) Koszovóban folytatódnak 
a tárgyalások az albánok és a szerbek között and 2) Koszovón 
folytatódnak… ‘Negotiations between the Albanians and Serbs 
in Kosovo continue.’ Country-by-country analyses show that 
significantly more respondents in Romania chose the “home suffix” 
with Craiova than respondents in the other countries (see Figure 5).
Figure 5. Choice of Craiovában vs. Craiován by Hungarians in seven 
countries. N = 818, chi-square (df = 6) = 109.501, p < .01
Written gapfilling: "abroad suffixation" (Craiovában )
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The same “home suffixation” was favored with Koszovó by 
respondents in Yugoslavia and Slovenia: only 20 to 27 percent 
of the respondents in five countries chose the “home suffixed” 
form Koszovón as more natural, but 61 percent in Yugoslavia and 
78 percent in Slovenia judged it more natural than the “abroad 
suffixed” Koszovóban. (The chi-square test shows this difference to 
be significant: N = 830, chi-square (df = 6) = 130.475, p < .01.)
The explanation for the effect of border changes on the use of 
place name suffixes comes from Szilágyi: in categorizing a place 
name, what is important is whether or not the place is in an area 
where Hungarians or speakers of Hungarian (potentially) live, or are 
perceived to potentially live. Speakers may vary in their perception 
of different places, hence the variation in language use. Hungarians 
in Romania perceive the Romanian regions beyond the Carpathian 
Mountains (which have never been part of Hungary) as places that 
they could themselves inhabit, and consequently they say and write 
forms such as Craiová-n ‘in Craiova’, which are highly unusual for 
Hungarians in Hungary.29
There are several other contact-induced effects on the 
grammar of minority Hungarian-speakers. When respondents 
had to choose the more natural sentence of these two for ‘I saw 
you on TV yesterday’, a) Tegnap láttalak a tévében and b) Tegnap 
láttalak téged a tévében (where use of the overt object pronoun 
téged is induced by the contact with Slavic languages), statistically 
significant differences were found between metropolitan and 
minority Hungarians. However, minority Hungarians are not 
homogeneous in their language use. One factor that plays a role 
in creating heterogeneity is the number of speakers of Hungarian 
with whom one is in daily contact. Hungarians who constitute 
a local majority (over 70 percent of the local population) show 
fewer contact effects than those who form a local minority (less 
than 30 percent of the population). For instance, 28 percent of the 
local-majority Hungarians in Slovakia, Ukraine, Romania and 
Yugoslavia judged the contact-induced sentence with the overt 
object pronoun (Tegnap láttalak téged a tévében) to be more 
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natural, as opposed to 38 percent of the local-minority Hungarians. 
This difference is statistically significant (N = 536, chi-square 
(df = 1) = 6.056, p < .05).30
Language maintenance, shift, and the role of education – As 
was indicated by the previous finding, the high or low concentration 
of Hungarian-speakers in a locality has a strong impact on the 
maintenance of Hungarian. Low speaker numbers are one of the 
factors in language shift: that is, the process whereby a group 
of Hungarian-speakers stops using Hungarian and starts using 
another language. This process is all but completed in Oberwart/
Felsőőr, Austria,31 and is undoubtedly taking place in several parts 
of the Hungarian-speaking regions. In the early 1990s, more than 
half of the minority Hungarians lived in settlements with a local 
Hungarian majority: 70 to 77 percent of the Hungarians in Slovakia, 
Transcarpathia (Ukraine) and Slovenia, and approximately 56 
percent each in Vojvodina (Yugoslavia) and in Romania formed a 
local majority in the villages and towns where they lived. In 1991 
there were 1,410 localities with a Hungarian majority population 
in the neighboring countries. Linguistic assimilation is shown, for 
instance, by the number of native Hungarian-speakers in Croatian-
majority territories being 12 percent lower than those of Hungarian 
ethnic affiliation.32 
A very influential factor in minority language maintenance 
and shift is education, which can contribute to the maintenance 
(reproduction) of a linguistic minority or its demise. Where the 
dominant (state) language is taught additively (in addition to the 
pupils’ mother tongue), chances for maintenance are much better 
than in situations of subtractive teaching (when the state language 
is taught at the cost of the mother tongue). The right of Hungarian 
minorities to education through the medium of their mother tongue 
was more or less recognized throughout the twentieth century. 
Typically, there has been an inverse relationship between the number 
of students studying in mother-tongue-medium schools and the level 
of their education. For instance, Gal notes that in Slovakia “Roughly 
80% of Hungarian-speaking children go to Hungarian primary 
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schools; this figure drops to 50% for secondary education and is 
even lower for technical education.”33 The subtractive language 
policy pursued in Slovakia is evident in Gal’s diagnosis: “While 
Slovak is taught in Hungarian schools, Hungarian is not taught in 
Slovak schools, so that parents who decide to send their children 
to Slovak schools give up all possibility of Hungarian educational 
input.”34
Such education can easily result in what Lanstyák and 
Szabómihály35 term language lapses and language gaps. The former 
denote cases when a speaker is temporarily unable to recall a word 
or a grammatical structure with which s/he is otherwise familiar. By 
the latter the authors mean cases when a required word or structure 
is not part of the speaker’s linguistic system at all. These phenomena 
contribute a great deal to bilingual Hungarians’ linguistic insecurity 
and may lead to register attrition. For instance, Hungarians in 
Romania often find it hard to write an official letter in Hungarian, 
since they have had hardly any opportunity to write them in their 
mother tongue. Language gaps have also become evident recently 
among Hungarian school teachers in Slovakia, who find it difficult 
to write class registers and school reports in Hungarian now that it 
has become legally possible. It is evident that such language gaps 
are the result of restrictive language policies or violations of the 
minority speakers’ linguistic human rights.36
The choice of the medium of education has been shown to 
have important effects on the linguistic development of bilingual 
Hungarians. For instance, Lanstyák and Szabómihály demonstrated 
that monolingual Hungarian high school children exhibit systematic 
differences in their use and judgment of different forms of Hungarian 
from their bilingual peers in southern Slovakia. A further difference 
has been established between bilingual Hungarian pupils who go 
to schools with Hungarian as the medium of instruction and those 
who go to schools with Slovak as the medium. For instance, when 
the three groups of high school children had to insert one of two 
forms that best fit the sentence provided, significant differences 
were shown in their choice: the Slovak-contact-induced form was 
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used to a much greater extent by the Slovak-medium pupils than the 
monolingual Hungarian form. See Figure 6. 
Sentence to complete:
Jó napot kívánok. A … jöttem, panaszt szeretnék tenni.  
‘Good afternoon. I have come to see the boss, I would like to lodge 
a complaint.’
Choice (a) főnökhöz (monolingual Hungarian form)
Choice (b) főnök után (induced by Slovak ísť za niekým) 
Figure 6. Choice of contact-induced főnök után vs. monolingual 
Hungarian főnökhöz by three groups of high school children: 
Hungarians in Hungary, Hungarians in Slovakia with Hungarian 
as medium of instruction (Slovakia_H) and Hungarians in Slovakia 
with Slovak as medium of instruction (Slovakia_S) (N = 806).37 
Choice of contact-induced főnök után  vs. monolingual 
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Lanstyák and Szabómihály have found that the linguistic 
differences between the Slovakia_H and Slovakia_S students are 
much greater than those between the Hungary students and the 
Slovakia_H students, despite the fact that the latter groups study in 
schools 40 to 50 kilometers apart, while the two bilingual groups 
often study in the same building. Thus the choice of Slovak as the 
medium of instruction clearly contributes to linguistic divergence 
(and possibly a shift to Slovak).38
Mother-tongue-medium education for the Hungarian minorities 
in most if not all of the neighboring countries suffers from legislation 
that makes minority-language-medium education seem a privilege, 
or something over which the minority pupils only have themselves 
to blame if they find school too difficult. “Equality” is provided 
by state-language education for all, without regard to the pupils’ 
mother tongue.39
One other problem influencing the linguistic skills of minority 
Hungarians is how the state languages are taught to them in schools. 
In most cases they are taught as if they were the mother tongue of 
Hungarians. What usually happens is that a school subject such as 
“Romanian language and literature” is identical in the curriculum 
for Romanian pupils and for minority pupils, although the teaching 
should serve radically different purposes. For Romanians the goal is 
to educate mother-tongue (L1) speakers of Romanian in Romanian 
language and literature, but for Hungarians and other minorities the 
goal is to enable them to acquire Romanian as a second language 
(L2). If the same methods and teaching materials are used to teach 
the state language as an L1 and an L2, the result can only be that 
Hungarians do not acquire Romanian well enough in school, which 
later renders them disadvantaged.40 Such practice, the denial of the 
right to learn an L2 as an L2, constitutes educational malpractice,41 
is a violation of linguistic human rights in education, and generates 
social conflicts in Slovakia, Ukraine, Romania and Serbia. 
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8. PoPuLAtIon MoVEMEntS
In tHE cArPAtHIAn BASIn
Tamás Stark
The main force behind the social and political changes in the former 
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy after the Great War came from a 
vision of the future: of the nation state as a rightful fusion of the 
constructs of nation and state. The new states that appeared after 
1918 rested on conscious, institutionalized nation-building by their 
majority nations. Yet they contained substantial minorities, and 
anxiety about the prospect of disintegration led to efforts, within the 
scope offered by the international situation, to erode the social and 
economic advantages of any such groups as did not belong to the 
majority nation, and to assimilate them. The number of Hungarians 
living in neighboring countries duly declined by one million over 
the next ninety years. The territories that would be detached from 
Hungary after the Great War had held 3,175,000 persons of Hungarian 
national affiliation in 1910, but only 2,174,921 such persons in 2001. 
The loss was greater still in proportional terms: from 31.1 percent in 
1910 to 17.6 percent in 2001.1 This section examines the contribution 
to the process made by the migration of Hungarians.
About 10 percent of the Hungarians outside the Trianon borders 
of Hungary, 350,000 people, moved into Hungary between 1918 and 
1924. According to figures from the National Office for Refugees, 
there were 107,000 arrivals from Czechoslovakia (which then 
included Transcarpathia), 197,000 from Romania, 45,000 from 
Yugoslavia, and 1,200 from Austria.2 Between the mid-1920s (by 
which time neighboring countries had introduced legislation on 
citizenship and Hungary had tightened its residence conditions) 
and 1940, a further 10,000 arrived from Romania and 3,000 from 
Yugoslavia, disregarding unregistered immigrants.3
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Romania and Yugoslavia followed strong assimilation policies 
between the world wars. Even the more democratically organized 
Czechoslovakia fell far short of the “Switzerland-of-the-East” policy 
that it proclaimed. In Hungary, its own national minorities were not 
seen as a big domestic issue between 1919 and 1938, as they made 
up less than 10 percent of the population, but this issue emerged 
again after the territorial acquisitions of 1938 and 1941. Hungarian 
governments sought to conserve or restore the pre-war ethnic 
structure in the expanded territory and throughout the Carpathian 
Basin. This meant automatic rejection of any proposals for population 
exchanges, which would have altered that structure substantially. 
A proposal for a population exchange with Czechoslovakia was 
turned down at talks at Komárom in October 1938, and so was one 
with Romania at talks at Turnu Severin in August 1940, prior to the 
Second Vienna Award brokered by Germany and Italy. A similar 
proposal by the Croatian government was rejected in 1942.4
Hungary’s efforts to restore the pre-1918 situation were focused 
on reversing the Czechoslovak, Romanian and Serbian settlement 
programs in the returned southern strip of Slovakia. After the First 
Vienna Award of November 2, 1938, the agricultural settlers and a 
total of some 5,000 public employees were removed in November 
and December.5
The Second Vienna Award of August 30, 1940, which 
returned Northern Transylvania to Hungary, was followed by mass 
spontaneous movements of people. Romanian settlers who had 
arrived after 1918 moved to the Regat. Indigenous Hungarians in 
Southern Transylvania made for Hungary, in a migration accelerated 
by a rapid deterioration of their prospects of making a living. The 
Hungarian government was dismayed, for its policy was still to 
sustain the Hungarians’ numerical, cultural and economic weight 
in Southern Transylvania in the hope of further territorial revision 
in Hungary’s favor. It tightened entry conditions substantially in the 
spring of 1941, yet foreign police records still showed 190,132 people 
arriving from Romania between September 1940 and February 
1944.6 Meanwhile 221,000 Romanians were fleeing from Northern 
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Transylvania,7 which negated the increase produced by Romanian 
settlement schemes after 1918.
Hungary’s leaders sought to restore 1918 ethnic proportions in 
occupied parts of the Southern Region after Germany’s invasion of 
Yugoslavia in April 1941. The civilian authorities registered 48,067 
persons in 1941 who had moved in after 1918 and stayed after the 
withdrawal of Yugoslav forces.8 These were primary targets for the 
local Hungarian administration and armed forces, but neither the 
German command in Belgrade nor the puppet Serbian regime would 
take them, as they were inundated with tens of thousands of Serbs 
expelled from Croatia. For want of an agreement, the Hungarian 
authorities in the Southern Region began to expel them unilaterally. 
According to Hungarian sources, 15,000 “indigenous” Serbs were 
deported between April 1941 and the end of the year,9 but German 
sources put the figure at 35,000 and the Refugee Commission set 
up by Milan Nedić’s puppet government in September 1941 put the 
number of returnees from the reannexed territories at 80,000.10
The Hungarian community in the reannexed territories was 
boosted further by the arrival of public officials. According to 
Hungary’s Central Statistics Office (CSO) and Ministry of Welfare 
reports after 1945, the numbers of immigrants and returnees were 
26,000 to the regained Upland territory and Transcarpathia, 24,000 
to Northern Transylvania, and 14,000 to the Southern Region.11 
Although the purpose was not settlement but to restore the pre-1918 
ethnic status quo, two small-scale settlements occurred, both from 
beyond the 1918 borders into the Southern Region. Some 17,700 
Székelys were came from Bukovina under an agreement with 
Romania from Bukovina,12 and 1,552 Hungarians from the Bosnian 
villages of Gunja, Vucijak and Brčko were rescued from partisan 
warfare. These migrations were relatively small. Nonetheless, there 
was a dramatic change in Hungary’s population structure in the last 
two years of the war.
The so-called Jewish Question featured high on the government 
and parliamentary agenda in the period when Hungary was gaining 
territory on four occasions. The National Assembly passed three 
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acts (usually known as the Jewish laws) between 1938 and 1941 that 
curtailed the civil and economic rights of the Jews, who thenceforth 
were not classed as Hungarians. The political leaders rejected 
successive requests from the German authorities for deportation of 
the Jews before German military occupation on March 19, 1944, 
installed a new regime under Döme Sztójay. This was replaced, 
after an unsuccessful attempt to bail out of the war led by head of 
state Miklós Horthy, by the quisling government of Ferenc Szálasi, 
which eagerly met the German demands for full deprivation of 
Jews’ rights and for their deportation. The number of victims of 
what came to be known as the Holocaust can be estimated from the 
difference in the size of the community before and after the war, 
although the historical sources leave broad margins of error. Some 
70,000–100,000 people were liberated from the Pest Ghetto,13 and 
at least another 20,000 were still in safe houses at the end of the 
war.14 Another 20,000–30,000 survived the war with false papers.15 
Thus the number of survivors in Budapest can be put at 110,000–
150,000. According to Government Repatriation Commission 
figures,16 68,000 deportees returned to the post-war territory of 
Hungary.17 Apart from the Budapest liberated and returnees, there 
was a third large group of survivors, consisting of Jews from the 
provinces drafted for labor service. These may have numbered 
20,000–40,000.18
Based on historical sources, the number of survivors in the 
present-day territory was certainly more than 190,000 and probably 
fewer than 260,000.19 The number of liberated and returnees in 
territories reannexed in 1938 was about 80,000, giving a total of 
270,000–340,000 for the territory that Hungary controlled in the 
war. The 1941 census recorded 780,000–820,000 citizens covered 
by the Jewish laws, and given the wide margins for numbers of 
liberated and returnees, it can be said for sure only that the Jewish 
community had certainly lost fewer than 550,000 and more than 
440,000 members by the end of the war.20 It must be stressed that 
handing over the provincial Jews to the Germans for extermination 
markedly weakened the Hungarian communities in areas of mixed 
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settlement – Transcarpathia and Northern Transylvania – at a time 
when it was priority government policy to restore and maintain 
their numbers. The number of Jews in the territory gained from 
Czechoslovakia sank from 30,000 to 10,000. There had been 115,000 
Jews in Transcarpathia, but fewer than 20,000 returned in 1945 to the 
Soviet-annexed area. Only 44,000 of the 151,000 Jews in Northern 
Transylvania remained at the time of the liberation, and only 4,000 
of the 14,000 Hungarian Jews did in the Southern Region.21
The war against the Jews struck a greater blow to the country 
than the actual warfare, for the number of military deaths, likewise 
hard to estimate, was a good deal lower than the number of Jews lost. 
The former were registered by the 22nd Department of the Ministry 
of Defense. By the end of October 1944, there were 256,431 names 
on its register of wounded, missing, certified prisoners of war, and 
those who had died in battle.22 No account was taken of the number 
of military deaths between November 1944 and April 1945. The 
greatest number of the eroding Hungarian military forces was lost 
in the siege of Budapest, where the number of fallen, missing, and 
wounded has been put at 50,000 by military historians.23 Bearing 
in mind the spring actions, the figure of 256,431 up to October 31, 
1944, must be raised to more than 300,000 by the end of the war. 
Military historians and available Soviet documents suggest that 50–
75 percent of the fallen and missing can be counted as having died, 
as can one third of the wounded, so that the total military loss of life 
can be estimated at 140,000–180,000. A detailed account of civilian 
losses was given in June 1945 by the CSO. Combined figures for the 
country’s post-war territory show that 44,490 civilians lost their lives 
in military action, air raids, and land attacks.24 The greatest losses 
by area – 8,568 lives according to the CSO – were in Budapest.25 
Prisoners of war are integral to warfare, but in the campaigns of the 
Soviet army they were more than a side effect, they were an aim. 
For the system of labor camps for foreign internees and prisoners of 
war was set up in September 1939, at the very beginning of the war, 
as the Soviets drew no distinction between civilians and military, 
and the war was intended not only to spread the communist system, 
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but to meet immediate labor needs. Beside that economic need lay 
motives of collective punishment and ethnic cleansing as well.
The CSO, in details prepared in 1946 for the Paris peace talks, put 
the number of Hungarians taken prisoner by the Soviets at 600,000, 
based on data from the Ministry of Defense Losses Department, 
enquiries about prisoners reaching the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
and Soviet war reports.26 The Division for Prisoners of War and 
Internees at the Soviet People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs 
(NKVD) recorded some 530,000 Hungarian prisoners, but the figure 
is for arrivals in the Soviet Union, excluding transit camp inmates or 
those who died in transit.27 The bulk of those taken were civilians. 
The circumstances in which they were gathered and deported point 
to the existence of special NKVD units in each territory, engaged in 
shipping them out. The number of civilians taken from the present-
day territory of Hungary (according to individual and group requests 
for information reaching the Prisoners of War Department at the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and estimated numbers deported from 
Budapest) was 120,000–200,000. Local research in Transcarpathia, 
the reannexed areas of the Upland and Transylvania adds more than 
50,000 to this.28
The data on returnees are uncertain and to some extent 
contradictory. There was no central registration of these in Hungary 
before July 1946, and the estimates vary between 100,000 and 
150,000. The 1947, 1948 and 1949 figures of the Prisoner of War 
Reception Committee in Debrecen add up to another 220,000 
returnees. However, there were still prisoners returning in the early 
1950s, after the reception camp was closed. According to the most 
optimistic estimates and calculations, at least 200,000 Hungarians 
died in Soviet captivity.
When the Red Army and Romanian forces that changed sides 
arrived at the southeast limits of the Carpathians, some of the 
inhabitants of Transylvania began to move westward. This favored 
the Romanian efforts to create a nation state, as the evacuees were 
Hungarians and Germans from an ethnically mixed area. Just two 
days after the Romanian change of sides on August 23 there were 
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Ministry of the Interior orders to intern Germans and Hungarians in 
Transylvania and the Banat if they were “dangerous to the order of 
state.” A bigger trauma (although one that involved fewer victims) 
was caused by a campaign of vengeance launched in Transylvania 
by Romanian paramilitary units raised in Bucharest at the end of 
August 1944. The events meant that about 400,000 Hungarians 
left Northern Transylvania in the autumn of 1944. A CSO survey 
suggests that 102,000 settled in the post-war territory of Hungary 
instead of returning to their native province after the fighting.29
The Front reached the Southern Region at the end of September 
1944. Vigorous ethnic cleansing ensued in areas occupied by 
Tito’s partisans, lasting from October 1944 to the spring of 1945 
and conducted by the Department of People’s Protection (OZNA) 
and by partisan units. At least 10,000 Germans were killed, and 
German sources estimate that another 60,000–70,000 died in the 
internment camps.30 The Vojvodina OZNA head Svetozar Kostić 
Čapo stated later that Ministry of the Interior forces killed about 
20,000 Hungarians.31 Serbian Hungarian authors, based on other 
recollections, eyewitness testimony and local documents, give total 
figures for Hungarian victims of 15,000–20,000.32 Some 60,000 
Hungarians left the Southern Region before or after the terror,33 
including some 14,000 public employees and another 14,000 
Bukovina Székelys who had arrived during 1941.
The Germans and Hungarians were the main obstacle to 
creating a Slav nation state in Czechoslovakia as well. The 
three main Allies agreed to deportation of the Germans at the 
Potsdam Conference, but despite Czechoslovakia’s efforts and 
Soviet support for them, it did not agree to resettlement of 
the 600,000-strong Hungarian minority. Czechoslovakia then 
sought a population exchange agreement with Hungary, its 
experts envisaging that 300,000–500,000 Slovaks from Hungary 
would move in, yet only 105,000 residents of Hungary had 
declared Slovak to be their native language in the 1931 census. 
The Hungarians remaining after the population exchange 
would then be dispersed by internal resettlement and further 
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unilateral expulsions. Official harassment of the Hungarians of 
Czechoslovakia eventually persuaded the Hungarian government 
to conclude a population exchange agreement on February 27, 
1946, whereby the numbers resettling in each direction would 
be the same. In the event, only 73,000 Slovaks left Hungary for 
Czechoslovakia. About one third of the 600,000 Hungarians of 
Slovakia were resettled in Hungary, including those deported 
unilaterally for having settled after 1938, and the ostensible 
war criminals. The vast majority of the Hungarian community 
remained where they were.
Implementation of the population exchange agreement had not 
even begun before the Czechoslovak Ministry of the Interior decided 
on June 17, 1946, to deport 200,000 Hungarians unilaterally, but this 
was rejected by the Western allies, despite strong Soviet backing for 
it, and an obligation to receive the Hungarians of Slovakia was not 
included in the Treaty of Paris. The thwarted plan gave way to efforts 
to “resolve” the problem internally. Presidential Order No. 88/1945 
on the obligation to work provided grounds for moving Hungarians 
on a mass scale into areas of Sudetenland evacuated by the Germans. 
This affected 44,129 Hungarians in 1946–1947,34 and they were able 
to return to their home district only after several years. In place 
of the deported Germans and Hungarians there arrived 130,000 
Slovaks from Romania, Poland, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, along 
with a further 25,000 from Transcarpathia, under a June 29, 1946, 
population exchange agreement with the Soviet Union, although 
Ukrainian sources put the last figure at about 12,000.
The persecution and the organized and voluntary resettlements 
brought Czechoslovakia close to its goal of becoming a state 
of Czechs and Slovaks, but such ethnic homogenization was 
prevented by the fact that most of the Hungarians remained. 
After the communist takeover in 1948, the Soviet Union switched 
from supporting the plans for a nation state to demanding of the 
new Czechoslovak leadership a peaceful conclusion to the ethnic 
conflict.
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There was little feeling in Hungarian society against indigenous 
Germans (Swabians). Tension had arisen in some provincial 
communities over Volksbund activity and SS recruitment, but there 
had been no open clashes. Nor was feeling against them roused by 
the German occupation of March 19, 1944. Once the Soviet army 
arrived, the members of the local German community were put in 
the dock, but there were no serious atrocities committed against 
them. The motives were economic, rather than matters of principle: 
the provisional post-war government had to cope with some 100,000 
refugees from the lost reannexed territories, and used the land reform 
legislation of March 17, 1945, as a means of confiscating Swabian 
land, prior to deporting the Swabians to Germany.
The government, with support from the political parties, 
requested in an oral note to the Soviet Union on May 26, 1945, that 
it agree to the deportation of 200,000–250,000 “fascist” Germans 
to the Soviet zone of Germany. Some 490,000 people in the post-
war area of Hungary had declared themselves as linguistically or 
ethnically German in the 1941 census. Thus half the community 
was condemned for such acts as joining the Volksbund or serving 
in the SS, even as enlisted men. The request was granted on the 
grounds of the Allied agreement at Potsdam, for Lieutenant-General 
Vladimir P. Sviridov, head of the Allied Control Commission, had 
called on the Hungarian government one week after Potsdam to 
prepare to deport 400,000–450,000 Germans. Despite Potsdam, 
Sviridov’s strong intervention, and the government’s own 
request, the political leadership was unprepared, and the earlier 
unanimity among the parties broke down in August 1945. Minister 
of Foreign Affairs János Gyöngyösi argued several times in the 
Council of Ministers that punishing the Germans on the grounds 
of their affiliation was to subscribe to Hitler’s principles and create 
a precedent on which neighboring countries could act against their 
Hungarian minorities.35 Nonetheless, the government decided in 
August to deport the whole German community, with full support 
from the Communist Party and the National Peasants’ Party.
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The lack of domestic political support and the problems with 
resettling the deportees in the Western zones of Germany meant 
that only about 160,000 Hungarian Germans had been deported 
by the time that the campaign was stopped on June 15, 1948. The 
deportations and spontaneous departures meant that the 500,000 
Hungarian Germans were reduced in number to 200,000–220,000. 
The political climate meant that in the 1949 census only 22,455 
declared German to be their native language and 2,600 claimed 
German as their national affiliation.36
Hungary’s total loss between 1941 and 1949 can be put at 
800,000–1,000,000. The campaigns of revenge led about 300,000 
Hungarians to leave their native areas for the territory of Trianon 
Hungary. So the loss within the area of present-day Hungary can 
be put at 300,000–400,000. However, census data show a decline 
for that period of 111,000, which means that the loss was offset to 
a large extent by natural increase and immigration. So, in purely 
demographic terms, the population losses from Nazi genocide, 
warfare, Soviet imprisonment, and deportation of indigenous 
Germans were much reduced by the arrival of masses of Hungarians 
from neighboring countries. The population of the present territory 
did indeed decline, but it was also replaced to some extent.
Movements of citizens of the socialist countries, even 
within the Soviet Bloc, were severely curtailed from 1948 to 
the mid-1950s. Emigration was seen as a malaise that socialist 
transformation of society would cure. Travelers in or out of 
the socialist countries were seen as potential enemies; to have 
relatives or connections abroad was suspect. This mistrust had 
a strong effect on relations between Hungary and Hungarian 
communities abroad.37 International migration affected 523,579 
people in Hungary between 1947 and 1989, of whom 370,000 
were emigrants.38 Of these 192,000 had left by April 1957 after 
the 1956 Revolution. Overrepresented were young people, and 
people from Budapest and Western Hungary. The main targets 
were Austria and Yugoslavia as transit countries, with 43,000 and 
16,000 respectively, the United States with 30,000, the United 
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Kingdom with 20,000, Canada with 15,000, West Germany with 
12,000, and Switzerland with 10,000.39
The decisive majority of immigrants into Hungary after 1956 
(1,500–2,000 a year) came from minority Hungarian communities, 
in direct proportion to their size. Altogether 113,372 immigrants 
arrived between 1948 and 1989, of whom 22,761 were naturalized 
or had their citizenship restored.40 The number of arrivals from 
neighboring countries began to rise in about 1973, but a relatively 
much bigger increase came in 1988, when Hungary recognized 
refugee status. In October 1989, Hungary acceded to the Geneva 
Convention, which granted refugee status to those who could show 
that they were being persecuted on national, political, religious or 
racial grounds. This was important particularly to the many illegal 
arrivals after 1986, who had come as tourists and remained in 
Hungary.
Year no. of immigrants no. of refugees
1987   1,239 -




Of the 127,000 refugees who arrived in Hungary in 1988–1994, 
42 percent were from Romania and 55 percent from Yugoslavia. 
Of immigrants, 67 percent were from Romania, 9 percent from 
Yugoslavia, and 8 percent from successor states of the Soviet 
Union. Of the refugees, 65 percent were ethnic Hungarians.41 Of 
the immigrants in the 1980–1991 period, 20.5 percent had a higher 
education, as did 6.2 percent of the refugees. The proportions of 
white-collar workers were 44.1 among the immigrants and 15 
percent among the refugees. Of the immigrants 35 percent were 
dependants, while the proportion of dependants among the refugee 
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population was only 14 percent.42 Mass flows of refugees began to 
move to Hungary after 1988 from several directions, as this was the 
first socialist country to recognize refugee status. Within these, the 
influx of those of Hungarian national affiliation was decisive. The 
flows eased markedly in 1994, but the net immigration for the 1990s 
was 161,000, at a time when Hungary’s rate of natural increase was 
negative, but they were mainly at the expense of minority Hungarian 
communities.
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BIoGrAPHIES oF KEY PErSonALItIES
Ágoston, András (born 1944)
Vojvodina lawyer, journalist and politician. A journalist and a 
manager of the Novi Sad Forum publishing concern before the 
change of system, he was behind the foundation in December 
1989 of the Democratic Community of Vojvodina Hungarians 
(VMDK). As president of this and the Hungarian Democratic 
Party of Vojvodina that he founded in February 1997, he has 
sought personal autonomy and proportionate parliamentary 
representation for Hungarians in Serbia, and the option of dual 
nationality.
Balla, László (1927–2010)
Transcarpathian poet, writer, translator and editor. He became 
editor in 1965 of the daily Kárpáti Igaz Szó in Transcarpathia, 
later converting it from a simple translation of its Ukrainian 
equivalent into a full Hungarian newspaper. He retired in 
1987. He did seminal work in the 1960s–1980s in promoting 
Hungarian literature in Transcarpathia and in public life in its 
Hungarian community, but his contribution came in for some 
criticism after the disintegration of the Soviet Union.
Balogh, Edgár (1906–1996)
Transylvanian political writer, editor and politician. Although of 
Transylvanian origin, Balogh went to high school in Bratislava 
and university in Prague, becoming the leading figure in 
Sarló (Sickle), a Marxist youth group among Czechoslovakian 
Hungarians. In 1935, he was deported to Romania and worked 
as a journalist. He joined the board of the communist-affiliated 
National Federation of Hungarian Workers (1934–1940), and 
after 1945 became a vice-president of the Hungarian People’s 
Alliance (1945–1946), the editor of the Cluj daily Világosság 
(1944–1948), and rector of the city’s Bolyai University (1948–
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1949), before being jailed on false charges (1949–1955). He was 
later deputy editor-in-chief of the journal Korunk (1957–1971).
Bánffy, Miklós (1873–1950)
Transylvanian politician and writer. A member of Parliament 
from 1901 to 1918, he became Hungarian minister of foreign 
affairs in 1921–1922, and then returned to Romania in 1926. There 
he initiated and financed several cultural movements, including 
the periodical Erdélyi Helikon and the newspaper Ellenzék, as 
well as writing plays and novels under the pseudonym Kisbán. 
He became a senior lay official of the Reformed Church, then 
chairman of the Hungarian People’s Community in 1939–1940, 
and a member of the Hungarian legislature again after the 
reannexation. He was on the staff of the Cluj literary periodical 
Utunk in 1944–1949, before moving back to Hungary.
Bethlen, György (1888–1968) 
Transylvanian politician and expert on agriculture. His public 
activity began with the annexation of Transylvania. He joined 
the presiding committee of the National Hungarian Party in 
1922 and served as its president in 1926–1938. He pursued a 
conservative policy aimed at defending the rights, estates and 
social positions of the Hungarian minority. He withdrew from 
politics in the period of royal dictatorship in 1938–1940, but 
entered the Hungarian legislature after the Second Vienna 
Award. He spent several years in Romanian prisons after World 
War II, and then worked as a manual laborer.
Bori, Imre (1929–2004)
Vojvodina literary historian, editor and university professor. 
He began teaching Hungarian in elementary and secondary 
schools in 1951, and then became professor of the Hungarian 
department at the University of Novi Sad until his retirement 
in 1995, serving concurrently as director of the Institute of 
Hungarian Studies (1979–1981) and editor of the periodical 
Híd (1984–2004). As the most influential cultural politician of 
his time, he stood for the development of a separate Hungarian 
culture within the specific social and economic conditions of 
Yugoslavia.
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Bródy, András (Andrej Brody) (1895–1946) 
Transcarpathian politician. Originally an elementary school 
teacher, he fought in World War I, and then studied law 
in Budapest. After the change of sovereignty he became a 
newspaper editor in Transcarpathia, then a founder and later 
president of the Autonomous Agricultural Union, and in 
October 1938 the region’s first prime minister. He joined the 
Lower House of the Hungarian Parliament in 1939. In 1946, he 
was tried for collaboration in Uzhgorod and executed.
Bugár, Béla (born 1958)
Slovakian Hungarian politician. He entered public life after 
Czechoslovakia’s 1989 revolution. He was a founder of the 
Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement, its president in 
1991–1998, then president of the Hungarian Coalition Party 
(1998–2007). In 2009 he became founder-president of the Now/
Bridge Party. A member of the federal legislature in Prague in 
1990–1992, he has been a member of the Bratislava legislature 
continuously since 1992. In 1998–2006 he was a deputy speaker 
of Parliament, as he has been again since 2010.
Csoóri, Sándor (born 1930)
Writer and politician. He worked on a literary paper in 1953–
1956, and as a journalist in the 1960s and a film scriptwriter 
in 1968–1988. He joined the periodical Hitel as editor in 1988 
and became editor-in-chief in 1992. He was a leading light in 
the people’s national opposition in the 1960s and later in the 
preparations for the change of system. He served as president of 
the World Federation of Hungarians in 1991–2000. In 1992 he 
sponsored the idea of Duna Television, a station for Hungarians 
abroad.
Csuka, Zoltán (1901–1984)
Writer, translator and literary activist. He left for Yugoslavia 
after the fall of the 1919 Hungarian Soviet Republic. There 
he became a motivating force within Hungarian literature in 
Yugoslavia and a translator of South Slav literature. He founded 
and worked for several Hungarian periodicals in Vojvodina (Út, 
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Képes Vasárnap, Vajdasági Írás, Kalangya). He returned 
to Hungary in 1933, and in 1944 became editor of Láthatár, 
which he had founded. Having been executive manager of the 
Hungarian–Yugoslav Society (1947–1948) and editor of its paper 
Déli Csillag (1947–1949), he was arrested for spying in 1950 and 
sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment, but was released in 1955.
Dobos, László (born 1930)
Slovakian Hungarian writer, publisher and politician. During 
the Prague Spring of 1968, he was president of the Hungarian 
cultural organization CSEMADOK, a member of the Prague 
and Bratislava legislatures, and a minister without portfolio 
responsible for minority affairs in the Slovak government. He 
was dismissed as minister in 1970 and from his CSEMADOK 
post in 1971, when he was also excluded from the Communist 
Party and the Prague and Bratislava legislatures. After the 
1989 change of system he became a vice-president of the World 
Federation of Hungarians, director of the Madách publishing 
firm in Bratislava, and for a short while honorary president of 
CSEMADOK.
Domokos, Géza (1928–2007)
Romanian Hungarian politician, writer and translator. On 
completing his university studies in Moscow, he returned to 
Romania to work as a journalist. In 1961 he became editor-
in-chief of the minority department at the literary publishers 
in Bucharest, then becoming manager of the new minority 
publisher Kriterion from 1970 to 1989. He was an alternate 
member of the Romanian Communist Party Central Committee 
from 1969 to 1984. He was a decisive organizing figure in 
Hungarian cultural life in Romania in the 1970s and 1980s. He 
chaired the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania from 
1990 to 1993, when he withdrew from public life.
Domokos, Pál Péter (1901–1992)
Transylvanian ethnographer and schoolteacher. After studies 
in Miercurea-Ciuc, Debrecen and Budapest, he returned to 
Transylvania to teach singing and music in teachers’ training 
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colleges. His first folksong collection tour of Catholic villages 
in Moldavia in 1929 was followed by regular work on folk 
music and culture among the Csángós. He headed the Cluj 
teachers’ training college from 1940 to 1944, and then moved 
to Budapest, where he was a ministry employee until he was 
dismissed in 1949. He then taught at various elementary and 
secondary schools until his retirement in 1961.
Duray, Miklós (born 1945)
Slovakian Hungarian geologist and politician. On the 
CSEMADOK and the Hungarian Youth Association boards in 
Czechoslovakia in 1968–1969, he was a Bratislava geologist in the 
1970s and 1980s. He became well known in the Czechoslovakian 
Hungarian opposition when he set up the Minority Rights 
Defense Committee, being imprisoned in 1982–1983 and 1984–
1985. After the system change he was founder-president of 
the political group Coexistence (1990–1998), vice-president of the 
Hungarian Coalition Party (1998–2010), and a member of the 
Prague and Bratislava Parliaments.
Egry, Ferenc (1864–1945)
Upper Hungarian bell-founder and politician. Bells from his 
foundry at Kisgejőc (Mali Hejivci) can be found today all over 
Central Europe. He was an activist in the Independence Party 
in the final years of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and in 
Transcarpathia in the Czechoslovak period was a leader of the 
Smallholders’ Party, later the Hungarian National Party, and 
then of the United Hungarian Party. He was a senator in 1924–
1929 and a seconded member of the Hungarian legislature from 
1939.
Esterházy, János (1901–1957)
Slovakian Hungarian landowner and politician. President of 
the National Christian Socialist Party in Czechoslovakia from 
1932, he became executive president of the United Hungarian 
Party in 1936. He was a member of the Prague legislature in 
1935–1938 and of the Bratislava legislature in 1938–1944. In 
the wartime Tiso period, he was in internal opposition, voting 
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against deportation of the Jews and giving sanctuary to some 
Jews and others in hiding. Deported to the Soviet Union in early 
1945, he was sentenced to death by the Slovak National Court in 
his absence. This was commuted to life imprisonment. He was 
behind bars in Czechoslovakia from 1949 until his death.
Fazekas, János (1926–2004)
Romanian Hungarian politician. On joining the Romanian 
Communist Party in 1945 he worked initially in its youth 
movement. He was a Central Committee member from 1954 
to 1984, as well as minister of the food industry (1961–1965), 
a deputy prime minister, and a member of the government 
Executive Committee (1975–1980). After 1956, he was 
responsible for Hungarian minority affairs, as a confidant of 
Ceauşescu and the Romanian Hungarian holding the highest 
public office, but he was edged out in the mid-1980s.
Fodó, Sándor (1940–2005)
Transcarpathian university professor and public figure. He 
was a professor in Uzhgorod State University’s Hungarian 
Faculty from 1967 to the 1990s, except in 1971–1976, when he 
had to work as a stoker and proofreader. He was president of 
the Transcarpathian Hungarian Cultural Association from its 
foundation in 1989 to 1996, then its honorary president until his 
death, but no longer had influence over it.
Gajdos, István (born 1971)
Transcarpathian politician. Graduating in mechanical 
engineering and law, he later moved from commerce into politics, 
as a member of the Ukrainian legislature in 2002–2006 for the 
Social Democratic Party of Ukraine (united), then the Ukrainian 
Socialist Party, and secretary of the legislature’s Human Rights 
and Minorities Committee. Since 2002 he has been president 
of the Ukrainian Hungarian Democratic Association. He was 
elected mayor of Berehove for two consecutive terms in 2006 
and 2010.
Gyárfás, Elemér (1884–1945)
Transylvanian politician and writer on economics. After law 
studies in Cluj, Budapest and Paris, he became an official, then 
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a lawyer in Dicsőszentmárton (Târnăveni). He was the state 
leader of Kis-Küküllő County in 1917–1918. In 1922, he joined 
the leadership of the Romanian National Hungarian Party. He 
was a member of Parliament for Csík County in 1926–1938. He 
headed a lay organization of the Transylvanian Roman Catholic 
Church (Catholic Status) and the Transylvanian Hungarian 
Banks’ Association. In 1940–1944 he stayed in Romanian-ruled 
Southern Transylvania as president of the Hungarian People’s 
Community.
Hámos, László (born 1951)
American Hungarian human rights activist. Having studied 
at the University of Pennsylvania, from 1976 he headed the 
Committee for Human Rights in Romania and its successor, 
the Hungarian Human Rights Foundation, as co-founding 
president. The latter, an NGO, seeks to provide US support 
to the Hungarians of the Carpathian Basin, and improve and 
publicize their human rights position.
Hodža, Milan (1878–1944)
Slovak politician and journalist. As the foremost Slovak 
politician in the First Republic, he sat in the Prague legislature 
for the Republic Agrarian Party (1918–1938), serving as a 
minister several times and as prime minister of Czechoslovakia 
in 1935–1938. He then went into exile. His book on his post-
war regional plans, Federation in Central Europe, appeared in 
London in 1942.
Hlinka, Andrej (1864–1938)
Slovak Roman Catholic priest and politician. A leading figure 
in the Slovak national movement before 1918, he was founder-
president of the Slovak National Party, which later called 
itself the Hlinka Slovak National Party. Once Czechoslovakia 
was founded, he campaigned against Prague centralism, for 
Slovakian autonomy. The party that he led became strongly 
nationalist, anti-Semitic and anti-democratic in its principles.
Hokky, Károly (Charles J. Hokky) (1883–1971)
Transcarpathian politician. He studied arts in Cluj and Budapest, 
and worked as a secondary school teacher in Budapest and then 
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Kassa (Košice). He fought on the Eastern Front in World War 
I. In 1921 he became general secretary and later executive of 
the Christian Socialist Party of Transcarpathia, based in Sevľuš 
(Vynohradiv), then a member of the provincial assembly from 
1928 and of the National Assembly of Czechoslovakia from 
1929, and a senator from 1935. In 1939 he became a member 
of the Hungarian Parliament. He emigrated overseas before the 
Soviet occupation.
Jakabffy, Elemér (1881–1963)
Romanian Hungarian lawyer, politician and columnist. He 
practiced law in Lugos (Lugoj) and was a member of the 
Hungarian Parliament in 1910–1918. He was a vice-president 
of the National Hungarian Party in Romania in 1924–1938, 
a member of Parliament in 1927–1938, a representative of 
Romanian Hungarians at the Congresses of European Nations 
in 1925–1936 and a founding editor of the journal Magyar 
Kisebbség. He withdrew from public life after 1945 and was in 
internal exile in 1949–1954.
Kardelj, Edvard (1910–1979)
Slovenian politician and publicist. An organizer of the Slovenian 
resistance movement from 1941, he was the author of the 
1943 AVNOJ resolution defining the federative structure for 
Yugoslavia. As Yugoslav minister of foreign affairs he headed 
the delegation to the Paris peace talks in 1947. In 1963 he became 
speaker of the federal Parliament. He remained a member of 
the highest bodies of the Yugoslav League of Communists 
and a close associate of Tito. He defined the theory of “self-
management” socialism.
Kecskeméti, Lipót (1865–1936)
Transylvanian rabbi and politician. A graduate of the rabbinical 
institute in Budapest, he became rabbi of the Neologist 
congregation of Nagyvárad (Oradea) from 1890 until his death. 
He was a celebrated preacher and a devotee of Hungarian-
language Jewish culture. He continued to advocate cultural and 
political assimilation after the Treaty of Trianon, thus remaining 
an anti-Zionist in the interwar period.
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Király, Károly (born 1930)
Romanian Hungarian politician. He began in the youth bodies 
of the Romanian Communist Party, attended the Komsomol 
school in Moscow in 1956–1957, and graduated from the Stefan 
Gheorghiu Party Academy in 1963. He was party first secretary 
of Covasna County in 1968–1972. He was also vice-president of 
the Hungarian National Council of Workers, which was set up 
at that time. He was a member of the party’s Central Committee 
in 1969–1974. He resigned his party position in 1972 and in 
1978 wrote a letter of protest criticizing the party leadership. 
In December 1989 he was elected onto the leadership of the 
National Salvation Front.
Korláth, Endre (1881–1946)
Transcarpathian politician. Before the change of sovereignty he 
practiced as a lawyer in Ungvár (Užhorod), before becoming a 
city official and then attorney-general of Ung County in 1917. 
He was a founder of the Transcarpathian Hungarian Party of 
Law and the Transcarpathian Hungarian Party Association in 
the Czechoslovak period. In 1924 he became a member of the 
National Assembly and then a senator, as well as Transcarpathian 
executive secretary of the Hungarian National Party in 1925. 
Seconded into the Hungarian Parliament in December 1938, he 
was appointed as lord lieutenant of Ung and Bereg a month later 
and then elected to Parliament.
Kós, Károly (1883–1977)
Transylvanian architect, writer and designer. He qualified as 
an architect at Budapest Technical University in 1907, and 
then worked in various firms and studied the folk architecture 
of Transylvania. He helped to initiate political activity 
among Romania’s Hungarians in 1921. In 1924, he and some 
Transylvanian writers founded a publishing firm that began in 
1926 to issue an arts journal, Erdélyi Helikon. He became the 
leading figure in “Transylvanianism,” a movement among the 
Romanian Hungarian elite that combined concern for regional 
interests with affiliations to the Hungarian nation.
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Kovács, Miklós (born 1967)
Transcarpathian politician and political scientist. He graduated in 
history from Uzhhorod State University and in political science 
from Budapest’s Eötvös Loránd University. He was then a local 
councilor for several terms, was a member of the Ukrainian 
legislature in 1998–2002, and sat on its Standing Committee 
on Human Rights, Religion and National Affiliation. He has 
chaired the Transcarpathian Hungarian Cultural Association 
since 1996 and teaches at the Ferenc Rákóczi II. Transcarpathian 
Hungarian Institute.
Kovács, Vilmos (1927–1977)
Transcarpathian writer, poet and literary activist. Having studied 
finance and economics, he worked as an accountant from 1945 
before becoming an editor in the Hungarian department of 
the Karpaty Publishing House in Uzhgorod in 1958–1971, but 
then became unemployed. He began to write literature in the 
1950s. At the turn of the 1970s he became a decisive literary 
and political figure at the Forrás Studio in Uzhgorod. He moved 
to Hungary in 1977 but was already mortally ill.
Kurkó, Gyárfás (1909–1983)
Romanian Hungarian politician and political writer. He began his 
political career in the Union of Hungarian Romanian Workers, 
and then in 1944–1947 became president of its successor, the 
Hungarian People’s Union. His calls for the need to retain an 
autonomous Hungarian system of institutions were at variance 
with the communists’ minority policies. He was arrested in the 
autumn of 1947, convicted of treason in 1951, released under a 
general amnesty in 1964 and rehabilitated in 1968. He worked 
for the rest of his life in a Braşov factory, at his own request.
Major, Nándor (born 1931)
Vojvodina writer, journalist and politician. He graduated from 
the Teachers’ Training College in Novi Sad, then worked from 
1950 as a journalist, becoming editor-in-chief in the periodical 
Híd in 1957. He joined the staff of the paper Magyar Szó in 
1962, and then became an editor and deputy manager at the 
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Forum publishing enterprise. His political career began in the 
mid-1970s as Tito began to pick off so-called liberals. He was 
a provincial secretary of the League of Yugoslav Communists 
from 1974, then national executive secretary from 1978. In 1982 
he joined the Vojvodina Presidium, as its last president. He was 
expelled from the party in 1989.
Makkai, Sándor (1890–1951)
Transylvanian theologian and writer. After university studies 
in Kolozsvár (Cluj) and Budapest, he gained a doctorate in 
philosophy in 1912, and then worked as a divinity teacher and 
clergyman, and from 1918 as a theology professor. He was 
elected as bishop of the Transylvanian Reformed Church district 
in 1926. Until the mid-1930s, he argued that moral renewal was 
the appropriate response to a minority existence, but in 1937 he 
wrote an article entitled “It Cannot Be,” in which he declared 
that a minority existence was not worthy of man.
Markó, Béla (born 1951)
Transylvanian poet, politician and editor. Graduating from 
Cluj-Napoca University in Hungarian and French in 1974, he 
served in 1974–1989 as editor of the Târgu Mureş periodical 
Igaz Szó and then in 1989–2005 as editor-in-chief of the journal 
Látó. In 1990 he became a Mureş County senator representing 
the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania and in 1993 
the organization’s president. He was a deputy prime minister 
in 2004–2007, responsible for cultural, educational and EU 
affairs. He was again appointed as deputy prime minister in 
December 2009.
Márton, Áron (1896–1980)
Transylvanian Roman Catholic bishop. He was ordained as 
priest in 1924 after theological studies at Alba Iulia. He then 
served as a priest and a divinity teacher in Ditrău, Gheorgheni, 
Târgu Mureş, Sibiu and Cluj. He was consecrated as bishop 
of Transylvania in 1938, and stayed in Alba Iulia in 1940. He 
dissociated himself from the Hungarian People’s Association 
in 1946. He was arrested and given a life sentence in 1949, but 
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was freed in 1955. He was under house arrest in Alba Iulia from 
1957 to 1967.
Németh, Zsolt (born 1963)
Politician. He graduated in economics and sociology from 
Budapest’s Karl Marx University in 1987, and then studied the 
theory of nationalism as a doctoral student at the Hungarian 
Research Institute in 1987–1990. He became a Fidesz MP in 
1990, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs state secretary in 1998–
2002 and again in 2010, and between the two terms leader of 
the parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee. As initiator of 
the Concession Act, he is a major figure in the formulation of 
Fidesz policy on Hungarians and minorities.
Paál, Árpád (1880–1944)
Transylvanian politician and columnist. After legal studies, he 
was chief recorder of Udvarhely (Odorhei) County in 1908–1918, 
then the real head of the county from November 1918 to January 
1919, after which he organized resistance against the invading 
Romanian forces. For this he was arrested by the Romanians, 
but he was released after 16 months. From 1920 he was on the 
staff of the newspaper Keleti Újság and was politically active. In 
1928–1930 he was a member of the legislature for the National 
Hungarian Party. He became editor-in-chief of the Oradea 
newspaper Erdélyi Lapok in 1932. The bourgeois radicalism 
that he promoted in the later 1920s turned in the 1930s into 
sympathy for German Nazism.
Pataky, Tibor (1888–1953)
Hungarian politician. After studying law in Kolozsvár (Cluj) 
and Vienna, he joined the Central Statistics Office in Budapest 
in 1912, moving to the Prime Minister’s Office to head the 
Second National Department from 1922 to 1944, dealing with 
minority problems in Hungary, contacts with and support for 
Hungarian communities in neighboring countries, and the 
affairs of Hungarians living abroad. He was pensioned in 1945 
and sent into internal exile in 1951–1953.
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Sterliczky, Dénes (1888–1953)
Vojvodina lawyer and politician. He was a secretary, and then sat 
on the Presidential Council of the Yugoslavian Hungarian Party 
founded in 1922, and was editor-in-chief of its paper, the Hírlap. 
He was a member of the Yugoslav legislature in 1927–1929, a 
member of the governing board of the Hungarian People’s 
League Association in Yugoslavia, and several times a delegate 
to the European Minority Congress. In 1933 he became editor 
of the journal Magyar Könyvtár. He withdrew from public life 
in 1941–1944, but was deputy president of the Subotica district 
People’s Front after 1945.
Szenteleky (Sztankovits), Kornél (1893–1933)
Vojvodina writer, poet and physician. A noted figure in 
Yugoslavian Hungarian literature, he started the literary papers 
Vajdasági Írás (1928) and A Mi Irodalmunk and Kalangya 
(1932) He also set up the Kalangya Library system. He saw local 
impact as a prime task for Vojvodina Hungarian literature and 
the intelligentsia.
Szent-Ivány, József (1884–1941)
Upper Hungarian landowner, writer and politician. The founder 
and president (1919–1925) of the Hungarian National Party, 
he remained its paramount leader, and represented it in the 
legislature from 1920 to 1938. He strongly supported the idea 
of self-organization of the Hungarians of Slovakia within the 
Czechoslovak state. He became a member of the Budapest 
Parliament after the First Vienna Award of 1938.
Szépfalusi, István (1932–2000)
Evangelical cleric, “sociographer” and cultural activist. After 
studying theology in Sopron and Budapest in 1950–1955, 
he studied history and interpreting at Graz University in 
1962–1968, having moved to Austria in 1955. (His mother 
was an Austrian citizen.) There he began to serve in 1956 as 
a Hungarian minister within the Austrian Evangelical Church. 
He taught translation and interpreting at Vienna University.
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He was the founder and organizer of the European Protestant 
Hungarian Free University and the Péter Bornemissza Society, 
whose publications he edited.
Szüllő, Géza (1872–1957)
Upper Hungarian landowner and politician. He was president 
of the National Christian Socialist Party in 1925–1932, in the 
legislature in 1925–1938, and chair of its parliamentary club. 
After the First Vienna Award of 1938 he was appointed in 
perpetuity to the Hungarian Upper House, where he joined 
the opposition in defending parliamentarian principles. He 
withdrew from public life after 1945.
Tabajdi, Csaba (born 1952)
Politician and diplomat. Graduating in international affairs in 
Budapest in 1974, he joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
working for seven years as cultural attaché in Moscow. He joined 
the Foreign Affairs Department at the Hungarian Socialist 
Workers’ Party Central Committee in 1983–1989, and then 
headed the secretariat of the government National and Ethnic 
Minorities’ College. He was a Socialist member of Parliament 
in 1990–2004, and political state secretary for minorities at the 
Prime Minister’s Office in 1994–1998.
Teitelbaum, Joel (1887–1979)
Transylvanian rabbi. A member of a rabbinical dynasty in 
Northern Transylvania, he was rabbi of Carei and then Satu 
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